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1.1 The Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilib-
rium
Mathematical economics is concerned with the description and the explanation of the
economic reality with the use of mathematical tools. General equilibrium theory is the
core of mathematical economics. In this monograph various general equilibrium models
are described and analyzed. The theory in this monograph is treated from an axiomatic
point of view, which may lead to a deeper understanding of problems, help to avoid
incorrect reasoning, and improve communication within the economic science.
Characteristic for general equilibrium theory is that the economic reality, also called
the economic system, is modelled as a whole, so all existing interdependencies are taken
into account. This as opposed to partial equilibrium analysis, where a single market is
studied and the influence of other markets is neglected. Often it is assumed that it is
possible to isolate the economic system and to leave other systems such as the political,
cultural, technological, and ecological ones out of consideration. Certainly, in general
there will be an interaction between these systems. In one of the parts of this monograph
the interaction between the economic system and the political system will turn out to be
important and will be taken into account. In the axiomatic point of view, the elementary
parts of the economic system, the primitive concepts, are carefully distinguished. Then
assumptions are made with respect to these primitive concepts. These assumptions are
comparable to axioms as being made in mathematics. The primitive concepts are con-
sidered to be exogenous variables, they are assumed to be given, unlike the endogenous
variables, which are determined as the outcome of the theory. A general equilibrium
model of the economic system will be referred to as an economy.
An economy is described by giving a specification of the values of all primitive con-
cepts. A state of an economy is described by specifying the values of all endogenous
variables. In general equilibrium theory a definition is given for a state to be an equilib-
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Figure 1.1.1. Ball in a landscape.
by the economy, no change occurs. Although it is not always possible to employ the
methodology used in the physical sciences in economic science, it is difficult to resist
making a comparison between the states of an economy and the states of a ball in a
landscape, see Figure 1.1.1, in order to clarify some concepts.
The landscape and the ball are considered to be exogenously given. A state of the ball
is determined by its position in the landscape and its speed. In Figure 1.1.1, assuming
a gravity field like depicted and the existence of some friction, the three equilibrium
states of the ball are drawn. Notice that in order to define an equilibrium state in
this situation, no knowledge concerning the initial state of the ball is required and the
amount of information needed concerning the state of the ball at each point in time is very
limited. Similarly, an equilibrium state as defined in a general equilibrium model of the
economic system uses only a limited amount of information concerning the development
of the economic system in time, and is therefore essentially a static concept.
An important first question to be answered for a general equilibrium model of the
economic system is whether an equilibrium state does exist. In the example of the
landscape, it is clear that some assumptions with respect to the shape of the landscape
can guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. If the equilibrium in an economy can be
guaranteed to be unique, then a theory for the prediction of the value of the endogenous
variables is obtained. However, both in the example of Figure 1.1.1 and in general
equilibrium models of the economic system, unicity of equilibrium is too much to be
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hoped for. Moreover, since the exogenous variables can only be measured subject to
some error, it is important for making predictions that small changes in these variables
do not lead to large changes in the equilibrium states, so a kind of continuity is required.
In the example of the landscape it is clear that a complete dynamic model of the
state of the ball would lead to a resolution of the problem which of the three equilibria
will result. A complete dynamic general equilibrium model of the economic system,
also called an adjustment process, determines the state of the economy at each point in
time. In order to obtain such a specification, one needs to know the initial state of the
economy and the change of the state of the economy. Then the equilibrium states of the
economy are exactly those states where no change of the state occurs. In the example
of Figure 1.1.1 a dynamic model of the state of the ball corresponds to imposing a
law of motion. If there exists an equilibrium of the economy and if a complete dynamic
general equilibrium model is specified, then the question whether given some initial state
eventually an equilibrium will be reached by the adjustment process becomes relevant,
i.e., whether the adjustment process converges to an equilibrium. This question is called
the equilibrium stability question. A priori, it is not clear at all whether for every initial
state the adjustment process will reach an equilibrium eventually, even if this equilibrium
is known to be unique. In the example of the ball the existence of some friction is needed
to guarantee this, unless the initial state is an equilibrium.
In this monograph several general equilibrium models of the economic system, several
descriptions of its state, and several models of the change of the state of the economy
will be considered.
1.2 The Objects of the Monograph
In order to carry out the ideas as described in the previous section, and hence to obtain
a general equilibrium model of the economic system based on the primitive concepts of
the economic system, there is a need for simplification and abstraction. Obviously, one
should take care that the simplifications made and abstractions used are the appropriate
ones, something which is often difficult to judge. In the following paragraphs a very
simplified and abstract model of the economic system is given, known as the Arrow-
Debreu model.
Several primitive concepts in the economic system can be distinguished. First of all
there are the agents acting in the economic system. It is assumed that there are two
types of agents, consumers and producers. Secondly, there are all kind of commodities
present in the economic system. The value and the allocation of these commodities in the
economic system should be regarded as the central question of economic science. Each
agent in the economic system is assumed to have a set of admissible actions available, and,
guided by his objectives, each agent is assumed to choose within this set of admissible
actions, an optimal action.
4 Introduction
The action a consumer takes consists of the choice of a consumption bundle, being
a list of quantities supplied and demanded of all available commodities, thereby being
restricted by exogenously given limitations of for example a physiological nature. The
consumption set determines the set of admissible actions of a consumer. For a producer
the set of admissible actions is given by the production possibility set, describing all
production possibilities, i.e., all technologically feasible transformations of commodity
bundles into other commodity bundles. The production possibility set is exogenously
given by the state of the technology.
The objectives of the consumer are determined by his exogenously given preference
relation, specifying for any two commodity bundles the one that is preferred, or specifying
indifference, or even impossibility of comparison. The objectives of the producer are given
by profit maximization, where in order to determine the profit of a specific action of the
producer it is important to know the value of a commodity bundle.
The value of a commodity bundle is assumed to be determined by the price system,
specifying the value of one unit of each commodity, the price of this commodity. The
price system is considered to be an endogenous variable, so it is explained by the theory.
Finally, a specification of all commodities initially owned by the consumers, the initial
endowments, and of the distribution of the profits generated by the producers to the
consumers, the profit shares, is given. This together with the price system determines
the income of a consumer and yields further restrictions on his set of admissible actions
by requiring that the value of an admissible action of a consumer should not exceed his
income. In this way the budget set of the consumer is obtained.
Trade is assumed to take place according to the market mechanism. For every com-
modity there is assumed to be a market. On the market of a commodity the various
agents acting in the economic system express their supply and their demand of this
commodity corresponding to the optimal action chosen, while taking the price system as
given. Given the price system and assuming all agents to be price takers the total excess
demand in the economic system is determined, being obtained by subtracting for every
commodity the total supply of the agents from the total demand of the agents. The
relation associating with every price system all possible resulting total excess demands
is called the total excess demand relation. This completes a very simplified and abstract
description of the economic system. The state of the economy is given by the prevailing
price system and the optimal actions given this price system of all the agents acting in
the economy. When these optimal actions exist for every price system, the total excess
demand relation is called the total excess demand correspondence. Often assumptions
are made such that, given a price system, the optimal action of every agent is unique,
so then the state of the economy is fully described by the price system, and the total
excess demand relation is called the total excess demand function.
Given a price system, the optimal actions of all the agents together are not necessarily
compatible, i.e., the total excess demand is not necessarily equal to zero on every market.
A market is said to be in equilibrium if the optimal actions of the agents with respect to
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this market are compatible, so the total supply equals the total demand on this market.
An equilibrium state or equilibrium of the economy is defined as a price system together
with compatible optimal actions of the agents with respect to all markets. Such a price
system is called an equilibrium price system.
The work of Adam Smith, “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations”, should be considered as a first attempt to give a theory of the economic
system as a whole. Central in his work is the idea that although there are many agents
in the economic system, possibly with conflicting interests, and although each agent acts
in his own self-interest, the final allocation of commodities in the economic system is an
efficient one. The price system is assumed to change according to Adam Smith’s famous
invisible hand, leading to an equilibrium price system.
The first complete general equilibrium model should be attributed to Walras (1874).
Therefore, an equilibrium state in the general equilibrium model as discussed in the
previous paragraphs is often called a Walrasian equilibrium. In the work of Walras
already a kind of equilibrium existence proof appears. Walras remarked that the number
of equations expressing the equality of supply and demand on all markets is equal to
the number of commodities and therefore to the number of prices. Assuming that it is
possible to describe the state of the economy by the price system, the number of prices
is equal to the number of endogenous variables. Moreover, since only the relative prices
matter, Walras chose one of the commodities to be the numeraire commodity having a
price equal to one, thereby reducing the number of endogenously determined variables by
one. Furthermore, Walras argued that the number of equations expressing the equality
between supply and demand can be reduced by one, due to the fact that equilibrium on
all markets except one implies equality of supply and demand on all markets. Finally,
Walras concluded that an equilibrium should exist due to the equality of the number of
free endogenous variables and the number of independent constraints.
Walras also discussed stability issues. The adjustment process of the economic system
Walras had in mind is known as the Walrasian tatonnement process. Assuming that the
state of the economy is completely determined by the price system, such a dynamic
model corresponds to a description of the initial state, the starting price system, and a
description of the change in the price system. Therefore, such an adjustment process
is called a price adjustment process. Let some initial state of the economy be given.
First, the price of one of the commodities, say commodity 1, is adjusted until supply and
demand of this commodity become equal. To do so the price of that commodity is raised
if its demand exceeds its supply and its price is decreased in the opposite case. The
basic idea behind this adjustment of the price of a single commodity is that a positive
excess demand on the market implies that the demand of some of the agents is not
satisfied. Such an agent can offer a price being slightly higher than the current price
of the commodity, thereby attracting all the supply. Similarly, every supplier of the
commodity can ask a price being slightly higher than the current price of it, while still
being able to sell all his supply. Notice that in this intuitive reasoning the assumption
6 Introduction
of price taking behaviour of the agents is abandoned. The same process is then repeated
for the markets of the other commodities, successively. It was claimed by Walras that
the supply and the demand of a commodity is more affected by the change in its own
price, than by the change in other prices. Therefore, Walras argued, when all prices are
adjusted in the way as described before, the markets are closer to an equilibrium state
than before. Repeating this process, an equilibrium is eventually reached. This also
yielded a second kind of equilibrium existence proof of Walras.
The work of Edgeworth (1881) and Pareto (1909) should also be mentioned. These
authors studied efficient allocations in the economy, i.e., allocations such that it is im-
possible to improve the welfare of some agents without worsening the welfare of others.
Moreover, they analyzed the relationship between Walrasian equilibria and efficient al-
locations.
Obviously, both equilibrium existence proofs of Walras do not satisfy the current stan-
dards of rigor in mathematics. The first rigorous treatment of the Walrasian equilibrium
existence problem and also of the problem of uniqueness of the Walrasian equilibrium
was given in Wald (1936). He gave a proof of the existence and the uniqueness of the
Walrasian equilibrium in some interesting cases. However, it is not possible to give rea-
sonable assumptions with respect to the primitive concepts such that these cases result.
Making use of some significant advancements in mathematics, like Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem (Brouwer (1912)) and Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (Kakutani (1941)), the
problem of the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium could be solved in Arrow and De-
breu (1954) and McKenzie (1954). In these papers only assumptions with respect to the
primitive concepts were made in order to show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Stability of the Walrasian equilibrium was investigated in Hicks (1939) where a def-
inition of stability is used that is essentially static in nature. In Samuelson (1941) the
first explicit dynamic general equilibrium model of the economic system and a related
notion of stability has been defined. Samuelson gave a mathematical formalization of the
reasoning of Walras, when the prices of the commodities are simultaneously increased
proportional to the total excess demand. The question whether the Walrasian equilib-
rium is stable turned out to be even more difficult to answer than the question whether a
Walrasian equilibrium exists. Several conditions with respect to the total excess demand
function under which the Walrasian tatonnement process as formulated by Samuelson
converges to some Walrasian equilibrium price system were given in Arrow and Hur-
wicz (1958) and Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz (1959). In the latter paper the Walrasian
tatonnement process was shown to be stable if the total excess demand function satisfies
gross substitutability in the finite increment form. This assumption means that if the
price of some commodity is raised, then the demand for all other commodities increases.
This assumption reflects the idea that if the price of some commodity is raised, then
the demand of all other commodities is increased due to the fact that these commodities
become relatively cheaper. Unfortunately, the assumption of gross substitutability in the
finite increment form does not follow from assumptions made with respect to primitive
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concepts. Examples given in Scarf (1960) and the lack of structure of the total excess
demand function, see Debreu (1974), make clear that the Walrasian tatonnement process
does not converge to a Walrasian equilibrium price system for a large class of economies.
For a discrete time version of the Walrasian tatonnement process even chaotic behaviour
may be expected, see Day and Pianigiani (1991). Even if the Walrasian tatonnement
process converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price system, convergence may take too
much time and will not take place, a point of view considered in Blad (1978).
The lack of stability of the Walrasian tatonnement process leads to the question how
the allocation of the commodities in the economic system is determined when trade has
to take place at a price system, which is not a Walrasian equilibrium price system. In
this case the interdependence between the various markets causes a lot of problems since
the inequality of supply and demand at some markets results in some consumers not
being able to obtain their desired amount of some commodities. However, as a conse-
quence consumers will change their supply and demand on other markets, causing again
other shortages or excesses. Notice that many real world phenomena are in accordance
with these observations, examples being the existence of unemployment on the labour
market, tensions on the market for houses, the existence of butter mountains, wine pools,
milk lakes, and dung-hills, and problems on the foreign exchange markets. Often the
shortages or excesses in the examples mentioned above are due to government interven-
tions like minimum wages, the linkage between the wages of civil servants and the wages
paid in industry, upper bounds on the rent for houses, minimum prices for agricultural
products, or fixed exchange rates. This gives another reason for the price system not
being completely flexible, but instead being subject to certain restrictions. Finally, it is
often argued that prices, especially wages, are sticky in the short run.
The goal of Part II of the monograph is to give a general equilibrium model for the
determination of the value and the allocation of commodities when the price system is not
completely flexible, but might be restricted by all kind of constraints, and therefore price
rigidities are present in the economy. The resulting set of price systems is determined by
the set of admissible price systems, which is assumed to be exogenously given. Since it is
possible that no Walrasian equilibrium price system is an element of the set of admissible
price systems, the resulting general equilibrium models of the economic system are known
as disequilibrium models. It will turn out that it is no longer sufficient to describe the
state of the economy by the price system and the optimal actions at this price system of
the various agents. Instead, the maximal amounts the agents are allowed to supply and
to demand of the various commodities, called a rationing scheme, should be included in
the description of the state. Another primitive concept needed is the rationing system,
specifying all admissible rationing schemes and describing how shortages or excesses are
allocated in the economy. This will also lead to different equilibrium concepts, yielding
the so-called constrained equilibria. The analysis performed in Part II is static in nature
and that part is therefore called “Static Aspects of Disequilibrium”. Seminal work on
this topic is done in Bénassy (1975b), Drèze (1975), see also Drèze (1991), and Younès
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(1975). The approach taken in Part II is closely related to the one of Drèze.
It has been remarked above that government interventions are a particular source
of causes for restrictions with respect to the price system and therefore for the possible
exclusion of all Walrasian equilibrium price systems. In Part II of the monograph these
restrictions are considered to be exogenously given, so being part of the description of
the economic system. The goal of Part III is to make government behaviour and conse-
quently the restrictions with respect to the price system endogenously. Therefore, that
part is called “Endogenously Determined Disequilibrium”. In Part III it is no longer as-
sumed that the economic and the political system are separated. Instead these systems
are considered jointly, resulting in the political economic system. The political economic
system and the state of the political economic system are defined and a definition of equi-
librium will be given. This involves the introduction of another type of agent, a political
candidate, his set of admissible actions being the set of admissible price regulations, and
his objectives being the maximization of the expected plurality or of the probability of
winning the elections. The state of the political economic system is determined by the
proposals made by the political candidates. Again a different equilibrium concept is
needed, called a political economic equilibrium. Also Part III is essentially static in na-
ture. One of the basic questions to be answered is whether government intervention will
typically lead to the exclusion of a Walrasian equilibrium price system in a democratic
society, or in other words, whether in general in a democracy political candidates will
impose price regulations on the economic system.
Although the Walrasian tatonnement process is often used in the literature as a
dynamic general equilibrium model of the economic system, it is not clear whether this
is the correct model. Therefore, a natural question to ask is whether other dynamic
general equilibrium models of the economic system are more appropriate and whether
these models yield convergence to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Similarly, the
stability of the constrained equilibria studied in Part II of the monograph should be
investigated. This determines the goal of Part IV of this monograph, namely to obtain
adjustment processes sustaining the various equilibrium concepts and being tools of
equilibrium selection if more than one state of the economic system satisfies the definition
of an equilibrium state. Therefore, Part IV of this monograph is called “Dynamic Aspects
of Disequilibrium Theory”. Ideally, an adjustment process converges to an equilibrium
under reasonable assumptions on the primitive concepts and the initial state of the
economy, while the adjustment process itself should have a nice economic interpretation.
In this respect the work of Smale (1976), van der Laan and Talman (1987a, 1987b), and
Kamiya (1990) concerning general equilibrium models of the economic system with a
completely flexible price system should be mentioned. In Smale (1976) a price adjustment
process is specified that converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. However, the
initial state of the economy has to satisfy some serious restrictions. In Kamiya (1990)
the initial state is allowed to be arbitrary and the assumptions made with respect to
the total excess demand function of the economy are reasonable. Nevertheless, these
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assumptions are not implied by ones made with respect to the primitive concepts. In the
price adjustment process introduced in van der Laan and Talman (1987a) no restrictions
with respect to the starting price system are made. Moreover, their process has a nice
economic interpretation. The analysis of the stability properties of this price adjustment
process will be the starting point of the analysis performed in Part IV of the monograph.
It should be remarked that there are some negative results in the literature concerning
the existence of adjustment processes being stable for a large class of economies, see
Saari and Simon (1978) and Saari (1985). However, as also remarked in Saari (1985),
it might be possible that the negative results can be circumvented if the adjustment
process depends upon the values of the prices. This idea will be carefully investigated
in Part IV.
Over the last two decades many important and basic existence problems raised in
general equilibrium theory have been solved successfully by constructive approaches.
Most of the literature on this issue derives from the pioneering work of Scarf (1967),
see also Scarf (1973). Scarf introduced an algorithm generating a sequence of adjacent
primitive sets in the unit simplex, every point in the unit simplex corresponding to a
price system, and terminating in a finite number of steps with a primitive set containing
an approximate Walrasian equilibrium price system. In Kuhn (1968) such an algorithm
with simplices instead of primitive sets is proposed. Such an algorithm is therefore
called a simplicial algorithm. These algorithms can be interpreted as following a path
of points with certain properties, see Zangwill and Garcia (1981) and van der Laan
and Talman (1983). A serious drawback of the algorithms of both Scarf and Kuhn is
that they cannot start with an arbitrary price system. So, if an approximate Walrasian
equilibrium price system is known, it is not possible to use this information, and start
the algorithm from there. Later more efficient and sophisticated algorithms have been
developed, for example the homotopy method proposed in Eaves (1972), the sandwich
method described in Kuhn and MacKinnon (1975), being closely related to an algorithm
given in Merrill (1972), and the variable dimension algorithm introduced in van der Laan
and Talman (1979). All these methods allow for an arbitrary starting price system.
In Shoven and Whalley (1973, 1992) and in Kaneko and Yamamoto (1986) simplicial
algorithms are used to compute an approximate equilibrium in a model with taxation and
in a model with indivisible commodities, respectively. In Brown, DeMarzo, and Eaves
(1993, 1994) a procedure is described to find an equilibrium in a model with incomplete
markets. By providing constructive equilibrium existence proofs the computational ap-
proach often gives additional insight into the problems under consideration. Moreover,
constructive approaches make it possible to actually compute an equilibrium or to fol-
low an adjustment process, thereby being of importance for applied work too. In this
monograph it will be investigated whether constructive approaches yield insights into
the problems considered in Part II with respect to the existence of constrained equilibria
and in Part IV with respect to the search for adjustment processes sustaining the various
equilibrium concepts considered.
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1.3 The Contents of the Monograph
The monograph consists of four parts. Each part is self-contained. Part I deals with the
mathematical and economic preliminaries needed and consists of two chapters.
In Chapter 2 the mathematical preliminaries are given. In fact, that chapter contains
an essentially complete and self-contained overview of the mathematical notions to be
used later on. The goal of Chapter 2 is to make the monograph as accessible as possible.
Of special importance for the developments of this monograph are the sections dealing
with notation, topology, relations and correspondences, fixed points, triangulations, and
differential topology.
Chapter 3 deals with the economic preliminaries. The general equilibrium model of
the economic system as presented in Arrow and Debreu (1954) is described, see Debreu
(1959) for a complete account of this model. Some primitive concepts of the economic
system, like commodities, agents, consumption sets, production possibility sets, prefer-
ence relations, initial endowments, and profit shares are described and all assumptions
made with respect to these primitive concepts in some chapter of this monograph are
discussed. Some attention is devoted to necessary and sufficient conditions needed for
the representation of a preference relation by a utility function. Some well-known results
of the total excess demand relation are also derived. The definition of a Walrasian equi-
librium is given and assumptions with respect to the primitive concepts guaranteeing
the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium are stated. Moreover, two results known as
the first and the second fundamental welfare theorem are presented, making statements
with respect to the efficiency of a Walrasian equilibrium and the possibility to achieve
a given efficient allocation by means of a redistribution of initial endowments and profit
shares. Also, a general formulation of adjustment processes and some stability concepts
are given. Moreover, the Walrasian tatonnement process is introduced and the result
shown in Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz (1959) concerning the stability of the Walrasian
tatonnement process if the total excess demand function satisfies gross substitutability
in the finite increment form is stated. Then Scarf’s example, see Scarf (1960), is treated,
showing that the Walrasian tatonnement process may not be stable for some economies.
Finally, the result given in Debreu (1974) is presented, implying that there is very lit-
tle structure on the total excess demand function. From this it follows that there is
a considerable class of economies for which the Walrasian tatonnement process is not
stable.
In Part II of the monograph the static aspects of disequilibrium theory are considered.
Part II consists of four chapters.
In Chapter 4 a general equilibrium model of the economic system is given for the case
that price rigidities or price regulations may be present in the economic system. Since
the presence of restrictions with respect to the price system may exclude all Walrasian
equilibrium price systems, it is possible that there exists a mismatch between supply
and demand at any admissible price system. The description of the state of the econ-
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omy therefore includes the maximal amounts all consumers are allowed to supply and
to demand of the various commodities, i.e., a rationing scheme. Moreover, a set of ad-
missible price systems and a rationing system are introduced as primitive concepts. The
total excess demand relation now depends on both the price system and the rationing
scheme. Special attention is devoted to giving necessary and sufficient conditions for
the representation of the rationing system by a rationing function. The assumptions
made with respect to the rationing system are shown to be very weak and allow for
many possibilities. The Walrasian equilibrium concept is generalized and replaced by
the constrained equilibrium concept, following the approach taken in Drèze (1975). It
will be shown that there exists an uncountable number of constrained equilibria. There
is said to be rationing on a market if the maximal amounts the agents in the economy
are allowed to supply and to demand on this market influence the behaviour of the
agents. Similarly, supply rationing on a market and demand rationing on a market are
defined. Well-known properties like the existence of a trivial supply constrained equilib-
rium, i.e., with full rationing on supply on all markets, the existence of a trivial demand
constrained equilibrium, i.e., with full rationing on demand on all markets, the existence
of constrained equilibria without rationing on the market of an a priori specified com-
modity, called a Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of this commodity, the
existence of constrained equilibria without demand rationing and without rationing on
the market of at least one commodity, called a supply constrained equilibrium, and the
existence of constrained equilibria without supply rationing and without rationing on
the market of at least one commodity, called a demand constrained equilibrium, follow
as special cases from the existence theorems of that chapter. Finally, it is shown that
the equilibrium relation, assigning to each specification of the initial endowments of the
consumers and of the set of admissible price systems the set of all possible constrained
equilibrium allocations, is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. In order to prove
these results a generalization of an existing continuity result of the budget relation is
given.
In Chapter 5 it is shown that in a general equilibrium model of the economic system
allowing for price rigidities there exists a connected set of constrained equilibria contain-
ing both trivial constrained equilibria. The proof of this theorem combines results in the
areas of mathematical programming, using simplicial algorithms with integer labelling,
with those in topology. This result is proved without using differentiability assumptions
and is also extended to the case with upper hemi-continuous total excess demand cor-
respondences. All known existence results for the general equilibrium model discussed
follow as easy corollaries to these results. In fact, it is shown that the connected set
of constrained equilibria containing the two trivial constrained equilibria, contains an
equilibrium of any type considered in Chapter 4. Although the proof of the result is
constructive when the total excess demand relation is a continuous function, this is
not the case for the result with respect to upper hemi-continuous total excess demand
correspondences.
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In Chapter 6 a fully constructive proof of the existence of a connected set of con-
strained equilibria containing both trivial constrained equilibria in a general equilibrium
model of the economic system with price rigidities is given. To achieve this goal a sim-
plicial algorithm with vector labelling is proposed. Using such an algorithm it is possible
to compute approximate constrained equilibria for the case in which the total excess
demand correspondence is upper hemi-continuous. In order to show the convergence of
the algorithm of that chapter, specific degeneracy problems have to be solved for. The
algorithm presented in Chapter 5 is not intended to be a good computational device,
but is only used to show theoretical properties of the set of constrained equilibria. This
as opposed to the algorithm of Chapter 6 which is much more efficient. The accuracy of
the approximate constrained equilibria obtained by the algorithm is also discussed.
Intersection theorems can be used to prove the existence of solutions to mathematical
programming problems, game theoretic problems, and problems in general equilibrium
theory. In all existing intersection theorems conditions are given under which the in-
tersection of certain sets in the cover of some given set is non-empty. In Chapter 7
conditions are formulated under which the intersection is a continuum of points satis-
fying some interesting topological properties. More precisely, the intersection theorems
are formulated on the unit cube and it is shown that both the vector of zeroes and the
vector of ones lies in the same component of the intersection. Therefore, the intersec-
tion theorems of that chapter belong to a new class. It is shown that these intersection
theorems are closely related to equilibrium existence problems in an economy with price
rigidities. In order to prove the intersection theorems, a non-constructive proof of the
existence of a connected set of constrained equilibria containing both trivial constrained
equilibria is given using Browder’s fixed point theorem. The intersection theorems of
Chapter 7 generalize the well-known results on the unit simplex given in Knaster, Ku-
ratowski, and Mazurkiewicz (1929) (KKM Lemma), in Sperner (1928) and Scarf (1967)
(Sperner Lemma), in Shapley (1973) (KKMS Lemma), and in Ichiishi (1988) (Ichiishi
Lemma). Moreover, the results can be used to sharpen the usual formulation of the
Sperner Lemma on the unit cube.
In Part III of the monograph price rigidities are determined endogenously. In the
two chapters of that part it is assumed that there exists a numeraire commodity and
attention is focused on Drèze equilibria with respect to the market of the numeraire
commodity.
There exists an extensive literature about economies with price rigidities, in which
price rigidities are exogenously given. In Chapter 8 the interaction between the political
system and the economic system is considered. In this way it is possible to determine
price regulations being imposed by the government upon the economic system endoge-
nously. In order to describe the political economic system some additional primitive
concepts have to be specified. Another type of agent, a political candidate, is intro-
duced. A political candidate chooses a price regulation in his set of admissible price
regulations. His objectives are determined by the maximization of either the expected
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plurality or the probability of winning the elections. The expectations of the political
candidates concerning the voting behaviour of the consumers are described by means
of voting functions. The description of the state of the political economic system is
given by the price regulations and associated Drèze equilibria proposed by the political
candidates. A definition of a political economic equilibrium is given, being a Nash equi-
librium of a game played between the political candidates. Under some conditions it is
shown that if the price of a commodity is sufficiently high, then no trade takes place on
this market in a Drèze equilibrium of the economy, irrespective of the price regulations
imposed. This result is used to give sufficient conditions for the existence of a political
economic equilibrium in mixed strategies and a political economic equilibrium in pure
strategies. A standard example is presented to show the existence of a political eco-
nomic equilibrium where both political candidates propose price regulations excluding
the Walrasian equilibrium price system.
In Chapter 9 the question is analyzed whether the example given in Chapter 8 is a
degenerate case. Or, in other words, does it hold that for a considerable class of political
economic systems both political candidates propose price regulations corresponding to
the same Walrasian equilibrium. It is not difficult to construct examples where both
political candidates propose price regulations such that a Walrasian equilibrium results.
Moreover, it is well-known that Drèze equilibria may be very inefficient. Nevertheless,
it will turn out that the example given in Chapter 8 corresponds to the generic case.
Furthermore, another model of the political economic system is given where political
candidates are only considered to choose among local options given some status quo.
The status quo is considered to be some Walrasian equilibrium. Political candidates are
assumed to have the possibility to choose directions of motion away from the status quo
or to stay at the status quo. Some motivation for considering only local options is given
by institutional restrictions, commitments made in the past, or costs of acquiring infor-
mation concerning proposals not close to the status quo. The objectives of the political
candidates are determined by the marginal change in the number of votes corresponding
to a certain direction of motion. The description of the state of the political economic
system is given by the directions of motion proposed by the political candidates. The
related equilibrium concept, being a Nash equilibrium of the game played between the
political candidates, is called a directional political economic equilibrium. Sufficient con-
ditions for the existence of such an equilibrium are given. Moreover, it is shown that,
generically, political candidates choose directions of motions away from the status quo.
Therefore, in the models of a political economic system considered in Part III of the
monograph, Walrasian equilibria are unstable and political candidates have incentives
to impose price regulations on the economic system.
Finally, Part IV of the monograph deals with dynamic aspects of disequilibrium
theory and consists of three chapters.
In Chapter 10 it is shown that, generically, the price adjustment process introduced
in van der Laan and Talman (1987a) converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price sys-
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tem. The prices are adjusted in such a way that prices of commodities with a negative
total excess demand are kept relatively minimal, i.e., the ratio of such a price with re-
spect to the starting price is minimal, prices of commodities with a positive total excess
demand are kept relatively maximal, while prices of commodities being in equilibrium
are allowed to vary between the relative minimum and the relative maximum. The as-
sumptions made with respect to the consumption sets, preference relations, and initial
endowments are standard. No restrictions are made with respect to the starting price
system. The well-known fact that, generically, the number of Walrasian equilibria is
odd, follows as a special case of the main theorem. If the demand functions satisfy gross
substitutability in the finite increment form, then convergence always takes place. In
this case prices of commodities with a negative (positive) excess demand are strictly
decreasing (increasing), and therefore the qualitative behaviour of the process resembles
the Walrasian tatonnement process. Moreover, on every market the absolute value of the
total excess demand is monotonically decreasing. This implies that a market attaining
an equilibrium state at some point in time, stays in equilibrium during the remainder of
the price adjustment process.
In Chapter 11 the price system is assumed to be completely fixed. An adjustment
process is described for an economy with a numeraire commodity that, generically, con-
verges to a Drèze equilibrium. Again, attention is focused on Drèze equilibria with
respect to the market of the numeraire commodity. The adjustment process proposed is
an adjustment process in rationing schemes or, equivalently, in quantities and is there-
fore called a quantity adjustment process. The total excess demand as a function of the
rationing schemes does not satisfy the assumptions under which any of the existing price
adjustment processes converges to a Walrasian equilibrium. The main features of the
quantity adjustment process under consideration are as follows. If there is a negative
total excess demand on a market at some point in time, then the rationing schemes
are adjusted in such a way that, compared to the initial state, supply rationing on this
market is strengthened and demand rationing on this market is weakened. Similarly, if
there is a positive total excess demand on a market at some point in time, the rationing
schemes are adjusted in such a way that, compared to the initial state, supply rationing
on this market is weakened and demand rationing on this market is strengthened. The
assumptions made with respect to consumption sets, preference relations, initial endow-
ments, and the rationing function are standard. No restrictions are made with respect to
the initial state of the economy, which determines the starting point of the adjustment
process. Moreover, it follows from the main theorem that, generically, the number of
Drèze equilibria is odd.
In Chapter 12 also an economy with price rigidities is considered. An adjustment
process in prices and quantities is described for an economy with a numeraire commodity.
In the short run the non-numeraire commodities have a flexible price level with respect
to the numeraire commodity but their relative prices are mutually fixed. In the long run
prices are assumed to be completely flexible. Keeping markets in equilibrium through
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rationing, an adjustment process in prices and quantities is described, converging from
a demand constrained equilibrium with no rationing on the market of the numeraire
commodity to a Walrasian equilibrium. Along the path initially all relative prices are kept
fixed and the price level is increased. Rationing schemes are adjusted to keep markets
in equilibrium. Doing so the process reaches a short run constrained equilibrium with
no supply rationing and no rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity and at
least one of the other commodities. The process allows for a downward price adjustment
of non-numeraire commodities on the market of which there is no rationing and reaches a
Walrasian equilibrium in the long run. In contrast with Chapters 10 and 11, markets are
in equilibrium during the entire adjustment process. Another difference between those








In this chapter the mathematical concepts and results being used in this monograph are
presented. Only some elementary notions from set theory and the foundations of the
real number system are taken for granted. For this the reader is referred to Sections
1.2 and 1.5, respectively, of the excellent book of Debreu, see Debreu (1959). Together
with these two sections the exposition given here yields a complete and self-contained
overview of the mathematical notions to be used later on.
Section 2.2 starts with introducing some notation being used in this monograph.
Section 2.3 describes some topological notions like compactness and connectedness,
being frequently used in the subsequent chapters. The notion of connectedness will be
employed in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12. It will be very useful both in Part II
concerning the static aspects of disequilibrium theory and in Part IV on disequilibrium
dynamics. The notions of paths and loops play an important role in Chapters 10, 11,
and 12. These topological concepts are used to describe the structure of certain sets of
points related to adjustment processes. Moreover, they will be used to give very general
definitions for convergence of adjustment processes. Topological properties of sets like
being dense or being residual give some indication about the size of a set. Such proper-
ties are needed in Chapters 4, 9, and 10.
In Section 2.4 some concepts related to vector spaces are introduced. Especially the
notions of convexity and of dimension will turn out to be important in the sequel. Vec-
tor spaces are also needed when formulating Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem in Section
2.6. Moreover, matrices and some of their elementary properties are introduced in that
section.
In Section 2.5 the concept of a relation is presented. Relations will turn out to be very
useful in Chapter 3 to describe preferences of economic agents. Also a special type of re-
lation, called a correspondence, is introduced. Definitions, characterizations, and results
concerning several forms of continuity of correspondences are given. Correspondences
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are important in almost every chapter of this monograph.
Fixed points are an essential ingredient throughout the monograph. Part II deals
with equilibrium existence problems in finite dimensions. It is well-known that such an
equilibrium existence problem is related to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. In Chapter 7
it is shown that additional insight into the equilibrium existence problems of Part II can
be obtained by using Browder’s fixed point theorem. Part III concerns equilibrium exis-
tence problems in infinite dimensions and is related to Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem.
In Section 2.6 the above mentioned fixed point theorems are formulated.
Many of the results to be presented are proved by using concepts from mathematical
programming. In particular simplicial algorithms will turn out to be very useful. These
are methods developed to solve problems related to Kakutani’s fixed point theorem by
computing an approximation of such a fixed point. A simplicial algorithm generates
a piecewise linear path of points in a simplicial subdivision. This path yields valuable
insights into the structure of the set of equilibria in the models to be presented in Chapter
4, as will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6. Moreover, simplicial algorithms make it possible
to actually compute an approximation of an equilibrium or of a continuum of equilibria
as in Chapters 5 and 6. These algorithms can also be used to approximate a path of
points generated by an adjustment process, see Chapters 10, 11, and 12. The main
concepts needed to describe a simplicial algorithm, like a simplicial subdivision and a
piecewise linear approximation, are gathered in Section 2.7.
In Section 2.8 some concepts from measure theory needed in Chapters 8, 9, 10, and 11
are exposed. In Chapter 8 measure theory is used to describe the strategies of economic
agents. In Chapters 9, 10, and 11 some statements are made which are typically valid
but not necessarily always. Measure theory will be used to show that the cases where
these statements are not true are very rare.
In Section 2.9 some concepts related to differential calculus are exposed and the
inverse function theorem is given. Moreover, necessary and sufficient conditions are
given for an element to be a maximizer of a function on a certain set. These neces-
sary conditions are needed in Chapters 10 and 11 when describing points generated by
an adjustment process, taking into consideration the optimizing behaviour of economic
agents.
Section 2.10 concludes this chapter with some notions from differential topology. The
definitions of a manifold, a manifold with generalized boundary, and a regular constraint
set, and some results like the implicit function theorem and the transversality theorem
are given. These concepts are very useful to describe the structure of the set of points
followed by the adjustment processes in Chapters 10 and 11. Moreover, in the Chapters
9, 10, and 11 some results from differential topology are employed when statements are
made that are typically true, but not necessarily always.
All concepts and results mentioned in this chapter are fairly well-known, and there-
fore no proofs are given. However, references are provided for all results. A number
is associated with every important definition and theorem mentioned in this chapter.
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Whenever such a definition or theorem is used in the remainder of the monograph, a
reference will be made to this number. The presentation is minimal in the sense that no
results are given that are not needed in the sequel. Moreover, the results are presented
in a self-contained way.
2.2 Some Notation
The quantifiers for every, there exists, and there does not exist are denoted by ∀, ∃,
and 6 ∃, respectively. Let a set (collection) X be given, then x ∈ X denotes that x is an
element (member) of X or that x belongs to X, and X is said to contain x. Similarly,
x /∈ X denotes that x is not an element of X. Let X denote a property that an element of
X has or does not have. Then {x ∈ X | x has property X} denotes the set of elements
of X having property X .
Let sets X and Y be given. Then X ⊂ Y denotes that the set X is a subset of Y,
and Y is said to contain X, X ∩ Y denotes the intersection of X and Y, X ∪ Y denotes
the union of X and Y, Y \ X denotes the complement of X in Y, and X × Y denotes
the Cartesian product of X and Y. The empty set is denoted by ∅. The sets X and Y
are said to be disjoint if X ∩ Y = ∅. The set X is called a proper subset of Y if X ⊂ Y
and Y \X 6= ∅. Let I be a set and, for every i ∈ I, let a set X i be given. Then ∩i∈IX i
denotes the intersection of the sets X i, ∪i∈IX i denotes the union of the sets X i, and∏
i∈I X
i denotes the Cartesian product of the sets X i. When the set I is empty, then no
intersection, union, or Cartesian product is defined.
The set of natural numbers is denoted by IN, i.e., IN = {1, 2, . . .}, Z denotes the set
of integers, i.e., Z = {· · · ,−1, 0, 1, · · ·}, Z+ denotes the set of non-negative integers, i.e.,
Z+ = {0, 1, . . .}, Q denotes the set of rational numbers, i.e., every element q of Q is of
the form m
n
with m and n integers and n 6= 0, and IR denotes the set of real numbers. For
m ∈ Z+, the set of integers {1, . . . , m} is denoted by Im and the set of integers {0, . . . , m}
is denoted by I0m. Notice that I0 = ∅ and I00 = {0}. The set of signs is denoted by S, i.e.,
S = {−1, 0,+1}.




m denotes the m-fold Cartesian product of Z, i.e., Zm =
∏
i∈Im Z,




i∈Im Z+, and Q
m denotes
the m-fold Cartesian product of Q, i.e., Qm =
∏
i∈Im Q. The set of sign vectors, denoted
by Sm, is defined as the m-fold Cartesian product of S, i.e., Sm =
∏
i∈Im S. For every sign
vector s ∈ Sm, define the sets I−(s) = {i ∈ Im | si = −1}, I0(s) = {i ∈ Im | si = 0}, and
I+(s) = {i ∈ Im | si = +1}. The m-dimensional Euclidean space is denoted by IRm, and
is defined as the m-fold Cartesian product of IR, i.e., IRm =
∏
i∈Im IR.
An element of IRm is also called a point or a vector. All vectors of IRm are assumed
to be column vectors, unless mentioned otherwise. A vector x ∈ IRm can be written as
(x1, . . . , xm)
⊤, with, for every i ∈ Im, xi denoting component i of x. The symbol ⊤ is
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used to denote the transpose of a vector, and changes a row vector into a column vector
and vice versa. The element of IRm with every component equal to zero is denoted by
0m and the element of IRm with every component equal to one by 1m. For i ∈ Im, the
i-th unit vector of IRm is denoted by em(i) and is defined by letting emi (i) = 1 and by
letting the other components of em(i) be equal to zero.
Given two real numbers x1 and x2, one writes x1 ≤ x2 or x2 ≥ x1 if x1 is less than
or equal to x2 and x1 < x2 or x2 > x1 if x1 is less than x2. A real number x is said to
be negative if x < 0, non-positive if x ≤ 0, non-negative if x ≥ 0, and positive if x > 0.
Notice that all elements of the set of non-negative integers, Z+, are non-negative. The
absolute value of a real number x, denoted by |x|, is defined by |x| = −x if x < 0, and
|x| = x if x ≥ 0. The greatest integer less than or equal to a real number x is denoted
by ⌊x⌋.
Given two elements x1 and x2 of IRm, ≤, <, and ≪ on IRm are defined by x1 ≤ x2
if x1i ≤ x2i , ∀i ∈ Im, x1 < x2 if x1 ≤ x2 and ∃i′ ∈ Im such that x1i′ < x2i′ , and x1 ≪ x2
if x1i < x
2
i , ∀i ∈ Im. Similarly, ≥, >, and ≫ are defined for elements of IRm. The non-
negative orthant of the m-dimensional Euclidean space, denoted by IRm+ , is defined by
IRm+ = {x ∈ IRm | x ≥ 0m}. The positive orthant of the m-dimensional Euclidean space,
denoted by IRm++, is defined by IR
m
++ = {x ∈ IRm | x≫ 0m}.
A subset S of IRm is called an interval if x1, x2 ∈ S and x1 ≤ x ≤ x2 for some x ∈ IRm
implies x ∈ S. For elements a, b of IRm, define the intervals (←, b) = {x ∈ IRm | x≪ b},
(←, b] = {x ∈ IRm | x ≤ b}, [a, b) = {x ∈ IRm | a ≤ x ≪ b}, [a, b] = {x ∈ IRm | a ≤
x ≤ b}, [a,→) = {x ∈ IRm | a ≤ x}, (a, b) = {x ∈ IRm | a ≪ x ≪ b}, (a, b] = {x ∈
IRm | a ≪ x ≤ b}, and (a,→) = {x ∈ IRm | a ≪ x}. The sets (←, b), (a, b), and (a,→)
are called open intervals and the sets (←, b], [a, b], and [a,→) are called closed intervals.
The sets [0m, 1m), [0m, 1m], (0m, 1m), and (0m, 1m] are called unit intervals. Notice that
IRm+ = [0
m,→) and IRm++ = (0m,→).




j . The product
∏
j∈∅ x
j is defined to be equal to one. In IRm addition
and multiplication by an element of IR is derived from addition and multiplication on
IR by performing addition and multiplication componentwise. For n ∈ IN, for every




every x1, x2 ∈ IRm, the inner product of x1 and x2, denoted by x1 · x2, is defined by
x1 · x2 = ∑i∈Im x1ix2i .
Let S1 and S2 be subsets of IRm. Then the sum of S1 and S2, denoted by S1 + S2, is
defined as the set {x ∈ IRm | ∃x1 ∈ S1, ∃x2 ∈ S2, x = x1 + x2}. Let λ be an element of
IR and let S be a subset of IRm. Then the product of λ and S, denoted by λS, is defined
as the set {x ∈ IRm | ∃x ∈ S, x = λx}. For n ∈ IN, for every j ∈ In, let a subset Sj of
IRm be given. Then the sum S1 + · · ·+ Sn is denoted by ∑j∈In Sj .
For every x ∈ IRm, the 1-norm of x, denoted by ‖x‖1, is defined by ‖x‖1 =
∑
i∈Im |xi|,




x ∈ IRm, for every δ ∈ IR++, the open m-dimensional ball in IRm with center x and radius
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δ, denoted by Bm(x, δ), is defined by Bm(x, δ) = {x ∈ IRm | ‖x−x‖2 < δ} and the closed
m-dimensional ball in IRm with center x and radius δ, denoted by Bm(x, δ), is defined by
Bm(x, δ) = {x ∈ IRm | ‖x−x‖2 ≤ δ}. For every x ∈ IRm, for every δ ∈ IR++, the (m−1)-
dimensional sphere in IRm with center x and radius δ, denoted by B̃m−1(x, δ), is defined
by B̃m−1(x, δ) = {x ∈ IRm | ‖x−x‖2 = δ}. The (m−1)-dimensional unit simplex in IRm,
denoted by ∆m−1, is defined by ∆m−1 = {x ∈ IRm | ∑i∈Im xi = 1 and xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Im}.
For every subset I of Im, the set ∆
m−1(I) is defined by ∆m−1(I) = {x ∈ ∆m−1 | xi = 0,
∀i ∈ I}. Notice that ∆m−1(∅) = ∆m−1 and ∆m−1(Im) = ∅. The set ∆̇m−1 is defined by
∆̇m−1 = {x ∈ IRm | ∑i∈Im xi = 1 and xi > 0, ∀i ∈ Im}. The m-dimensional unit cube in
IRm, denoted by Qm, is defined by Qm = [0m, 1m] = {x ∈ IRm | 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ Im}. For
every subset I of Im, the set Q
m(I) is defined by Qm(I) = {x ∈ Qm | xi = 0, ∀i ∈ I}.
Notice that Qm(∅) = Qm and Qm(Im) = {0m}.
Let X and Y be two sets. If with every element x of X is associated exactly one
element y of Y, then a function f from X into Y is defined, denoted by f : X → Y.
Let a function f : X → Y be given. The set X is called the domain of f. If x is an
element of X, then f(x) denotes the element y of Y associated with x and is called the
image by f of x. If X = ∅, then a function f from X into Y is denoted by ∅. Let S
be a subset of X and let T be a subset of Y. The image of S by f, denoted by f(S), is
defined by f(S) = {y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ S, y = f(x)} and the inverse image of T by f, denoted
by f−1(T ), is defined by f−1(T ) = {x ∈ X | f(x) ∈ T}. The image by f of X is called
the range of f. The function g : S → Y, defined by g(x) = f(x), ∀x ∈ S, is denoted by
f|S, and is called the restriction of f to S. If X is a set containing X, and g : X → Y
is a function satisfying g(x) = f(x), ∀x ∈ X, then g is called an extension of f to X.
The function f is said to be injective if f−1({y}) contains at most one element for every
element y of Y, and f is said to be surjective if f(X) = Y. If the function f is injective
and surjective, then the function which associates with every element y of Y the element
x of X satisfying f(x) = y is called the inverse of f and is denoted by f−1 : Y → X.
Let X be a set. For every i ∈ Im, let fi be a function from X into IR, and let
f : X → IRm be a function such that f(x) = (f1(x), . . . , fm(x))⊤, ∀x ∈ X. The functions
f1, . . . , fm are called the components of f.
A set X is said to be finite if the number of its elements is a non-negative integer. A
set X is said to be countable if there exists an injective function f from X into a subset
of IN. Let I be a set and, for every i ∈ I, let a set X i be given. The intersection ∩i∈IX i
is said to be finite if the set I is finite and is said to be countable if I is countable. The
notions finite union and countable union are defined similarly. It is easily shown that a
countable union of countable sets yields a countable set.
Let X be a finite set of elements. Then #X denotes the cardinality of X, i.e., the
number of elements of X. For every sign vector s ∈ Sm, the integers i−(s), i0(s), and
i+(s) are defined by i−(s) = #I−(s), i0(s) = #I0(s), and i+(s) = #I+(s).
Let a set X be given. The collection of all subsets (including the empty set) of X,
denoted by 2X , is called the power set of X. A function f : IN→ X is called a sequence
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in X and is denoted by (xn)n∈IN, where x
n = f(n), ∀n ∈ IN. If (xn)n∈IN is a sequence in X
and (nm)m∈IN is a sequence in IN such that n
m < nm+1, ∀m ∈ IN, then (xnm)m∈IN is called
a subsequence of (xn)n∈IN. For m ∈ IN, a function f : Im → X is called a finite sequence
in X and is denoted by (x1, . . . , xm) or by (xi)i∈Im, where x
i = f(i), ∀i ∈ Im. For a finite
set X with cardinality m, an injective function π : Im → X is called a permutation of
the elements of X, and is denoted by (x1, . . . , xm), where xi = π(i), ∀i ∈ Im. Notice that
π(Im) = X in this case. For a subset S of X, the function χS : X → {0, 1}, defined by
χS(x) = 1, ∀x ∈ S, and χS(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ X \S, is called the characteristic function of S.
2.3 Topology
The material treated in this section can be found in any introductory book on topology,
see for instance Dugundji (1965), Munkres (1975), or Armstrong (1983).
The definition of a topological space is given since this framework is general enough
to describe many important notions used in this monograph.
Definition 2.3.1 (Topological space)
A topology on a set X is a non-empty collection of subsets of X, called open sets of X,
such that any union of open sets of X is an open set of X, any finite intersection of
open sets of X is an open set of X, and both the empty set and X are open sets of X. A
topological space X is the set X together with a topology on it.
An open set of a topological space X is said to be open in X.
Let X be a topological space and let B be a collection of sets such that every open
set of X is the union of the members of some subset of B. Then the collection B is called
a base for the topology on X.
For m ∈ IN, for every i ∈ Im, let X i be a topological space and let B denote the
collection of all subsets of
∏
i∈Im X
i of the form
∏
i∈Im S
i, where the set Si is open in X i





A topological space X is called a Hausdorff space if any two different elements of X
are contained in two disjoint open sets of X.
Let the m-dimensional Euclidean space IRm be given and consider the topology on
IRm given by the collection of subsets S of IRm satisfying that for every x ∈ S there
exists δ ∈ IR++ such that Bm(x, δ) ⊂ S. In the entire monograph it will be assumed that
this is the topology on IRm. This topology coincides with the m-fold product topology
on
∏
i∈Im IR. The topological space IR
m can be shown to be a Hausdorff space.
Let S be a subset of a topological space X. The induced topology on S is defined
as the collection of sets obtained by the intersection of open sets of X with S. When a
subset S of IRm is considered as a topological space, then it will be assumed in the entire
monograph that S has the induced topology.
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Let X be a topological space. A subset S of X is called a closed set of X if its
complement X \S is open in X. A closed set of X is said to be closed in X. Clearly, any
intersection of closed sets of X and any finite union of closed sets of X is closed in X.
Moreover, both the empty set and X are closed in X. Clearly, the Cartesian product of
a finite number of closed sets is closed in the product topology. The closure in X of a
subset S of X is defined as the smallest closed set of X containing S, i.e., the intersection
of all closed sets of X containing S, and is denoted by cl(S).
When a subset S of IRm is said to be open or closed, then it is assumed in the entire
monograph that it is open or closed in IRm, unless mentioned otherwise. Notice that
open intervals are open and closed intervals are closed.
Let X be a topological space and let S be a subset of X. The set S is said to be
dense in X if cl(S) = X. The set S is called a residual set in X if S contains a countable
intersection of open, dense subsets of X. Notice that a countable intersection of residual
sets is also a residual set. The topological space X is called a Baire space if every
countable intersection of open, dense subsets of X is dense in X.
The Euclidean space IRm can be shown to be a Baire space, see also Theorem 2.3.15.
Hence, every residual set in IRm is dense in IRm. There exist dense sets in IRm that are
not residual sets in IRm. Consider for example the set Qm. Clearly, Qm is dense in IRm.
Suppose Qm is a residual set in IRm, then, clearly, Qm + {
√
2} is a residual set in IRm
too. Therefore, ∅ = Qm ∩ (Qm + {
√
2}) is a residual set in IRm, and since IRm is a Baire
space it holds that cl(∅) = IRm, a contradiction.
Let X be a topological space and let S be a subset of X. The interior in X of S
is defined as the union of all open sets of X contained in S and is denoted by int(S).
The boundary in X of S is defined as the intersection of S with the closure of X \ S
and is denoted by bd(S). The frontier in X of S is defined as the intersection of the
closure of S with the closure of X \ S and is denoted by fr(S). It can be shown that
cl(S) = int(S) ∪ fr(S), see for instance Dugundji (1965), Theorem 4.11, page 72. The
element x of X is called a limit point in X of S if every open set of X containing x also
contains at least one element of S. The element x of X is called an accumulation point in
X of S if every open set of X containing x also contains at least one element of S \ {x}.
Theorem 2.3.2
Let X be a topological space and let S be a subset of X. Then the set S is closed in X if
and only if all limit points in X of S are contained in S.
See Armstrong (1983), Theorem 2.2, page 29.
Let (xn)n∈IN be a sequence in IR. The sequence (x
n)n∈IN is said to diverge to −∞, denoted
by xn → −∞, if for every n ∈ IN there exists n′ ∈ IN such that n > n′ implies xn < −n.
The sequence (xn)n∈IN is said to diverge to +∞, denoted by xn → +∞, if for every n ∈ IN
there exists n′ ∈ IN such that n > n′ implies xn > n. The sequence (xn)n∈IN is said to
converge to x ∈ IR, denoted by xn → x or by limn→+∞ xn = x, if for every ε ∈ IR++
there exists n′ ∈ IN such that n > n′ implies |xn − x| < ε.
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Let (xn)n∈IN be a sequence in IR
m. Then the sequence (xn)n∈IN is said to converge to
x ∈ IRm, denoted by xn → x or by limn→+∞ xn = x, if xni → xi, ∀i ∈ Im. In this case the
sequence is said to be convergent. The element x is uniquely determined and is called
the limit of the sequence. Obviously, the notions related to convergence are well-defined
if there exists n′ ∈ IN such that the element xn is only defined for every n ≥ n′.
Let X be a subset of IRm, let x be an element of X, and let S be a subset of X. Then
the element x is a limit point in X of S if and only if x is the limit of some sequence in
S. Therefore, it follows by Theorem 2.3.2 that the set S is closed in X if and only if for
any element x of X being the limit of a sequence in S it holds that x ∈ S.
Let topological spaces X and Y, an element x of X, and a function f : X → Y be
given. The function f is said to be continuous at x if for every open set O of Y containing
f(x) it holds that f−1(O) is open in X. The function f is said to be continuous if it is
continuous at every x ∈ X. Clearly, the function f is continuous at x if and only if
for every closed set T of Y containing f(x) it holds that f−1(T ) is closed in X. The
set of continuous functions from X into Y is denoted by C0(X, Y ). The function f is
called a homeomorphism if it is continuous, injective, surjective, and has a continuous
inverse. The topological spaces X and Y are called homeomorphic if there exists a
homeomorphism f : X → Y.
Let a subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, and an element x of S be given. It is
well-known that a function f : S → T is continuous at x if and only if (xn)n∈IN being a
sequence in S, xn → x, yn = f(xn), ∀n ∈ IN, and y = f(x) implies yn → y.
Let X be a topological space. The topological space X is called an arc if X and the
closed unit interval [0, 1] are homeomorphic, X is called a loop if X and the unit circle
in IR2, being the set B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 1), are homeomorphic. If X is an arc and f : [0, 1]→ X
is a homeomorphism, then f({0, 1}) is called the relative boundary of X, f(0) and f(1)
are called boundary points of X, and X \ f({0, 1}) is called the relative interior of X.
It can be shown that both the relative boundary and the relative interior of X are
independent of the homeomorphism chosen, see Armstrong (1983), page 193, problem
36. A continuous function f : [0, 1] → X is called a path. The elements f(0) and f(1)
are called the beginning and end points of the path f, respectively, and f(0) and f(1)
are said to be joined by the path f. Since IRm and IRn are homeomorphic if and only if
m = n, Theorem 2.3.3 is quite surprising.
Theorem 2.3.3
There exists a path f : [0, 1]→ ∆2 being surjective.
See Armstrong (1983), Section 2.3, page 36-38.
Since Theorem 2.3.4 implies that an injective, surjective path f : [0, 1] → ∆2 is a
homeomorphism, and since it is well-known that [0, 1] and ∆2 are not homeomorphic, it
follows that the path f in Theorem 2.3.3 is not injective.
Let a set X be given. A cover of X is defined as a collection of subsets of X whose
union equals X. A subset of a cover of X is called a subcover. Let X be a topological
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space and let x be an element of X. An open cover of X is defined as a collection of
open sets of X whose union equals X. Similarly, a closed cover of X is defined as a
collection of closed sets of X whose union equals X. The topological space X is said to
be compact if every open cover of X has a finite subcover. A subset of a topological
space is said to be compact if it becomes a compact topological space when given the
induced topology. Clearly, the Cartesian product of a finite number of compact sets is
compact in the product topology.
Theorem 2.3.4
Let X be a compact topological space, let Y be a Hausdorff space, and let f : X → Y be a
continuous, injective, and surjective function. Then the function f is a homeomorphism.
See Armstrong (1983), Theorem 3.7, page 48.
Let a topological space X be given. The topological space X is said to be connected
if there do not exist two disjoint, non-empty, open sets of X whose union equals X.
Obviously, the topological space X is connected if and only if there do not exist two
disjoint, non-empty, closed sets of X whose union equals X. A subset of a topological
space is said to be connected if it becomes a connected topological space when given the
induced topology. Let x be an element of X. The component of x in X is defined as the
union of all connected subsets of X containing x. It is easily seen that each component
is connected and therefore the component of x in X is the largest connected subset of
X containing x.
Let a topological space X be given. The topological space X is said to be path-
connected if every two elements of X can be joined by a path f : [0, 1]→ X. A subset of a
topological space is said to be path-connected if it becomes a path-connected topological
space when given the induced topology. Let x be an element ofX. The path-component of
x in X is defined as the union of all path-connected subsets of X containing x. It is easily
seen that each path-component is path-connected and therefore the path-component of
x in X is the largest path-connected subset of X containing x.
Theorem 2.3.5
Let a topological space X and an element x of X be given. Then the path-component of
x in X is contained in the component of x in X.
See Munkres (1975), Theorem 4.3, page 162.
The following example shows that the converse of Theorem 2.3.5 is not true.
Example 2.3.6







































Figure 2.3.1. A set being connected but not path-connected.
In Figure 2.3.1 the set S is depicted. In Munkres (1975), Example 7, page 156, it is
shown that the set S is connected, but not path-connected.
Let a topological space X and an element x of X be given. The quasi-component of x
in X is defined as the intersection of all subsets of X containing x that are both open
and closed in X.
Theorem 2.3.7
Let a topological space X and an element x of X be given. Then the component of x in
X is contained in the quasi-component of x in X.
See Munkres (1975), Exercise 3, page 163.
The following example is a modified version of Steen and Seebach Jr. (1970), Example













∣∣∣x1 = 1 and 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1
}
,
and, for every n ∈ IN, let Sn be a square with center ( 12 , 12) and diameter nn+1 , i.e., Sn
is the set of elements x of IR2 satisfying |x1 − 12 | ≤ n2n+2 and |x2 − 12 | ≤ n2n+2 , while
|x1 − 12 | = n2n+2 or |x2 − 12 | = n2n+2 . Let the set S be defined by S = S ∪ S ∪ (∪n∈INSn) .






























Figure 2.3.2. A set S with the component of (0, 0)⊤ in S being a proper subset of the
quasi-component of (0, 0)⊤ in S.
Since, for every n ∈ IN, the set ∪j∈InSj is open and closed in S, it holds that the
quasi-component of (0, 0)⊤ in S is a subset of S ∪S. Clearly, the set S is the component
of (0, 0)⊤ in S. Therefore, by Theorem 2.3.7, it holds that the set S is a subset of the
quasi-component of (0, 0)⊤ in S. Since every open and closed set in S containing S also
contains S, it holds that the quasi-component of (0, 0)⊤ in S is given by the set S ∪ S.
Let X be a set and let X be a collection of subsets of X. The collection X is called
a partition of X if the sets in X are pairwise disjoint, i.e., the intersection of any two
different sets in X is empty, and the union over all sets in X equals X. IfX is a topological
space, then the collection of components, the collection of path-components, and the
collection of quasi-components of X are partitions of X. A partition of a topological
space X is said to be locally finite if for every x ∈ X there exists an open set O of
X containing x such that the collection of sets in the partition having a non-empty
intersection with O is finite.
Let a subset S of IRm be given. The set S is said to be bounded from below if there
exists n ∈ IN such that, for every x ∈ S, x ≥ −n1m. The set S is said to be bounded
from above if there exists n ∈ IN such that, for every x ∈ S, x ≤ n1m. The set S is said
to be bounded if it is both bounded from below and bounded from above. A function f
from a set X into S is said to be bounded if f(X) is bounded. It is well-known that a
bounded sequence in IRm has a convergent subsequence. A partition of the set S is said
to be bounded if every set in the partition is bounded.
Let a subset S of IRm be given. Then the set S is compact if and only if S is bounded
and closed, see for example Armstrong (1983), Theorem 3.1, page 44. Moreover, the set
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S is compact if and only if every sequence (xn)n∈IN in S has a subsequence converging to
an element of S, see for instance Munkres (1975), Theorem 7.4, page 181. The following
two theorems are also helpful in verifying the compactness of a set.
Theorem 2.3.9
Let S be a closed set of a compact topological space. Then the set S is compact.
See Armstrong (1983), Theorem 3.5, page 47.
Theorem 2.3.10
Let S be a compact subset of a Hausdorff space. Then the set S is closed.
See Armstrong (1983), Theorem 3.6, page 47.
The following three theorems are very helpful in showing the connectedness of a set.
Theorem 2.3.11
Let S be a connected subset of a topological space. If S ⊂ T ⊂ cl(S), then the set T is
connected.
See Munkres (1975), Theorem 1.4, page 149.
Theorem 2.3.12
Let S be a subset of IR. Then the set S is connected if and only if S is an interval.
See Armstrong (1983), Theorem 3.19, page 57.
Theorem 2.3.13
Let X and Y be topological spaces and let f : X → Y be a continuous function. Then
f(X) is compact if the set X is compact, f(X) is connected if X is connected, and f(X)
is path-connected if X is path-connected.
See Munkres (1975), Theorem 5.5, page 167, Theorem 1.5, page 149, and the remark on
top of page 156.
Let a set X, a subset S of X, and a function f : X → IR be given. An element x of
S is said to minimize f on S, x is called a minimizer of f on S, and f(x) is called the
minimum of f on S if f(x) ≤ f(x), ∀x ∈ S. An element x of S is said to maximize
f on S, x is called a maximizer of f on S, and f(x) is called the maximum of f on S
if f(x) ≥ f(x), ∀x ∈ S. Using Theorem 2.3.13 it is not difficult to show the following
result.
Theorem 2.3.14
Let X be a non-empty, compact topological space and let f : X → IR be a continuous
function. Then there exists a minimum and a maximum of f on X.
See Munkres (1975), Theorem 6.4, page 175.
The topological space X is said to be locally compact if for every x ∈ X there exists
an open set O of X such that x ∈ O and cl(O) is compact. Notice that every compact
subset of IRm is locally compact, but also that every open set of IRm is locally compact.
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Theorem 2.3.15
Every locally compact Hausdorff space is a Baire space.
See Dugundji (1965), Theorem 10.1, page 249.
Let X and Y be locally compact topological spaces. A continuous function f : X → Y
is proper if the inverse image of every compact subset of Y by f is a compact subset of
X.
2.4 Vector spaces
For any result mentioned in this section without reference, see for instance Edwards
(1973) or Strang (1980).
In order to formulate Theorem 2.6.2, the concept of a vector space is needed.
Definition 2.4.1 (Vector space)
A set V together with a function f : V × V → V, written as f(v1, v2) = v1 + v2,
∀(v1, v2) ∈ V × V, and a function g : IR × V → V, written as g(λ, v) = λv, ∀λ ∈ IR,
∀v ∈ V, is a vector space if
∀v1, v2, v3 ∈ V, (v1 + v2) + v3 = v1 + (v2 + v3),
∃0 ∈ V, ∀v ∈ V, v + 0 = v,
∀v1 ∈ V, ∃v2 ∈ V, v1 + v2 = 0,
∀v1, v2 ∈ V, v1 + v2 = v2 + v1,
∀v ∈ V, ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ IR, (λ1λ2)v = λ1(λ2v),
∀v1, v2 ∈ V, ∀λ ∈ IR, λ(v1 + v2) = λv1 + λv2,
∀v ∈ V, ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ IR, (λ1 + λ2)v = λ1v + λ2v,
∀v ∈ V, 1v = v.
Let a vector space V together with the functions f and g be given. The function f
defines addition in V and the function g defines multiplication in V. In subsets of IRm
addition and multiplication will always be defined as in Section 2.2. Then IRm is a vector
space.
Let V be a vector space. The elements v1, . . . , vm of V are said to be independent if
λi ∈ IR, ∀i ∈ Im, and
∑
i∈Im λ
ivi = 0 implies λi = 0, ∀i ∈ Im. A subset S of V is said to
be independent if every finite number of pairwise different elements of S is independent.
An independent subset S of V not being a proper subset of another independent subset
of V is called a basis for V. If a finite set S with cardinality k is a basis for V, then it
can be shown that every basis for V has k elements. In this case the integer k is called
the dimension of V and the vector space V is said to be k-dimensional. It can be shown
that every vector space has at least one basis.
A vector space V, being a subset of the Euclidean space IRm, is k-dimensional for some
k ∈ Z+ with k ≤ m. Notice that the m-dimensional Euclidean space IRm has dimension
m and that the set {em(1), . . . , em(m)} is a basis for IRm.
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Let a vector space V and a subset S of V be given. The set S is called a cone if
v ∈ S implies λv ∈ S, ∀λ ∈ IR+. The set S is said to be convex if v1, v2 ∈ S implies
λv1 + (1 − λ)v2 ∈ S, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. The element λv1 + (1 − λ)v2 is said to be a convex
combination of v1 and v2 with weights λ and (1− λ). Clearly, the intersection of convex
sets is a convex set. The convex hull of S, denoted co(S), is defined as the smallest convex
subset of V containing S, i.e., the intersection of all convex subsets of V containing S.
Let two vector spaces V and W be given. A function f : V →W is said to be linear
if f(v1 + v2) = f(v1) + f(v2), ∀v1, v2 ∈ V, and f(λv) = λf(v), ∀λ ∈ IR, ∀v ∈ V. A
function f : V →W is said to be affine if there exists an element w of W such that the
function g : V → W, defined by g(v) = f(v) − w, ∀v ∈ V, is linear. Let S be a subset
of V and let T be a subset of W. A function f : S → T is said to be linear if it is the
restriction to S of a linear function from V into W and f is said to be affine if it is the
restriction to S of an affine function from V into W. A function f : S → T is said to
be piecewise linear if there exists a collection of sets being a locally finite partition of S
such that f restricted to any set of this partition is affine.





M11 · · · M1n
...
...
Mm1 · · · Mmn

 .
If m = n, then M is called a square matrix. Notice that a vector x ∈ IRm is an m × 1
matrix. The m× n matrix M satisfying Mij = 0, ∀i ∈ IM , ∀j ∈ IN , is denoted by 0m×n.
Let an m × n matrix M be given. For every i ∈ Im, the row vector (Mi1, . . . ,Min)
is called the i-th row of M and is denoted by Mi·, and, for every j ∈ In, the vector
(M1j , . . . ,Mmj)
⊤ is called the j-th column of M and is denoted by M·j. The maximal
number of independent columns of the matrix M equals the maximal number of inde-
pendent rows of M and is called the rank of M.
The sum of two m × n matrices M1 and M2, denoted by M1 + M2, is the m × n




ij , ∀i ∈ Im, ∀j ∈ In. The product of an m1 × n
matrix M1 and an n × m2 matrix M2, denoted by M1M2, is the m1 × m2 matrix M,






ji2, ∀i1 ∈ Im1 , ∀i2 ∈ Im2 .
The m×m matrix M, defined by Mii = 1, ∀i ∈ Im, and Mi1i2 = 0, ∀i1, i2 ∈ Im with
i1 6= i2, is called the m-dimensional identity matrix and is denoted by Im. An m × m
matrix M is said to be invertible if there exists an m×mmatrix M ′ such that MM ′ = Im
and M ′M = Im. It is easily shown that there exists at most one such matrix M ′, called
the inverse of M and denoted by M−1. It is well-known that an m × m matrix M is
invertible if and only if it has rank m.
The determinant of a square matrix M, denoted by det(M), is defined inductively
as follows. The determinant of a 1× 1 matrix M is the real number M. For an m×m
matrix M, for i1, i2 ∈ Im, let M i1i2 denote the (m − 1) × (m − 1) matrix obtained by
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deleting the i1-th row, Mi1·, and the i
2-th column, M·i2 , of M. Let i
′ be an element of










It can be shown that the m×m matrix M is invertible if and only if det(M) 6= 0.
Let M be an m × n matrix. The set {x ∈ IRm | ∃y ∈ IRn, x = My} is called the
column space of M. The set {y ∈ IRn | My = 0m} is called the nullspace of M. If the
matrix M has rank k, then the column space of M is a k-dimensional vector space and
the nullspace of M is an (n− k)-dimensional vector space.
Finally, some results concerning the representation of a linear function by a matrix
are presented. It can be shown that a function f : IRm → IRn is linear if and only if there
exists an n×m matrix M such that f(x) = Mx, ∀x ∈ IRm. It is easily shown that the
matrix M is uniquely determined.
For m ∈ IN, let V be an m-dimensional vector space and let {v1, . . . , vm} be a basis
for V. It is easily verified that for every v ∈ V there exist unique real numbers λi, ∀i ∈ Im,
such that v =
∑
i∈Im λ
ivi. Therefore, every v ∈ V can be identified with a unique vector
(λ1, . . . , λm)⊤ ∈ IRm and the vector space V can be identified with IRm. For n ∈ IN, let
W be an n-dimensional vector space and let {w1, . . . , wn} be a basis for W. As before,
every element w of W can be identified with a unique vector (µ1, . . . , µn) ∈ IRn and W
can be identified with IRn. Let f be a function from V into W. The function f is said to
be represented by the n×m matrix M if v ∈ V is identified with λ ∈ IRm and µ = Mλ
implies that f(v) ∈ W is identified with µ ∈ IRn. The matrix M is easily shown to be
unique. It can be shown that the function f is linear if and only if there exists an n×m
matrix M representing f, see Mas-Colell (1985), Section B.3, page 14.
For m ∈ IN, let V be an m-dimensional vector space and let f : V → V be a linear
function. Let a basis for V be given and let the function f be represented by the m×m
matrix M. It can be shown that the determinant of M is independent of the choice of
the basis for V, see Mas-Colell (1985), Section B.4, page 15. The determinant of the
function f is defined as the determinant of the matrix M.
2.5 Relations and Correspondences
Let X and Y be two sets. A relation ϕ from X into Y associates with every element x
of X a subset ϕ(x) of Y, and is denoted by ϕ : X → Y. The set X is called the domain
of ϕ. If x is an element of X, then ϕ(x) is called the image by ϕ of x. Let a subset S of
X and a subset T of Y be given. The image by ϕ of S, denoted by ϕ(S), is defined by
ϕ(S) = {y ∈ Y |∃x ∈ S, y ∈ ϕ(x)} .
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The image by ϕ of the domain of ϕ is called the range of ϕ. The inverse image by ϕ of
T, denoted by ϕ−1(T ), is defined by
ϕ−1(T ) = {x ∈ X |ϕ(x) ∩ T 6= ∅} .
The relation µ : S → Y, defined by µ(x) = ϕ(x), ∀x ∈ S, is denoted by ϕ|S, and is called
the restriction of ϕ to S. The set
{(x, y) ∈ X × Y |y ∈ ϕ(x)}
is called the graph of ϕ. If Y is a topological space and ϕ(x) is compact for every x ∈ X,
then the relation ϕ is said to be compact-valued. If Y is a topological space and ϕ(x) is
closed for every x ∈ X, then the relation ϕ is said to be closed-valued. If Y is a vector
space and ϕ(x) is convex for every x ∈ X, then the relation ϕ is said to be convex-valued.
Let sets X1, X2, X3 and relations ϕ1 : X1 → X2 and ϕ2 : X2 → X3 be given. Then
the composition of ϕ1 and ϕ2, denoted by ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1, is a relation from X1 into X3 and is
defined by ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1(x) = ϕ2(ϕ1(x)), ∀x ∈ X1.
A binary relation on a set X is defined as a relation from X into itself.
Definition 2.5.1 (Properties of binary relations)
A binary relation ϕ on a set X is
reflexive if, for every x ∈ X, x ∈ ϕ(x),
transitive if, for every x1, x2, x3 ∈ X, x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) and x3 ∈ ϕ(x2) implies x3 ∈ ϕ(x1),
complete if, for every x1, x2 ∈ X, x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) or x1 ∈ ϕ(x2),
symmetric if, for every x1, x2 ∈ X, x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) implies x1 ∈ ϕ(x2),
anti-symmetric if, for every x1, x2 ∈ X, x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) and x1 ∈ ϕ(x2) implies x1 = x2.
a pre-ordering if it is reflexive and transitive,
an ordering if it is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric,
an equivalence relation if it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
Notice that a complete binary relation is also reflexive.
Let ϕ be a binary relation on a set X, let µ be a binary relation on a set Y, and
let f : X → Y be a function. Let both ϕ and µ be a pre-ordering. The function f
is said to be decreasing if x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) and x1 ∈ ϕ(x2) implies f(x2) ∈ µ(f(x1)) and
f(x1) ∈ µ(f(x2)), and if x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) and x1 /∈ ϕ(x2) implies f(x1) ∈ µ(f(x2)) and
f(x2) /∈ µ(f(x1)). The function f is said to be non-increasing if x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) implies
f(x1) ∈ µ(f(x2)). The function f is said to be non-decreasing if x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) implies
f(x2) ∈ µ(f(x1)). The function f is said to be increasing if x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) and x1 ∈ ϕ(x2)
implies f(x2) ∈ µ(f(x1)) and f(x1) ∈ µ(f(x2)), and if x2 ∈ ϕ(x1) and x1 /∈ ϕ(x2) implies
f(x2) ∈ µ(f(x1)) and f(x1) /∈ µ(f(x2)).
Let ϕ be a binary relation on a set X and let S be a subset of X. Then an element x
of X is called a lower bound of S for ϕ if there exists no x ∈ S such that x ∈ ϕ(x) and
x /∈ ϕ(x). A lower bound x of S for ϕ is called an infimum of S for ϕ if there exists no
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lower bound x̂ of S for ϕ satisfying x̂ ∈ ϕ(x) and x /∈ ϕ(x̂). The set of infima of S for ϕ
is denoted by inf(S). If x ∈ inf(S) ∩ S, then the element x is called a minimal element
or minimum of S for ϕ. The set of minima of S for ϕ is denoted by min(S). Similarly,
x ∈ X is called an upper bound of S for ϕ if there exists no x ∈ S such that x ∈ ϕ(x)
and x /∈ ϕ(x). An upper bound x of S for ϕ is called a supremum if there exists no upper
bound x̂ of S for ϕ satisfying x ∈ ϕ(x̂) and x̂ /∈ ϕ(x). The set of suprema of S for ϕ is
denoted by sup(S). If x ∈ sup(S)∩S, then the element x is called a maximal element or
maximum of S for ϕ. The set of maxima of S for ϕ is denoted by max(S). The element
x of S is called a worst element of S for ϕ if x ∈ ϕ(x) for every x ∈ S. The element x of
S is called a best element of S for ϕ if x ∈ ϕ(x) for every x ∈ S.
Notice that ≤ induces a binary relation ϕ on IRm, defined by ϕ(x) = [x,→), ∀x ∈ IRm.
The binary relation ϕ is a pre-ordering but it is not complete unless m = 1. If S is a
subset of IRm, then inf(S) denotes the infimum of S for ≤, min(S) denotes the minimum
of S for ≤, sup(S) denotes the supremum of S for ≤, and max(S) denotes the maximum
of S for ≤ if the infimum, minimum, supremum, and maximum, respectively, exists. In
this case inf(S), min(S), sup(S), and max(S), respectively, are uniquely determined and
therefore are assumed to denote an element instead of a set. If S is a finite subset of
IRm, then inf(S) is obtained by taking the componentwise minimum of the elements of
S, and sup(S) is obtained by taking the componentwise maximum of the elements of S.
The infinity norm of an element x of IRm is defined by ‖x‖∞ = max({|xi| | i ∈ Im}).
Notice that ⊂ induces a binary relation ϕ on 2IRm, defined by ϕ(S) = {T ∈ 2IRm |
S ⊂ T}, ∀S ∈ 2IRm. The binary relation ϕ is a pre-ordering, but it is not complete. If a
member of a subset of 2IR
m
is said to be minimal or maximal, then it is a minimum or a
maximum of this subset for ϕ.
A relation ϕ from a set X into a set Y such that ϕ(x) 6= ∅ for every x ∈ X is called
a correspondence. Notice that a correspondence ϕ : X → Y can be considered as a
function if ϕ(x) contains exactly one element for every x ∈ X.
Now upper hemi-continuity of a correspondence is defined.
Definition 2.5.2 (Upper hemi-continuity)
Let topological spaces X and Y and an element x of X be given. A correspondence
ϕ : X → Y is upper hemi-continuous at x if for every open set O′ of Y satisfying
ϕ(x) ⊂ O′ there exists an open set O of X containing x such that ϕ(O) ⊂ O′. The
correspondence ϕ is upper hemi-continuous if it is upper hemi-continuous at every x ∈ X.
Notice that a correspondence being both upper hemi-continuous and a function is a
continuous function.
Theorem 2.5.3
Let topological spaces X and Y and an upper hemi-continuous correspondence ϕ : X → Y
be given. If T is a closed set of Y, then ϕ−1(T ) is a closed set of X.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 1, page 22.
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Theorem 2.5.4
Let compact topological spaces X and Y and a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence ϕ : X → Y be given. If S is a compact subset of X, then ϕ(S) is a
compact subset of Y.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 3, page 24.
The following theorem yields as a corollary that the composition of two continuous
functions is continuous.
Theorem 2.5.5
Let X1, X2, and X3 be topological spaces and let ϕ1 : X1 → X2 and ϕ2 : X2 → X3 be
upper hemi-continuous correspondences. Then the correspondence ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1 : X1 → X3 is
upper hemi-continuous.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Corollary of Proposition 1, page 22.
Often it is possible to give easy characterizations of upper hemi-continuity.
Theorem 2.5.6
Let a subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, an element x of S, and a compact-valued
correspondence ϕ : S → T be given. Then the correspondence ϕ is upper hemi-continuous
at x if and only if for every sequence (xn)n∈IN in S converging to x and every sequence
(yn)n∈IN in T with y
n ∈ ϕ(xn), ∀n ∈ IN, there exists a subsequence of (yn)n∈IN converging
to some element of ϕ(x).
See Hildenbrand (1974), Theorem 1, page 24.
Theorem 2.5.7
Let a subset S of IRm, a compact subset T of IRn, an element x of S, and a compact-valued
correspondence ϕ : S → T be given. Then the correspondence ϕ is upper hemi-continuous
at x if and only if for every sequence (xn)n∈IN in S converging to x and every sequence
(yn)n∈IN in T with y
n ∈ ϕ(xn), ∀n ∈ IN, converging to y ∈ IRn it holds that y ∈ ϕ(x).
The correspondence ϕ is upper hemi-continuous if and only if the graph of ϕ is closed in
S × T.
See Debreu (1959), 1.8.d, page 17.
The following results are also often helpful in proving the upper hemi-continuity of
correspondences.
Theorem 2.5.8
Let a subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, and a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence ϕ from S into T be given. Then the correspondence µ : S → T, defined
by µ(x) = co(ϕ(x)), ∀x ∈ S, is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 6, page 26.
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Theorem 2.5.9
Let a subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, and closed-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondences ϕ1 and ϕ2 from S into T be given such that ϕ1(x) ∩ ϕ2(x) 6= ∅, ∀x ∈ S.
Then the correspondence ϕ : S → T, defined by ϕ(x) = ϕ1(x) ∩ ϕ2(x), ∀x ∈ S, is upper
hemi-continuous.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 2, page 24.
Theorem 2.5.10
Let a subset S of IRm and, for k ∈ IN, for every i ∈ Ik, a subset T i of IRn be given.
Let ϕi : S → T i, ∀i ∈ Ik, be a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Then the correspondence ϕ : S → ∏i∈Ik T i, defined by ϕ(x) =
∏
i∈Ik ϕ
i(x), ∀x ∈ S,




i(x), ∀x ∈ S, is upper hemi-continuous.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 4, page 25, and Proposition 5, page 25.
Next, lower hemi-continuity of a correspondence is defined.
Definition 2.5.11 (Lower hemi-continuity)
Let topological spaces X and Y and an element x of X be given. A correspondence
ϕ : X → Y is lower hemi-continuous at x if for every open set O′ of Y satisfying
ϕ(x) ∩ O′ 6= ∅ there exists an open set O of X containing x such that ϕ(x) ∩ O′ 6= ∅,
∀x ∈ O. The correspondence ϕ is lower hemi-continuous if it is lower hemi-continuous
at every x ∈ X.
Theorem 2.5.12
Let X1, X2, and X3 be topological spaces and let ϕ1 : X1 → X2 and ϕ2 : X2 → X3 be
lower hemi-continuous correspondences. Then the correspondence ϕ2 ◦ ϕ1 : X1 → X3 is
lower hemi-continuous.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 7, page 27, and Corollary of Proposition 1, page
22.
Often it is possible to give easy characterizations of lower hemi-continuity.
Theorem 2.5.13
Let a subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, and an element x of S be given. Then the
correspondence ϕ is lower hemi-continuous at x if and only if for every sequence (xn)n∈IN
in S converging to x and for every element y of ϕ(x) there exists a sequence (yn)n∈IN in
T such that yn ∈ ϕ(xn), ∀n ∈ IN, and yn → y.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Theorem 2, page 27.




Let a subset S of IRm and, for k ∈ IN, for every i ∈ Ik, a subset T i of IRn be given. Let ϕi :
S → T i, ∀i ∈ Ik, be a lower hemi-continuous correspondence. Then the correspondence
ϕ : S → ∏i∈Ik T i, defined by ϕ(x) =
∏
i∈Ik ϕ
i(x), ∀x ∈ S, is lower hemi-continuous.
Moreover, the correspondence µ : S → ∑i∈Ik T i, defined by µ(x) =
∑
i∈Ik ϕ
i(x), ∀x ∈ S,
is lower hemi-continuous.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Proposition 8, page 27, and Proposition 9, page 28.
Finally, continuity of a correspondence is defined.
Definition 2.5.15 (Continuity)
Let topological spaces X and Y and an element x of X be given. A correspondence
ϕ : X → Y is continuous at x if it is both upper and lower hemi-continuous at x. The
correspondence ϕ is continuous if it is continuous at every x ∈ X.
The following result shows that an upper hemi-continuous correspondence is continuous
at many elements.
Theorem 2.5.16
Let a subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, and a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence ϕ : S → T be given. Then there exists a residual set in S such that the
correspondence ϕ is continuous at every element of that set.
See Fort (1949), Theorem 3, page 239, and Dierker (1974), Theorem 8.5, page 84.
The following theorem is known as the maximum theorem.
Theorem 2.5.17 (Maximum theorem)
Let a subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, and a continuous, compact-valued correspondence
ϕ : S → T be given. Let f : S × T → IR be a continuous function. Define the relation
µ : S → T by µ(x) = {y ∈ ϕ(x) | f(x, y) ≥ f(x, y), ∀y ∈ ϕ(x)}, ∀x ∈ S, and the relation
g : S → IR by g(x) = {f(x, y) | y ∈ µ(x)}, ∀x ∈ S. Then µ is an upper hemi-continuous,
compact-valued correspondence and g is a continuous function.
See Hildenbrand (1974), Corollary of Theorem 3, page 30.
2.6 Fixed Points
Let ϕ be a relation from a set X into a set Y. The element x of X is called a fixed point
of ϕ if x ∈ ϕ(x).
Related to the concept of a fixed point is the notion of a zero point. Let ϕ be
a relation from a set X into IRm. The element x of X is called a zero point of ϕ if
0m ∈ ϕ(x). As mentioned in Section 2.1 several fixed point theorems are essential for the
theory developed in this monograph. The first one is known as Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem.
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Theorem 2.6.1 (Kakutani’s fixed point theorem)
Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of IRm and let ϕ : S → S be a convex-
valued correspondence such that the graph of ϕ is closed in S × S. Then there exists an
element x of S such that x ∈ ϕ(x).
See Kakutani (1941), Theorem 1, page 457, and Corollary of Theorem 1, page 458.
Notice that by Theorem 2.5.7 the correspondence ϕ in Theorem 2.6.1 has a closed graph
if and only if ϕ is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. If the cor-
respondence ϕ in Theorem 2.6.1 is a function, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem is obtained,
see Brouwer (1912).
A linear topological space is a Hausdorff space V with a vector space structure such
that the functions f : V × V → V and g : IR × V → V given in Definition 2.4.1 are
both continuous when the set V × V and the set IR× V is given the product topology.
The following generalization of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem is known as Glicksberg’s
fixed point theorem.
Theorem 2.6.2 (Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem)
Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of a linear topological space X and let
ϕ : S → S be a convex-valued correspondence such that the graph of ϕ is closed in S×S,
where the set S × S is given the topology induced from the product topology on X ×X.
Then there exists an element x of S such that x ∈ ϕ(x).
See Glicksberg (1952), Theorem, page 171.
If the correspondence in Theorem 2.6.2 is a continuous function, then Tychonoff’s fixed
point theorem is obtained, see Tychonoff (1935).
Finally, an extension of Browder’s fixed point theorem as formulated in Theorem 2
in Browder (1960) is given. Theorem 2.6.3 is a special case of Theorem 3 in Mas-Colell
(1974a).
Theorem 2.6.3 (Browder’s fixed point theorem)
Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of IRm and let ϕ : S × [0, 1] → S be a
convex-valued correspondence such that the graph of ϕ is closed in S × [0, 1]× S. Then
the set Fϕ = {(x, λ) ∈ S × [0, 1] | x ∈ ϕ(x, λ)} contains a connected set F cϕ such that
(S × {0}) ∩ F cϕ 6= ∅ and (S × {1}) ∩ F cϕ 6= ∅.
See Mas-Colell (1974a), Theorem 3, page 230.
Notice that by Theorem 2.5.7 the correspondence ϕ in Theorem 2.6.3 has a closed graph
if and only if ϕ is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
2.7 Triangulations
In this section some notions needed when describing simplicial algorithms are given. For
more details concerning these notions the reader is referred to Todd (1976), Garcia and
Zangwill (1981), and Doup (1988).
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For t ∈ Z+, let points x1, . . . , xt+1 of IRm be given. The element x of IRm is said








Let S be a convex subset of IRm. The affine hull of S, denoted by aff(S), is defined
as the set of all affine combinations of elements of S. It is easily shown that the set
aff(S)−S is a vector space. The dimension of S is defined as the dimension of the vector
space aff(S) − S and is denoted by dim(S). If dim(S) = k, then the set S is said to be
k-dimensional. Notice that dim(∆m−1) = m−1, dim(∆̇m−1) = m−1, and dim(Qm) = m.
Let S be a convex subset of IRm. The relative boundary of S, denoted by rb(S), is
defined as the boundary of S in aff(S). Similarly, the relative frontier and the relative
interior of S, denoted by rf(S) and ri(S), respectively, are defined as the frontier of S in
aff(S) and the interior of S in aff(S), respectively. Notice that ∆̇m−1 = ri(∆m−1).
For t ∈ Z+, let points x1, . . . , xt+1 of IRm be given. These points are said to be
affinely independent if λi ∈ IR, ∀i ∈ It+1,
∑
i∈It+1 λ
ixi = 0m, and
∑
i∈It+1 λ
i = 0 implies
λi = 0, ∀i ∈ It+1. A t-simplex in IRm, denoted by σ, is defined as the convex hull of t+ 1
affinely independent points x1, . . . , xt+1 of IRm, so σ = co({x1, . . . , xt+1}), and is also
denoted by σ(x1, . . . , xt+1). The points x1, . . . , xt+1 are called the vertices of the t-simplex
σ(x1, . . . , xt+1). It is easily shown that the t-simplex σ(x1, . . . , xt+1) has dimension t and
is equal to the set
{
x ∈ IRm
∣∣∣∀i ∈ It+1, ∃λi ≥ 0,
∑
i∈It+1λ






A t-simplex is sometimes called a simplex if the dimension t is clear from the context.
A subset S of IRm is called a polytope if there exists t ∈ Z+ and there exist points
x1, . . . , xt+1 of IRm such that S = co({x1, . . . , xt+1}). Obviously, a t-simplex is a polytope.
A finite Cartesian product of simplices is called a simplotope. Clearly, also a simplotope
is a polytope.
Given a t-simplex σ, its vertices x1, . . . , xt+1 are uniquely determined. A (t − 1)-
simplex τ being the convex hull of t vertices of a t-simplex σ(x1, . . . , xt+1) is called a
facet of σ. There is exactly one vertex of a t-simplex σ(x1, . . . , xt+1), say xi, for some
i ∈ It+1, not being a vertex of a facet τ of σ, and therefore τ is called the facet of σ
opposite xi, and, similarly, xi is called the vertex of σ opposite τ. A k-simplex τ, for some
k ∈ I0t , is called a face or k-face of a t-simplex σ if all the vertices of τ are vertices of σ.





i and is obviously
an element of σ.
It is now possible to give the definition of a simplicial subdivision, also called trian-
gulation, of a convex subset of IRm.
Definition 2.7.1 (Simplicial subdivision or triangulation)
For t ∈ Z+, let S be a convex t-dimensional subset of IRm. A collection Σ of t-simplices
is a simplicial subdivision or triangulation of S and the set S is said to be triangulated
by Σ if
2.7 Triangulations 41
1. ∪σ∈Σσ = S,
2. the intersection of two t-simplices of Σ is either empty or a common face,
3. if a facet τ of a t-simplex σ1 ∈ Σ is a subset of rb(S), then there is no t-simplex
σ2 ∈ Σ such that σ2 6= σ1 and τ is a facet of σ2, and if τ is not a subset of rb(S),
then there is exactly one t-simplex σ2 ∈ Σ such that σ2 6= σ1 and τ is also a facet
of σ2.
Theorem 2.7.2
For t ∈ Z+, a triangulation of a compact, convex t-dimensional subset S of IRm contains
a finite number of t-simplices.
See Todd (1976), Theorem 2.3, page 27.
Let the collection Σ be a triangulation of a compact, convex subset of IRm. Then the




∣∣∣∃σ ∈ Σ, x1, x2 ∈ σ
})
.
In Chapters 5 and 6 a triangulation of the set Qm with an arbitrarily small chosen mesh
size will be needed. Here an example of such a triangulation is given. It is called the
K-triangulation of Qm and it is obtained by taking a subset of the K-triangulation of
IRm, introduced in Freudenthal (1942).
Definition 2.7.3 (K-triangulation of Qm)
Let some n ∈ IN be given. The K-triangulation of Qm with grid size 1
n
is the collection
of all m-simplices σ(x1,π) with vertices x




for some a1, . . . , am ∈ I0n−1, π : Im → Im is a permutation, and xi+1 = xi+ 1n em(π(i)),
∀i ∈ Im.





. The K-triangulation of Q2 with grid size 16 is illustrated in Figure 2.7.1.
Consider the point x1 = ( 13 ,
1
6)
⊤ in Figure 2.7.1. There are two possible permutations
of the elements of I2, π
1 = (1, 2) and π2 = (2, 1). Therefore, the 2-simplex σ1 = σ(x1,π1)
has vertices x1 = ( 13 ,
1
6)
⊤, x2 = ( 12 ,
1
6)
⊤, and x3 = ( 12 ,
1
3)
⊤, and the 2-simplex σ2 = σ(x1,π2)
has vertices x1 = ( 13 ,
1
6)
⊤, x2 = ( 13 ,
1
3)




In Chapter 10 a triangulation of the set ∆m−1, for some m ∈ IN \ {1}, with an
arbitrarily small chosen mesh size will be needed. Here an example of such a triangulation
is given. It is called the V -triangulation of ∆m−1 and is introduced in Doup and Talman
(1987).
Let a point v of ∆̇m−1 be given, i.e., v ∈ ri(∆m−1). The point v is considered to be
fixed in the entire description of the V -triangulation of ∆m−1. The set of admissible sign





























































































































































Figure 2.7.1. The K-triangulation of Q2, n = 6.
Notice that there are 2m− 2 elements of S containing no zeroes. For every s ∈ S, define










∣∣∣ ı ∈ Im
})







∣∣∣ ı ∈ Im
})
, ∀i ∈ I+(s)
}
.




∣∣∣∃α, β ∈ IR, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 ≤ β, and xi = αvi, ∀i ∈ I−(s),
αvi ≤ xi ≤ βvi, ∀i ∈ I0(s),
xi = βvi, ∀i ∈ I+(s)
}
.
For every s ∈ S, define ts = i0(s) + 1. It is not difficult to show that, for every s ∈ S,
dim(A(s)) = ts. Moreover, it holds that ∪s∈{s∈S|ts=m−1}A(s) = ∆m−1. For m = 3 and





⊤, the sets A(s) are depicted in Figure 2.7.2 for all s ∈ S. For convenience,
“−1” is replaced by “−” and “+1” by “+” in Figure 2.7.2. The V -triangulation of ∆m−1
is constructed in such a way that for every s ∈ S the set A(s) is triangulated by a subset
of the V -triangulation of ∆m−1.
For every non-empty subset I of Im, p(I) denotes the relative projection of v on





, ∀i ∈ I,
pi(I) = 0, ∀i ∈ Im \ I.
For every s ∈ S, define the collection Πs by
Πs =
{
ρ : Its−1 → I0(s)

















































































































































































































































































Figure 2.7.2. The sets A(s), for s ∈ S, m = 3, v = ( 1118 , 19 , 518)⊤.
Notice that if s ∈ S is such that ts = 1, then Πs = {∅}, and if s ∈ S is such that
ts = 2, then Πs = {ρ} with ρ : I1 → I0(s) the unique permutation of the elements of
I0(s). In general the set Πs contains (ts− 1)! different permutations as its elements. For
every s ∈ S, the set A(s) will be subdivided in subsets A(s, ρ) with ρ ∈ Πs. For every
ρ ∈ Πs, the set A(s, ρ) will be triangulated by a collection of simplices, being a subset
of a collection of simplices obtained by taking the image by a certain affine function of
the K-triangulation of IRt
s
. The V -triangulation of ∆m−1 is then obtained by taking the
union for all s ∈ S with ts = m − 1 and for all ρ ∈ Πs of the triangulations of the sets






and, for every i ∈ Its−1, define the point q(ρ(i)) of IRm by
q (ρ(i)) = p
(




I+(s) ∪ ρ (Ii−1)
)
, ∀i ∈ Its−1.




∣∣∣∀i ∈ I0ts−1, ∃αi ∈ [0, 1], αt
s−1 ≤ · · · ≤ α0,
x = v + α0q (ρ(0)) + · · ·+ αts−1q (ρ(ts − 1))
}
.




αiq(ρ(i)) implies x = λ0v +
∑
i∈Its λ
ip(I+(s) ∪ ρ(Ii−1)) with




λi = 1 and λi ≥ 0,
∀i ∈ I0ts , so the point x is a convex combination of the point v and ts relative projections
of v.
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Definition 2.7.4 (V -triangulation of ∆m−1)
Let a point v of ∆̇m−1 and some n ∈ IN be given. For every s ∈ S, for every ρ ∈
Πs, Σ(s, ρ) is the collection of all ts-simplices σ(x1,π) with vertices x
1, . . . , xt
s+1 ∈ IRm






q(ρ(i)) for some a0, . . . , at
s−1 ∈ I0n−1 with at
s−1 ≤ · · · ≤ a0,
π : Its → {0} ∪ I0(s) is a permutation such that ai−1 = ai, ρ(i − 1) = π(j1), and
ρ(i) = π(j2), for some i ∈ Its−1 and some j1, j2 ∈ Its , implies j1 < j2, and, finally,
xi+1 = xi + 1
n
q(π(i)), ∀i ∈ Its . For every s ∈ S, Σ(s) is the collection ∪ρ∈ΠsΣ(s, ρ).




It can be shown that the collection Σ given in Definition 2.7.4 satisfies the conditions of a
triangulation given in Definition 2.7.1. Moreover, the collection Σ is constructed in such
a way that for every s ∈ S an appropriate collection of ts-faces of the (m− 1)-simplices
of Σ triangulates A(s).
Theorem 2.7.5
Let the collection Σ be the V -triangulation of ∆m−1 with respect to v ∈ ∆̇m−1 and with
grid size 1
n
for some n ∈ IN. Then, for every s ∈ S, for every ρ ∈ Πs, the collection
Σ(s, ρ) equals the collection {τ ⊂ A(s, ρ) | ∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is a ts-face of σ} and triangulates
A(s, ρ). Moreover, for every s ∈ S, the set A(s) is triangulated by Σ(s).
See Doup, van der Laan, and Talman (1987), Lemma 3.3, page 247.
It is easily shown that the V -triangulation of ∆m−1 with respect to v ∈ ∆̇m−1 and with
grid size 1
n
, for some n ∈ IN, has mesh size equal to 1
n
max({1 − vi | i ∈ Im}), hence
the mesh size can be made arbitrarily small. The V -triangulation of ∆2 with respect to





⊤ and with grid size 12 is illustrated in Figure 2.7.3.
Consider the admissible sign vector s = (0,+1,−1)⊤ of S. Since I0(s) = {1}, it holds
that ts = 2, and therefore Πs = {ρ} with ρ = (1). Since I+(s) = {2}, it holds that
q(ρ(0)) = q(0) = p({2}) − v = (0, 1, 0)⊤ − v = (−1118 , 89 ,− 518)⊤, and q(ρ(1)) = q(1) =
p({1, 2}) − p({2}) = ( 1113 , 213 , 0)⊤ − (0, 1, 0)⊤ = ( 1113 ,−1113 , 0)⊤. Hence, A(s) = A(s, ρ) =
co({v, (0, 1, 0)⊤, ( 1113 , 213 , 0)⊤}). Consider x1 = v+ 12q(0) + 0q(1) = ( 1136 , 59 , 536)⊤ ∈ A(s), i.e.,
a0 = 1 and a1 = 0. There are two possible permutations of the elements of I01 , π
1 = (0, 1)
and π2 = (1, 0). Since a0 6= a1, both permutations are allowed. Hence, in Figure 2.7.3,
both σ1 = σ(x1,π1) and σ
2 = σ(x1,π2) are members of Σ(s) = Σ(s, ρ). To illustrate Theorem
2.7.5, notice that in Figure 2.7.3 the collection {τ 1, τ 2} triangulates the 1-dimensional
set A((−1,+1,+1)⊤), being equal to co({v, p({2, 3})}).
In Chapter 11 a triangulation of Qm satisfying properties as in Theorem 2.7.5 is
needed. Here an example of such a triangulation is given. The example is called the
V -triangulation of Qm and is closely related to the V -triangulation introduced in Doup
and Talman (1987) for a Cartesian product of unit simplices.
Let a point v of Qm be given. The point v is considered to be fixed in the entire



























































































































































































































































































































































⊤, n = 2.
S, is defined by
S = {s ∈ Sm |∃i ∈ Im, vi = 0 and si = +1, or
∃i ∈ Im, 0 < vi < 1 and si ∈ {−1,+1}, or
∃i ∈ Im, vi = 1 and si = −1} .
Notice that s ∈ S implies I−(s) ∪ I+(s) 6= ∅. For every s ∈ S, define ts = i0(s) + 1 and




∣∣∣∃α ∈ [0, 1], xi = αvi, ∀i ∈ I−(s),
αvi ≤ xi ≤ 1− α + αvi, ∀i ∈ I0(s),
xi = 1− α + αvi, ∀i ∈ I+(s)
}
.
It is not difficult to verify that, for every s ∈ S, dim(A(s)) = ts. It is also easily shown
that ∪s∈{s∈S|ts=m}A(s) = Qm. For m = 2, for s ∈ S, the sets A(s) corresponding to
v = (0, 0)⊤, v = ( 12 , 0)
⊤, v = ( 12 ,
1
2)
⊤, and v = ( 14 ,
3
8)
⊤ are illustrated in Figure 2.7.4.




∣∣∣ri = −1, ∀i ∈ I0(s) with vi = 1, and ∀i ∈ I−(s),
ri ∈ {−1,+1}, ∀i ∈ I0(s) with 0 < vi < 1,
ri = +1, ∀i ∈ I0(s) with vi = 0, and ∀i ∈ I+(s)
}
.
For every s ∈ S, the set A(s) will be subdivided into sets A(s, r) with r ∈ Rs. For every





























































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.7.4. The sets A(s), for s ∈ S, m = 2.
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of a collection of simplices obtained by taking the image by a certain affine function of
the K-triangulation of IRt
s
. The V -triangulation of Qm is then obtained by taking the
union over s ∈ S with ts = m and over all r ∈ Rs of the triangulations of A(s, r). For
every s ∈ S, for every r ∈ Rs, define the point q(0) ∈ IRm by
qi(0) = −vi, ∀i ∈ I−(r),
qi(0) = 1− vi, ∀i ∈ I+(r).
For every s ∈ S, for every r ∈ Rs, for every i ∈ I0(s), define the point q(i) ∈ IRm by
q(i) = vie
m(i) if i ∈ I−(r),
q(i) = (vi − 1)em(i) if i ∈ I+(r).




∣∣∣∀i ∈ {0} ∪ I0(s), ∃αi ∈ [0, 1], αi ≤ α0 and x=v +∑i∈{0}∪I0(s)αiq(i)
}
.
Notice that for every s ∈ S the set A(s) is subdivided into 2k subsets A(s, r) with r ∈ Rs,
where k = #{i ∈ I0(s) | 0 < vi < 1}.
Definition 2.7.6 (V -triangulation of Qm)
Let a point v ∈ Qm and some n ∈ IN be given. For every s ∈ S, for every r ∈ Rs, Σ(s, r)
is the collection of all ts-simplices σ(x1,π) with vertices x
1, . . . , xt






q(i) for some a0, ai in I0n−1 with a
i ≤ a0, ∀i ∈ I0(s), π : Its → {0}∪I0(s)
is a permutation such that a0 = ai, π(j1) = 0, and π(j2) = i, for some i ∈ I0(s), for
some j1, j2 ∈ Its , implies j1 < j2, and, finally, xi+1 = xi + 1nq(π(i)), ∀i ∈ Its . For every
s ∈ S, Σ(s) is the collection ∪r∈RsΣ(s, r). The V -triangulation of Qm with respect to v
and with grid size 1
n
is the collection Σ = ∪s∈{s∈S|ts=m}Σ(s).
It can be shown that the collection Σ defined above satisfies the conditions of a trian-
gulation given in Definition 2.7.1. Moreover, the collection Σ is constructed in such a
way that for every s ∈ S an appropriate collection of ts-faces of the m-simplices in Σ
triangulates A(s).
Theorem 2.7.7
Let the collection Σ be the V -triangulation of Qm with respect to v ∈ Qm and with grid
size 1
n
for some n ∈ IN. Then, for every s ∈ S, for every r ∈ Rs, the collection Σ(s, r)
equals the collection {τ ⊂ A(s, r) | ∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is a ts-face of σ} and triangulates A(s, r).
Moreover, for every s ∈ S, the set A(s) is triangulated by Σ(s).
See Doup and Talman (1987), remark below Definition 3.3, page 332.
It is easily shown that the V -triangulation of Qm with respect to v ∈ Qm and with grid
size 1
n
, for some n ∈ IN, has mesh size 1
n
max({vi | i ∈ Im} ∪ {1− vi | i ∈ Im}), hence the
mesh size can be made arbitrarily small. For v = (0, 0)⊤, v = ( 12 , 0)




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.7.5. The V -triangulation of Q2, n = 3.
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v = ( 14 ,
3
8)
⊤, the V -triangulation of Q2 with respect to v and with grid size 13 is illustrated
in Figure 2.7.5.
Consider s = (+1, 0)⊤. Notice that for every point v mentioned in the previous
paragraph it holds that s ∈ S. The set A(s) is given by co({v, (1, 0)⊤, (1, 1)⊤}). In case
v = (0, 0)⊤ or v = ( 12 , 0)
⊤ it holds that the set Rs only contains the element r1 given by
r1 = (+1,+1)⊤ since I0(s) = {2}. In this case q(0) = (1− v1, 1)⊤ and q(2) = (0,−1)⊤.
In case v = ( 12 ,
1
2)
⊤ or v = ( 14 ,
3
8)
⊤ it holds that Rs = {r1, r2} with r1 = (+1,+1)⊤
and r2 = (+1,−1)⊤. Now the element r1 yields the points q(0) = (1− v1, 1− v2)⊤ and
q(2) = (0, v2 − 1)⊤ and r2 induces the points q(0) = (1− v1,−v2)⊤ and q(2) = (0, v2)⊤.
In all four cases, consider x1 = v + 13q(0) +
1
3q(2) ∈ A(s, r1), i.e., a0 = 1 and a2 = 1.
There are two possible permutations of the elements of {0, 2}, π1 given by π1 = (0, 2)
and π2 given by π2 = (2, 0). Since a0 = a2, it follows that only the permutation π1 is
allowed. So, σ1 = σ(x1,π1) is a member of Σ(s, r
1).
Many more triangulations of ∆m−1 and Qm are proposed in the literature. Some
other triangulations of ∆m−1 are the Q-triangulation and a number of variants of the
V -triangulation, one of these being a triangulation proposed in Tuy, Thoai, and Muu
(1978), see Doup (1988), the T1-triangulation, see Dang and Talman (1990), and some
barycentric triangulations, see Scarf (1973) and Zangwill (1977). Some other triangu-
lations of Qm are the Q-triangulation and the V ′-triangulation, see Doup (1988), the
Q′-triangulation, see van der Laan and Talman (1982), and the D1-triangulation of IR
m
restricted to Qm, see Dang (1991a). For more details about these and other triangu-
lations, the reader is referred to Todd (1976), Doup (1988), and Dang (1991b). The
following result is valid for every triangulation.
Theorem 2.7.8
For t ∈ IN, let the collection Σ be a triangulation of a convex t-dimensional subset S of
IRm, and let the subset T of rb(S) be such that T = S ∩aff(T ) and dim(T ) = t−1. Then
the collection Σ given by Σ = {τ ⊂ T | ∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is a facet of σ} is a triangulation of T.
See Todd (1976), Theorem 2.3, page 27.
Finally, the notion of a piecewise linear approximation is defined.
Definition 2.7.9 (Piecewise linear approximation)
For t ∈ Z+, let a compact, convex t-dimensional subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, a
triangulation Σ of S, and a correspondence ϕ : S → T be given. A function F : S → IRn
is a piecewise linear approximation of ϕ with respect to Σ if for every vertex x of any
σ ∈ Σ it holds that F (x) ∈ ϕ(x) and for every element x of S it holds that F (x) =
∑
i∈It+1 λ
iF (xi), when x ∈ σ(x1, . . . , xt+1) for some t-simplex σ ∈ Σ and x = ∑i∈It+1 λixi
for some λi ∈ IR, ∀i ∈ It+1.
In Definition 2.7.9 it holds that λi ∈ IR+, ∀i ∈ It+1, and
∑
i∈It+1 λ
i = 1. A piecewise
linear approximation F of a correspondence with respect to a triangulation Σ is uniquely
determined when the images by F of all the vertices of every σ ∈ Σ are specified.
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Therefore, it follows that a piecewise linear approximation of a function with respect
to a triangulation is uniquely determined. Often it is important to know the accuracy
of the piecewise linear approximation of a continuous function with respect to some
triangulation. Then the following result is useful.
Theorem 2.7.10
Let S be a compact subset of IRm, let T be a subset of IRn, and let f : S → T be a
continuous function. Then, for every ε ∈ IR++, there exists δ ∈ IR++ such that, for every
x1, x2 ∈ S with ‖x1 − x2‖∞ < δ, ‖f(x1)− f(x2)‖∞ < ε.
See Munkres (1975), Theorem 7.3, page 180.
2.8 Measure Theory
This section is mainly based on Hildenbrand (1974), Taylor (1985), and Kelley and
Srinivasan (1988).
The set of real numbers can be extended to the set of extended real numbers, denoted
by IR∗. This is done by adding the elements −∞ and +∞ to IR. The set IN∗, defined
by IN∗ = IN ∪ {+∞}, is called the set of extended natural numbers, the set Z∗+, defined
by Z∗+ = Z ∪ {+∞}, is called the set of extended non-negative integers, and the set Z∗,
defined by Z∗ = {−∞}∪Z∪{+∞}, is called the set of extended integers. The sets IR∗m,
IN∗m, Z∗m+ , and Z
∗m are defined as the m-fold Cartesian product of the sets IR∗, IN∗, Z∗+,
and Z∗, respectively. An element of IR∗m is assumed to be a column vector. The element
of IR∗m with every component equal to −∞ is denoted by −∞m and the element of IR∗m
with every component equal to +∞ is denoted by +∞m.
The complete ordering ≤ on IR is extended to a complete ordering on IR∗ as follows.
It holds that −∞ < +∞, −∞ < x, ∀x ∈ IR, and x < +∞, ∀x ∈ IR. It follows
easily, see Taylor (1985), page 5, that every subset of IR∗ has a uniquely determined
infimum and a uniquely determined supremum being an element of IR∗. The ordering
≤ on IR∗m is derived from the ordering ≤ on IR∗ in the same way as the ordering ≤
on IRm is derived from the ordering ≤ on IR. Moreover, the binary relations ≪, <,>,≥,
and ≫ on IR∗m are defined in the obvious way. The sets IR∗m+ and IR∗m++ are defined by
IR∗m+ = {x ∈ IR∗m | x ≥ 0m} and IR∗m++ = {x ∈ IR∗m | x≫ 0m}.
Let (xn)n∈IN be a sequence in IR
∗. The sequence (xn)n∈IN is said to converge to x ∈ IR∗,
denoted by xn → x or by limn→+∞ xn = x, if for every element x− of IR∗ with x− < x
there exists n1 ∈ IN such that n > n1 implies x− < xn, and if for every element x+ of
IR∗ with x+ > x there exists n2 ∈ IN such that n > n2 implies xn < x+. In this case the
sequence (xn)n∈IN is said to be convergent and the point x is called the limit of (x
n)n∈IN.
Obviously, the notions related to convergence are well-defined if there exists n′ ∈ IN such
that the element xn is only defined for every n ≥ n′.
Let (xn)n∈IN be a sequence in IR
∗m. Then the sequence (xn)n∈IN is said to converge to
x ∈ IR∗m, denoted by xn → x or by limn→+∞ xn = x, if xni → xi, ∀i ∈ Im. Notice that
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this notion of convergence coincides with the one given for sequences in IRm in case xn,
∀n ∈ IN, and x are elements of IRm.
Addition in IR∗ is an extension of addition in IR and is defined by the following rules,
(−∞) + (−∞) = −∞, (+∞) + (+∞) = +∞, and, for every x ∈ IR, x + (−∞) =
(−∞) + x = −∞ and x+ (+∞) = (+∞) + x = +∞. Notice that (−∞) + (+∞) is not
defined. Multiplication in IR∗ is an extension of multiplication in IR and is defined by
the following rules. For λ ∈ IR∗, if −∞ ≤ λ < 0, then λ(−∞) = (−∞)λ = +∞ and
λ(+∞) = (+∞)λ = −∞, if 0 < λ ≤ +∞, then λ(−∞) = (−∞)λ = −∞ and λ(+∞) =
(+∞)λ = +∞, and 0(−∞) = (−∞)0 = 0(+∞) = (+∞)0 = 0. In IR∗m addition and
multiplication by an element of IR∗ is derived from addition and multiplication in IR∗ by
performing addition and multiplication componentwise.
Let S1 and S2 be subsets of IR∗m such that x1 ∈ S1, x2 ∈ S2, and there exists i ∈ Im
with x1i = −∞ implies x2i 6= +∞, whereas x1 ∈ S1, x2 ∈ S2, and there exists i ∈ Im with
x1i = +∞ implies x2i 6= −∞. Then the sum of S1 and S2, denoted by S1 + S2, is defined
as the set {x ∈ IR∗m | ∃x1 ∈ S1, ∃x2 ∈ S2, x = x1 + x2}. Let λ be an element of IR∗ and
let S be a subset of IR∗m. Then the product of λ and S, denoted by λS, is defined as the
set {x ∈ IR∗m | ∃x ∈ S, x = λx}.
Let (xn)n∈IN be a sequence in IR
∗ such that, for every n ∈ IN, xn ≥ 0. For every
n ∈ IN, the sum x1 + · · · + xn is well-defined using the properties mentioned in the
previous paragraph and is denoted by
∑
j∈In x
j . Let the sequence (xn)n∈IN in IR
∗ be such
that, for every n ∈ IN, xn = ∑j∈In xj . It can be shown that this sequence always converges
to some element of IR∗, denoted by
∑
n∈IN x
n. Moreover, it can be shown that the limit
is independent of the order of addition.
Consider the topology on IR∗ given by the collection of subsets S of IR∗ satisfying
that for every x ∈ S either x = −∞ and there exists x̂ ∈ IR such that {x ∈ IR∗ | −∞ ≤
x < x̂} ⊂ S, or x ∈ IR and there exists δ ∈ IR++ such that B1(x, δ) ⊂ S, or x = +∞
and there exists x̂ ∈ IR such that {x ∈ IR∗ | x̂ < x ≤ +∞} ⊂ S. Consider the topology
on IR∗m given by the product topology. In the entire monograph it will be assumed that
this is the topology on IR∗m. The topological space IR∗m can be shown to be a Hausdorff
space.
Let a subset S of IR∗m, a subset T of IR∗n, and an element x of S be given. It is not
difficult to show that a function f : S → T is continuous at x if and only if (xn)n∈IN
being a sequence in S, xn → x, yn = f(xn), ∀n ∈ IN, and y = f(x) implies yn → y.
A collection A of subsets of a non-empty set X such that X ∈ A, En ∈ A, ∀n ∈ IN,
implies ∪n∈INEn ∈ A, and E1, E2 ∈ A implies E1 \ E2 ∈ A is called a σ-algebra of X.
The pair (X,A) consisting of a non-empty set X and a σ-algebra A of X is called a
measurable space and the members of A are called A-measurable.
Let A be a σ-algebra of a non-empty set X. Then ∅ ∈ A since ∅ = X \X. Therefore,
any finite union of members of A is contained in A. Moreover, any countable intersection
of members of A is contained in A since ∩n∈INEn = E \∪n∈IN(E \En) with E = ∪n∈INEn.
An example of a σ-algebra of X is the collection of all subsets of X.
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Let E be a non-empty collection of subsets of a non-empty set X. The intersection of
all σ-algebras A of X such that E ⊂ A is a σ-algebra of X and is called the σ-algebra of
X generated by E .
Let a non-empty set X be a topological space and let B(X) be the σ-algebra generated
by the collection of all open sets of X. The members of B(X) are called Borel sets of X
and B(X) is called the Borel σ-algebra of X.
Let two measurable spaces (X1,A1) and (X2,A2) be given. A function f : X1 → X2
is said to be measurable if for every E ∈ A2 it holds that f−1(E) ∈ A1. When a function
f : X1 → IR is considered, then it is always assumed that on IR the Borel σ-algebra is
taken.
Theorem 2.8.1
Let measurable spaces (X1,A1), (X2,A2), and a function f : X1 → X2 be given. Let E
be a non-empty collection of subsets of X2 that generates the σ-algebra A2. If for every
E ∈ E it holds that f−1(E) ∈ A1, then the function f is measurable.
See Hildenbrand (1974), 3, page 41.
Let (X,A) be a measurable space. A function µ : A → IR∗ is called a measure on A if for
every E ∈ A it holds that µ(E) ≥ 0, µ(∅) = 0, and µ is countably additive, i.e., when the
sets En, ∀n ∈ IN, are pairwise disjoint members of A, then ∑n∈IN µ(En) = µ(∪n∈INEn).
For every E ∈ A, the extended real number µ(E) is called the measure of E. A measure
µ : A → [0, 1] satisfying that µ(X) = 1 is called a probability measure. A triple
(X,A, µ) given by a non-empty set X, a σ-algebra A of X, and a measure µ on A is
called a measure space. If X is a topological space, then a measure µ : B(X) → IR is
called a Borel measure. If X is a topological space and µ is a Borel measure, then there
exists a smallest closed set E of X such that µ(E) = µ(X), called the support of µ.
Let a measure space (X,A, µ) be given. A property X is said to hold for almost
every x ∈ X if the set E = {x ∈ X | x does not have property X} is a member of the
σ-algebra A with µ(E) = 0. A subset S of X is said to be negligible if for some E ∈ A
it holds that S ⊂ E and µ(E) = 0. The measure space (X,A, µ) is said to be complete
if every negligible subset of X is a member of A.
A measure often used for IRm is the Lebesgue measure. It is constructed as follows.
For a, b ∈ IRm with a ≪ b, the volume of the open interval (a, b) of IRm, denoted by
vol(a, b), is defined by vol(a, b) =
∏
i∈Im(bi − ai). For every subset S of IRm, a Lebesgue
covering of S is defined as a countable collection of non-empty, open intervals of IRm,
say {(ai, bi) | i ∈ I} with I a countable set, satisfying S ⊂ ∪i∈I(ai, bi). The function
µ∗ : 2IR






∣∣∣ {(ai, bi)|i ∈ I} is a Lebesgue covering of S
})
.
It is easily verified that µ∗(∅) = 0, µ∗(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ⊂ IRm, and µ∗((a, b)) = µ∗(cl((a, b))) =
vol(a, b) for every a, b ∈ IRm with a≪ b. Moreover, if S1 and S2 are subsets of IRm with
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S1 ⊂ S2, then µ∗(S1) ≤ µ∗(S2), and if, for every i ∈ I with I a countable set, Si is a
subset of IRm, then µ∗(∪i∈ISi) ≤
∑
i∈I µ
∗(Si). It should be remarked that (IRm, 2IR
m
, µ∗)
is not a measure space since the function µ∗ fails to be countably additive. A subset E
of IRm is said to be µ∗-measurable if for every S ⊂ IRm it holds that µ∗(S) = µ∗(S ∩
E) + µ∗(S \ E). Define A′ as the collection of µ∗-measurable subsets of IRm. Define the
function µ′ : A′ → IR∗ by µ′(E) = µ∗(E), ∀E ∈ A′. The function µ′ is called the Lebesgue
measure for IRm.
Theorem 2.8.2
The collection A′ is a σ-algebra of IRm containing B(IRm) as a proper subset and the
triple (IRm,A′, µ′) is a complete measure space.
See Taylor (1985), Theorem 4.7.5, page 199, Theorem 4.7.6, page 200, and Theorem
4.7.7, page 200.
The σ-algebra A′ does not contain all subsets of IRm, see for example Taylor (1985), page
212. Since the measure space (IRm,A′, µ′) is complete, it follows immediately from the
construction of the measure µ′ that a subset S of IRm has Lebesgue measure zero if and




i, bi) < ε.
Now a theory of integration can be developed. Attention will be restricted to inte-
gration over a probability measure since this is all what will be needed in the sequel.
Clearly, the approach given can easily be extended to other measures. Let a measurable
space (X,A) be given. A function f : X → IR is said to be simple if f(X) is a finite set
and, for every x ∈ IR, f−1({x}) ∈ A. Hence, if f : X → IR is a simple function, then
f(X) = {a1, . . . , am}, with ai ∈ IR, ∀i ∈ Im, and letting Ei = {x ∈ X | f(x) = ai},
∀i ∈ Im, it holds that f(x) =
∑
i∈Im a
iχEi(x), ∀x ∈ X. Using Theorem 2.8.1 it follows
easily that a simple function f is measurable.
Let a measurable space (X,A) be given and let f : X → IR be a measurable function
satisfying f(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X. A sequence of simple functions (fn)n∈IN with the property
that for every x ∈ X both fn(x) → f(x) and 0 ≤ fn(x) ≤ fn+1(x), ∀n ∈ IN, is called a
regular approximating sequence for f. In Taylor (1985), Theorem 5.1.9, page 237, it is
shown that a regular approximating sequence (fn)n∈IN for the function f exists.
Let a measure space (X,A, µ) be given with µ a probability measure. Let f : X → IR




iχEi(x), ∀x ∈ X. The integral of f is denoted by
∫






iµ(Ei). Now let f : X → IR be a measurable function
satisfying f(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X. If (fn)n∈IN and (gn)n∈IN are two regular approximating






ndµ, see Taylor, Lemma 5.4.1,
page 253. The function f is said to be summable if limn→+∞
∫
X f
ndµ < +∞. In this case
the integral of f, denoted by
∫
X fdµ, is defined as this limit,
∫




Next, let f : X → IR be an arbitrary measurable function. The functions f− : X → IR
and f+ : X → IR are defined by f−(x) = −min({f(x), 0}), ∀x ∈ X, and f+(x) =
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max({f(x), 0}), ∀x ∈ X. Hence, f(x) = f+(x)−f−(x), ∀x ∈ X. Using Theorem 2.8.1 it is
not difficult to show that if the function f is measurable, then the functions f− and f+ are
also measurable. Now f is said to be summable if both f− and f+ are summable and in
this case the integral of f, denoted by
∫






It can be shown that every bounded measurable function is summable.
Let (X1,A1, µ1) and (X2,A2, µ2) be measure spaces with µ1 and µ2 probability mea-
sures. The σ-algebra of X1×X2 generated by the collection of sets E1×E2 with E1 ∈ A1
and E2 ∈ A2 is called the product σ-algebra of the σ-algebras A1 and A2 and is denoted
by A1 ⊗ A2. For every subset S of X1 × X2, for every x1 ∈ X1, let the set S(x1) be
defined by S(x1) = {x2 ∈ X2 | (x1, x2) ∈ S} and, for every x2 ∈ X2, let the set S(x2)
be defined by S(x2) = {x1 ∈ X1 | (x1, x2) ∈ S}. Let some E ∈ A1 ⊗ A2 be given.
In Taylor (1985), Theorem 7.5.1, page 339, it is shown that E(x1) ∈ A2, ∀x1 ∈ X1,
and E(x2) ∈ A1, ∀x2 ∈ X2. So, both the function f 1 : X1 → IR and the function
f 2 : X2 → IR, defined by f 1(x1) = µ2(E(x1)), ∀x1 ∈ X1, and f 2(x2) = µ1(E(x2)),
∀x2 ∈ X2, are well-defined. In Taylor (1985), Theorem 7.5.3, page 340, it is shown







that since µ1 and µ2 are probability measures it holds that the functions f 1 and f 2 are
bounded, and therefore f 1 and f 2 are summable. For every E ∈ A1⊗A2, define the real






2dµ2. Then µ : A1 ⊗ A2 → IR is called the
product measure of the measures µ1 and µ2 and is denoted by µ = µ1×µ2. From Taylor
(1985), Theorem 7.5.4, page 343, it follows that µ is indeed a probability measure.
2.9 Differential Calculus
This section is mainly based on Rudin (1976) and Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983).
Let an open set U of IRm
1
, an element x of U, and a function f : U → IRm2 be given.





, called the derivative of f at x, such that for every sequence
(hn)n∈IN in IR
m1 with hn 6= 0m1 , ∀n ∈ IN, and hn → 0m1 it holds that
‖f(x+ hn)− f(x)− ∂f(x)(hn)‖2
‖hn‖2
→ 0.
The function f is said to be differentiable if it is differentiable at every x ∈ U. Since the
set U is open, it holds that there exists n′ ∈ IN such that, for every n ≥ n′, x+ hn ∈ U,
so then f(x+hn) is well-defined. It is easily shown that if the function f is differentiable
at x, then the function ∂f(x) is uniquely determined. Moreover, it is easily shown that
if the function f is differentiable at x, then f is continuous at x.
The following result is known as the chain rule. Let an open set U1 of IRm
1
, an
element x of U1, an open set U2 of IRm
2
, a function f 1 : U1 → IRm2 , and a function
f 2 : U2 → IRm3 be given such that U2 contains f 1(U1), f 1 is differentiable at x, and f 2
is differentiable at f 1(x). Then the function f : U1 → IRm3 , defined by f(x) = f 2(f 1(x)),
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∀x ∈ U1, is differentiable at x and ∂f(x) = ∂f 2(f 1(x)) ◦ ∂f 1(x), see for instance Rudin
(1976), Theorem 9.15, page 214.
Let an open set U of IRm
1
, an element x of U, and a function f : U → IRm2 be given.
For every i ∈ Im1 , the i-th (first order) partial derivative of f at x, or the (first order)
partial derivative of f at x with respect to xi, denoted by ∂xif(x), is defined by x̂ ∈ IRm
2
if for every sequence (hn)n∈IN in IR with h









Since the set U is open, it holds that there exists n′ ∈ IN such that, for every n ≥ n′,
x+ hnem
1
(i) ∈ U, so then f(x+ hnem1(i)) is well-defined.
Let an open set U of IRm, an element x of U, and a function f : U → IRn be given.
For every i ∈ Im, it is easily shown that the partial derivative ∂xif(x) exists if and
only if the partial derivative ∂xifj(x) exists for every j ∈ In. Moreover, it holds that
∂xif(x) = (∂xif1(x), . . . , ∂xifn(x))
⊤. If the i-th partial derivative of f at x exists for




∂x1f1(x) · · · ∂xmf1(x)
...
...
∂x1fn(x) · · · ∂xmfn(x)

 .
Let an open set U of IRm, an element x of U, and a function f : U → IRn being
differentiable at x be given. Then it can be shown that for every i ∈ Im the i-th partial
derivative of f at x, ∂xif(x), exists and that ∂f(x)(x) = ∂xf(x)x, ∀x ∈ IRm, see for
instance Rudin (1976), Theorem 9.17, page 215. So, the uniquely determined matrix
representing the linear function ∂f(x), see also Section 2.4, is given by ∂xf(x).
Let an open set U of IRm and a function f : U → IRn be given. If the partial derivative
∂xif(x) exists for every element x of U, then ∂xif : U → IRn is a function, called the
i-th (first order) partial derivative of f or the (first order) partial derivative of f with
respect to xi. The function f is said to be continuously differentiable if for every i ∈ Im
the function ∂xif is continuous. It can be shown that if the function f : U → IRn is
continuously differentiable, then f is also differentiable, see for instance Rudin (1976),
Theorem 9.21, page 219.
Let an open set U of IRm, an element x of U, and a continuously differentiable function
f : U → IRn be given. For every i1, i2 ∈ Im, the second order partial derivative of f











f)(x) if this expression is well-defined. If for every i1, i2 ∈ Im the function
∂2x
i1xi2
f : U → IRn is continuous, then the function f is called a twice continuously
differentiable function. In a similar way, for every r ∈ IN, the r-th order partial derivatives
of the function f can be defined, and f is called r times continuously differentiable if
all partial derivatives of f up to the order r are continuous functions. If f is a function
from U into IR, then ∂2xxf(x) denotes the matrix having for every i
1, i2 ∈ Im the element
∂2x
i1xi2
f(x) in column i1 and row i2.
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For a function f : U → T with U an open set of IRm and T a non-empty subset of IRn,
all notions mentioned above are defined in an identical way. For every r ∈ IN, Cr(U, T )
is defined as the set of r times continuously differentiable functions from U into T. The
set C∞(U, T ) is defined by C∞(U, T ) = ∩r∈INCr(U, T ). An element of C∞(U, T ) is called
a smooth function. It follows easily that C∞(U, T ) ⊂ · · · ⊂ C1(U, T ) ⊂ C0(U, T ). For
any r ∈ IN, the order of taking the partial derivatives to obtain an r-th order partial
derivative does not matter for the resulting value of the partial derivative of an element
of Cr(U, T ), see Rudin (1976), Corollary of Theorem 9.4.1, page 236.
The following result is easily verified, but nevertheless surprising.
Theorem 2.9.1
The function f : IR→ IR, defined by f(x) = 0, ∀x ≤ 0, and f(x) = exp(− 1
x
), ∀x > 0, is
an element of C∞(IR, IR).
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), page 41.
A result related to Theorem 2.9.1 is given in Theorem 2.9.2.
Theorem 2.9.2
For every α, β ∈ IR with 0 < α < β, there exists a function f ∈ C∞(IRm, [0, 1]) such that,
for every x ∈ IRm, f(x) = 1 if ‖x‖2 ≤ α, 0 < f(x) < 1 if α < ‖x‖2 < β, and f(x) = 0 if
‖x‖2 ≥ β.
See Hirsch (1976), page 41-42.
The following result is known as the inverse function theorem.
Theorem 2.9.3 (Inverse function theorem)
For r ∈ IN∗, let an open set U of IRm, an element x of U, and a function f ∈ Cr(U, IRm)
be given. If ∂xf(x) is an invertible matrix, then there exist open sets U
1 and U2 of IRm
such that x ∈ U1, the function g ∈ Cr(U1, U2), defined by g(x) = f(x), ∀x ∈ U1, is
injective and surjective, g−1 ∈ Cr(U2, U1), and ∂xg−1(g(x)) = (∂xg(x))−1. If U1 and U2
are open sets of IRm and g is a function of Cr(U1, U2) such that g is injective, surjective,
and g−1 ∈ Cr(U2, U1), then ∂xg(x) is invertible for every x ∈ U1.
See Mas-Colell (1985), Theorem C.3.1, page 20.
For r ∈ Z+, let an open set U of IRm, a subset T of IRn, and a function f ∈ Cr(U, T ) be
given. For every k ∈ Zm+ with ‖k‖1 ≤ r, the function ∇kf : U → IRn is defined by letting,
for every x ∈ U, ∇kf(x) be the value of the ‖k‖1-th order partial derivative obtained
by taking, for every i ∈ Im, ki times the partial derivative of f with respect to xi at x.
Notice that ∇0mf = f and, for every i ∈ Im, ∇em(i)f = ∂xif.
Let some r ∈ Z∗+ and an open set U of IRm be given. A topology on the set Cr(U, IR)
is needed in Chapter 9. The following topology, called the Cr-topology, will be used.
The Cr-topology is defined by giving a base for it.
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Definition 2.9.4 (Cr-topology)
Let r ∈ Z+, r ∈ Z∗+ with r ≤ r, and an open set U of IRm be given. A base for the
Cr-topology on Cr(U, IR) is given by the set
{
V rg,ǫ






f ∈ Cr(U, IR)
∣∣∣∀k ∈ Zm+ with ‖k‖1 ≤ r, |∇kg(x)−∇kf(x)| < ǫ(x), ∀x ∈ U
}
.
A subset O of C∞(U, IR) is open in the C∞-topology on C∞(U, IR) if there exists r ∈ IN
such that O is open in the Cr-topology on C∞(U, IR).
Let r ∈ IN∗, a subset S of IRm, and a subset T of IRn be given. A function f : S → T
is called r times continuously differentiable if for every element x of S there exists an
open set U of IRm containing x and a function g ∈ Cr(U, IRn) such that g(x) = f(x),
∀x ∈ S ∩ U. The set of r times continuously differentiable functions from S into T
is denoted by Cr(S, T ). A function f : S → T is called a Cr diffeomorphism if f is
injective, surjective, f ∈ Cr(S, T ), and f−1 ∈ Cr(T, S). The sets S and T are called
Cr diffeomorphic if there exists a Cr diffeomorphism f : S → T. Although the above
definitions are of a local character, the following result shows that they can be made
global.
Theorem 2.9.5
For r ∈ IN∗, let a subset S of IRm, a subset T of IRn, and a function f ∈ Cr(S, T ) be
given. Then there exists an open set U of IRm containing the set S and there exists a
function g ∈ Cr(U, IRn) such that g(x) = f(x), ∀x ∈ S.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.1.5, page 103.
Differentiability properties are often employed in optimization. Before giving necessary
and sufficient conditions for an element to be a maximizer of a function on a certain
set, some properties of functions are given first. Let a subset S of IRm, an element x
of S, and a function f : S → IR be given. The function f is said to be quasi-convex
at x if f(x̂) ≤ f(x) for some x̂ ∈ S and λx̂ + (1 − λ)x ∈ S for some λ ∈ [0, 1] implies
f(λx̂+ (1− λ)x) ≤ f(x). The function f is said to be quasi-convex if it is quasi-convex
at every x ∈ S. The function f is said to be quasi-concave at x if f(x̂) ≥ f(x) for some
x̂ ∈ S and λx̂ + (1− λ)x ∈ S for some λ ∈ [0, 1] implies f(λx̂ + (1− λ)x) ≥ f(x). The
function f is said to be quasi-concave if it is quasi-concave at every x ∈ S.
Let an open set U of IRm, an element x of U, and a function f : U → IR be given. The
function f is said to be pseudo-convex at x if f is differentiable at x and if ∂xf(x)(x̂−x) ≥
0 for some x̂ ∈ U implies f(x̂) ≥ f(x). The function f is said to be pseudo-convex if it
is pseudo-convex at every x ∈ U. The function f is said to be pseudo-concave at x if f
is differentiable at x and if ∂xf(x)(x̂− x) ≤ 0 for some x̂ ∈ U implies f(x̂) ≤ f(x). The
function f is said to be pseudo-concave if it is pseudo-concave at every x ∈ U.
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The following result gives sufficient conditions for an element to be a maximizer of a
function on a certain set.
Theorem 2.9.6
Let an open set U of IRm, an element x of U, a function f : U → IR, and a function
g : U → IRn be given. Let the function f be pseudo-concave at x and let the function g







then x is a maximizer of f on the set S given by S = {x ∈ U | g(x) ≥ 0n}.
See Mangasarian (1969), Theorem 10.1.2, page 153.
The following result gives necessary conditions for an element to be a maximizer of a
function on a certain set.
Theorem 2.9.7
Let an open set U of IRm, a function f : U → IR, and a function g : U → IRn be given.
Let the element x be a maximizer of f on the set S given by S = {x ∈ U | g(x) ≥ 0n}









while λj > 0 for some j ∈ In such that gj(x) = 0 and gj is not pseudo-convex at x, or
µ > 0.
See Mangasarian (1969), Theorem 10.2.2, page 154.
2.10 Differential Topology
This section is mainly based on Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973) and Jongen, Jonker,
and Twilt (1983, 1986). For a nice introduction into the field the reader is referred to
Milnor (1965).
Intuitively, for some k ∈ IN, a k-dimensional manifold is a set which is locally like
IRk. The following definitions make this statement more precise.
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Definition 2.10.1 (Topological manifold)
For k ∈ Z+, a subset X of IRm is a k-dimensional topological manifold if for every
element x of X there exists an open set U of X containing x, an open set V of IRk, and an
injective and surjective function φ : U → V such that φ ∈ C0(U, V ) and φ−1 ∈ C0(V, U),
i.e., φ : U → V is a homeomorphism.
Definition 2.10.2 (Cr manifold)
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, a subset X of IRm is a k-dimensional Cr manifold if for every
element x of X there exists an open set U of X containing x, an open set V of IRk, and an
injective and surjective function φ : U → V such that φ ∈ Cr(U, V ) and φ−1 ∈ Cr(V, U),
i.e., φ : U → V is a Cr diffeomorphism.
The pair (U, φ) in Definition 2.10.2 is called a chart of X around x and (V, φ−1) are
called local Cr coordinates for U. The function φ is called a Cr coordinate system for X
around x.
Definition 2.10.3 (Piecewise Cr manifold)
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, a subset X of IRm is a k-dimensional piecewise Cr manifold if
X is a k-dimensional topological manifold being a finite union of Cr manifolds.
If X is a k-dimensional topological manifold, a k-dimensional Cr manifold, or a k-
dimensional piecewise Cr manifold, then the dimension of X is said to be k. In Definition
2.10.3 it is allowed that the dimension of some of the Cr manifolds whose union is equal
to X is less than k.
Examples of m-dimensional C∞ manifolds are the set IRm and any open set of IRm.
The set B̃m−1(0m, 1) can be shown to be an (m− 1)-dimensional C∞ manifold. The set
IN is a 0-dimensional C∞ manifold. The empty set is a k-dimensional C∞ manifold for
every k ∈ Z+. Clearly, for every r, r ∈ IN∗ with r < r, it holds that a Cr manifold is also a
Cr manifold. For some r ∈ IN, let a function f ∈ Cr(IR, IR) \Cr+1(IR, IR) be given. Then
the set {x ∈ IR2 | x2 = f(x1)} is a Cr manifold, but not a Cr+1 manifold, see Jongen,
Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Example 3.1.1, page 91. The set Qm is neither a Cr manifold
for any r ∈ IN∗ nor a topological manifold. The set S = {x ∈ IR2 | min({x1, x2}) = 0} is
a 1-dimensional topological manifold, but it is not a C1 manifold. It is the union of the
1-dimensional C∞ manifold S1 = {x ∈ IR2 | x1 = 0 and x2 > 0}, the 0-dimensional C∞
manifold S2 = {x ∈ IR2 | x = (0, 0)⊤}, and the 1-dimensional C∞ manifold S3 = {x ∈
IR2 | x1 > 0 and x2 = 0}. Therefore, the set S is a 1-dimensional piecewise C∞ manifold.
The set Qm is not a piecewise C1 manifold since it is not a topological manifold.
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let a k-dimensional Cr manifold X, an element x of X, and a
coordinate system φ for X around x be given. Then the set ∂φ−1(φ(x))(IRk) is called the
tangent space of X at x and is denoted by TxX. It can be shown that the set TxX does
not depend on the choice of the coordinate system φ. The 1-dimensional C∞ manifold
B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 2), the tangent space of B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 2) at x1 = (2, 0)⊤, Tx1B̃
1((0, 0)⊤, 2), and











































Figure 2.10.1. The set S = B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 2), the tangent space Tx1S, and the tangent
space Tx2S, with x





For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, a characterization of a k-dimensional Cr manifold is given
in the following theorem. This characterization is also sometimes used as a definition of
a k-dimensional Cr manifold, see for instance van Geldrop (1981).
Theorem 2.10.4
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, a subset X of IRm is a k-dimensional Cr manifold if and only if
for every element x of X there exists a Cr coordinate system φ : U → V of IRm around
x satisfying φ(x) = 0m and φ(X ∩ U) = {y ∈ V | yi = 0, ∀i ∈ Im−k}.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Theorem 3.11, page 89.
Notice that, by definition, the function φ : U → V in Theorem 2.10.4 is a Cr coordinate
system of IRm around x if x ∈ U, U and V are open sets of IRm, φ is injective and
surjective, φ ∈ Cr(U, V ), and φ−1 ∈ Cr(V, U).
For the purposes of this monograph the concept of a manifold is too restrictive.
Especially sets like the unit simplex ∆m−1 or the unit cube Qm will be frequently studied
in Part IV of this monograph, both not being manifolds. Hence, the notion of a manifold
with generalized boundary is introduced.
Definition 2.10.5 (Manifold with generalized boundary)
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, a subset X of IRm is a k-dimensional Cr manifold with gener-
alized boundary (MGB) if for every element x of X there exists a Cr coordinate system
φ : U → V of IRm around x and an integer ℓ(x), 0 ≤ ℓ(x) ≤ k, satisfying φ(x) = 0m and
φ(X ∩ U) =
{
y ∈ V
∣∣∣yi = 0, ∀i ∈ Im−k, and yi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Im−k+ℓ(x) \ Im−k
}
.
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If X is a k-dimensional Cr manifold with generalized boundary, then the dimension of
X is said to be k. From Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.1.3, page 97, it
follows that the dimension k, for every MGB X, and the integer ℓ(x), for every element
x of X, are independent from the choice of the coordinate system. Intuitively, a k-
dimensional manifold with generalized boundary is in a neighbourhood of x ∈ X like the
set {x ∈ IRk | xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Iℓ(x)}.
Using Definition 2.10.5 it is easily verified that the set Qm is an m-dimensional C∞
MGB with ℓ(x) = #({i ∈ Im | xi = 0} ∪ {i ∈ Im | xi = 1}), ∀x ∈ Qm. The unit
simplex ∆m−1 is an (m − 1)-dimensional C∞ MGB with ℓ(x) = #{i ∈ Im | xi = 0},
∀x ∈ ∆m−1. These results follow immediately from Theorem 2.10.11. Notice that the set
{x ∈ IR2+ | x1 = 0 or x2 = 0} is not an MGB.
Theorem 2.10.6
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let the set X be a k-dimensional Cr MGB. Then every component
in X is a path-connected k-dimensional Cr MGB.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.1.1, page 93, and Exercise 3.1.4, page
97.
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let the set X be a k-dimensional Cr MGB. Define the set Bl(X)
by
Bl(X) = {x ∈ X | ℓ(x) = l}, ∀l ∈ I0k .
For every l ∈ I0k , a path-component of Bl(X) is called a stratum of X. Clearly, the
collection of strata of X is a partition of X. The set B0(X) is called the relative interior
of X. The set X \B0(X) is called the relative boundary of X. These definitions of relative
interior and relative boundary are consistent with the corresponding definitions in Section
2.3 for arcs and in Section 2.7 for convex sets. In case X = B0(X) it follows that the set
X is a k-dimensional Cr manifold by Theorem 2.10.4. If X = B0(X)∪B1(X), then the
set X is called a manifold with boundary. The following theorem yields that the relative
boundary of a manifold with boundary is a manifold.
Theorem 2.10.7
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let the set X be a k-dimensional Cr MGB. For every l ∈ I0k , the
set Bl(X) is a (k − l)-dimensional Cr manifold.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.1.4, page 98.
From Theorem 2.10.6 and Theorem 2.10.7 it follows that a stratum of an MGB is a
manifold. The following result is often useful in showing that a set is an MGB.
Theorem 2.10.8
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let the set X be a k-dimensional Cr MGB and let the function
f : X → Y be a Cr diffeomorphism, where Y is a subset of IRn. Then the set Y is a
k-dimensional Cr MGB. If the set S is a stratum of X, then the set f(S) is a stratum
of Y.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Corollary 3.1.3, page 103.
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Compact 1-dimensional MGB’s have a particular nice structure, as follows from the
following theorem.
Theorem 2.10.9
For r ∈ IN∗, let the set X be a compact 1-dimensional Cr MGB. Then the set X has
a finite number of components, each being Cr diffeomorphic to either the unit circle
B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 1) or the unit interval [0, 1].
See Mas-Colell (1985), H.6, page 35.
An interesting class of sets are the so-called regular constraint sets. Let U be an open
set of IRm and let, for some n1 ∈ Z+, for some n2 ∈ Z+, functions g̃j : U → IR, ∀j ∈ In1,
and h̃j : U → IR, ∀j ∈ In2, be given. Define the set M [g̃, h̃] by
M [g̃, h̃] =
{
x ∈ U
∣∣∣g̃j(x) = 0, ∀j ∈ In1 , and h̃j(x) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ In2
}
.
For every element x of U, define the set J0(x) = {j ∈ In2 | hj(x) = 0}. In the above
definitions n1 and n2 are allowed to be zero, in which case g̃ and h̃ are denoted by ∅,
respectively.
Definition 2.10.10 (Regular constraint system and regular constraint set)
For n1, n2 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let U be an open set of IRm and let g̃j : U → IR, ∀j ∈ In1,
and h̃j : U → IR, ∀j ∈ In2 , be Cr functions. The pair of functions (g̃, h̃) is a Cr regular










∣∣∣ j ∈ J0(x)
}
is an independent set. The set S is a Cr regular constraint set (RCS) if there exists a
Cr regular constraint system (g̃, h̃) such that S = M [g̃, h̃].
Let g̃ = ∅ and define the function h̃ : IRm → IR2m+1 as follows. For every i ∈ Im,
h̃i(x) = xi, ∀x ∈ IRm, h̃m+i(x) = 1− xi, ∀x ∈ IRm, and h̃2m+1(x) =
∑
i∈Im xi, ∀x ∈ IRm.
Then M [g̃, h̃] = Qm, but the pair of functions (g̃, h̃) is not a Cr regular constraint system
for any r ∈ IN∗. This follows from the fact that J0(0m) = Im ∪ {2m + 1} and since a
subset of IRm containing m + 1 elements can never be independent. Now let g̃ = ∅ and
define the function h̃ : IRm → IR2m by letting for every i ∈ I2m component h̃i of h̃ be
as above. Then, again, it holds that M [g̃, h̃] = Qm. It is easily verified that the pair of
functions (g̃, h̃) is a C∞ regular constraint system. Hence, the unit cube Qm is a C∞
RCS.
Define the function g̃ : IRm → IR by g̃(x) = ∑i∈Im xi − 1, ∀x ∈ IRm, and, for every
i ∈ Im, define the function h̃i : IRm → IR by h̃i(x) = xi, ∀x ∈ IRm. It is easily verified that
the pair of functions (g̃, h̃) is a C∞ regular constraint system. Since M [g̃, h̃] = ∆m−1, it
holds that the unit simplex ∆m−1 is a C∞ RCS.
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Theorem 2.10.11
For r ∈ IN∗, let the subset X of IRm be a Cr RCS and let the pair of functions (g̃, h̃) be a
Cr regular constraint system such that M [g̃, h̃] = X, where g̃ has n1 components. Then
X is a k-dimensional Cr MGB with k = m − n1. Moreover, ℓ(x) = #J0(x) for every
element x of X.
See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Lemma 3.1.2, page 94.
Theorem 2.10.11 shows that the dimension of a non-empty RCS is well-defined. In many
cases Theorem 2.10.11 can be used to show that a certain set is an MGB.
Next, the tangent space and the tangent cone of a manifold with generalized boundary
are defined.
Definition 2.10.12 (Tangent space and tangent cone)
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let the set X be a k-dimensional Cr MGB. Let x be an element of
X and let the function φ be a Cr coordinate system for IRm around x with the properties
given in Definition 2.10.5. The tangent space of X at x, denoted by TxX, is the set
∂φ−1(0m)({0m−k} × IRk) and the tangent cone of X at x, denoted by CxX, is the set
∂φ−1(0m)({0m−k} × IRk−ℓ(x)+ × IRℓ(x)).
It can be shown that both the tangent space TxX and the tangent cone CxX as defined
in Definition 2.10.12 do not depend on the choice of the coordinate system. Moreover, in
case the set X \B0(X) is empty, the definition of a tangent space as given in Definition
2.10.12 coincides with the definition given before. It is also easily verified that a tangent
cone is indeed a cone. Since ∂φ−1(0m) is a C∞ diffeomorphism, it holds by Theorem
2.9.3 that ∂xφ
−1(0m) is an invertible matrix and therefore TxX is a k-dimensional vector
space. Moreover, it follows from Theorem 2.10.8 that CxX is a k-dimensional MGB.
In case a set X is an RCS the following theorem gives an easy way to determine the
tangent space of X at an element of X.
Theorem 2.10.13
For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let the subset X of IRm be a k-dimensional Cr RCS, let x be
an element of X, and let the pair of functions (g̃, h̃) be a regular constraint system such







See Jongen, Jonker, and Twilt (1983), Example 3.2.2, page 111.
For r ∈ IN∗, let the subsets X of IRm and Y of IRn be Cr manifolds, let x be an element
of X, and let f be a function of Cr(X, Y ). Let U be an open set of IRm such that X ⊂ U
and let the function g ∈ Cr(U, IRn) be such that g(x) = f(x), ∀x ∈ X. Such a function
g exists by Theorem 2.9.5. It can be shown that ∂g(x)|TxX is a function from TxX into
Tf(x)Y. Moreover, the function ∂g(x)|TxX does not depend on the choice of the function
g. The derivative of f at x, denoted by ∂f(x), is defined by ∂f(x) = ∂g(x)|TxX . The
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element x is called a regular point of f if ∂f(x)(TxX) = Tf(x)Y. Otherwise x is called
a critical point of f. Let an element y of Y be given. The element y is called a critical
value of f if it is the image of a critical point of f. Otherwise y is called a regular value
of f. Notice that every element y of Y \ f(X) is a regular value of f.
For r ∈ IN∗ \ {1}, for m ∈ IN \ {1}, let the subset X of IRm be an m-dimensional Cr
manifold with boundary. Let x be an element of B1(X). With the element x is associated
the vector ĝ(x) of IRm satisfying ĝ(x) ·x = 0, ∀x ∈ TxB1(X), ĝ(x) ·x ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ CxX, and
‖ĝ(x)‖2 = 1. It is easily verified that the vector ĝ(x) is uniquely determined. The function
ĝ : B1(X) → B̃m−1(0m, 1), obtained by associating with every element x of B1(X) the
vector ĝ(x), is called the Gauss map of B1(X). It can be shown that the function ĝ
is continuously differentiable and that, for every x ∈ B1(X), ∂ĝ(x) is a function from
TxB
1(X) into TxB
1(X), see Mas-Colell (1985), page 39. For every x ∈ B1(X), the
determinant of the linear function ∂ĝ(x), for the definition see Section 2.4, is called the
Gaussian curvature of B1(X) at x.
Let C1 manifolds X, Y, and Z, Z being a subset of Y, an element x of X, and a
function f ∈ C1(X, Y ) be given. The function f is said to intersect Z transversally at
x ∈ X, denoted by f ⊤  Z at x, if
f(x) /∈ Z, or f(x) ∈ Z and Tf(x)Z + ∂f(x)(TxX) = Tf(x)Y.
The function f is said to intersect Z transversally if f ⊤  Z at every x ∈ X. The following
theorem follows almost immediately from the definition of transversality.
Theorem 2.10.14
For k1, k2, k3 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let a k1-dimensional C1 manifold X, a k2-dimensional
C1 manifold Y, and a k3-dimensional C1 manifold Z, Z being a subset of Y, be given, and
let the function f ∈ C1(X, Y ) be such that f ⊤  Z. If k1− k2 + k3 < 0, then f−1(Z) = ∅.
See Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973), Proposition 4.2, page 51.
The following result is complementary to Theorem 2.10.14.
Theorem 2.10.15
For k1, k2, k3 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let a k1-dimensional Cr manifold X, a k2-dimensional
Cr manifold Y, and a k3-dimensional Cr manifold Z, Z being a subset of Y, be given,
and let the function f ∈ Cr(X, Y ) be such that f ⊤  Z. If k1 − k2 + k3 ≥ 0, then f−1(Z)
is a (k1 − k2 + k3)-dimensional Cr manifold.
See Mas-Colell (1985), I.2.1, page 43.
The following result is an easy corollary to Theorems 2.10.14 and 2.10.15.
Theorem 2.10.16
For k1, k2 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let a k1-dimensional Cr manifold X, a k2-dimensional Cr
manifold Y, and a function f ∈ Cr(X, Y ) be given. Let the element y of Y be a regular
value of f. If k1 − k2 < 0, then f−1({y}) = ∅, and if k1 − k2 ≥ 0, then f−1({y}) is a
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(k1 − k2)-dimensional Cr manifold.
See Mas-Colell (1985), H.2.2, page 38.
For Theorem 2.10.18 the notion of Lebesgue measure zero in X for a subset of a manifold
X needs to be defined. For k ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let the subset X of IRm be a k-dimensional
Cr manifold and let S be a subset of X. Then the set S is said to have Lebesgue measure
zero in X if there exists a countable cover {Un | n ∈ IN} of S and charts (Un, φn),
∀n ∈ IN, such that φn(Un ∩ S) has Lebesgue measure zero for every n ∈ IN. In case X
is an m-dimensional Cr manifold, being a subset of IRm, Theorem 2.10.17 will be used
to show that the notions of Lebesgue measure zero and Lebesgue measure zero in X
coincide.
Theorem 2.10.17
Let a subset S of IRm having Lebesgue measure zero and a function f ∈ C1(S, IRm) be
given. Then f(S) has Lebesgue measure zero.
See Golubitsky and Guillemin (1973), Proposition 1.3, page 30.
For r ∈ IN∗, let the subset X of IRm be an m-dimensional Cr manifold and let S be a
subset ofX. Using Theorem 2.10.17 it follows that if the set S has Lebesgue measure zero,
then S has Lebesgue measure zero inX. Now assume that the set S has Lebesgue measure
zero in X. Then there exists a countable cover {Un | n ∈ IN} of S and charts (Un, φn),
∀n ∈ IN, such that the set V n = φn(Un∩S) is of Lebesgue measure zero for every n ∈ IN.
For every n ∈ IN, since (φn)−1 ∈ Cr(V n, IRm), it follows, from Theorem 2.10.17 and the
fact that a subset of a set with Lebesgue measure zero has Lebesgue measure zero, that
(φn)−1(V n) has Lebesgue measure zero. Consequently, the set ∪n∈IN(φn)−1(V n) = S has
Lebesgue measure zero.
Theorem 2.10.18 (Transversality theorem)
For k1, k2, k3 ∈ Z+, for r ∈ IN∗, let a k1-dimensional Cr manifold X1, a Cr manifold X2,
a k2-dimensional Cr manifold Y, a k3-dimensional Cr manifold Z, being a subset of Y,
and a function f ∈ Cr(X1×X2, Y ) be given, with r ≥ max({1, k1− k2 + k3}). For every
x2 ∈ X2, define a function fx2 ∈ Cr(X1, Y ) by fx2(x1) = f(x1, x2), ∀x1 ∈ X1. Then
f ⊤  Z implies fx2 ⊤  Z, except for a subset of X2 having Lebesgue measure zero in X2.
See Mas-Colell (1985), I.2.2, page 45.






In this chapter a general equilibrium model of the economic system is developed, called
the Arrow-Debreu model. This chapter is based on Debreu (1959), where a complete
exposition of this model is given. In the Arrow-Debreu model both the value and the
distribution of all goods and all services in the economic system is determined, the
central questions of the economic science. Therefore, this model yields the fundamentals
for most of modern economic theory. The Arrow-Debreu model has been the subject of
extensive research during the last forty years and has led to an impressive collection of
results and a solid body of knowledge. The conclusions of the investigations into this
model are summarized in many nice textbooks, like Arrow and Hahn (1971), Mas-Colell
(1985), and Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988), on which this chapter also relies heavily.
In this monograph new results concerning the Arrow-Debreu model are given. Also,
various extensions of this model will be considered. The purpose of this chapter is to
present the Arrow-Debreu model, to give an overview of the various assumptions made
in this monograph with respect to the basic elements of this model, and to discuss the
reasonability of these assumptions. Moreover, this chapter gives rise to a number of
questions not solved by the Arrow-Debreu model. These questions will be addressed in
the various parts of this monograph.
Section 3.2 is devoted to the description of the basic ingredients of any model of
the economic system, commodities, agents, and value. The value and the distribution
of commodities over agents acting in the economic system is the central question in
economic science. Therefore, the primitive concepts commodity, agent, and value, should
be carefully defined. In this chapter there will be two types of agents, producers and
consumers. To model the interaction between these agents, one needs to know the set
of admissible actions of each agent, the objectives of each agent, and the outcome for
each one of the agents given a specification of an admissible action of every agent. The
action of a producer consists of the choice of a production plan, while the action of a
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consumer is the choice of a consumption bundle. The set of admissible actions of a
consumer is also determined by the prevailing allocation mechanism, being the market
mechanism. In the market mechanism the agents of the economic system are assumed
to act in a decentralized way and are guided by the price system, the only information
transmitted by the model of the market mechanism given in this chapter. The price
system determines the value of a commodity bundle. Due to the market mechanism it is
not possible for a consumer to choose a consumption bundle having a value that exceeds
his wealth.
In Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 some technological restrictions on the set of actions of
a producer and a consumer, respectively, are described. This is done by introducing a
production possibility set for a producer and a consumption set for a consumer. Various
assumptions concerning these sets made in the monograph are discussed. A consumption
set yields physiological and possibly legislative constraints on the set of actions of a
consumer. When the wealth constraint imposed by the market mechanism is also taken
into account, then the budget set of a consumer is obtained. A production possibility
set specifies the set of admissible actions of a producer, while a budget set specifies the
set of admissible actions of a consumer.
In Section 3.5 and Section 3.6 the objectives of producers and consumers, respectively,
are described. The objectives of a producer are determined by profit maximization.
Hence, an optimal action of a producer consists of choosing a production plan in his
set of admissible actions with the highest value. An optimal action of a consumer
consists of choosing a consumption bundle in his set of admissible actions that is best
according to his preferences. In Section 3.6 special attention is devoted to the various
assumptions made in the monograph with respect to the preferences of consumers. Given
the specification of the set of admissible actions, the objectives of each agent, and the
description of the allocation mechanism, it is possible to describe the behaviour of each
of the agents in the economic system.
In Section 3.7 the Arrow-Debreu model of the economic system is completed by
describing the resources of the consumers in the economy, being the amounts of all
commodities initially available to them, and their share in the profit generated by a
producer. The wealth of a consumer is determined by the value of these resources.
The economy is now obtained by a specification of the production possibility sets of
all the producers and of the consumption sets, preference relations, and resources of
all the consumers. The behaviour of all agents in the economy is expressed by the total
excess demand relation, specifying for each price system the balances of every commodity
resulting from optimal actions of the agents. This relation is introduced and some of its
properties are derived.
In Section 3.8 the definition of a Walrasian equilibrium is given. A Walrasian equi-
librium is a state of the economy, i.e., a specification of a price system and of optimal
actions of the producers and the consumers, such that the optimal actions of the agents
are compatible. It is argued why a Walrasian equilibrium is an equilibrium state of
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the economy. An important question to be answered in Section 3.8 is whether there
exist price systems that make the optimal actions of agents compatible, i.e., whether a
Walrasian equilibrium exists.
In Section 3.9 two important results, called the first and second fundamental welfare
theorem, respectively, are presented. These theorems state that decentralized decision
making by agents leads to an efficient allocation of resources and that every efficient
allocation of resources can be obtained as the result of decentralized decision making by
agents. In Section 3.10 an example is presented, which will be used throughout Part II
of this monograph in order to illustrate the theory of that part. It concerns a standard
example with two commodities and two consumers having preference relations that can
be represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions.
Section 3.11 deals with some stability issues. General formulations of dynamic pro-
cesses and of some stability concepts are given. Then a specific model of a price ad-
justment process, the Walrasian tatonnement process, is described and properties of the
total excess demand function guaranteeing convergence to a Walrasian equilibrium price
system of this process are given. In Section 3.12 an example is presented for which
the Walrasian tatonnement process does not converge to a Walrasian equilibrium price
system. This example will be used throughout Part IV of this monograph in order to
illustrate the theory presented in that part. Section 3.13 concludes with a discussion
concerning the possibility of the existence of other models of price adjustment having
better stability properties and with a motivation for the problems analyzed in the various
parts of this monograph.
3.2 Agents, Commodities, and Value
In the model of the economic system given in this chapter it is assumed that two types
of agents are present. There is a finite number of producers, say L, indexed by h ∈ IL,
and a finite number of consumers, say M ∈ IN, indexed by i ∈ IM . These concepts are
abstractions of the real world for the sake of the theory, a producer being an abstraction
of a firm and a consumer of a household.
Commodity is the collective noun for goods and services. A good is defined by three
characteristics, its physical characteristics, its location or place of availability, and its
date of delivery or time of availability. Services are also regarded as goods. For the
development of the theory the difference between goods and services is not important
and therefore the word commodity will be used. Two commodities are assumed to be
different if they differ in any of the three characteristics mentioned above. So, to describe
a commodity, each of the three characteristics mentioned above should be specified in
detail. It is assumed that there is a finite number of commodities, say N ∈ IN, indexed
by j ∈ IN . This assumption implies, for instance, that there is a point in time after
which the precise date of availability does not matter. Furthermore, time has to be
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subdivided in non-degenerate intervals, called elementary intervals, and space in areas
with positive volume, called elementary regions. Also physical characteristics, like colour,
should sometimes be subdivided in classes indistinguishable from the point of view of the
theory. Many of the results developed for a world with a finite number of commodities are
still valid in a world with an infinite number of commodities, although often additional
difficulties arise in that case, see Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (1989) or Kahn and
Yannelis (1991).
The assumption of the existence of a finite number of commodities is reasonable since
agents acting in the real world are not able to distinguish differences between commodi-
ties with very close characteristics, while agents are not concerned with commodities
available at a date in the very far future.
With every commodity is associated a unit of measurement. Given the unit of mea-
surement, it is possible to express the quantity of a commodity by a non-negative real
number. For many examples of descriptions of commodities and units of measurement,
see Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 of Debreu (1959).
Producers have the ability to produce commodities, i.e., to transform certain quan-
tities of commodities into certain quantities of other commodities, and to trade com-
modities, i.e., it is possible that some quantity of a commodity is made available to this
agent and it is also possible that some quantity of a commodity is made available by
this agent. Consumers have the ability to consume commodities, which influences their
well-being, and also to trade commodities.
A commodity bundle of a producer h ∈ IL is a vector yh ∈ IRN where, for every
j ∈ IN , yhj ≥ 0 denotes that a quantity yhj of commodity j is made available by producer
h, i.e., commodity j is an output of producer h, and yhj ≤ 0 denotes that a quantity −yhj
of commodity j is made available to producer h, i.e., commodity j is an input of producer
h. A commodity bundle of a producer is also called a production plan. A commodity
bundle of a consumer i ∈ IM is a vector xi ∈ IRN where, for every j ∈ IN , xij ≥ 0 denotes
the quantity of commodity j made available to consumer i ∈ IM , i.e., commodity j is
an input of consumer i, and xij ≤ 0 denotes that a quantity −xij of commodity j has
been made available by consumer i, i.e., commodity j is an output of consumer i. The
only outputs of consumers concern labour services, like construction services, teaching,
driving, and so on, all performed at a given location and a given date. These services
can also be used as inputs by a consumer. A commodity bundle of a consumer is also
called a consumption bundle. The set of all possible commodity bundles is called the
commodity space and is given by IRN . The action of a producer h ∈ IL and of a consumer
i ∈ IM concerns the choice of a commodity bundle.
Not all actions of producers and consumers are admissible. The set of admissible
actions of every agent has to be modelled explicitly. The set of admissible actions is
determined by both technological requirements as to be introduced in Section 3.3 and
Section 3.4 and the allocation mechanism assumed to be present in the economic system.
An allocation mechanism is a specification of rules according to which trade takes place.
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In the entire monograph it will be assumed that trade takes places according to
the allocation mechanism called the market mechanism. In the model of the market
mechanism given in this chapter it is assumed that with every commodity j ∈ IN is
associated a real number, denoted by pj, being the price of one unit of that commodity.
The price of a commodity is expressed in a fictional unit of account. Every unit of a
commodity j ∈ IN made available to an agent costs this agent pj and every unit of
commodity j made available by an agent yields this agent pj. If some commodity j ∈ IN
is available at a future date, then pj denotes the current cost, i.e., the amount to be paid
now in order to obtain the commodity at this future date. Notice that pj is independent
of both the agent and of the quantities of commodities made available by or to an agent.
When trade in a commodity j ∈ IN takes place according to the market mechanism, then
there is said to be a market for commodity j. The market mechanism is an abstraction
of allocation mechanisms used frequently in the real world.
It will be assumed that there is a market for every commodity j ∈ IN , i.e., markets
are assumed to be complete. In the real world this assumption is not satisfied since it is
not possible to trade in every commodity, especially not in commodities available at a
date being far in the future. Nevertheless, the analysis of an economy with a complete
market system is an essential first step to study the more difficult case of an economy
with incomplete markets. In Arrow and Hahn (1971), Section 2.10, a model for the
case with incomplete markets is given that is mathematically equivalent to a model with
complete markets. Moreover, it can also be argued that there do exist future markets
for very important commodities, like oil, sugar, coffee, stocks, and so on, at least when
the future is not too far away. Since in the real world future markets are not forbidden
by law, the non-existence of many future markets seems to be a matter of the costs
needed to organize these markets, something abstracted from in this monograph. The
assumption of complete markets might therefore still be a good approximation. For an
overview of the literature dealing with the case of incomplete markets, the reader is
referred to Magill and Shafer (1991).
The price system is a vector p ∈ IRN with component pj denoting the price of com-
modity j for every j ∈ IN . Consider some production plan yh ∈ IRN of a producer h ∈ IL.
The inner product p · yh denotes the value of the production plan yh and is often called
the profit of the production plan yh. Consider some consumption bundle xi ∈ IRN of a
consumer i ∈ IM . The inner product p · xi denotes the value of the consumption bundle
xi. Notice that borrowing by an agent, i.e., a commodity is made available to the agent
at a future date, and lending, i.e., the agent makes a commodity available at a future
date, is allowed. In the market mechanism it is required that the value of an admissible
consumption bundle of a consumer i ∈ IM does not exceed the wealth of consumer i,
so the possibility of stealing is excluded. The wealth of a consumer is determined by
the value of all the commodities the consumer owns, adding all the profits of producers
the consumer is entitled to. It should be emphasized that the market mechanism is
a decentralized mechanism. Decision making by producers and consumers takes place
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independently.
3.3 Production Possibility Sets
The set of admissible actions of a producer h ∈ IL is determined by the production
possibility set of producer h, denoted by Y h. It contains all production plans techno-
logically feasible for producer h, so Y h ⊂ IRN , ∀h ∈ IL. An element yh of Y h is called
an admissible production plan of producer h ∈ IL. The production possibility set Y h
describes the technological constraints on the production plans of producer h ∈ IL. The
production possibility set does not depend on the input quantities of the various com-
modities that are available to the producer, it only describes technological possibilities.
Notice that for every producer h ∈ IL the production possibility set Y h does not depend
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j , . . . , y
L
j )
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h. All the assumptions on the production possibility sets made somewhere
in the monograph, although not simultaneously, are presented below. In the presentation
of these assumptions, let some producer h ∈ IL be given.
- The production plan 0N is an admissible action of producer h, i.e., 0N ∈ Y h. Producer
h is assumed to have the possibility of doing nothing.
- The production possibility set Y h is closed, i.e., whenever (yh
n
)n∈IN is a sequence of
admissible production plans in Y h converging to yh ∈ IRN , then yh ∈ Y h. This
assumption is technical and pretty harmless.
- The production possibility set Y h is bounded, i.e., there exists n ∈ IN such that, for
every yh ∈ Y h, ‖yh‖∞ ≤ n. This is not intended to be a realistic assumption.
Notice that a production possibility set reflects the technological possibilities of a
producer and should therefore also describe the possible outputs given arbitrarily
large amounts of inputs. However, for some purposes it is possible to replace
a not necessarily bounded production possibility set by a bounded one, thereby
facilitating the analysis.
- The production possibility set Y h is convex, i.e., whenever yh and ŷh are admissible
production plans, then, for every λ ∈ [0, 1], yh = λyh + (1 − λ)ŷh ∈ Y h, i.e.,
yh is an admissible production plan. This assumption is not as innocent as the
previous assumptions. In particular, it is easily seen that the assumption 0N ∈ Y h
together with the assumption of convexity of the production possibility set Y h
implies that Y h satisfies the assumption of non-increasing returns to scale, i.e.,
whenever yh ∈ Y h, then, for every λ ∈ [0, 1], λyh ∈ Y h. Therefore, the case of
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increasing returns to scale is excluded, a serious restriction. The assumption of
non-increasing returns to scale is also sometimes referred to as the assumption
of divisibility of production plans. Clearly, not all production plans in the real
world are divisible, for instance production plans with a car with certain physical
characteristics as output at a given location and a given date. Nevertheless, if
the number of cars produced of this type is sufficiently large, then the divisibility
assumption is acceptable as an approximation.
- The production possibility set Y h satisfies constant returns to scale, i.e., whenever
yh ∈ Y h, then, for every λ ∈ IR+, λyh ∈ Y h, hence Y h is a cone. Production
possibility sets satisfying constant returns to scale are often used in applied general
equilibrium theory. Clearly, constant returns to scale is a special case of non-
increasing returns to scale.
- The production possibility set corresponds to the linear activity model. In this case a
finite number, say m ∈ IN, of vectors a1, . . . , am in IRN , called activities, is assumed










If the production possibility set Y h corresponds to the linear activity model, then
it satisfies 0N ∈ Y h, it is closed and convex, and it satisfies constant returns to
scale. This type of production possibility set is also often used in applied work.
- The production possibility set Y h contains the set −IRN+ , called the assumption of free
disposal. This assumption implies that it is possible to use arbitrary amounts of in-
put without generating any output. Often this assumption is reasonable, although
real world examples like for example nuclear waste show that this assumption is
not always satisfied.
- No non-trivial production plans are allowed, i.e., Y h = {0N}. This is not intended to
be a reasonable assumption. However, it will often be made in the sequel when
the inclusion of non-trivial production into the model does not yield any additional
insights and is notationally cumbersome. A possible interpretation of a model with
Y h = {0N} is that all production has already taken place and that the outputs
have been allocated to the consumers. Now the consumers are only involved in
trading the consumption bundles they own among themselves.
Finally, an assumption on the total production possibility set is considered.
- The total production possibility set satisfies Ỹ ∩−Ỹ ⊂ {0N}, i.e., ỹ ∈ Ỹ \{0N} implies
−ỹ /∈ Ỹ . This assumption is called irreversibility of production. Recalling that the
time of availability is part of the description of commodities and assuming that
production takes some time, it becomes clear that this assumption is completely
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realistic. Otherwise, it would be possible to obtain an output dated earlier than
the inputs used to generate it. Even if it is not assumed that production takes
some time, then this assumption is still reasonable since production usually causes
some loss of inputs.
This concludes the description of the assumptions on the production possibility sets
made somewhere in the monograph.
3.4 Consumption Sets and Budget Sets
The set of actions of a consumer i ∈ IM is restricted by the consumption set of consumer i,
denoted by X i. The consumption set of a consumer i ∈ IM is a subset of IRN . Recall that
if xi ∈ X i is a consumption bundle of consumer i ∈ IM , then a component xij for some
j ∈ IN is necessarily non-negative, unless commodity j corresponds to a labour service.
The consumption set describes the physiological constraints on the consumption bundles
to be chosen by a consumer. An obvious example is that a consumer is able to make
available more manual labour services when more of some food commodity is available to
this consumer, or that a consumer is only able to make available some technical labour
services after having consumed certain teaching services. Another example is that the
time during which the various labour services are made available by a consumer in a given
elementary time interval cannot exceed the total length of time in this interval. It is also
possible to use the consumption set to describe certain legislative constraints, like the
obligation to take an insurance when certain commodities are consumed. The assumption
that X i is a subset of IRN implies that the consumption set of a consumer i ∈ IM does
not depend on the production plans chosen by the producers or the consumption bundles




denoted by X. If x = (x1, . . . , xM) is an element of X, then for every j ∈ IN the element
xj of IR
M is defined by xj = (x
1




The budget set of a consumer i ∈ IM having wealth wi ∈ IR at a price system p ∈ IRN ,




xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣p · xi ≤ wi
}
.
An element xi ∈ β̃i(p, wi) is called an admissible consumption bundle of consumer i ∈ IM
and therefore β̃i(p, wi) is the set of admissible actions of consumer i at price system
p ∈ IRN and wealth wi ∈ IR. The relation β̃i : IRN × IR → IRN associating with every
(p, wi) ∈ IRN × IR the set β̃i(p, wi) is called the budget relation of consumer i ∈ IM .
All the assumptions on the consumption sets made somewhere in the monograph,
although not simultaneously, are presented below. All these assumptions are pretty
reasonable. In the presentation of these assumptions, let some consumer i ∈ IM be
given.
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- The consumption set X i is closed, i.e., whenever (xi
n
)n∈IN is a sequence of consumption
bundles in X i converging to xi ∈ IRN , then xi ∈ X i.
- The consumption set X i is bounded from below, i.e., there exists a vector χi ∈ IRN such
that X i ⊂ [χi,→). This assumption is reasonable since commodities not related to
labour services are bounded in amount from below by zero, whereas the maximal
quantity consumer i can make available of some labour service is clearly limited
during an elementary time interval. If this assumption is made, then there is no
loss of generality in assuming that χi = 0N since each commodity can be redefined
in such a way that a consumption bundle xi according to the original definition
corresponds to a consumption bundle xi − χi according to the new definition.
Therefore, the assumption X i ⊂ IRN+ is also often made.
- The consumption set X i is bounded, i.e., there exists n ∈ IN such that, for every
xi ∈ X i, ‖xi‖∞ ≤ n. This is not intended to be a realistic assumption. However,
for some purposes it is possible to replace a not necessarily bounded consumption
set by a bounded one, thereby facilitating the analysis.
- The consumption set X i is convex, i.e., whenever xi and x̂i are elements of X i, then,
for every λ ∈ [0, 1], xi = λxi + (1− λ)x̂i ∈ X i.
- It is always possible to consume more of a commodity, i.e., X i + IRN+ ⊂ X i.
- The consumption set equals the non-negative orthant, i.e., X i = IRN+ . This assumption
is not intended to be a realistic one. However, especially when the analysis focuses
on the case without production it is often made for the sake of simplicity. In these
cases considering more realistic consumption sets would not yield any additional
insights and would be technically more cumbersome.
- The consumption set equals the strictly positive orthant, i.e., X i = IRN++. Again, this
assumption is not intended to be a realistic one and is often made for the sake
of simplicity. This assumption implies that an admissible consumption bundle is
strictly positive. This assumption is usually made when certain differentiability
requirements with respect to the actions chosen by the consumers are needed.
This concludes the description of the assumptions on the consumption sets made some-
where in the monograph.
3.5 The Behaviour of Producers
A producer is assumed to take the prevailing price system as given and to maximize
profit given this price system on his production possibility set. In Section 3.7 the issue
of profit maximization will be addressed. Define, for every producer h ∈ IL, for every
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price system p ∈ IRN , the set ηh(p) as the set of production plans maximizing profit
given p on Y h, i.e.,
ηh(p) =
{
yh ∈ Y h
∣∣∣p · yh ≥ p · yh, ∀yh ∈ Y h
}
,
and if ηh(p) 6= ∅, then define the profit of producer h at price system p, denoted by πh(p),
by the profit of a production maximizing production plan yh ∈ ηh(p), i.e.,
πh(p) = p · yh.
Notice that πh(p) does not depend on the incidental choice of yh ∈ ηh(p). An element
of ηh(p) is called an optimal action or optimal production plan of producer h at price
system p. Given an optimal production plan yh of producer h ∈ IL, producer h is said
to supply a commodity j ∈ IN if yhj ≥ 0 and producer h is said to demand commodity j
if yhj ≤ 0.
It is easily verified that, for every h ∈ IL, for every p ∈ IRN , the set ηh(p) depends
only on the relative prices, i.e., if λ ∈ IR++, then ηh(p) = ηh(λp). If the production set
Y h of a producer h ∈ IL satisfies constant returns to scale while there exist non-trivial
production plans, then it is easy to find price systems p ∈ IRN such that p · yh > 0 for
some yh ∈ Y h, implying that ηh(p) = ∅. In this case it is also easy to find price systems
p ∈ IRN for which ηh(p) contains many elements. Define P h as the set of price systems







The relation ηh : IRN → IRN associating with every p ∈ IRN the set ηh(p) is called the
supply relation of producer h ∈ IL and the relation πh : IRN → IR associating with every
p ∈ P h the set {πh(p)} and with every p ∈ IRN \ P h the empty set is called the profit
relation of producer h ∈ IL. It is easily verified that if p ∈ P h for a producer h ∈ IL and
if λ ∈ IR++, then λp ∈ P h and πh(λp) = λπh(p).
3.6 The Behaviour of Consumers
An essential step in the modelling of the behaviour of consumers is to describe their
preferences. The mathematical concept of a binary relation will turn out to be very
useful. Let a consumer i ∈ IM be given. It is assumed that, given any two consumption
bundles xi, x̂i in the consumption set X i of consumer i, precisely one of the following
four statements holds:
1. xi ≺i x̂i, i.e., x̂i is preferred to xi by consumer i,
2. xi ∼i x̂i, i.e., consumer i is indifferent between xi and x̂i,
3. xi ≻i x̂i, i.e., xi is preferred to x̂i by consumer i,
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4. xi 2i x̂i, i.e., xi and x̂i cannot be compared by consumer i.
Moreover, xi ≺i x̂i if and only if x̂i ≻i xi, xi2ix̂i if and only if x̂i2ixi, and xi ∼i x̂i if
and only if x̂i ∼i xi. Hence, for every consumption bundle xi ∈ X i, the cases xi ≺i xi
and xi ≻i xi are excluded.
The assumption made above implies that the preferences of a consumer do not depend
on the consumption bundles chosen by other consumers or the production plans chosen
by producers. A similar assumption was made with respect to production possibility sets
of producers and consumption sets of consumers. It will turn out in Section 3.8 that the
market mechanism is a very efficient mechanism to allocate these commodities. Certainly,
there are commodities having external effects, pollution and commodities available to a
group of agents being obvious examples. Such commodities may require other allocation
mechanisms, see Gilles and Ruys (1994b). From the existence of commodities having
external effects commodities will be abstracted in this monograph. Another possible
interpretation is that all choices with respect to commodities having external effects
have already been made by the agents.
It is convenient to define the following two statements being derived from the ones
above,
xi i x̂i if xi ≺i x̂i or xi ∼i x̂i, i.e., x̂i is at least as desired as xi by consumer i,
xi i x̂i if xi ≻i x̂i or xi ∼i x̂i, i.e., xi is at least as desired as x̂i by consumer i.
The preference relation of a consumer i ∈ IM is also denoted by i and is the binary
relation i : X i → X i, defined by
i (xi) =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣xi i xi
}
, ∀xi ∈ X i.
It is easily verified that each one of the statements (1)-(4) given above can be deduced
from the preference relation i of consumer i ∈ IM . So, knowledge of the preference
relation i suffices to determine the preferences of consumer i ∈ IM completely. The
set of pairs of consumption bundles between which a consumer i ∈ IM is indifferent is
denoted by I(i), i.e.,
I(i) =
{




All the assumptions on the preference relations made somewhere in the monograph,
although not simultaneously, are presented below. In the description of the assumptions
on the preference relations, some consumer i ∈ IM is assumed to be given.
- The preference relation i is complete, i.e., for every xi, x̂i ∈ X i, it holds that xi i x̂i
or x̂i i xi. It follows immediately that a complete preference relation is a reflexive
relation, see also Section 2.5.
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- The preference relation i is transitive, i.e., for every xi, x̂i, x̃i ∈ X i, if xi i x̂i and
x̂i i x̃i, then xi i x̃i. Both the assumptions of completeness and transitivity are
reasonable and can even be relaxed for many purposes as is shown in Mas-Colell
(1974b) and Gale and Mas-Colell (1975, 1979). Let the preference relation i be
transitive and let xi, x̂i, x̃i ∈ X i be given. It is easily verified that xi ∼i x̂i and
x̂i ∼i x̃i implies xi ∼i x̃i. Moreover, xi i x̂i and x̂i ≺i x̃i implies xi ≺i x̃i, and
xi ≺i x̂i and x̂i i x̃i implies xi ≺i x̃i.
- The preference relation i is continuous, i.e., for every xi ∈ X i, both the set {xi ∈
X i | xi i xi} and the set {xi ∈ X i | xi i xi} are closed in X i. Although
this is certainly a reasonable assumption, it might exclude some interesting cases
like lexicographic preference relations, see for instance Debreu (1959), Note 2,
page 73. The preference relation i on X i is called a lexicographic preference
relation with respect to a permutation π : IN → IN if it holds that xi i x̂i if
and only if xi = x̂i or there exists k′ ∈ I0N−1 such that xiπ(k) = x̂iπ(k), ∀k ∈ Ik′,
and xiπ(k′+1) < x̂
i
π(k′+1). If consumer i has a lexicographic preference relation with
respect to π, then commodity π(1) is appreciated most by consumer i, followed by
commodity π(2), and so on.
- The preference relation i is of the class Cr for some r ∈ IN∗, i.e., I(i) is a (2N − 1)-
dimensional Cr manifold. This assumption is often made when X i = IRN++ and it
is purely technical. Although it rules out certain cases, it is not very restrictive
and it is excellent as an approximation, see Mas-Colell (1985), Section 2.8.
- The preference relation i is non-satiated, i.e., for every xi ∈ X i, there exists xi ∈ X i
such that xi ≺i xi. In this case there exists for every consumption bundle another
consumption bundle that is preferred to it by consumer i. This is a very weak
assumption.
- The preference relation i is locally non-satiated, i.e., for every xi ∈ X i, for every
set Oi open in X i and containing xi, there exists xi ∈ Oi such that xi ≺i xi. In
this case there exists for every consumption bundle another consumption bundle,
arbitrarily close, that is preferred to it by consumer i. This is still a very weak
assumption. If the preference relation i is locally non-satiated, then it is also
non-satiated.
- The preference relation i is weakly monotonic, i.e., xi, x̂i ∈ X i and xi ≤ x̂i implies
xi i x̂i. In this case a consumption bundle containing at least as much of every
commodity as another consumption bundle is at least as desired as this other
consumption bundle by consumer i. In most cases this is a reasonable assumption,
although it is certainly possible to find counterexamples to it in the real world.
If the preference relation i is weakly monotonic, then it is not necessarily non-
satiated.
3.6 The Behaviour of Consumers 79
- The preference relation i is monotonic, i.e., xi, x̂i ∈ X i and xi ≪ x̂i implies xi ≺i x̂i.
Also this assumption is reasonable. It means that a consumption bundle containing
more of every commodity than another consumption bundle is preferred to this
other consumption bundle. If the preference relation i is monotonic, then it is
not necessarily weakly monotonic, although this is certainly the case under some
weak additional assumptions on i .
- The preference relation i is monotonic with respect to commodity j′ ∈ IN , i.e.,
xi, x̂i ∈ X i, xij′ < x̂ij′, and xij = x̂ij , ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}, implies xi ≺i x̂i. In this case
consumer i always likes to have more of commodity j′, assuming the amounts of
the other commodities to remain the same.
- The preference relation i is strongly monotonic, i.e., xi, x̂i ∈ X i and xi < x̂i implies
xi ≺i x̂i. It means that a consumption bundle containing at least as much of every
commodity as another consumption bundle and more of at least one commodity
is preferred to this other consumption bundle by consumer i. If the preference
relation i is strongly monotonic, then it is monotonic. Of all the assumptions
made with respect to non-satiability or monotonicity, this one should be regarded
as the strongest. Nevertheless, in order to study the most important features of
the economic system it is a reasonable assumption.
- The preference relation i is weakly convex, i.e., xi, x̂i ∈ X i, xi i x̂i, and λxi + (1−
λ)x̂i ∈ X i for some λ ∈ (0, 1) implies xi i λxi + (1 − λ)x̂i, so if x̂i is at least as
desired as xi by consumer i, then any convex combination with positive weights of
these two consumption bundles lying in the consumption set is at least as desired
as xi by consumer i.
- The preference relation i is convex, i.e., xi, x̂i ∈ X i, xi ≺i x̂i, and λxi+(1−λ)x̂i ∈ X i
for some λ ∈ (0, 1) implies xi ≺i λxi + (1 − λ)x̂i, so if x̂i is preferred to xi, then
any convex combination with positive weights of these two consumption bundles
lying in the consumption set is preferred to xi by consumer i.
- The preference relation i is strongly convex, i.e., xi, x̂i ∈ X i with xi 6= x̂i, xi ∼i x̂i,
and λxi + (1 − λ)x̂i ∈ X i for some λ ∈ (0, 1) implies xi ≺i λxi + (1 − λ)x̂i, so
if consumer i is indifferent between x̂i and xi, then any convex combination with
positive weights of these two consumption bundles lying in the consumption set is
preferred to xi.
In Debreu (1959), Section 4.7, it is shown that if the consumption set X i is convex and
the preference relation i is complete, transitive, and continuous, then i is strongly
convex implies i is convex, and i is convex implies i is weakly convex. Of all the
assumptions on preference relations presented so far, the assumption of strong convexity
is clearly the strongest. It is not difficult to find real world examples where even the
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assumption of weak convexity of preference relations does not hold. Nevertheless, this
assumption seems to be satisfied for many commodity bundles. In an economy with a
finite number of agents this assumption is indispensable when showing the existence of
a Walrasian equilibrium. Fortunately, however, it can be shown that in the case with
a finite but large number of agents an approximate Walrasian equilibrium exists even
when preference relations are not weakly convex, where approximate may have various
meanings, see Mas-Colell (1985), Section 7.4. In case there is an infinite number of
agents, for example modelled by the unit interval with the Lebesgue measure on it,
the convexity assumptions can even be dispensed with, while still many results can be
obtained, see Hildenbrand (1974), Trockel (1984), and Mas-Colell (1985).
- Consider the case where X i = IRN++. The preference relation i satisfies the boundary
condition, i.e., for every xi ∈ X i, the closure of the set {xi ∈ X i | xi i xi} is
contained in IRN++. This assumption is often made when certain differentiability
requirements with respect to the actions chosen by the consumers are needed.
Although this assumption will not always hold in the real world, it is excellent as
an approximation.
Often it is useful to represent a preference relation by a utility function. A function
ui : X i → IR is said to represent the preference relation i of a consumer i ∈ IM and ui
is called the utility function of consumer i if for every xi, x̂i ∈ X i it holds that
xi i x̂i ⇔ ui(xi) ≤ ui(x̂i).
Notice that if i is a pre-ordering, then a function f : X i → IR is a utility function of
consumer i ∈ IM if and only if the function f is increasing, whereX i is assumed to be pre-
ordered by i . A function ui : X i → IR generates in a unique way a preference relation
of a consumer i ∈ IM by defining, for every xi, x̂i ∈ X i, xi i x̂i if ui(xi) ≤ ui(x̂i).
Clearly, if a preference relation can be represented by a utility function, then such a
representation is not unique. However, not every preference relation can be represented
by a utility function. It is easily verified that if a preference relation can be represented by
a utility function, then the preference relation is complete and transitive. If a preference
relation can be represented by a continuous utility function, then the preference relation
is complete, transitive, and continuous. The following theorem gives a converse of this
result.
Theorem 3.6.1
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i be a convex consumption set and let i be a complete,
transitive, and continuous preference relation. Then the preference relation i can be
represented by a continuous utility function.
See Debreu (1959), Theorem 1, page 56.
The following result gives an easy way to construct a preference relation of the class Cr
for some r ∈ IN∗.
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Theorem 3.6.2
For r ∈ IN∗, for some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++ and let the preference relation i
be represented by the utility function ui ∈ Cr(X i, IR) having no critical point. Then the
preference relation i is of the class Cr.
Proof
Define the function g̃ : IRN++ × IRN++ → IR by
g̃(xi, x̂i) = ui(xi)− ui(x̂i), ∀(xi, x̂i) ∈ IRN++ × IRN++.
Define the function h̃ by h̃ = ∅. Then
M [g̃, h̃] =
{
(xi, x̂i) ∈ IRN++ × IRN++
∣∣∣g̃(xi, x̂i) = 0
}
= I(i). (3.1)
From the fact that ui has no critical point, it follows that (∂xiu
i(xi),−∂xiui(x̂i))⊤ 6= 02N ,
∀(xi, x̂i) ∈ IRN++ × IRN++, and therefore M [g̃, h̃] is an RCS by Definition 2.10.10. From
Theorem 2.10.11 and from (3.1) it follows that the set I(i) is a (2N − 1)-dimensional
Cr manifold. So, i is of the class Cr. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3.6.2 is also stated in Mas-Colell (1985), Proposition 2.3.5, page 62. A proof is
given here to show the usefulness of the theory of regular constraint sets given in Section
2.10. A converse of Theorem 3.6.2 is given next.
Theorem 3.6.3
For r ∈ IN∗, for some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++ and let the preference relation i
be complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic, and of the class Cr. Then the preference
relation i can be represented by a utility function ui ∈ Cr(X i, IR) having no critical
point.
See Mas-Colell (1985), Proposition 2.3.9, page 64, and Proposition 2.3.15, page 68.
For a consumer i ∈ IM , define the indifference surface of the preference relation i at
a consumption bundle xi ∈ X i, denoted by I(i, xi), as the set of consumption bundles
such that consumer i is indifferent between these and xi, i.e.,
I(i, xi) =
{




and let P (i, xi) denote the set of consumption bundles xi of X i such that xi is at least
as desired as xi by consumer i, i.e.,
P (i, xi) =
{




Under suitable assumptions these two sets are (N − 1)-dimensional Cr manifolds and
N -dimensional Cr manifolds with boundary for some r ∈ IN∗, respectively.
Theorem 3.6.4
For r ∈ IN∗, for some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++ and let the preference relation
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i be complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic, and of the class Cr. Then, for every
xi ∈ X i, the set I(i, xi) is an (N −1)-dimensional Cr manifold and the set P (i, xi) is
an N-dimensional Cr manifold with boundary, where the relative boundary of P (i, xi)
is given by I(i, xi).
Proof
By Theorem 3.6.3, i can be represented by ui ∈ Cr(X i, IR) having no critical point.
Let some consumption bundle xi ∈ X i be given. Define the function g̃ by g̃ = ∅ and
define the function h̃ : IRN++ → IR by
h̃(xi) = ui(xi)− ui(xi), ∀xi ∈ X i.
Since ui has no critical point, it holds that ∂xih(x̂
i)⊤ 6= 0N , ∀x̂i ∈ X i, and therefore
M [g̃, h̃] = P (i, xi) is an RCS by Definition 2.10.10. Obviously, #J0(x̂i) ≤ 1, ∀x̂i ∈ X i.
Moreover, B1(M [g̃, h̃]) = I(i, xi). From Theorem 2.10.7 and Theorem 2.10.11 it follows
that I(i, xi) is an (N − 1)-dimensional Cr manifold and P (i, xi) is an N -dimensional
Cr manifold with boundary, where the relative boundary of P (i, xi) is given by I(i, xi).
Q.E.D.
The result given in Theorem 3.6.4 for I(i, xi) is also given in Mas-Colell (1985), Propo-
sition 2.3.10, page 66. For r ∈ IN∗ \ {1}, for some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++ and
let the preference relation i be complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic, and of the
class Cr. Clearly, every consumption bundle xi of X i belongs to I(i, xi), the relative
boundary of P (i, xi) by Theorem 3.6.4. Define for every xi ∈ X i the real number ĉ(xi)
as the Gaussian curvature of the relative boundary of P (i, xi) at xi, see also Section
2.10.
- The preference relation i has non-zero Gaussian curvature, i.e., ĉ(xi) 6= 0, ∀xi ∈ X i.
Intuitively, this assumption means that the indifference surface of i is not flat
at any xi ∈ X i. Although there are certainly cases where this assumption is not
satisfied, this assumption is excellent as an approximation.
The following theorem gives an explicit formula for the number ĉ(xi) for any xi ∈ X i.
Theorem 3.6.5
For r ∈ IN∗ \ {1}, for some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++, let xi be an element of
X i, and let the preference relation i be complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic,
and of the class Cr. Let the preference relation i be represented by the utility function










See Mas-Colell (1985), Proposition 2.5.1, page 76.
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A consumer i ∈ IM with wealth wi ∈ IR is assumed to take the prevailing price system
p ∈ IRN as given and to choose a best element of β̃i(p, wi) for i . Define, for every
consumer i ∈ IM , for every price system p ∈ IRN , for every wealth wi ∈ IR, the set
δ̃i(p, wi) as the set of consumption bundles being best elements of β̃i(p, wi) for i, i.e.,
δ̃i(p, wi) =
{
xi ∈ β̃i(p, wi)
∣∣∣xi i xi, ∀xi ∈ β̃i(p, wi)
}
.
An element of δ̃i(p, wi) is called an optimal action or an optimal consumption bundle of
consumer i ∈ IM at (p, wi) ∈ IRN × IR.
It is easily verified that, for every i ∈ IM , for every (p, wi) ∈ IRN × IR, δ̃i(p, wi)
depends only on the relative prices and the relative wealth, i.e., if λ ∈ IR++, then
δ̃i(p, wi) = δ̃i(λp, λwi). Define P i as the set (p, wi) ∈ IRN × IR for which δ̃i(p, wi) of
consumer i ∈ IM is a non-empty set, so
P i =
{
(p, wi) ∈ IRN × IR
∣∣∣δ̃i(p, wi) 6= ∅
}
.
The relation δ̃i : IRN×IR→ IRN associating with every (p, wi) ∈ IRN×IR the set δ̃i(p, wi)
is called the demand relation of consumer i ∈ IM .
3.7 The Arrow-Debreu Model
The description of the economic system is completed by specifying the resources of the
agents in the economy, being the amounts of all commodities initially available in the
economy, and the distribution of profits generated by the producers in the economy. It
will be assumed that all the resources are owned by consumers only. Moreover, it will
be assumed that the producers are controlled by the consumers. The initial endowment
of a consumer i ∈ IM , denoted by ωi ∈ IRN , is a specification of all commodities initially
owned by consumer i. Furthermore, it is assumed that a consumer i ∈ IM obtains a
fixed non-negative share of the profit of every producer h ∈ IL, denoted by θhi, and that
all profits generated by producers are allocated to the consumers. Therefore, θhi ≥ 0,
∀h ∈ IL, ∀i ∈ IM , and
∑
i∈IM θ
hi = 1, ∀h ∈ IL. So, if the price system is given by p ∈ IRN
and every producer h ∈ IL has chosen a production plan yh ∈ Y h, then the wealth of a
consumer i ∈ IM is given by




Consequently, consumers are also responsible for losses. So, the producers considered are
abstractions of firms with a partnership structure. Since it will usually be assumed that
0N ∈ Y h, ∀h ∈ IL, producers make non-negative profits. It is clear that, when the price
system is considered as given, under very weak monotonicity assumptions with respect
to the preferences of consumers, from the consumer’s point of view as shareholder, profit
maximization is the natural objective of a producer in the framework developed so far.
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The description of the economic system is now completed. So, formally, the economy,
denoted by E , is defined by a specification of the production possibility sets of all the
producers and of the consumption sets, preference relations, initial endowments, and the













In case the production possibility sets and the profit shares are omitted in the description
of the economy, it is assumed that Y h = {0N}, ∀h ∈ IL. For every consumer i ∈ IM ,
define the wealth at a price system p ∈ IRN ∩ (∩h∈{h′∈IL|θh′i>0}P h), denoted by b̃i(p), by





and define the set P̃ i by
P̃ i =
{




) ∣∣∣(p, b̃i(p)) ∈ P i
}
,
so, for every p ∈ P̃ i, δ̃i(p, b̃i(p)) 6= ∅. Notice that, for every p ∈ IRN∩(∩h∈{h′∈IL|θh′i>0}P h),






, ∀p ∈ ∩h∈{h′∈IL|θh′i>0}P h,





is called the budget relation of consumer i and βi(p) is called the budget set of consumer






, ∀p ∈ P̃ i,
δi(p) = ∅, ∀p ∈ IRN \ P̃ i,
is called the demand relation of consumer i. An element of δi(p) is called an optimal
action or optimal consumption bundle of consumer i ∈ IM at price system p ∈ IRN .
Given an optimal consumption bundle xi of consumer i ∈ IM , consumer i is said to
supply a commodity j ∈ IN if xij ≤ ωij and consumer i is said to demand commodity j
if xij ≥ ωij.
Define the set P̃ by
P̃ = ∩i∈IM P̃ i,
so, for every price system p ∈ P̃ , for every producer h ∈ IL, ηh(p) 6= ∅, and for every






i∈IM{ωi}, ∀p ∈ P̃ ,
ζ(p) = ∅, ∀p ∈ IRN \ P̃ ,
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is called the total excess demand relation of the economy E and the set ζ(p) is called the
total excess demand at price system p ∈ IRN of the economy E .
Next, some properties of the total excess demand relation ζ, known as homogeneity
of degree zero, Walras’ law, convex-valuedness, compact-valuedness, and upper hemi-
continuity are presented in Theorem 3.7.1, Theorem 3.7.2, Theorem 3.7.3, and Theorem
3.7.5. These properties are the main ingredients needed to show the existence of a
Walrasian equilibrium. Under slightly different assumptions, these results can also be
found in Debreu (1959). The first result uses no assumptions at all.
Theorem 3.7.1 (Homogeneity of degree zero)
The total excess demand relation ζ of the economy E is homogeneous of degree zero, i.e.,
for every λ ∈ IR++, for every p ∈ IRN , it holds that
ζ(λp) = ζ(p).
Proof
For p ∈ IRN \ P̃ this property is trivial since p ∈ IRN \ P̃ implies λp ∈ IRN \ P̃ for every
λ ∈ IR++. For p ∈ P̃ the result follows from the fact that, for every λ ∈ IR++, for every















The following result is valid under very weak assumptions. It was first recognized by
Walras, see Walras (1874).
Theorem 3.7.2 (Walras’ law)
Let the economy E = ((Y h)h∈IL, (X i,i, ωi, (θhi)h∈IL)i∈IM ) be such that for every con-
sumer i ∈ IM the preference relation i is locally non-satiated. Then the total excess
demand relation ζ of the economy E satisfies Walras’ law, i.e., for every p ∈ IRN , for
every z ∈ ζ(p), p · z = 0.
Proof
Suppose there exists p ∈ IRN and z ∈ ζ(p) such that p · z 6= 0. Clearly, p ∈ P̃ . Hence, for




i −∑h∈IL yh −
∑
i∈IM ω
i. By definition of ηh, ∀h ∈ IL, and δi, ∀i ∈ IM ,
it follows that
p · z = p ·
∑
i∈IM
xi − p ·
∑
h∈IL






























Since, by supposition, p · z 6= 0, it follows that p · z < 0. Hence, there exists i′ ∈ IM










′ ∈ Oi′ and, for every xi′ ∈ Oi′, p · xi′ < b̃i′(p). By local non-satiation of
i′ there exists x̂i′ ∈ Oi′ such that xi′ ≺i′ x̂i′ . Obviously, x̂i′ ∈ βi′(p), so this contradicts
xi
′ ∈ δi′(p). Consequently, for every p ∈ IRN , for every z ∈ ζ(p), p · z = 0. Q.E.D.
Under convexity assumptions on the production sets and the consumption sets it can be
shown that the total excess demand relation of the economy E is convex-valued.
Theorem 3.7.3 (Convex-valuedness)
Let the economy E = ((Y h)h∈IL, (X i,i, ωi, (θhi)h∈IL)i∈IM ) be such that for every producer
h ∈ IL the production possibility set Y h is convex, and for every consumer i ∈ IM the
consumption set X i is convex and the preference relation i is transitive and weakly
convex. Then the total excess demand relation ζ of the economy E is convex-valued.
Proof
Let some p ∈ IRN and some z, ẑ ∈ ζ(p) be given. Clearly, p ∈ P̃ . So, for every h ∈ IL,
there exists yh ∈ ηh(p) and, for every i ∈ IM , there exists xi ∈ δi(p) such that z =∑
i∈IM x
i −∑h∈IL yh −
∑
i∈IM ω
i, and, for every h ∈ IL, there exists ŷh ∈ ηh(p) and, for
every i ∈ IM , there exists x̂i ∈ δi(p) such that ẑ =
∑
i∈IM x̂




suffices to show that for any λ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
λyh + (1− λ)ŷh ∈ ηh(p), ∀h ∈ IL, (3.2)
λxi + (1− λ)x̂i ∈ δi(p), ∀i ∈ IM . (3.3)
Now (3.2) follows from the convexity of Y h and the fact that p ·(λyh+(1−λ)ŷh) = πh(p),
∀h ∈ IL. From the convexity of X i, it follows that λxi + (1− λ)x̂i ∈ X i, ∀i ∈ IM . This,
together with the fact that, for every i ∈ IM , p · (λxi + (1 − λ)x̂i) ≤ b̃i(p) and i is
transitive and weakly convex, yields (3.3). Q.E.D.
An element (y, x) ∈ Y × X is called an allocation of the economy E , so an allocation
consists of a specification of admissible production plans of every producer and admissible
consumption bundles of every consumer in the economy E . An allocation of the economy
E being feasible in the sense that the sum over the consumers of their consumption
bundles equals the sum over the producers of their production plans plus the sum over the
consumers of their initial endowments, is called an attainable allocation of the economy









ωi = 0N .
The set of all attainable allocations of the economy E is denoted by A. The following
result gives conditions under which the set of attainable allocations is compact. Such
a result should hold in any realistic model of the economic system since otherwise the
outputs of the producers can become infinitely large in an economy with fixed resources.
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Theorem 3.7.4
Let the economy E = ((Y h)h∈IL, (X i,i, ωi, (θhi)h∈IL)i∈IM ) be such that for every producer
h ∈ IL the production possibility set Y h is closed, convex, and 0N ∈ Y h, Ỹ ∩−Ỹ ⊂ {0N},
and for every consumer i ∈ IM the consumption set X i is closed and bounded from below.
Then the set of attainable allocations A is compact.
See Debreu (1959), Theorem 1, page 77, and Theorem 2, page 77.
It has already been remarked that the assumptions that Y h, ∀h ∈ IL, and X i, ∀i ∈ IM ,
are compact are not realistic. Nevertheless, Theorem 3.7.4 shows that the set A of
attainable allocations is compact. For many purposes it is therefore possible to replace
the production possibility sets and the consumption sets by compact ones. This makes
the following theorem interesting.
Theorem 3.7.5 (Compact-valuedness and upper hemi-continuity)
Let the economy E = ((Y h)h∈IL, (X i,i, ωi, (θhi)h∈IL)i∈IM ) be such that for every producer
h ∈ IL the production possibility set Y h is compact and 0N ∈ Y h, and for every consumer
i ∈ IM the consumption set X i is convex and compact and the preference relation i
is complete, transitive, and continuous. Then P h = IRN , ∀h ∈ IL, and the relation
ζ|{p∈IRN |∀i∈IM ,∃xi∈Xi,p·xi<b̃i(p)} : {p ∈ IR
N | ∀i ∈ IM , ∃xi ∈ X i, p · xi < b̃i(p)} → IRN is a
compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
See Debreu (1959), Theorem 3, page 48, and Theorem 1, page 72.
3.8 Equilibrium
An element (p, y, x) ∈ IRN × Y × X is called a state of the economy E if yh ∈ ηh(p),
∀h ∈ IL, and xi ∈ δi(p), ∀i ∈ IM . So, a state of the economy E consists of a specification
of a price system, an optimal production plan at this price system for every producer,
and an optimal consumption bundle at this price system for every consumer in the







i, hence z ∈ ζ(p). The actions chosen by the producers
and the consumers in a state of the economy are not necessarily compatible in the sense
that the total excess demand at this state is equal to zero. Given some state of the
economy, the market of a commodity j ∈ IN is said to be in equilibrium if the total
excess demand of commodity j is equal to zero. A Walrasian equilibrium of the economy
E is a state of E at which every market is in equilibrium, so at which the optimal actions
of the producers and consumers yield an attainable allocation.
Definition 3.8.1 (Walrasian equilibrium)
A Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E = ((Y h)h∈IL, (X i,i, ωi, (θhi)h∈IL)i∈IM ) is an
element
(p∗, y∗, x∗) ∈ IRN × Y ×X
satisfying
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1. for every producer h ∈ IL, y∗h ∈ ηh(p∗),




∗i −∑h∈IL y∗h −
∑
i∈IM ω
i = 0N .
When (p∗, y∗, x∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E , then p∗ is called a Wal-
rasian equilibrium price system and (y∗, x∗) is called a Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
Condition 1 reflects that every producer chooses an optimal production plan at the Wal-
rasian equilibrium price system, Condition 2 that every consumer chooses an optimal
consumption bundle at the Walrasian equilibrium price system, and Condition 3 that the
Walrasian equilibrium allocation is an attainable allocation of the economy E . Notice that
if (p∗, y∗, x∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E , then p∗ ∈ P̃ , πh(p∗) = p∗ · y∗h,
∀h ∈ IL, and 0N ∈ ζ(p∗). In a Walrasian equilibrium the optimal actions of the agents in
the economy are compatible. It should be noticed that the actions taken by the agents
in the economy are not necessarily completely decentralized at a Walrasian equilibrium.
This may be the case when there is an agent having more than one optimal action, while
not every optimal action is compatible with a Walrasian equilibrium.
Let the element (p∗, y∗, x∗) be a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E . By Theorem
3.7.1 the element (λp∗, y∗, x∗) is also a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E for every
λ ∈ IR++. These equilibria are often identified, so a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, y∗, x∗) of
the economy E is said to be unique if every Walrasian equilibrium of E is of the form
(λp∗, y∗, x∗) for some λ ∈ IR++.











j > 0, then there is a positive total excess demand of commodity j
at this state. Therefore, it is not possible to satisfy the demand at p for commodity j of
every agent, whereas every agent may get rid of his supply at p of commodity j. In such
a situation the price of commodity j has a tendency to rise since an agent whose demand
at p is not satisfied can offer a price being slightly higher than pj thereby attracting all
the supply. Similarly, every agent supplying commodity j can ask a price being slightly
higher than pj and will still be able to sell all his supply. Notice that in this reasoning
certain monotonicity properties with respect to the preferences of consumers and certain












j < 0, then there is a negative total excess demand of
commodity j at this state and a similar reasoning as above can be used to argue that the
price of commodity j has a tendency to fall. A state of the economy at which the total
excess demand is zero is in equilibrium in the sense that the price system has no tendency
to change. Therefore, a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy is an equilibrium state of
the economy. There are no forces that bring about a change in a Walrasian equilibrium
price system and allocation.
This yields two reasons why Walrasian equilibria are important. They yield states
of the economy being both compatible and in equilibrium. The natural question to ask
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is therefore whether such a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy exists. The following
result gives an affirmative answer for a large class of economies.
Theorem 3.8.2
Let the economy E = ((Y h)h∈IL, (X i,i, ωi, (θhi)h∈IL)i∈IM ) be such that for every producer
h ∈ IL the production possibility set Y h is closed, convex, 0N ∈ Y h, and −IRN+ ⊂ Y h,
Ỹ ∩−Ỹ ⊂ {0N}, and for every consumer i ∈ IM the consumption set X i is closed, convex,
and bounded from below, the preference relation i is complete, transitive, continuous,
non-satiated, and convex, and there exists xi ∈ X i such that xi ≪ ωi. Then there exists
a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E and every Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, y∗, x∗)
of E satisfies p∗ ∈ IRN+ \ {0N}.
See Debreu (1959), Theorem 1, page 83.
All assumptions made in Theorem 3.8.2 have been discussed in Section 3.3, Section 3.4,
and Section 3.6, with the exception of the condition that for every consumer i ∈ IM
there exists a consumption bundle xi ∈ X i such that xi ≪ ωi. This condition will in
general not be satisfied in the real world since it requires that a consumer can supply a
positive quantity of every commodity. However, as an approximation of the case where
for every consumer i ∈ IM there exists a consumption bundle xi ∈ X i such that xi ≤ ωi,
this assumption is clearly excellent. Cases where for some consumer i ∈ IM there is no
consumption bundle xi ∈ X i such that xi ≤ ωi are rare, but might occur for example if
the initial endowment of a consumer includes the obligation to deliver some amount of
a commodity. Such cases might lead to bankruptcy problems and are abstracted from
in this monograph. At the cost of a more technical assumption and a more difficult
proof, the assumption that for every consumer i ∈ IM there exists a consumption bundle
xi ∈ X i such that xi ≪ ωi can be relaxed using the notion of indirect resource relatedness,
see Arrow and Hahn (1971), Definition 5, page 118. Another relaxation will be given in
Theorem 3.11.1.
3.9 Fundamental Welfare Theorems
Let two attainable allocations (y, x) and (ŷ, x̂) of the economy E be given. The second
allocation is said to be at least as desired as the first one, denoted by (y, x)  (ŷ, x̂),
if xi i x̂i, ∀i ∈ IM . The relation  : A → A is a pre-ordering being not necessarily
complete. It is possible to derive the relations ≺, ∼, ≻, and 2 from the relation  in
the same way as for a consumer i ∈ IM the relations ≺i, ∼i, ≻i, and 2i are derived from
i, respectively. The allocation (y, x) is said to be Pareto dominated by the allocation
(ŷ, x̂) if (y, x) ≺ (ŷ, x̂), so there exists at least one consumer i ∈ IM such that xi ≺i x̂i.
An allocation of the economy is said to be Pareto efficient if it is attainable and not
dominated by another attainable allocation of the economy. It is now a natural question
to ask whether a Walrasian equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. The question can be
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answered affirmatively under extremely mild assumptions as is shown by the following
result. This result is known as the first fundamental welfare theorem, and is, using
different assumptions, also given in Debreu (1959), Theorem 6.3.1, page 94.
Theorem 3.9.1
Let the economy E = ((Y h)h∈IL, (X i,i, ωi, (θhi)h∈IL)i∈IM ) be such that for every con-
sumer i ∈ IM the preference relation i is transitive and locally non-satiated. Then
every Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, y∗, x∗) of the economy E is Pareto efficient.
Proof
Using the fact that i is locally non-satiated it follows, using the same arguments as in
the proof of Theorem 3.7.2, that
p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ωi +
∑
h∈IL
θhiπh(p∗), ∀i ∈ IM . (3.4)
Suppose (y, x) ∈ A satisfies (y∗, x∗) ≺ (y, x). It holds that yh ∈ Y h, ∀h ∈ IL, so
p∗ · yh ≤ πh(p∗), ∀h ∈ IL. (3.5)
For every i ∈ IM it holds that x∗i i xi, xi ∈ X i, and i is transitive, and therefore
either xi ∈ δi(p∗) and p∗ ·xi = p∗ ·ωi +∑h∈IL θhiπh(p∗), or xi /∈ δi(p∗) and it follows that
p∗ · xi > p∗ · ωi +∑h∈IL θhiπh(p∗). Therefore,
p∗ · xi ≥ p∗ · ωi +
∑
h∈IL
θhiπh(p∗), ∀i ∈ IM . (3.6)
There exists i′ ∈ IM such that x∗i′ ≺i′ xi′ and, since x∗i′ ∈ δi′(p∗), i′ is transitive, and
xi
′ ∈ X i′, it follows that






So, since (y, x) ∈ A, it follows from (3.4), (3.5), (3.6), and (3.7) that






































a contradiction. Consequently, there is no (y, x) ∈ A such that (y∗, x∗) ≺ (y, x). Q.E.D.
Theorem 3.9.1 gives another reason for the stability of a Walrasian equilibrium of the
economy. It is not possible to propose an attainable allocation of the economy that
makes at least one consumer better off and no consumer worse off than in a Walrasian
equilibrium allocation.
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Another natural question to ask is whether a given Pareto efficient allocation of the
economy can be implemented as a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy. The next
result, known as the second fundamental welfare theorem, almost gives an answer to this
question.
Theorem 3.9.2
Let the economy E = ((Y h)h∈IL, (X i,i, ωi, (θhi)h∈IL)i∈IM ) be such that for every producer
h ∈ IL the production possibility set Y h is convex, and for every consumer i ∈ IM the
consumption set X i is convex and the preference relation i is complete, transitive,
continuous, non-satiated, and convex. Then, for every Pareto efficient allocation (y, x)
of the economy E , there exists a price system p ∈ IRN \{0N} with the following properties:
1. for every producer h ∈ IL, yh ∈ ηh(p),
2. for every consumer i ∈ IM , p · xi ≤ p · xi, ∀xi ∈ {x̂i ∈ X i | x̂i i xi}.
See Debreu (1959), Theorem 1, page 95.
Let (y, x) be a Pareto efficient allocation of the economy and let p ∈ IRN \ {0N} be
such that Property 1 and Property 2 of Theorem 3.9.2 are satisfied. Let the initial
endowments and the profit shares be redistributed in such a way that every consumer
i ∈ IM has wealth equal to p · xi. This can be done in many ways, for example by giving
every consumer i ∈ IM an initial endowment equal to xi− 1M (
∑
h∈IL y
h) and a profit share
1
M
in the profit of every producer. However, notice that such a redistribution of initial
endowments might involve the redistribution of certain labour services, an operation not
always feasible. Another possibility is to let each consumer keep his initial endowments
and profit shares and to give every consumer i ∈ IM in addition an amount in units of
account equal to p · xi − p · ωi − p ·∑h∈IL θhiπh(p). In this way a new economy, denoted
by E , is obtained. If xi ∈ δ̃i(p, p · xi), ∀i ∈ IM , then Theorem 3.9.2 yields that (p, y, x)
is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E . By Debreu (1959), Theorem 1, page 69,
this is indeed the case if for every consumer i ∈ IM there exists a consumption bundle
xi ∈ X i such that p · xi < p · xi.
3.10 An Example
In order to illustrate the theory presented in this monograph, an example will be given
in each chapter. In this section the example used throughout Part II is examined. In
this example the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I2) is such that N = 2,
X1 = X2 = IR2+,











4 , ∀x2 ∈ IR2+,
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and
ω1 = (1, 4)⊤,
ω2 = (2, 1)⊤.




















, ∀p ∈ IR2++.
It is also easily verified that, for every consumer i ∈ I2, δi(p) = ∅ if p ∈ IR2 \ IR2++.
Notice that the assumptions of Theorem 3.7.1, Theorem 3.7.2, and Theorem 3.7.3 are
satisfied, and that indeed the relation δi, ∀i ∈ I2, is homogeneous of degree zero, satisfies
Walras’ law, and is convex-valued, and therefore the same properties hold for the total
excess demand relation ζ. Moreover, di, ∀i ∈ I2, is a continuous function, which is not
surprising given the result mentioned in Theorem 3.7.5. The Walrasian equilibrium price
systems are given by the solutions p ∈ IR2++ of the system of equations d1(p) + d2(p) =
ω1 +ω2 = (3, 5)⊤. It follows easily that p∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price system if and







Therefore, the Walrasian equilibrium is unique in this case. The Walrasian equilibrium
allocation x∗ is given by
x∗1 = (2 1952 , 1
13
28)




Notice that all assumptions of Theorem 3.8.2 are satisfied by the economy E of the
example, except the assumption that −IR2+ ⊂ Y h, ∀h ∈ IL. Clearly, the example would
not change by making the assumption that Y h = −IR2+, ∀h ∈ IL.






1 ≤ 3, x21 = 3− x11, x12 =
5x11
27− 8x11





Since the economy E of the example satisfies all the requirements of Theorem 3.9.1, it
is not surprising that the Walrasian equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient. Moreover,
all assumptions made in Theorem 3.9.2 are satisfied by the economy E . Given a Pareto
efficient allocation x it can be shown that a price system p ∈ IR2 \ {(0, 0)⊤} satisfies the








Furthermore, it can be shown that, by redistribution of the initial endowments of the
consumers in an appropriate way, every Pareto efficient allocation can be obtained as
a Walrasian equilibrium of the resulting economy, with the Walrasian equilibrium price
system p ∈ IR2++ satisfying (3.8).
3.11 Stability
Theorem 3.8.2 gives a very strong result with respect to the existence of a Walrasian
equilibrium. In Section 3.8 it was argued that a Walrasian equilibrium is indeed an equi-
librium state of the economy in several respects. So, if an economy reaches a Walrasian
equilibrium, then it will stay there and trade can take place. A natural question to ask
is whether there are tendencies such that an economy reaches a Walrasian equilibrium.
Moreover, even if a Walrasian equilibrium has been reached by the economy, it is im-
portant to know what happens in the case of slight perturbations of this state. These
questions will be referred to as the stability question.
To address the stability question, one should formulate an explicit dynamic model
of the state of the economy at an arbitrary point in time, given any initial state of the
economy. Empirically, it is often argued that economies do reach an equilibrium state.
Moreover, many economic theories are based on the assumption that the economy will
reach an equilibrium state, for instance theories of economic growth or theories based
on comparative statics. This motivates the search for dynamic models of the state of
the economy such that convergence to an equilibrium state results for a large class of
economies and for an arbitrarily specified initial state of the economy. When specifying a
dynamic model of the state of the economy, it is possible to treat time as either discrete
or continuous. The latter treatment of time will always be employed in this monograph.
Now a general formulation of dynamic processes and of some stability concepts is
given. Let the subset S of IRm denote the set of all possible states of the economy.
Notice that it is implicitly assumed that it is indeed possible to represent the set of all
possible states by a subset of a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Let T be an interval
of IR+ such that 0 ∈ T, representing time. Let t̃ denote the supremum of T, where by
definition t̃ = +∞ when T = IR+. The initial state of the economy, i.e., the state at t = 0,
is denoted by v and is given by an element of S. The state of the economy at time t is also
represented by an element of the set S. A dynamic process is a function π : S × T → S
satisfying π(v, 0) = v, ∀v ∈ S. For every v ∈ S, for every t ∈ T, π(v, t) denotes the state
of the economy at time t if the initial state is v. Often a dynamic process is described
implicitly by means of a differential equation. In this case a function f : S → IRm is
given and the dynamic process π is required to satisfy
∂tπ(v, t) = f (π(v, t)) , ∀v ∈ S, ∀t ∈ T. (3.9)
The dynamic process is then often called the trajectory of the differential equation. In
this case the set T is taken equal to IR+ and some requirements with respect to f and S
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have to be made in order to guarantee that π is well-defined and uniquely determined,
see for example Hahn (1982). Notice that the function f used in the formulation (3.9)
does not depend on the initial state. Although it is not difficult to make f dependent
upon the initial state, usually this is not done in the literature. However, in the dynamic
processes analyzed in Part IV of this monograph, the dependence on the initial state
will be crucial. If the dynamic process is described as in (3.9) and some state is reached,
then the states subsequently generated by the process are independent of the history of
the process, in particular the initial state. In the dynamic processes analyzed in Part
IV of this monograph, the history of the process remains important, and influences the
states to be reached in the future.
Often it is assumed that the dynamic process π|{v}×T : {v} × T → S is a continuous
function for every initial state v of S. This assumption is natural in a model involving
continuous time. All dynamic processes considered in Part IV of this monograph will be
continuous functions, given the initial state.
Let S be a subset of IRm and let T be an interval of IR+. The dynamic process
π : S × T → S is said to converge to the state s of S given the initial state v, where s is
called the limit of π given the initial state v, if for every sequence (tn)n∈IN in T converging
to t̃ it holds that the sequence (π(v, tn))n∈IN in S converges to s. Notice that if π|{v}×T
is a continuous function, t̃ ∈ T, and π converges to the state s of S given the initial
state v, then π(v, t̃) = s. Under weak conditions, it can be shown that for a dynamic
process determined as in (3.9) it holds that if π converges to the state s of S given any
v ∈ S, then f(s) = 0m, see Hahn (1982), Theorem 1.2, page 749. The dynamic process
π is said to be locally stable if for every state s of S being the limit of π given some
initial state, there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that s is the limit of π given any initial state in
Bm(s, ε)∩S. The dynamic process π is said to be globally stable if for every initial state
v of S there exists a state s of S such that s is the limit of π given the initial state v.
Notice that the state s might be different for different initial states v. Various refinements
of the stability properties defined above exist. The notion of local stability captures the
idea of an economy returning to an equilibrium state, when a small perturbation in this
state has taken place. The notion of global stability captures the idea that the economy
reaches some equilibrium state.
It is far from obvious how an explicit dynamic model of the economy as described in
this chapter should look like. In the literature a distinction is made between tatonnement
processes and non-tatonnement processes. In a tatonnement process it is assumed that
no trade occurs until an equilibrium state is reached by the economy. Then the stabil-
ity question for the model of the economy presented in this chapter boils down to the
question whether the tatonnement process converges to a Walrasian equilibrium of the
economy. In a non-tatonnement process trade is allowed before an equilibrium state is
reached. In this case the stability question reduces to the question whether the process
converges to some equilibrium state, in general not compatible with a Walrasian equi-
librium of the original economy. In some non-tatonnement processes the description of
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the market mechanism given in this chapter is abandoned and there is no price system
present in the economy. In other non-tatonnement processes the price system is included
in the description of the process, but since the behaviour of the agents in the economy is
incompatible at non-Walrasian equilibrium price systems, the determination of the trade
taking place is often rather ad hoc. An overview of non-tatonnement processes (and also
of tatonnement processes) is given in Hahn (1982).
In this monograph only tatonnement processes are analyzed, which should be con-
sidered as dynamic descriptions of the economy for the very short run. Theoretically,
the very short run should not exceed the elementary time interval used to distinguish
commodities. Other cases where a tatonnement process makes sense as a description of
dynamic processes going on in an economic system, concern a world where commodities
are perishable and where all agents in the economy are faced in each period with the
same technologies, preferences, and resources, irrespective of the trade which has taken
place in the previous period. Obviously, understanding of tatonnement processes does
not lead to a full understanding of the adjustment of prices taking place in any real
world economic system, but it should be considered as an essential and important step.
The stability question will be discussed in a relatively easy setting, i.e., one without
production and relatively strong assumptions with respect to the economy. Theorem
3.11.1 shows the properties one might expect in an economy in such a setting and will
give a bench-mark for further analysis.
Theorem 3.11.1
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) be such that, for every consumer i ∈ IM , X i =
IRN+ , the preference relation i is complete, transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic,
and strongly convex, ωi ∈ IRN+ , and
∑
i∈IM ω
i ∈ IRN++. Then P̃ = IRN++, δi|IRN++ : IR
N
++ →
IRN , ∀i ∈ IM , and ζ|IRN++ : IR
N
++ → IRN , denoted by z, are continuous functions. If
(pn)n∈IN is a sequence of price systems in IR
N
++ converging to p ∈ IRN+ \ ({0N} ∪ IRN++),
then the sequence (z(pn))n∈IN satisfies
∑
j∈IN zj(p
n) → +∞. Moreover, there exists a
Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E and every Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) of E
satisfies p∗ ∈ IRN++.
See Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988), Proposition 3.2, page 96, and Theorem 3.1, page
108.
Motivated by Theorem 3.11.1, when studying the stability question, it will often be
assumed that the restriction of the total excess demand relation to IRN++, ζ|IRN++, is a
continuous function, being denoted by z. Moreover, it may be assumed to satisfy the
type of boundary behaviour as given in Theorem 3.11.1, homogeneity of degree zero,
see Theorem 3.7.1, and Walras’ law, see Theorem 3.7.2. Together with the property
that z(p) ≥ −∑i∈IM ωi, ∀p ∈ IRN++, these are the only properties used in showing the
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium.
If the total excess demand relation restricted to IRN++ is a function as in Theorem
3.11.1, then the state of the economy is completely determined by the price system, and
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it suffices to model the dynamic behaviour of the price system. The dynamic process of
the state of the economy will then be referred to as a price adjustment process. Notice
that, implicitly, it is then assumed that at each point in time every agent observes the
same price for a commodity and every agent expresses his optimal action, given the
prevailing price system. Although such assumptions are reasonable for an equilibrium
state of the economy, they seem to be restrictive when considering economies out of
equilibrium. Nevertheless, such assumptions will always be made in this monograph.
As is shown in Dierker (1972), using a stronger notion of local stability than in this
monograph, for a very large class of price adjustment processes local stability implies
that there is exactly one Walrasian equilibrium. It is not difficult to give examples of
economies having more than one Walrasian equilibrium, see for example Kehoe (1991)
and see also Section 3.12, while there is still more than one Walrasian equilibrium when
these economies are slightly perturbed. Hence, local stability is too much to be hoped
for. Therefore, in this monograph attention will be focused to the question whether there
exist globally stable price adjustment processes.
Using the same type of reasoning as in Section 3.8, it is often argued that in a price
adjustment process the price system moves in accordance with the sign of the total
excess demand at the current price system, called the law of demand. Although the law
of demand seems to be a very natural assumption, there is some criticism to it, see for
instance Koopmans (1957). One of the problems is that in the model of this chapter it
is assumed that every agent is a price taker. Therefore, it is impossible to view the price
adjustment process as being the result of price setting behaviour of the individual agents
acting in the economy. Nevertheless, most price adjustment processes formulated in the
literature do satisfy assumptions closely related to the law of demand. To deal with
the problem that every agent is assumed to be a price taker, while the price system is
allowed to change, it is often assumed that the price system is determined by a fictitious
auctioneer at each point in time. The auctioneer is then assumed to adjust the price
system based on total excess demand at the current price system. Whether a fictitious
auctioneer is assumed to exist or not, the main purpose of a price adjustment process
is to describe the global features of the behaviour of the market mechanism when an
economy is out of equilibrium. Something similar to the law of demand does not seem
to be unreasonable as a global feature of the behaviour of the market mechanism.
A function f : IR → IR is said to be sign preserving if, for every s ∈ IR, s < 0
implies f(s) < 0, s = 0 implies f(s) = 0, and s > 0 implies f(s) > 0. Let the economy
E have a total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IRN and, for every j ∈ IN , let
sign preserving functions fj : IR → IR be given. Consider the price adjustment process
π : IRN++ × IR+ → IRN++, where, for every j ∈ IN , πj is implicitly defined by
∂tπj(v, t) = fj (zj (π(v, t))) , ∀v ∈ S, ∀t ∈ IR+. (3.10)
Notice that (3.10) reflects the law of demand exactly. If for every commodity j ∈ IN
there exists λj ∈ IR++ such that the function fj is defined by fj(s) = λjs, ∀s ∈ IR, then
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(3.10) yields the formulation of the Walrasian tatonnement process as given in Samuelson
(1941). Notice that there is no loss of generality in taking λj = 1, ∀j ∈ IN , since it is
possible to change the unit of measurement of the commodities. The price adjustment
process determined by (3.10) can be shown to be globally stable in many cases, like
the case with one consumer (or more general the case where the total excess demand
function could result from an economy with one consumer), the case with one or two
commodities, and the case where the distribution of the initial endowments constitutes
a Pareto efficient allocation, see Arrow and Hurwicz (1958) and Arrow and Hahn (1971),
see also Negishi (1962) and Hahn (1982) for surveys of other results. For the most
important special case the concept of gross substitutability in the finite increment form
is needed.
A total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IR is said to satisfy gross substitutability
in the finite increment form if for every p, p̂ ∈ IRN++ such that, for some j′ ∈ IN , pj′ < p̂j′
and pj = p̂j , ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}, it holds that zj(p) < zj(p̂), ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}. If a total excess
demand function z satisfies gross substitutability in the finite increment form, then an
increase in the price of a commodity results in an increase of the total excess demand
of all the other commodities. Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive this property
from assumptions on the consumption sets, initial endowments, and preference relations,
although it is economically appealing.
Theorem 3.11.2
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) be such that ζ|IRN++ : IR
N
++ → IRN , denoted by
z, is a continuous function being bounded from below, satisfying homogeneity of degree
zero, Walras’ law, gross substitutability in the finite increment form, and if (pn)n∈IN is
a sequence of price systems in IRN++ converging to p ∈ IRN+ \ ({0N} ∪ IRN++), then the
sequence (z(pn))n∈IN is such that
∑
j∈IN zj(p
n) → +∞. Then there exists a unique Wal-
rasian equilibrium price system p∗ ∈ IRN++ of the economy E . For every j ∈ IN , let
fj : IR → IR be a continuous, sign preserving function. Then the price adjustment pro-
cess π : IRN++ × IR+ → IRN++, where, for every j ∈ IN , πj is determined by ∂tπj(v, t) =
fj(zj(π(v, t))), ∀v ∈ IRN++, ∀t ∈ IR+, is globally stable. Moreover, for every v ∈ IRN++,
for every t1, t2 ∈ IR+ with t1 < t2, it holds that ‖π(v, t1)− p∗‖∞ > ‖π(v, t2)− p∗‖∞.
See Arrow, Block, and Hurwicz (1959), Footnote 4, page 86, Lemma 3.3, page 89, The-
orem 4.1.1, page 95, and Theorem 3.11.1.
Although Theorem 3.11.2 shows global stability of the price adjustment process deter-
mined by (3.10) for an interesting class of economies, it does not yet show universal
stability of this process, i.e., it does not show stability for a typical economy with M
consumers and N commodities. The next section describes an example with an unstable
unique Walrasian equilibrium, originally presented in Scarf (1960).
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3.12 Scarf’s Example
In this section the example to be used throughout Part IV is examined. This example is
known as Scarf’s example and can be found in Scarf (1960). In this example the economy
E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I3) is such that N = 3,
X1 = X2 = X3 = IR3+,
1, 2, and 3 can be represented by utility functions u1 : X1 → IR, u2 : X2 → IR, and
u3 : X3 → IR, respectively, defined by
u1(x1) = min({x11, x12}), ∀x1 ∈ IR3+,
u2(x2) = min({x22, x23}), ∀x2 ∈ IR3+,
u3(x3) = min({x31, x33}), ∀x3 ∈ IR3+,
and
ω1 = (1, 0, 0)⊤,
ω2 = (0, 1, 0)⊤,
ω3 = (0, 0, 1)⊤.





























, ∀p ∈ IR3++.
It is easily shown that there is no Walrasian equilibrium price system belonging to
IR3\IR3++ and that p∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price system if and only if p∗ = λ(1, 1, 1)⊤
for some λ ∈ IR++. The unique Walrasian equilibrium allocation x∗ is given by
x∗1 = ( 12 ,
1
2 , 0)
⊤, x∗2 = (0, 12 ,
1
2)




Let some initial state v ∈ IR3++ be given. The dependence of the price adjustment process
on the initial state v is suppressed in the notation. Consider the price adjustment process
π : IR+ → IR3++ determined by
∂tπ(t) = z (π(t)) , ∀t ∈ IR+,
i.e., the Walrasian tatonnement process. Define the function f : IR+ → IR by f(t) =∑
j∈I3(πj(t))







πj(t)zj (π(t)) = 0, ∀t ∈ IR+, (3.11)
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using Walras’ law. So, π(t) ∈ B̃2((0, 0, 0)⊤, ‖v‖2), ∀t ∈ IR+, i.e., the Euclidean norm
of the price systems generated by the Walrasian tatonnement process remains constant
during the process. Define the function g : IR+ → IR by g(t) = π1(t)π2(t)π3(t), ∀t ∈ IR+.
Then, after making some computations, it follows that
∂tg(t) = z1 (π(t)) π2(t)π3(t) + π1(t)z2 (π(t))π3(t) + π1(t)π2(t)z3 (π(t)) = 0, ∀t ∈ IR+.
(3.12)
Therefore, the product of the prices in the price systems generated by the Walrasian
tatonnement process remains constant during the process. Now (3.11) and (3.12) to-









2 and p1p2p3 = v1v2v3
}
.
It is easily verified that this set is a circle, unless v = λ(1, 1, 1)⊤ for some λ ∈ IR++, i.e.,
unless v is a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Therefore, although there is a unique
Walrasian equilibrium, the Walrasian tatonnement process is neither locally nor globally
stable in Scarf’s example. In Scarf (1960) also other examples are given for which the
Walrasian tatonnement process is neither locally nor globally stable, while the instability
does not disappear when the economy is slightly perturbed.
3.13 Globally and Universally Stable Price Adjust-
ment Processes
When one is searching for a globally and universally stable price adjustment process, it
is interesting to know what kind of properties a total excess demand relation satisfies.
Theorem 3.7.1 yields homogeneity of degree zero, Theorem 3.7.2 Walras’ law, and The-
orem 3.11.1 continuity and some boundary behaviour. The idea that there is a lack of
further properties was first expressed in Sonnenschein (1973) and Mantel (1974). The
following result makes clear that indeed no other properties can be expected.
Theorem 3.13.1
Let z : IRN++ → IRN be a continuous function satisfying z(λp) = z(p), ∀λ ∈ IR++, ∀p ∈
IRN++, and p ·z(p) = 0, ∀p ∈ IRN++. Then, for every ε ∈ IR++, there exists an economy E =
((X i,i, ωi)i∈IN ) with total excess demand relation ζ such that, for every consumer i ∈
IN , X
i = IRN+ , the preference relation i is complete, transitive, continuous, monotonic,





See Debreu (1974), Theorem, page 16.
Therefore, every continuous function z : IRN++ → IRN satisfying homogeneity of degree
zero and Walras’ law is the total excess demand relation restricted to a subset of IRN++
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arbitrarily close to IRN++ of an economy with N consumers satisfying standard assump-
tions. For a survey of related results, the reader is referred to Shafer and Sonnenschein
(1982).
Theorem 3.13.1 makes it very easy to construct other examples of economies such that
the Walrasian tatonnement process is not globally stable. From Balasko (1988), Lemma
1.9.4, page 27, it follows that the Walrasian tatonnement process can be regarded as a
first order linear approximation of the price adjustment process determined by (3.10).
Therefore, considering such a process will not solve the problem of the lack of universal
stability.
Let the price adjustment process π be described by means of a differential equation,
where, given a continuously differentiable total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IRN ,
the adjustment of the price system reached at a point in time t is allowed to depend
on z(π(t)) and ∂pz(π(t)). The results of Saari and Simon (1978) make clear that in
this case there exists an economy satisfying all the usual assumptions while the price
adjustment process is not globally stable, unless the number of commodities is required
to be equal to one or two, or the price adjustment process uses the information of most
of the partial derivatives of z. Notice that the Walrasian tatonnement process is globally
and universally stable when restricted to economies with one or two commodities. It
should be remarked that modelling a price adjustment process in discrete time instead
of continuous time only aggravates the problems as has been shown in Saari (1985).
There it is shown that even for the case with only two commodities, but in general for
cases with more commodities, there is no globally and universally stable price adjustment
process in a rather large class of price adjustment processes.
The results presented in this section make clear that it is very important to study
the allocation of commodities when trade has to take place at a non-Walrasian equi-
librium price system since the analysis of price adjustment processes suggests that one
cannot be too confident that, in an economy as described in this chapter, a Walrasian
equilibrium price system will be reached. This analysis will be performed in Part II of
this monograph. Obviously, it is easy to give also other reasons for such an analysis. For
instance, it is not always reasonable to assume price taking behaviour of all the agents
in the economy. If some of the agents have the ability to influence the price system, then
it is no longer reasonable to assume that a Walrasian equilibrium will result. Often the
government is an agent that exercises influence on the price system by using price con-
trols like minimum wages, minimum prices for agricultural products, linkages between
the wages of civil servants and the wages paid in industry, and so on. Therefore, gov-
ernment behaviour is endogenously determined in Part III of this monograph, making it
possible to extend an analysis that considers the allocation of commodities when some
price rigidities or price regulations are assumed to be given to an analysis where also
the price regulations themselves are endogenously determined. Finally, it is possible to
study dynamic processes not belonging to the class for which negative results have been
obtained in Saari and Simon (1978) and Saari (1985). For example Saari (1985) states
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“A possible option is that a mechanism must depend upon the values of the prices . . .”,
a possibility that will be investigated in Part IV of this monograph.
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Part II
Static Aspects of Disequilibrium
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Chapter 4
Equilibrium Existence Results for
Economies with Price Rigidities
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter a general equilibrium model of the economic system is developed for the
case price rigidities may be present. In Theorem 3.8.2 and in Theorem 3.11.1 quite gen-
eral assumptions were stated under which the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium of the
economy can be guaranteed. However, it is assumed in Chapter 3 that the price system
may be any element of IRN . When the set of price systems is restricted by constraints
imposed by price regulations or by price rigidities, the set of admissible price systems is
obtained. It is possible that no Walrasian equilibrium price system of the economy does
belong to the set of admissible price systems.
In case a state corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy prevails,
then the description of the market mechanism given in Section 3.2 is sufficient to deter-
mine the outcome for each one of the agents. The information transmitted by the market
mechanism is the price system, on which the agents base their decisions. When a non-
Walrasian equilibrium price system prevails in the economy, the optimal actions of the
agents at this price system are necessarily incompatible, and a description of the market
mechanism should include how commodities are allocated in this case. Following Drèze
(1975), the information transmitted by the market mechanism is now the price system
together with a rationing scheme for each agent, being the maximal amount an agent is
allowed to make available with regard to his initial endowment of every commodity and
the maximal amount made available to an agent with regard to his initial endowment
of every commodity. Still, agents make their decisions independently, but the decision
of an agent is now based on both the price system and his rationing scheme. Except
for the possibility of price rigidities and the extension of the description of the market
mechanism, the interpretation of the model is the same as the one given in Chapter 3.
In this chapter it is assumed that all agents in the economy are consumers. To include
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producers in the model does not yield additional difficulties, see for instance Dehez and
Drèze (1984).
In Section 4.2 the set of admissible actions of a consumer is analyzed, given the price
system and the rationing scheme of the consumer. As in Section 3.4 the set of admissible
actions of a consumer is specified by the budget set of the consumer. The properties
of the budget relation of a consumer, associating with every price system and rationing
scheme of the consumer the corresponding budget set, are analyzed.
In Section 4.3 the behaviour of a consumer is studied, given the price system and
the rationing scheme of the consumer. The demand relation of a consumer is derived,
associating with every price system and every rationing scheme the set of optimal actions
in the budget set according to the preference relation of the consumer. Given the price
system and the rationing scheme, a consumer is said to be rationed on his supply on a
market if his behaviour would change by having no restrictions on the maximal amount
he may supply on this market and a consumer is said to be rationed on his demand on a
market if his behaviour would change by having no restrictions on the maximal amount
he may demand on this market.
In Section 4.4 the model of an economy with price rigidities is extended by specifying
the set of admissible price systems and in Section 4.5 the model is extended by introduc-
ing the set of admissible rationing schemes on supply and the set of admissible rationing
schemes on demand. The pair formed by the latter two sets is called the rationing sys-
tem. In this chapter the set of admissible price systems is obtained by specifying lower
and upper bounds on the prices on each market. This way of modelling price rigidities
is based on Drèze (1975). Making some substitutions it can be shown that under certain
assumptions models with prices depending on a general price index as studied in Dehez
and Drèze (1984) and van der Laan (1984) are special cases of the model considered in
this chapter. The rationing system makes it possible to model that not all rationing
schemes are feasible. For instance, it is possible that a market is organized in such a
way that the rationing scheme of every consumer is the same or that there is a kind
of priority system according to which commodities are allocated. The specification of
the rationing system given in this chapter is very general. It will be shown that uni-
form rationing, rationing determined by initial endowments, rationing determined by
market share, rationing determined by priority, and the rationing system consisting of
all rationing schemes are included as special cases. Often it is possible to specify the
rationing system on supply and the rationing system on demand as being the range of a
certain function, called the rationing function on supply and the rationing function on
demand, respectively. Both necessary and sufficient conditions for the representation of
the rationing system by a rationing function are given. The economy is then described
by a specification of the consumption sets, preference relations, and the resources of all
the consumers, together with a specification of the set of admissible price systems and
the rationing system. In Section 4.6 an equilibrium concept of the economy is given for
which the corresponding equilibria are called constrained equilibria.
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In Section 4.7 it is shown that there exists an uncountable set of constrained equilib-
ria of the economy. This is in accordance with the examples given in Böhm and Müller
(1977) and with the results obtained in van der Laan and Talman (1990) for the uni-
form rationing system. A continuum of correspondences will be given such that each
correspondence has a fixed point whereas each fixed point corresponds to a constrained
equilibrium of the economy. Moreover, the correspondences can be chosen such that
fixed points of different correspondences correspond to different constrained equilibria of
the economy and such that all constrained equilibria of the economy are obtained. In
this way characterizations of the complete set of constrained equilibria of the economy
are given. Moreover, a refinement of the constrained equilibrium concept, called a Drèze
equilibrium, is presented and its existence is shown to follow as a special case of the main
result of Section 4.7.
In Kurz (1982) and van der Laan (1980a) it has been remarked that in the real world
consumers are rationed more frequently on their supply than on their demand. In van
der Laan (1982) the existence of a constrained equilibrium with no consumer rationed
on his demand on any market and with at least one market without rationing at all has
been proved, using the technique of simplicial approximation of equilibria. This yields
another refinement of the constrained equilibrium concept, called a supply constrained
equilibrium. In Polterovich (1993) general equilibrium type models of centrally planned
economies are considered where no rationing on the supply of any consumer is allowed.
These models provide the motivation for another refinement of the constrained equilib-
rium concept, called a demand constrained equilibrium. Demand constrained equilibria
are also considered in van der Laan and Talman (1990). Generalizations of these two
equilibrium refinements and existence results are given in Section 4.8.
Given the consumption sets, the preference relations of the consumers, and the ra-
tioning system, the equilibrium relation is introduced. It assigns to each specification of
initial endowments and of the set of admissible price systems the set of all constrained
equilibrium allocations. In Section 4.9 it is shown that the equilibrium relation is a
compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence being continuous on a residual
set of points. The results concerning the equilibrium relation make clear that the set of
constrained equilibria is stable against certain perturbations of the economy.
In Section 4.10 the example of Section 3.10 is considered when the economy given
there is extended by a set of admissible price systems and a rationing system.
This chapter is based on Herings (1992) and Herings (1995a).
4.2 The Set of Admissible Actions of a Consumer
As in Chapter 3 it is assumed in this chapter that there are M ∈ IN consumers, indexed
by i ∈ IM , and N ∈ IN commodities, indexed by j ∈ IN . Given consumption sets X i, ∀i ∈
IM , the set
∏
i∈IM X
i is denoted by X, and if x = (x1, . . . , xM) is an element of X, then
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xj = (x
1
j , . . . , x
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . Given initial endowments ωi, ∀i ∈ IM , ω = (ω1, . . . , ωM),
ωj = (ω
1
j , . . . , ω
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN , and ω̃ =
∑
i∈IM ω
i denotes the total initial endowment.
For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i and the preference relation i are
assumed to be given in this section.
The description of the market mechanism given in Section 3.2 is now extended in the
sense that the information transmitted by the market mechanism is not only the price
system, but also (the negative of) the maximal amount a consumer is allowed to supply
of every commodity, called the rationing scheme on supply, and the maximal amount
a consumer is allowed to demand of every commodity, called the rationing scheme on
demand. The rationing scheme on supply is denoted by l = (l1, . . . , lM) ∈ ∏i∈IM −IR∗N+
and the rationing scheme on demand by L = (L1, . . . , LM) ∈ ∏i∈IM IR∗N+ . The pair (l, L)
is called the rationing scheme. For every consumer i ∈ IM , li is called the rationing
scheme on the supply of consumer i, Li is called the rationing scheme on the demand of
consumer i, and the pair (li, Li) is called the rationing scheme of consumer i. For every
j ∈ IN , lj = (l1j , . . . , lMj )⊤ is called the rationing scheme on supply on the market of
commodity j ∈ IN , Lj = (L1j , . . . , LMj )⊤ is called the rationing scheme on demand on
the market of commodity j, and the pair (lj , Lj) is called the rationing scheme on the
market of commodity j.
For every consumer i ∈ IM , define the budget set of consumer i having an initial
endowment ωi ∈ IRN at a price system p ∈ IRN and a rationing scheme (li, Li) ∈ −IR∗N+ ×
IR∗N+ , denoted by β
i(p, li, Li, ωi), as the set of consumption bundles in the consumption
set of consumer i satisfying the constraints imposed by the rationing scheme of consumer
i and being such that the value of these consumption bundles does not exceed p · ωi, so
βi(p, li, Li, ωi) =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣p · xi ≤ p · ωi and li ≤ xi − ωi ≤ Li
}
.
Notice that the requirement that li ∈ −IR∗N+ and Li ∈ IR∗N+ implies that only voluntary
trading takes place. No consumer can be forced to supply or to demand at least a
certain amount of a commodity. In case li = −∞N and Li = +∞N the definition of
the budget set is equal to the one given in Chapter 3. Therefore, the description of
the market mechanism given here is more general than the description of Chapter 3. A
consumption bundle xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li, ωi) is called an admissible consumption bundle of
consumer i ∈ Im.
The relation βi : IRN × −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ × IRN → IRN associating with every element
(p, li, Li, ωi) of IRN × −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ × IRN the set βi(p, li, Li, ωi) is called the budget
relation of consumer i ∈ IM . If p ∈ IRN , (li, Li) ∈ −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ , and ωi ∈ X i, then
the budget set βi(p, li, Li, ωi) of consumer i ∈ IM is not equal to the empty set since it
contains ωi in that case. The following lemma is also useful.
Lemma 4.2.1
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i be convex. Then the budget
relation βi is convex-valued.
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Proof
It is easily seen that the set βi(p, li, Li, ωi) is convex for every (p, li, Li, ωi) ∈ IRN ×
−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ × IRN since it is equal to the intersection of the convex sets X i, {xi ∈ IRN |
p · xi ≤ p · ωi}, and {xi ∈ IRN | li ≤ xi − ωi ≤ Li}. Q.E.D.
For the equilibrium existence proofs of Section 4.7 and Section 4.8 and the results of
Section 4.9 it has to be shown that the restriction of the budget relation βi to the set
IRN++×−IRN+×IRN+× int(X i) is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence
for every consumer i ∈ IM . In Section 4.6 it will be shown that it is indeed sufficient to
consider rationing schemes of a consumer belonging to the subset −IRN+ × IRN+ of the set
−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ .
Lemma 4.2.2
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i be closed. Then the restriction
of the budget relation βi to the set IRN ×−IRN+ × IRN+ × IRN is compact-valued.
Proof
For every (p, li, Li, ωi) ∈ IRN ×−IRN+ × IRN+ × IRN , the set βi(p, li, Li, ωi) is compact since
it is equal to the intersection of the closed sets X i, {xi ∈ IRN | p · xi ≤ p · ωi}, and
{xi ∈ IRN | li ≤ xi − ωi ≤ Li}, and is therefore closed. Furthermore, xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li, ωi)
implies ‖xi‖∞ ≤ max({‖li+ωi‖∞, ‖Li+ωi‖∞}), and therefore βi(p, li, Li, ωi) is bounded.
Q.E.D.
In Drèze (1975) the initial endowment ωi ∈ int(X i) of consumer i ∈ IM is considered as
given and the following result is shown.
Theorem 4.2.3
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i be closed, convex, X i ⊂ IRN+ ,
and X i + IRN+ ⊂ X i, and let the initial endowment ωi of consumer i belong to int(X i).
Then the restriction of the budget relation βi to the set IRN+ × −IRN+ × IRN+ × {ωi} is
a correspondence being continuous at every (p, li, Li, ωi) ∈ IRN+ × −IRN+ × IRN+ × {ωi}
satisfying p · li < 0.
See Drèze (1975), Lemma, page 304.
The condition in Theorem 4.2.3 that p · li < 0 will turn out to be restrictive in Section
4.7, Section 4.8, and Section 4.9. The following example makes clear that even if an
initial endowment ωi of a consumer i ∈ IM belongs to the interior of the consumption
set and the consumption set is compact, then the restriction of the budget relation βi
to the set IRN+ × −IRN+ × IRN+ × {ωi} is not necessarily a correspondence being lower
hemi-continuous at every (p, li, Li, ωi) ∈ IRN+ ×−IRN+ × IRN+ × {ωi} satisfying p · li = 0.
Example 4.2.4
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = {xi ∈ IR2+|xi1 ≤ 2 and xi2 ≤ 2}, ωi = (1, 1)⊤, and,















xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣1− 1
n
≤ xi1, 1− 1n ≤ xi2, and 12xi1 + 1nxi2 ≤ 12 + 1n
}
.
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)n∈IN converges to (p, l
i, Li) with p = ( 12 , 0)
⊤, li = (0, 0)⊤, and
Li = (1, 1)⊤. Since
βi(p, li, Li, ωi) =
{
xi ∈ X i









∣∣∣xi ∈ βi(pn, lin , Lin , ωi)
})
= 1 12 ,
and, consequently, the restriction of the budget relation βi to the set IRN+×−IRN+×IRN+ ×
{ωi} is not lower hemi-continuous at (p, li, Li, ωi) according to Theorem 2.5.13.
In Example 4.2.4 and in Drèze (1975) the prices of some commodities are allowed to be
zero. This case will be excluded in this chapter. It will turn out that the restriction of
the budget relation βi of a consumer i ∈ IM to the set IRN++ × −IRN+ × IRN+ × {ωi} is
continuous, so even at (p, li, Li, ωi) ∈ IRN++×−IRN+ × IRN+ × int(X i) with li = 0N . This is
quite surprising since li = 0N and p ∈ IRN++ implies that there is no consumption bundle
in the budget set of a consumer i ∈ IM having a value lower than the value of the initial
endowment ωi, a condition always used in the literature to show lower hemi-continuity
of the budget relation. In order to show that the equilibrium relation in Section 4.9 is
a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence it is not enough to examine
the continuity of the budget relation given fixed initial endowments ωi ∈ int(X i), but
instead the more general case presented in the next theorem has to be considered.
Theorem 4.2.5
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i be closed and convex, and let








is a correspondence. Let some (p, li, Li, ωi) ∈ IRN++ ×
−IRN+ × IRN+ × int(X i) be given. First, it will be shown that βi|IRN++×−IRN+×IRN+×int(Xi)





















)n∈IN be a sequence in IR
N
++ × −IRN+ × IRN+ × int(X i) converging to
(p, li, Li, ωi) and let the sequence (xi
n
)n∈IN in X
i be such that xi
n ∈ βi(pn, lin , Lin , ωin).
The sequence (xi
n
)n∈IN is bounded since

















Without loss of generality, the sequence (xi
n
)n∈IN converges to some x
i ∈ X i. Moreover,
p · xi = lim
n→+∞
pn · xin ≤ lim
n→+∞
pn · ωin = p · ωi,
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is upper hemi-continuous at














)n∈IN be a sequence in IR
N
++ × −IRN+ × IRN+ × int(X i) converging to












N such that xi
n ∈ βi(pn, lin , Lin , ωin) and xin → xi. Three cases
have to be considered, p · (xi−ωi) < 0, p · (xi−ωi) = 0 and li = 0N , and p · (xi−ωi) = 0
and li < 0N .
2.1. p · (xi − ωi) < 0.
First a sequence (ai
n
)n∈IN in X
i converging to xi is constructed. Then this sequence
is used to construct a sequence (bi
n
)n∈IN in X
i satisfying additionally that there exists




















Since ωi ∈ int(X i), there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that xi ∈ IRN and ‖xi − ωi‖∞ ≤ ε
implies xi ∈ X i. Since ωin → ωi, there exists n1 ∈ IN such that, for every n ≥ n1,









nxij + (1− λn)ωi
n
j , ∀j ∈ J1 ∪ J3,
where the real number λn is defined by
λn = 1 if J2 = ∅, (4.4)
λn = min
({
ε− |ωinj − ωij|
ε
∣∣∣∣∣ j ∈ J
2
})
if J2 6= ∅. (4.5)
It will be shown that ai
n ∈ X i, ∀n ≥ n1, and that ain → xi.



















j , ∀j ∈ J1 ∪ J3,
so, ai
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Now it will be shown that ai











|ωinj − ωij |
1− λn .
For every j ∈ J2, if ωinj = ωij , then |ai
n
j − ωij | = 0 < ε, and if ωi
n












∣∣∣∣  ∈ J2
}) ≤ |ω
in











λnxij + (1− λn)ωi
n
j − λnxij








Since ‖ain − ωi‖∞ ≤ ε, it holds that ain ∈ X i. Since ain = (1− λn)ain + λnxi, it follows
that ai




ε− |ωinj − ωij|
ε













nxij + (1− λn)ωi
n
j → xij, ∀j ∈ J1 ∪ J3. (4.7)









j , ∀j ∈ J3.




















, ∀j ∈ J3.




j > 0 and L
in
j ≥ 0, and, for




j < 0 and l
in























Let some n ≥ n2 be given. Clearly, 0 ≤ µn ≤ 1. Since ain , ωin ∈ X i, it follows that
bi
n ∈ X i. (4.8)




































































































































= 1, ∀j ∈ J3.










→ ωi + xi − ωi = xi. (4.14)
Hence, pn · (bin − ωin) → p · (xi − ωi) < 0. Therefore, there exists n3 ∈ IN such that
n3 ≥ n2 and n ≥ n3 implies pn · (bin − ωin) < 0. This together with (4.8)-(4.13) yields
that bi















, ∀n ≥ n3.
This sequence has all the desired properties.
2.2. p · (xi − ωi) = 0 and li = 0N .
Since xi−ωi ≥ li and li = 0N , it holds that xi ≥ ωi. Using p ∈ IRN++ this implies xi = ωi.
Obviously, ωi








, ∀n ∈ IN. This sequence has all the desired properties.
2.3. p · (xi − ωi) = 0 and li < 0N .







Since ωi ∈ int(X i), there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that xi ∈ IRN and ‖xi − ωi‖∞ ≤ ε implies
xi ∈ X i. Since ωin → ωi and lin → li, there exists n′ ∈ IN such that n′ ≥ n2, where n2 is
defined as in Part 2.1 of the proof, and, for every n ≥ n′, ‖ωin − ωi‖∞ ≤ 12ε and li
n
j < 0,
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and define ω̂i










j , ∀j ∈ IN \ J.
For every n ≥ n′, ω̂in has the following properties,
ω̂i
n ∈ X i, lin ≤ ω̂in − ωin < 0N ≤ Lin , and pn · ω̂in < pn · ωin. (4.15)
Moreover, ω̂i
n → ω̂i, where, for ε equal to min({−lij |j ∈ J} ∪ { 12ε}),
ω̂ij = ω
i
j − ε, ∀j ∈ J,
ω̂ij = ω
i
j , ∀j ∈ IN \ J.
Therefore,
ω̂i ∈ X i, li ≤ ω̂i − ωi < 0N ≤ Li, and p · ω̂i < p · ωi.
For every n ≥ n2, the element bin of IRN has been defined in Part 1 of the proof satisfying,
according to (4.8)-(4.14), that
bi
n ∈ X i, lin ≤ bin − ωin ≤ Lin , and bin → xi. (4.16)
For every n ≥ n′, define the real number λn by
λn =
pn · ωin − pn · ω̂in
pn · bin − pn · ω̂in if p
n · bin > pn · ωin, (4.17)
λn = 1 if pn · bin ≤ pn · ωin, (4.18)











Let some n ≥ n′ be given. Since ω̂in ∈ X i and bin ∈ X i by (4.15) and (4.16), and
0 < λn ≤ 1, it follows that
ci
n ∈ X i. (4.19)
By (4.15) and (4.16),
ci










≥ lin , (4.20)
ci










≤ Lin . (4.21)
If pn · bin > pn · ωin, then, by (4.17),
pn · cin =
(
pn · ωin − pn · ω̂in
pn · bin − pn · ω̂in
)
pn · bin +
(
pn · bin − pn · ωin
pn · bin − pn · ω̂in
)
pn · ω̂in = pn · ωin, (4.22)
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and if pn · bin ≤ pn · ωin, then, by (4.18), λn = 1, and hence it holds that
pn · cin = pn · bin ≤ pn · ωin. (4.23)
From (4.19)-(4.23) it follows that ci
n ∈ βi(pn, lin, Lin , ωin). From (4.16) and since p ·xi =
p · ωi, it follows that
pn · ωin − pn · ω̂in
pn · bin − pn · ω̂in →
p · ωi − p · ω̂i
p · xi − p · ω̂i =
p · ωi − p · ω̂i
p · ωi − p · ω̂i = 1.















, ∀n ≥ n′.
This sequence has all the desired properties. Q.E.D.
4.3 The Behaviour of a Consumer
For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i, the preference relation i, and the
initial endowment ωi are assumed to be given in this section. Therefore, the dependence
on the initial endowment is suppressed in the notation of the budget relation and the
budget set of a consumer.
A consumer i ∈ IM is assumed to take the price system p ∈ IRN and the rationing
scheme (li, Li) ∈ −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ as given, and to choose a best element of βi(p, li, Li) for
i . Define, for every consumer i ∈ IM , for every (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN × −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ , the
set δi(p, li, Li) as the set of consumption bundles being best elements of βi(p, li, Li) for
i, i.e.,
δi(p, li, Li) =
{
xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li)
∣∣∣xi i xi, ∀xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li)
}
.
An element of δi(p, li, Li) is called an optimal action or optimal consumption bundle of
consumer i ∈ IM at (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN × −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ . Given an optimal consumption
bundle xi of a consumer i ∈ IM , consumer i is said to supply a commodity j ∈ IN
if xij ≤ ωij and consumer i is said to demand commodity j if xij ≥ ωij. The relation
δi : IRN ×−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ → IRN associating with every (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN ×−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ the
set δi(p, li, Li) is called the demand relation of consumer i ∈ IM . Although a rationing
scheme (li, Li) ∈ −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ specifies the maximal amount consumer i ∈ IM is allowed
to supply and to demand of every commodity, his behaviour is not necessarily influenced
by these constraints.
Definition 4.3.1 (Being constrained or rationed)
Let some j′ ∈ IN be given. A consumer i ∈ IM is constrained or rationed on his
supply on the market of commodity j′ at (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN ×−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ if there exists a
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consumption bundle xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li), where lij′ = −∞ and lij = lij, ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}, such
that there is no consumption bundle xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li) satisfying xi i xi. A consumer
i ∈ IM is constrained or rationed on his demand on the market of commodity j′ at
(p, li, Li) ∈ IRN × −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ if there exists a consumption bundle xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li),
where Lij′ = +∞ and Lij = Lij , ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}, such that there is no consumption bundle
xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li) satisfying xi i xi. A consumer i ∈ IM is constrained or rationed on
the market of commodity j′ at (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN × −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ if he is rationed on his
supply or his demand on the market of commodity j′ at (p, li, Li).
Definition 4.3.2 (Rationing on a market)
There is supply rationing on the market of a commodity j ∈ IN at (p, l, L) ∈ IRN ×
−IR∗MN+ × IR∗MN+ if at least one consumer i ∈ IM is rationed on his supply on the market
of commodity j at (p, li, Li). There is demand rationing on the market of a commodity
j ∈ IN at (p, l, L) ∈ IRN×−IR∗MN+ ×IR∗MN+ if at least one consumer i ∈ IM is rationed on
his demand on the market of commodity j at (p, li, Li). There is rationing on the market
of a commodity j ∈ IN at (p, l, L) ∈ IRN × −IR∗MN+ × IR∗MN+ if there is supply rationing
or demand rationing on the market of commodity j at (p, l, L).
The following result shows how a consumer behaves when there is supply or demand
rationing on some market.
Theorem 4.3.3
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i be convex and let the preference
relation i be complete and convex. Let some (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN ×−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ and some
j′ ∈ IN be given. If consumer i is rationed on his supply on the market of commodity
j′ at (p, li, Li) and if xi ∈ δi(p, li, Li), then xij′ − ωij′ = lij′. If consumer i is rationed
on his demand on the market of commodity j′ at (p, li, Li) and if xi ∈ δi(p, li, Li), then
xij′ − ωij′ = Lij′.
Proof
Let consumer i be rationed on his supply on the market of commodity j′ ∈ IN at
(p, li, Li) and let li ∈ −IR∗N+ be such that lij′ = −∞ and lij = lij, ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}. Let some
xi ∈ δi(p, li, Li) be given. Then there exists xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li) such that xi ≺i xi. For every
λ ∈ [0, 1], define the element xi(λ) of IRN by
xi(λ) = λxi + (1− λ)xi.
Since βi(p, li, Li) ⊂ βi(p, li, Li) and since βi(p, li, Li) is convex by Lemma 4.2.1, it holds
that xi(λ) ∈ βi(p, li, Li), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, xi ≺i xi(λ), ∀λ ∈ (0, 1].
Suppose xij′ − ωij′ > lij′. Then there exists λ ∈ IR++ such that λ ∈ (0, λ) implies xij′(λ)−
ωij′ > l
i
j′, and so x
i(λ) ∈ βi(p, li, Li). Since xi ≺i xi(λ), this implies xi /∈ δi(p, li, Li), a
contradiction. Consequently, xij′−ωij′ = lij′. Similarly, it can be shown that xij′−ωij′ = Lij′
if consumer i is rationed on his demand on the market of commodity j′ at (p, li, Li).
Q.E.D.
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If a consumer i ∈ IM is constrained on his supply (demand) on the market of a commodity
j ∈ IN at (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN ×−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ , then lij (Lij) is said to be binding.
4.4 The Set of Admissible Price Systems
It is assumed that for every commodity j ∈ IN a lower bound on the price of commodity
j, denoted by pj , and an upper bound on the price of commodity j, denoted by pj , is
given. For every commodity j ∈ IN it is assumed that pj belongs to IR∗ \ {+∞} and pj
to IR∗ \{−∞}, while pj ≤ pj. The element p ∈ IR∗N , given by p = (p1, . . . , pN)⊤, is called
the lower bound on the price system, and p ∈ IR∗N , given by p = (p1, . . . , pN)⊤, is called
the upper bound on the price system. The set of admissible price systems, denoted by




∣∣∣p ≤ p ≤ p
}
.
The set of admissible price systems P(p,p) includes the model of Chapter 3, where all
price systems are allowed, as the special case with p = −∞N and p = +∞N . The set
of admissible price systems makes it possible to allow for a commodity j ∈ IN for a
minimum price, pj > −∞, and for a maximum price, pj < +∞. It is also possible to
model total inflexibility of the price of a commodity j ∈ IN , i.e., pj = pj . The sets of
admissible price systems considered are slightly more general than the ones considered
in Drèze (1975), where only results are given for the cases with p1 = p1 = 1.
An interesting special case of the set of admissible price systems considered is the
one, also considered in the seminal work of Bénassy (1975b), where the price system is
completely fixed, i.e., p = p. This case corresponds to the Keynesian point of view that
in the short run the price system is rigid and markets are cleared by means of quantity
adjustments. The interesting case where the price system needs not be completely in-
flexible in the short run, but that instead on each market the price may rise or fall by
some amount, is also allowed for.
Another point of view is that price rigidities are institutionally determined or are the
result of strategic elements in the price setting process, see also Chapter 8 and Chapter
9. Typical examples are minimum wages, minimum prices for agricultural products,
maximum price controls to reduce inflation (see Cox (1980)), price systems resulting
from models with imperfect competition (see Bénassy (1993)), price indexation, and the
linkage between the wages of civil servants and the wages paid in industry.
Models with a different set of admissible price systems are given in Dehez and Drèze
(1984) and van der Laan (1984). There a partition {J1, J2, J3} of the set of commodities
is given with J1 the set of free commodities, J2 the set of index commodities, and J3 the
set of price following commodities. The price system is assumed to be an element of IRN+ .
The price index function is a continuous function π : IRN+ → IR+ being homogeneous of
degree one, i.e., π(λp) = λπ(p), ∀λ ∈ IR+, ∀p ∈ IRN+ . Given a price system p ∈ IRN+ , the
real number π(p) is called the price index. The value of the price index is assumed to
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depend only on the prices of the index commodities. For every commodity j ∈ J2 ∪ J3
it is assumed that a lower bound pj ∈ IR+ and an upper bound pj ∈ IR+ is given such
that the price of commodity j is between the product of pj and the price index and the







j∈J1pj = 1 and pjπ(p) ≤ pj ≤ pjπ(p), ∀j ∈ J2 ∪ J3
}
.
Under some assumptions, among which the one that pj = pj, ∀j ∈ J2, it is shown in van
der Laan (1984) that the set Pπ is in some sense equivalent to the set of admissible price
systems P(p,p) with pj = 0 and pj = +∞, ∀j ∈ J1, and is therefore a special case of the
set of admissible price systems considered in this chapter. If the set J1 consists of one
element, say J1 = {1}, and it is required that the value of the price index is above some
level π ∈ IR++, then the model of Dehez and Drèze (1984) is obtained. In this case the
set of admissible price systems is equivalent to the set of admissible price systems P(p,p)
with p1 = π
−1. If, furthermore, it is required that the value of the price index is below
some level π with π ≥ π, then it can be shown that the corresponding set of admissible
price systems is equivalent to the set of admissible price systems P(p,p) with p1 = π
−1
and p1 = π
−1.
In Kurz (1982), Weddepohl (1987), and Wu (1988) models with rather general link-
ages between prices are taken into account. Again, only price systems in IRN+ are consid-
ered. A partition {J1, J2, J3, J4} of the set of commodities is given. For every commodity
j ∈ J3 ∪ J4, let φj : IRN+ → IR+ and, for every commodity j ∈ J4, let ψj : IRN+ → IR+, be
continuous index functions being homogeneous of degree one, i.e., for every commodity
j ∈ J3 ∪ J4, φj(λp) = λφj(p), ∀λ ∈ IR+, ∀p ∈ IRN+ , and, for every commodity j ∈ J4,
ψj(λp) = λψj(p), ∀λ ∈ IR+, ∀p ∈ IRN+ . Moreover, for every commodity j ∈ J3 ∩ J4, it is









In Kurz (1982) the case with J3 = ∅, φj = ψj , ∀j ∈ J4, and the index functions only
depending on the prices of commodities in the set J2 is considered. In Wu (1988) also the
case with J4 = ∅ and the index functions only depending on the prices of commodities in
the set J2 is analyzed. Weddepohl (1987) considers the set P(φ,ψ) making other assump-
tions with respect to the index functions. Van der Laan (1984) also considers a special





∈J2 p. Many different situations can be modelled by the set P(φ,ψ). The
assumptions made in Kurz (1982) and Wu (1988) allow for a fixed price system. In Wed-
depohl (1987) it is shown that the set of admissible price systems considered in Drèze
(1975) is not excluded by his assumptions. It is clear that it is also possible to model
situations not corresponding to a set P(p,p) and it is therefore an interesting question
whether the complete characterizations of constrained equilibria given in this chapter
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can also be given for other models of the set of admissible price systems. In this respect
it should be remarked that in models with a set of admissible price systems P(φ,ψ) it is in
general not possible to show the existence of equilibria satisfying the equilibrium concept
to be introduced in this chapter. Therefore, other equilibrium concepts are used in the
literature concerning these models. More precisely, it may happen in specific cases that
there is supply rationing on some market, while the price on this market still might be
lowered, something that will be excluded in this chapter for reasons given in the Section
4.6.
4.5 The Set of Admissible Rationing Schemes
For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i, the preference relation i, and the
initial endowment ωi are assumed to be given in this section. The description of the
economic system is extended in this section by the specification of a set of admissible
rationing schemes.
The market mechanism specifies the price system and the rationing scheme of every
consumer. However, in general not all rationing schemes are generated by the market
mechanism in the economy. Sometimes rationing schemes are required to be uniform
for all consumers, sometimes they depend on the amount of initial endowments owned
by the various consumers, in other cases they are determined according to some priority
system. The rationing system is given by the pair of sets (l̇, L̇), where l̇ ⊂ −IR∗MN+ and
L̇ ⊂ IR∗MN+ , specifying all admissible rationing schemes. The set l̇, called the rationing
system on supply, specifies all admissible rationing schemes on supply and the set L̇,
called the rationing system on demand, specifies all admissible rationing schemes on
demand. The market mechanism is assumed to specify a price system p ∈ P(p,p) and a
rationing scheme (l, L) ∈ l̇ × L̇. First, some examples of rationing systems are given.
Example 4.5.1 (Unrestricted rationing system)
In the unrestricted rationing system every rationing scheme is allowed. The unrestricted
rationing system on supply is defined by
l̇ = −IR∗MN+ .
The unrestricted rationing system on demand is defined by
L̇ = IR∗MN+ .
Example 4.5.2 (Uniform rationing system)
The uniform rationing system is used in Drèze (1975). The uniform rationing system on




∣∣∣l1 = · · · = lM
}
.
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∣∣∣L1 = · · · = LM
}
.
Example 4.5.3 (Proportional rationing system)
The proportional rationing system is used in Kurz (1982). Assume that ωij > 0, ∀i ∈ IM ,




∣∣∣∀j ∈ IN , ∃λj ∈ IR∗+, ∀i ∈ IM , lij = −λjωij
}
.




∣∣∣∀j ∈ IN , ∃λj ∈ IR∗+, ∀i ∈ IM , Lij = λjωij
}
.
Example 4.5.4 (Market share rationing system)
The market share rationing system is used in Weddepohl (1983). For every j ∈ IN , let




j = 1. The market share rationing
system on supply with respect to α = (α11, . . . , α
M
N )




∣∣∣∀j ∈ IN , ∃λj ∈ IR∗+, ∀i ∈ IM , lij = −λjαij
}
.




j = 1. The








∣∣∣∀j ∈ IN , ∃λj ∈ IR∗+, ∀i ∈ IM , Lij = λjαij
}
.
Example 4.5.5 (Priority rationing system)
Among other rationing systems, the priority rationing system is considered in Weddepohl
(1987). For every j ∈ IN , let πj : IM → IM be a permutation specifying the order in
which consumers are rationed on their supply on the market of commodity j, so, for every
k ∈ IM , if consumer πj(k) is rationed on his supply on the market of of commodity j, then
the consumers πj(1), . . . , πj(k − 1) are fully rationed on their supply on the market of





∣∣∣∀k ∈ IM \ {1}, ∀j ∈ IN , lπj(k)j > −∞ ⇒ l
πj(k−1)
j = 0,





For every j ∈ IN , let πj : IM → IM be a permutation specifying the order in which
consumers are rationed on their demand on the market of commodity j, so, for every
k ∈ IM , if consumer πj(k) is rationed on his demand on the market of commodity j, then
the consumers πj(1), . . . , πj(k − 1) are fully rationed on their demand on the market of





∣∣∣∀k ∈ IM \ {1}, ∀j ∈ IN , Lπj(k)j < +∞⇒ L
πj(k−1)
j = 0,
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The following assumptions are often made with respect to the rationing system (l̇, L̇).
- No rationing on supply is admissible, i.e., −∞MN ∈ l̇, no rationing on demand is
admissible, i.e., +∞MN ∈ L̇, full rationing on supply is admissible, i.e., 0MN ∈ l̇,
and full rationing on demand is admissible, i.e., 0MN ∈ L̇. The rationing system
on supply is flexible, i.e., {−∞MN , 0MN} ⊂ l̇. The rationing system on demand
is flexible, i.e., {0MN ,+∞MN} ⊂ L̇. The rationing system is flexible, i.e., both
the rationing system on supply and the rationing system on demand is flexible.
Notice that the rationing systems of Example 4.5.1, Example 4.5.2, Example 4.5.3,
Example 4.5.4, and Example 4.5.5 are all flexible.
- The rationing system on supply is market independent, i.e., there exist subsets l̇j,
∀j ∈ IN , of −IR∗M+ such that l ∈ l̇ if and only if lj ∈ l̇j , ∀j ∈ IN . The rationing
system on demand is market independent, i.e., there exist subsets L̇j , ∀j ∈ IN , of
IR∗M+ such that L ∈ L̇ if and only if Lj ∈ L̇j , ∀j ∈ IN . The rationing system is
market independent, i.e., both the rationing system on supply and the rationing
system on demand is market independent. Notice that the rationing systems of
Example 4.5.1, Example 4.5.2, Example 4.5.3, Example 4.5.4, and Example 4.5.5
are all market independent.
- The rationing system on supply is connected, i.e., the set l̇ is connected in −IR∗MN+ ,
the rationing system on demand is connected, i.e., the set L̇ is connected in IR∗MN+ .
The rationing system is connected, i.e., both the rationing system on supply and
the rationing system on demand is connected. Notice that the rationing systems of
Example 4.5.1, Example 4.5.2, Example 4.5.3, Example 4.5.4, and Example 4.5.5
are all connected.
- The rationing system on supply is closed, i.e., the set l̇ is closed in −IR∗MN+ , the ra-
tioning system on demand is closed, i.e., the set L̇ is closed in IR∗MN+ . The rationing
system is closed, i.e., both the rationing system on supply and the rationing system
on demand is closed. Notice that the rationing systems of Example 4.5.1, Example
4.5.2, Example 4.5.3, Example 4.5.4, and Example 4.5.5 are all closed.
- For every rationing scheme on supply l ∈ l̇, for every commodity j ∈ IN , let the
set I−∞j (l) be defined by I
−∞
j (l) = {i ∈ IM | lij = −∞} and let the integer
i−∞j (l) be defined by i
−∞
j (l) = #I
−∞
j (l). The rationing system on supply is weakly













j (l) is a proper subset of I
−∞
j (l̂), or
I−∞j (l̂) is a proper subset of I
−∞
j (l). Moreover, some limit property is needed
for weak monotonicity. Let ((l)n)n∈IN be a sequence in l̇ converging to some l ∈
l̇, where, for every j ∈ IN , for every n ∈ IN, I−∞j ((l)n) is a proper subset of
I−∞j (l). Then, for every j ∈ IN , for every l ∈ l̇, i−∞j (l) ≤ i−∞j ((l)n) for some
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i−∞j (l). For every rationing scheme on demand L ∈ L̇, for every commodity j ∈
IN , define the set I
+∞
j (L) by I
+∞
j (L) = {i ∈ IM | Lij = +∞} and define the
integer i+∞j (L) by i
+∞
j (L) = #I
+∞
j (L). The rationing system on demand is weakly















j , or I
+∞
j (L) is a proper subset of
I+∞j (L̂), or I
+∞
j (L̂) is a proper subset of I
+∞
j (L). Moreover, let ((L)
n)n∈IN be a
sequence in L̇ converging to some L ∈ L̇, where, for every j ∈ IN , for every
n ∈ IN, I+∞j ((L)n) is a proper subset of I+∞j (L). Then, for every j ∈ IN , for













j (L) > i
+∞
j (L). The rationing system
is weakly monotonic, i.e., both the rationing system on supply and the rationing
system on demand is weakly monotonic. The rationing system of Example 4.5.1 is
not weakly monotonic, but the rationing systems of Example 4.5.2, Example 4.5.3,
Example 4.5.4, and Example 4.5.5 are weakly monotonic.
- The rationing system on supply is monotonic, i.e., if l, l̂ ∈ l̇, then, for every j ∈ IN , lj ≤
l̂j or lj ≥ l̂j . The rationing system on demand is monotonic, i.e., if L, L̂ ∈ L̇, then,
for every j ∈ IN , Lj ≤ L̂j or Lj ≥ L̂j . The rationing system is monotonic, i.e., both
the rationing system on supply and the rationing system on demand is monotonic.
It is easily verified that a monotonic rationing system is weakly monotonic, so the
rationing system of Example 4.5.1 is not monotonic. The rationing systems of
Example 4.5.2, Example 4.5.3, Example 4.5.4, and Example 4.5.5 are monotonic.
The assumptions that no rationing on supply and no rationing on demand is admissible
and that the rationing system is market independent are so basic, that they hardly can
be considered as assumptions. This is also true for the assumption of connectedness.
The weak monotonicity assumption is also reasonable. This assumption corresponds to
the idea that if two rationing schemes on supply on a market j ∈ IN are given, say lj and
l̂j , then the consumers together are allowed to supply less at lj than at l̂j, or lj = l̂j, or
the consumers together are allowed to supply more at lj than at l̂j on market j. Similarly,
if two rationing schemes on demand on a market j ∈ IN are given, say Lj and L̂j , then
the consumers together are allowed to demand less at Lj than at L̂j , or Lj = L̂j , or
the consumers together are allowed to supply more at Lj than at L̂j on market j. The
monotonicity assumption is similar, but then for every rationing scheme on demand on
a market j ∈ In every consumer is allowed to supply less on market j at lj than at l̂j, or
lj = l̂j , or every consumer is allowed to supply more on market j at lj than at l̂j . Similar
remarks apply to monotonic rationing systems on demand.
Not all different rationing schemes are different from the point of view of the con-
sumer. The following definition captures this idea.
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Definition 4.5.6 (Equivalent rationing schemes)
The rationing scheme on supply l is equivalent to the rationing scheme on supply l̂,
denoted by l ∼ l̂, if, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN , l̂ij ≥ −ωij implies lij = l̂ij , and
l̂ij < −ωij implies lij < −ωij . The rationing scheme on demand L is equivalent to the
rationing scheme on demand L̂, denoted by L ∼ L̂, if, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
L̂ij ≤ ω̃j − ωij implies Lij = L̂ij , and L̂ij > ω̃j − ωij implies Lij > ω̃j − ωij . The rationing
scheme (l, L) is equivalent to the rationing scheme (l̂, L̂), denoted by (l, L) ∼ (l̂, L̂), if
l ∼ l̂ and L ∼ L̂.
It is easily verified that the binary relation on the set of all possible rationing schemes
on supply, −IR∗MN+ , induced by ∼, is an equivalence relation, the binary relation on the
set of all possible rationing schemes on demand, IR∗MN+ , induced by ∼, is an equivalence
relation, and the binary relation on the set of all possible rationing schemes, −IR∗MN+ ×
IR∗MN+ , induced by ∼, is an equivalence relation.
Two equivalent rationing schemes may induce different consumer behaviour. How-
ever, under weak assumptions, this will not be the case in a constrained equilibrium as
will be shown in Theorem 4.6.4.
Definition 4.5.7 (Equivalent rationing systems)
The rationing system on supply l̇ is equivalent to the rationing system on supply
̂̇
l, denoted
by l̇ ∼ ̂̇l, if for every l ∈ l̇ there exists l̂ ∈ ̂̇l such that l ∼ l̂ and for every l̂ ∈ ̂̇l there exists
l ∈ l̇ such that l̂ ∼ l. The rationing system on demand L̇ is equivalent to the rationing
system on demand
̂̇
L, denoted by L̇ ∼ ̂̇L, if for every L ∈ L̇ there exists L̂ ∈ ̂̇L such that
L ∼ L̂ and for every L̂ ∈ ̂̇L there exists L ∈ L̇ such that L̂ ∼ L. The rationing system
(l̇, L̇) is equivalent to the rationing system (̂l̇,
̂̇
L), denoted by (l̇, L̇) ∼ (̂l̇, ̂̇L), if both l̇ ∼ ̂̇l
and L̇ ∼ ̂̇L.
It is easily verified that the binary relation on the set of all possible rationing systems
on supply, 2−IR
∗MN
+ , induced by ∼, is an equivalence relation, the binary relation on the
set of all possible rationing systems on demand, 2IR
∗MN
+ , induced by ∼, is an equivalence





+ , induced by ∼, is an equivalence relation.
The rationing system on supply is often defined as being the range of a function
l̃ : S → −IRMN+ defined on some subset S of IRN . Often, S = IRN+ or S = QN . From now
it will be assumed in this chapter that S = QN . The function l̃ is called the rationing
function on supply. For every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN , component (i − 1)N + j of l̃
is denoted by l̃ij . Moreover, l̃
i = (l̃i1, . . . , l̃
i
N )
⊤, ∀i ∈ IM , and l̃j = (l̃1j , . . . , l̃Mj )⊤, ∀j ∈ IN .
Given q ∈ QN , the vector l̃i(q) yields a rationing scheme on the supply of consumer
i ∈ IM . Similarly, the rationing system on demand is often defined as being the range
of a function L̃ : QN → IRMN+ , called the rationing function on demand. For every
i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN , component (i − 1)N + j of L̃ is denoted by L̃ij . Moreover,
L̃i = (L̃i1, . . . , L̃
i
N)
⊤ and L̃j = (L̃
1
j , . . . , L̃
M
j )
⊤. Given q ∈ QN , the vector L̃i(q) yields
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a rationing scheme on the demand of consumer i ∈ IM . The pair (l̃, L̃) is called a
rationing function. Notice that the image of the rationing function (l̃, L̃) is a subset of
−IRMN+ × IRMN+ .
Definition 4.5.8 (Representation by a rationing function)
The rationing system on supply l̇ is represented by a rationing function on supply l̃ if
l̇ ∼ l̃(QN ). The rationing system on demand L̇ is represented by a rationing function
on demand L̃ if L̇ ∼ L̃(QN). The rationing system (l̇, L̇) is represented by a rationing
function (l̃, L̃) if (l̇, L̇) ∼ (l̃(QN ), L̃(QN)).
Now some examples of rationing functions are given, representing the rationing systems
of Example 4.5.1, Example 4.5.2, Example 4.5.3, Example 4.5.4, and Example 4.5.5,
respectively. In the examples it is assumed that ωij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ IM , ∀j ∈ IN , and ω̃ ∈ IRN++.
Example 4.5.9 (Unrestricted rationing function)
First, a continuous function hM : [0, 1]→ QM will be constructed. Let f 1 be a path from
[0, 1] into ∆2 being surjective. Such a path f 1 exists by Theorem 2.3.3. It is not difficult
to construct a continuous function f 2 : ∆2 → Q2 being surjective. Then the function
f 2 ◦ f 1 : [0, 1]→ Q2 is a continuous function being surjective. Using the function f 2 ◦ f 1
it is not difficult to construct a continuous function g2 : [0, 1]→ Q2 being surjective and
having the additional property that g2(0) = (0, 0)⊤ and g2(1) = (1, 1)⊤. For every n ∈
IN \ {1, 2}, define the function gn : Qn−1 → Qn by gn(q) = (gn−1(q1, . . . , qn−2)⊤, qn−1)⊤,
∀q ∈ Qn−1. Clearly, the function gn is continuous and surjective for every n ≥ 3. Define
the function h1 : [0, 1] → Q1 by h1(q) = q, ∀q ∈ Q1. For every n ∈ IN \ {1}, define the
function hn : [0, 1] → Qn by hn(q) = gn(hn−1(q)), ∀q ∈ [0, 1] . Then the function hn is
continuous and surjective for every n ∈ IN.
Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. Notice that if l̇ is the unrestricted rationing system on
supply, then l̇ ∼ ∏i∈IM
∏
j∈IN [min({−ω1j , . . . ,−ωMj })− ε, 0]. Therefore, the unrestricted
rationing system on supply is represented by the rationing function on supply l̃ : QN →
−IRMN+ obtained by defining, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
l̃ij(q) =
(
min({−ω1j , . . . ,−ωMj })− ε
)
hMi (qj), ∀q ∈ QN .
If L̇ is the unrestricted rationing system on demand, then L̇ ∼ ∏i∈IM
∏
j∈IN [0, ω̃j + ε].
Therefore, the unrestricted rationing system on demand is represented by a rationing
function on demand L̃ : QN → IRMN+ obtained by defining, for every i ∈ IM , for every
j ∈ IN ,
L̃ij(q) = (ω̃j + ε)h
M
i (qj), ∀q ∈ QN .
Example 4.5.10 (Uniform rationing function)
Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. The uniform rationing system on supply is represented
by the rationing function on supply l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ obtained by defining, for every
i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
l̃ij(q) =
(
min({−ω1j , . . . ,−ωMj })− ε
)
qj , ∀q ∈ QN .
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The uniform rationing system on demand is represented by the rationing function on
demand L̃ : QN → IRMN+ obtained by defining, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
L̃ij(q) = (ω̃j + ε) qj, ∀q ∈ QN .
Example 4.5.11 (Proportional rationing function)
Assume that ωij > 0, ∀i ∈ IM , ∀j ∈ IN . Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. The proportional
rationing system on supply is represented by the rationing function on supply l̃ : QN →
−IRMN+ obtained by defining, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
l̃ij(q) = −(1 + ε)ωijqj, ∀q ∈ QN .
The proportional rationing system on demand is represented by the rationing function
on demand L̃ : QN → IRMN+ obtained by defining, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
L̃ij(q) =
ω̃j
min({ω1j , . . . , ωMj })
ωijqj , ∀q ∈ QN .
Example 4.5.12 (Market share rationing function)





j = 1. The proportional rationing system on supply with respect to
α = (α11, . . . , α
M
N )
⊤ is represented by the rationing function on supply l̃ : QN → −IRMN+


















qj , ∀q ∈ QN .









represented by the rationing function on demand L̃ : QN → IRMN+ obtained by defining,





min({α1j , . . . , αMj })
qj, ∀q ∈ QN .
Example 4.5.13 (Priority rationing function)
Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. For every j ∈ IN , let πj : IM → IM be a permutation
specifying the order in which consumers are rationed on their supply on the market of
commodity j. The priority rationing system on supply with respect to π = (π1, . . . , πN)
is represented by the rationing function on supply l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ obtained by defining,
for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
l̃ij(q) =
(




π−1j (i)−M +Mqj , 0
})
, ∀q ∈ QN .
For every j ∈ IN , let πj : IM → IM be a permutation specifying the order in which
consumers are rationed on their demand on the market of commodity j. The priority
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rationing system on demand with respect to π = (π1, . . . , πN ) is represented by the
rationing function on demand L̃ : QN → IRMN+ obtained by defining, for every i ∈ IM ,
for every j ∈ IN ,
L̃ij(q) = (ω̃j + ε)max
({
π−1j (i)−M +Mqj , 0
})
, ∀q ∈ QN .
The following assumptions are often made with respect to the rationing function on
supply l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ and the rationing function on demand L̃ : QN → IRMN+ .
- It holds that l̃(1N) ≪ −ω, so there is a rationing scheme on supply equivalent to
−∞MN . For every i ∈ IM , L̃i(1N) ≫ ω̃ − ωi, so there is a rationing scheme on
demand equivalent to +∞MN . It holds that l̃(0N) = 0MN , so full rationing on
supply is admissible, and it holds that L̃(0N) = 0MN , so full rationing on demand
is admissible. The rationing function on supply is flexible, i.e., l̃(0N) = 0MN and
l̃(1N)≪ −ω. The rationing function on demand is flexible, i.e., L̃(0N) = 0MN and
L̃i(1N)≫ ω̃ − ωi, ∀i ∈ IM .
- The rationing function on supply is market independent, i.e., for every j ∈ IN , for
every q, q̂ ∈ QN , it holds that l̃j(q) = l̃j(q̂) if qj = q̂j . The rationing function on
demand is market independent, i.e., for every q, q̂ ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN , it holds
that L̃j(q) = L̃j(q) if qj = qj .
- The rationing function on supply is continuous, i.e., the function l̃ is continuous. The
rationing function on demand is continuous, i.e., the function L̃ is continuous.
Sometimes, the continuity assumption will be replaced by the stronger assumption
of differentiability, which is clearly of a similar nature.
- The rationing function on supply is weakly monotonic, i.e., for every q1, q2 ∈ QN , for










2). The rationing function
on demand is weakly monotonic, i.e., for every q1, q2 ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN ,












2). Sometimes the weak monotonicity
assumption will be needed in differentiable form. Then it is required that, for every








j(q) > 0, ∀q ∈ QN .
- The rationing function on supply is monotonic, i.e., for every q1, q2 ∈ QN , for every







2). The rationing function on demand is monotonic, i.e., for every
q1, q2 ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN , if q1j < q2j , then L̃ij(q1) ≤ L̃ij(q2), ∀i ∈ IM , and there
exists i′ ∈ IM such that L̃i′j (q1) < L̃i
′
j (q
2). Sometimes the monotonicity assumption
will be needed in differentiable form. Then it is required that, for every j ∈ IN ,
∂qj l̃j(q) < 0
M , ∀q ∈ QN , and ∂qj L̃j(q) > 0M , ∀q ∈ QN .
If an assumption is said to be made with respect to the rationing function (l̃, L̃), then it
is meant that this assumption is made both with respect to l̃ and with respect to L̃.
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It is easily verified that all the assumptions mentioned above are satisfied in Example
4.5.10, Example 4.5.11, Example 4.5.12, and Example 4.5.13, and that all assumptions
mentioned above, except the assumptions concerning the weak monotonicity and the
monotonicity of the rationing function, are satisfied in Example 4.5.9.
The following four results give an interesting relationship between the assumptions
made with respect to the rationing system and the assumptions made with respect to
the rationing function.
Theorem 4.5.14
Let the rationing system on supply l̇ be represented by the rationing function on supply l̃ :
QN → −IRMN+ . If l̃ is flexible, then l̇ is equivalent to a flexible rationing system on supply,
if l̃ is market independent, then l̇ is equivalent to a market independent rationing system
on supply, if l̃ is continuous, then l̇ is equivalent to a closed and connected rationing
system on supply, if l̃ is market independent and weakly monotonic, then l̇ is equivalent
to a weakly monotonic rationing system on supply, and if l̃ is market independent and
monotonic, then l̇ is equivalent to a monotonic rationing system on supply.
Proof
Let l̃ be flexible. Then l̃(0N) = 0MN ∼ l for some l ∈ l̇ since l̇ ∼ l̃(QN ). Moreover,
l̃(1N)≪ −ω, so −∞MN ∼ l̃(1N) ∼ l for some l ∈ l̇, using that l̇ ∼ l̃(QN ).
Let l̃ be market independent. Since l̇ ∼ l̃(QN ), it is sufficient to show that the rationing
system l̃(QN ) is market independent. It will be shown that l ∈ l̃(QN) if and only if
lj ∈ l̃j(QN), ∀j ∈ IN , thereby showing the market independence of l̃(QN ). Clearly,
l ∈ l̃(QN ) implies lj ∈ l̃j(QN ), ∀j ∈ IN . Let lj ∈ l̃j(QN), ∀j ∈ IN , be given. For every
j ∈ IN , there exists qj ∈ QN such that lj = l̃j(qj). Define the element q of QN by qj = qjj ,
∀j ∈ IN . Then l̃(q) = l by the market independence of l̃, so l ∈ l̃(QN).
Let l̃ be continuous. Since l̇ ∼ l̃(QN), it is sufficient to show that the rationing system
l̃(QN ) is closed and connected. Since QN is compact and connected, it follows that
l̃(QN ) is compact and connected in −IRMN+ by Theorem 2.3.13. Therefore, l̃(QN ) is also
compact and connected in IR∗MN . Since l̃(QN) is a compact subset of the Hausdorff space
IR∗MN , it is closed in IR∗MN by Theorem 2.3.10.
Let l̃ be market independent and weakly monotonic. Since l̇ ∼ l̃(QN), it is sufficient to
show that l̃(QN ) is weakly monotonic. Let l, l̂ ∈ l̃(QN) be given and let q, q̂ ∈ QN be
such that l = l̃(q) and l̂ = l̃(q̂). Clearly, for every j ∈ IN , lj ≫ −∞M and l̂j ≫ −∞M .
For every j ∈ IN , if qj = q̂j , then lj = l̂j since l̃ is market independent, and if, without








j by the weak monotonicity of l̃.
Let l̃ be market independent and monotonic. Since l̇ ∼ l̃(QN), it is sufficient to show
that l̃(QN ) is monotonic. Let l, l̂ ∈ l̃(QN) be given and let q, q̂ ∈ QN be such that l = l̃(q)
and l̂ = l̃(q̂). For every j ∈ IN , if qj = q̂j, then lj = l̂j since l̃ is market independent, and
if, without loss of generality, qj < q̂j , then lj > l̂j by the monotonicity of l̃. Q.E.D.
The proof for the results given in Theorem 4.5.15 concerning the rationing system on
demand is similar to the proof of the corresponding results concerning the rationing
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system on supply given in Theorem 4.5.14.
Theorem 4.5.15
Let the rationing system on demand L̇ be represented by the rationing function on demand
L̃ : QN → IRMN+ . If L̃ is flexible, then L̇ is equivalent to a flexible rationing system
on demand, if L̃ is market independent, then L̇ is equivalent to a market independent
rationing system on demand, if L̃ is continuous, then L̇ is equivalent to a closed and
connected rationing system on demand, if L̃ is market independent and weakly monotonic,
then L̇ is equivalent to a weakly monotonic rationing system on demand, and if L̃ is
market independent and monotonic, then L̇ is equivalent to a monotonic rationing system
on demand.
The following two results give a converse of Theorem 4.5.14 and Theorem 4.5.15.
Theorem 4.5.16
Let the rationing system on supply l̇ be flexible, market independent, closed, and con-
nected. If the rationing system on supply l̇ is weakly monotonic, then l̇ can be represented
by a flexible, market independent, continuous, and weakly monotonic rationing function
on supply. If the rationing system on supply l̇ is monotonic, then l̇ can be represented by
a flexible, market independent, continuous, and monotonic rationing function on supply.
Proof
Let l̇ be weakly monotonic. A rationing function on supply l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ with the
desired properties will be constructed. Since l̇ is market independent, it holds that
there exist subsets l̇j, ∀j ∈ IN , of −IR∗MN+ such that l ∈ l̇ if and only if lj ∈ l̇j,
∀j ∈ IN . Let some j′ ∈ IN be given. For every lj′ ∈ l̇j′, let the set I−∞(lj′) be de-
fined by I−∞(lj′) = {i ∈ IM | lij′ = −∞} and let the integer i−∞(lj′) be defined by
i−∞(lj′) = #I
−∞(lj′). Let the set K be given by K = {k ∈ I0M | ∃lj′ ∈ l̇j′, i−∞(lj′) = k}.
Since l̇ is flexible, it holds that 0 ∈ K and M ∈ K. For every k ∈ K \ {M}, let





∣∣∣ lj′ ∈ l̇j′ and i−∞(lj′) = k
})
.
Clearly, α(0) = 0. Let π be an increasing function from I#K into K. Notice that π is
uniquely determined, π(1) = 0, and π(#K) = M.




, ∀s ∈ (←, α].




, ∀t ∈ [0, 1),
(fα)−1(1) = −∞.
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Clearly, if (sn)n∈IN is a sequence in {s ∈ IR∗ | s ≤ α} and sn converges to some s ∈
{s ∈ IR∗ | s ≤ α}, then the sequence (fα(sn))n∈IN converges to fα(s). Therefore, fα is a
continuous function. Similarly, it can be shown that (fα)−1 is a continuous function.
Now a continuous, injective, and surjective function g is constructed such that with
every lj′ ∈ l̇j′ a real number of [0, 1] is associated. This is achieved by subdividing
the unit interval in #K = π−1(M) pieces and constructing the function g such that, for






























π−1(M)− 1 = 0.
Now it is shown that g is continuous. Let ((lj′)
n)n∈IN be a sequence in l̇j′ converging
to some lj′ ∈ l̇j′. Suppose the sequence (g((lj′)n))n∈IN does not converge to g(lj′). From
the continuity of fα(k), ∀k ∈ K \ {M}, and since i−∞(lj′) = M implies lj′ = −∞M ,
it follows that if i−∞((lj′)
n) = i−∞(lj′), ∀n ∈ IN, then g((lj′)n) → g(lj′), a contra-
diction with the supposition that (g((lj′)
n))n∈IN does not converge to g(lj′). Conse-
quently, without loss of generality, i−∞((lj′)
n) 6= i−∞(lj′), ∀n ∈ IN. From the weak
monotonicity of l̇ it follows that, for every n ∈ IN, I−∞((lj′)n) is a proper subset of
I−∞(lj′) or I
−∞(lj′) is a proper subset of I
−∞((lj′)
n). Without loss of generality, since
(lj′)






j′ → −∞. If π−1(i−∞((lj′)n)) = π−1(i−∞(lj′)) − 1,































π−1(M)− 1 = g(lj′),
a contradiction with the supposition that (g((lj′)
n))n∈IN does not converge to g(lj′).
Consequently, without loss of generality, for every n ∈ IN, I−∞((lj′)n) ⊂ I−∞(lj′)
and π−1(i−∞((lj′)
n)) < π−1(i−∞(lj′)) − 1. So, there exists an element l̂j′ ∈ l̇j′ with
i−∞(l̂j′) > i
−∞((lj′)
n), ∀n ∈ IN, and i−∞(l̂j′) < i−∞(lj′). Using that l̇ is market indepen-
dent, this leads to a contradiction to the weak monotonicity of l̇. Consequently, g is a
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continuous function.
It will be shown that l̇j′ is connected in IR
∗M . Suppose l̇j′ is not connected in IR
∗M , then
there exist two disjoint, non-empty subsets of l̇j′, say l̇j′ and
̂̇
lj′, both being open in l̇j′
and whose union equals l̇j′. Obviously, the sets l̇1× · · · × l̇j′−1× l̇j′ × l̇j′+1× · · · × l̇N and
l̇1 × · · · × l̇j′−1 × ̂̇lj′ × l̇j′+1 × · · · × l̇N are two disjoint, non-empty subsets of
∏
j∈IN l̇j,
both being open in
∏
j∈IN l̇j , contradicting the connectedness of l̇. Consequently, l̇j′ is
connected in IR∗M .
Since the function g is continuous and l̇j′ is connected in IR
∗M , it follows from Theorem
2.3.13 that g(l̇j′) is connected in [0, 1] and hence an interval by Theorem 2.3.12. Clearly,
0M ∈ l̇j′ and −∞M ∈ l̇j′ since l̇ is flexible and market independent. Since g(0M) = 0
and g(−∞M) = 1, it follows that g is surjective.
Next, it is shown that g is injective. Suppose g is not injective, then there exists
lj′, l̂j′ ∈ l̇j′ such that lj′ 6= l̂j′ and g(lj′) = g(l̂j′). From the definition of g it follows







l̂ij′. This yields a contra-
diction to the weak monotonicity of l̇. Consequently, g is injective.
It is easily verified that the topological spaces QM and IR∗M are homeomorphic. There-
fore, a set closed in IR∗M is also compact in IR∗M by Theorem 2.3.9. Since l̇ is closed in
IR∗MN , it follows easily from the market independence that l̇j′ is closed in IR
∗M , hence
compact in IR∗M . Since l̇j′ is a compact topological space, [0, 1] is a Hausdorff space, and
g : l̇j′ → [0, 1] is a continuous, injective, and surjective function, it follows from Theorem
2.3.4 that g is a homeomorphism, so g−1 : [0, 1] → l̇j′ is a continuous function. Let the
function h : [0, 1]→ l̇j′ be defined by h = g−1.
The function h would represent l̇j′ if its image is a subset of −IRM+ . The function h will
now be modified in order to guarantee this.
When K = {0,M}, then there exists t ∈ (0, 1) such that, for every t ∈ [t, 1], hi(t) < −ωij′,
∀i ∈ IM . Let the function l̃j′ : QN → −IRM+ be defined by
l̃j′(q) = h(tqj′), ∀q ∈ QN .
Now consider the case that {0,M} is a proper subset of K. By the weak monotonicity of
l̇ there exists a uniquely determined proper subset I of IM such that i
−∞(lj′) = π(2) for
some lj′ ∈ l̇j′ implies I−∞(lj′) = I. Since the set [0, 1π−1(M)−1 ] is compact and hi(t) > −∞,
∀i ∈ IM \ I, ∀t ∈ [0, 1π−1(M)−1 ], it holds by Theorem 2.3.14 that for every i ∈ IM \ I the
continuous function hi has a minimum on [0, 1π−1(M)−1 ], say α
i. For every i ∈ IM \ I, let
the real number αi be defined by αi = min({αi,−ωij′})− 1. For every i ∈ IM \ I, let the
function l̃ij′ : Q
N → −IR+ be defined by
l̃ij′(q) = max ({αi, hi(qj′)}) , ∀q ∈ QN . (4.24)
Notice that, for every i ∈ IM \ I, for every q ∈ QN ,
l̃ij′(q) = hi(qj′) if qj′ ∈ [0, 1π−1(M)−1 ], (4.25)
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and, moreover,
hi(qj′) ≥ −ωij′ implies l̃ij′(q) = hi(qj′), and hi(qj′) < −ωij′ implies l̃ij′(q) < −ωij′. (4.26)
Let t̂ ∈ (0, 1








, ∀t ∈ [t̂, 1]. (4.27)
Notice that such a real number t̂ exists since h is continuous and hi(t) = −∞, ∀i ∈ I,
∀t ∈ [ 1
π−1(M)−1
, 1]. Let q̂ be any element of QN such that q̂j′ = t̂. Notice that, for every
i ∈ I, hi(t) < −ωij′, ∀t ∈ [t̂, 1]. For every i ∈ I, let the function l̃ij′ : QN → −IR+ be
defined by
l̃ij′(q) = hi(qj′), ∀q ∈ QN with qj′ ≤ t̂,






, ∀q ∈ QN with qj′ > t̂.
Notice that, for every i ∈ I, l̃ij′ is continuous and, using (4.27), for every q ∈ QN with
qj′ > t̂,


















l̃ıj′(q) ≤ −ωij′, (4.28)
where for the last inequality (4.24) is used.
Using the previous two paragraphs, a rationing function on supply l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ is
constructed. Using (4.26) and (4.28) it follows easily that l̇ is represented by l̃. Obviously,
l̃ is flexible, market independent, and continuous. Let q1, q2 ∈ QN be such that q1j′ <
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Let q1, q2 ∈ QN be such that q1j′ ≤ t̂ ≤ q2j′ and q1j′ < q2j′. Then the two cases considered










2). Therefore, l̃ is weakly mono-
tonic. So, l̃ satisfies all the desired properties.
Next, let l̇ be a monotonic rationing system on supply. Let some j′ ∈ IN be given.
Construct the continuous, injective, and surjective function h : [0, 1]→ l̇j′ as in the first
part of the proof and, for α ∈ IR, let the function fα : {s ∈ IR∗ | s ≤ α} → [0, 1] be
defined as before. For every i ∈ IM , let αi = min({−ωij′, 0}) − 1 and let the function
gi : −IR∗+ → [αi − 1, 0] be defined by
gi(s) = αi − f 0(s− αi), ∀s ∈ −IR∗+ \ [αi, 0] ,
gi(s) = s, ∀s ∈ [αi, 0] .
Let the function l̃j′ : Q
N → −IRM+ be defined by
l̃j′(q) =
(
g1 (h1(qj′)) , . . . , g
M (hM(qj′))
)⊤
, ∀q ∈ QN .
In this way a rationing function on supply l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ is constructed. It is easily
verified that l̇ is represented by l̃ and that l̃ is flexible, market independent, continuous,
and monotonic. Q.E.D.
The proof for the results concerning the rationing system on demand given in Theorem
4.5.17 is similar.
Theorem 4.5.17
Let the rationing system on demand L̇ be flexible, market independent, closed, and con-
nected. If the rationing system on demand L̇ is weakly monotonic, then L̇ can be rep-
resented by a flexible, market independent, continuous, and weakly monotonic rationing
function on demand. If the rationing system on demand L̇ is monotonic, then L̇ can
be represented by a flexible, market independent, continuous, and monotonic rationing
function on demand.
The last four results show that the set of admissible rationing schemes can be described
equally well by means of a rationing system as by a rationing function and provide
necessary and sufficient conditions that make a representation possible.
4.6 Constrained Equilibria
The introduction of the set of admissible price systems in Section 4.4 and of the set of
admissible rationing schemes in Section 4.5 completes the description of the economy. So,
formally, the economy Ẽ is defined by a specification of the consumption sets, preference
relations, and initial endowments of all the consumers, the set of admissible price systems,
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The relation ζ : P(p,p) × l̇ × L̇→ IRN , defined by




δi(p, li, Li)− {ωi}
)
, ∀(p, l, L) ∈ P(p,p) × l̇ × L̇,
is called the total excess demand relation of the economy Ẽ and the set ζ(p, l, L) is
called the total excess demand at (p, l, L) ∈ P(p,p) × l̇× L̇ of the economy Ẽ . Notice that
ζ(p, l, L) = ∅ at (p, l, L) ∈ P(p,p) × l̇ × L̇ if δi(p, li, Li) = ∅ for some consumer i ∈ IM . In
this section the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̇, L̇)) is assumed to be given. An
element (p, l, L, x) ∈ P(p,p) × l̇× L̇×X is called a state of Ẽ if xi ∈ δi(p, li, Li), ∀i ∈ IM ,
so a state of the economy Ẽ consists of a specification of an admissible price system, an
admissible rationing scheme, and an optimal consumption bundle at this price system
and rationing scheme for every consumer in the economy Ẽ . The total excess demand




z ∈ ζ(p, l, L). The actions chosen by the consumers in a state of the economy are not
necessarily compatible in the sense that the total excess demand at this state is not equal
to zero. In a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ the state of Ẽ is such that the
total excess demand is zero, so the optimal actions of the consumers yield an attainable
allocation of Ẽ . Moreover, the price system and the rationing scheme have to satisfy
certain properties in a constrained equilibrium. The following definition of a constrained
equilibrium is closely related to the one given in Drèze (1975).
Definition 4.6.1 (Constrained equilibrium)
A constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̇, L̇)) is an ele-
ment
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ P(p,p) × l̇ × L̇×X
satisfying




∗i −∑i∈IM ωi = 0N ,




j for some consumer i
′ ∈ IM implies






j for some consumer i
′ ∈ IM implies
x∗ij − ωij > l∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM ,
4. for every commodity j ∈ IN , p∗j > pj implies l∗ij < x∗ij − ωij , ∀i ∈ IM , and p∗j < pj
implies L∗ij > x
∗i
j − ωij , ∀i ∈ IM .
When (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ , then p∗ is called a
constrained equilibrium price system, (l∗, L∗) is called a constrained equilibrium rationing
scheme, and x∗ is called a constrained equilibrium allocation. The set of constrained
equilibria of the economy Ẽ is denoted by Ẽ.
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The first condition in Definition 4.6.1 reflects that every consumer chooses an optimal
consumption bundle at the constrained equilibrium price system and the constrained
equilibrium rationing scheme, and the second condition that the constrained equilibrium
allocation is an attainable allocation of the economy Ẽ . These two conditions correspond
to Condition 2 and Condition 3 of Definition 3.8.1. Condition 3 of Definition 4.6.1 implies
that markets are frictionless, i.e., if the consumption set of every consumer is convex and
the preference relation of every consumer is complete and convex, then, by Theorem
4.3.3, it does not occur on any market that simultaneously a consumer is rationed on
his supply, while another consumer is rationed on his demand. In case these conditions
on the consumption sets and preference relations are not satisfied, it is probably more
natural to replace Condition 3 of Definition 4.6.1 by the stronger condition that, for
every j ∈ IN , l∗j = −∞M or L∗j = +∞M .
If the consumption set of every consumer is convex and the preference relation of
every consumer is complete and convex, then Condition 4 of Definition 4.6.1 implies
that there is no demand rationing on the market of a commodity j ∈ IN if the price of
commodity j is not equal to the upper bound on the price of commodity j, and, similarly,
supply rationing does not occur on the market of commodity j if the price of commodity
j is greater than the lower bound on the price of commodity j. In case these conditions
on the consumption sets and preference relations are not satisfied, then it is probably
more natural to replace Condition 4 of Definition 4.6.1 by the stronger condition that,
for every j ∈ IN , p∗j > pj implies l∗j = −∞M , and p∗j < pj implies L∗j = +∞M .
Notice that if (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ , then 0N ∈
ζ(p∗, l∗, L∗). Furthermore, it should be noticed that the actions taken by the agents in
the economy Ẽ are not necessarily completely decentralized at a constrained equilibrium.
This may be the case when there is a consumer having more than one optimal action,
while not every optimal action is compatible with a constrained equilibrium.
Consider a state (p, l, L, x) of the economy Ẽ and a commodity j ∈ IN . In case it
happens that a consumer i ∈ IM is rationed on his supply on the market of commodity
j at (p, li, Li), while another consumer is rationed on his demand on the market of
commodity j, then, under weak assumptions (as in Theorem 4.3.3), the first consumer is
willing to supply more of commodity j, while the second consumer is willing to demand
more of commodity j. Such a situation is incompatible with an equilibrium state of the









j > 0, i.e., there is a positive excess demand of commodity j
at this state. It has been explained in Section 3.8 that the price of commodity j has a
tendency to rise in such a situation. If pj = pj , then this is impossible. However, if a
consumer i ∈ IM is rationed on his supply on the market of commodity j at (p, li, Li),
then this consumer is willing to supply more of commodity j. When the total excess
demand of commodity j is indeed positive, then this additional supply can be absorbed
on the market of commodity j. Therefore, lij has a tendency to decrease. Furthermore,
Lij has a tendency to fall for every consumer i ∈ IM since there is not enough supply to
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satisfy the demand of all the consumers. Using a similar reasoning as before it follows
that if there is a negative total excess demand of commodity j at the state (p, l, L, x),




j have a tendency
to rise for every consumer i ∈ IM . This motivates Condition 2 of Definition 4.6.1, the
total excess demand should be equal to zero at an equilibrium state of the economy.
Finally, consider the case where the total excess demand of commodity j is zero at the
state (p, l, L, x). If pj < pj and a consumer i ∈ IM is rationed on his demand on the
market of commodity j at (p, li, Li), then this consumer can offer a price being slightly
higher than pj , thereby attracting all the supply and making it possible to weaken the
rationing on his demand. Therefore, demand rationing on the market of commodity j
at a state (p, l, L, x), while pj < pj , is incompatible with (p, l, L, x) being an equilibrium
state of the economy. A similar argument leads to the statement that supply rationing
on the market of commodity j at a state (p, l, L, x), while pj > pj, is incompatible with
(p, l, L, x) being an equilibrium state of the economy. This motivates Condition 4 of
Definition 4.6.1.
The following definitions are inspired by Theorem 4.3.3.
Definition 4.6.2 (Equivalent constrained equilibria)
A constrained equilibrium (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) of the economy Ẽ1 = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p),
(l̇, L̇)) is equivalent to a constrained equilibrium (p̂∗, l̂∗, L̂∗, x̂∗) of the economy Ẽ2 =
((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (̂l̇,
̂̇
L)), denoted by (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p̂∗, l̂∗, L̂∗, x̂∗), if p∗ = p̂∗,
x∗ = x̂∗, and, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
l∗ij = x
∗i
j − ωij implies l̂∗ij = l∗ij ,
l∗ij < x
∗i
j − ωij implies l̂∗ij < x̂∗ij − ωij,
L∗ij = x
∗i
j − ωij implies L̂∗ij = L∗ij ,
L∗ij > x
∗i
j − ωij implies L̂∗ij > x̂∗ij − ωij.
So, two constrained equilibria are equivalent if the constrained equilibrium price system
is the same, the constrained equilibrium allocation is the same, and only non-binding
rationing schemes are allowed to be different.
Definition 4.6.3 (Equivalent economies)
The economy Ẽ1 = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̇, L̇)) is equivalent to the economy Ẽ2 =
((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (̂l̇,
̂̇
L)), denoted by Ẽ1 ∼ Ẽ2, if for every (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ Ẽ1
there exists (p̂∗, l̂∗, L̂∗, x̂∗) ∈ Ẽ2 such that (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p̂∗, l̂∗, L̂∗, x̂∗) and for ev-
ery (p̂∗, l̂∗, L̂∗, x̂∗) ∈ Ẽ2 there exists (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ Ẽ2 such that (p̂∗, l̂∗, L̂∗, x̂∗) ∼
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗), where Ẽ1 denotes the set of constrained equilibria of the economy Ẽ1 and
Ẽ2 denotes the set of constrained equilibria of the economy Ẽ2.
It is easily verified that the binary relation on the set of all possible constrained equi-
libria of economies differing only with respect to the rationing system, induced by ∼ of
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Definition 4.6.2, is an equivalence relation. Similarly, the binary relation on the set of
economies differing only with respect to the rationing system, induced by ∼ of Definition
4.6.3, is an equivalence relation.
It is easily seen that in general a constrained equilibrium is not unique and that from
the point of view of the consumer many constrained equilibria do not differ from each
other in the sense that they are equivalent.
Theorem 4.6.4
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̇, L̇)) be such that for every consumer
i ∈ IM the consumption set X i is convex and the preference relation i is complete,
transitive, and convex. Let (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) be a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ .
Let the rationing scheme (l, L) ∈ −IR∗MN+ × IR∗MN+ be such that, for every i ∈ IM , for
every j ∈ IN ,
l∗ij = x
∗i
j − ωij implies lij = l∗ij ,
l∗ij < x
∗i
j − ωij implies lij < x∗ij − ωij ,
L∗ij = x
∗i
j − ωij implies Lij = L∗ij ,
L∗ij > x
∗i
j − ωij implies Lij > x∗ij − ωij .
Then (p∗, l, L, x∗) satisfies Conditions 1-4 of Definition 4.6.1 of a constrained equilib-
rium of the economy Ẽ . If, moreover, (l, L) ∈ l̇ × L̇, then (p∗, l, L, x∗) is a constrained
equilibrium of the economy Ẽ and (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p∗, l, L, x∗).
Proof








′ ≺i′ xi′ for some xi′ ∈ βi′(p∗, li′, Li′). Since xi′ 6∈ βi′(p∗, l∗i′, L∗i′)
and xi















j for some j ∈ IN . Moreover, using the construction of (l, L), it
































+ (1− λ) x∗i′ .






) is convex, so xi
′
(λ) ∈ βi′(p∗, li′ , Li′),
∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, x∗i′ ≺i′ xi′ (λ) , ∀λ ∈ (0, 1]. However, there exists some λ ∈
(0, 1) such that λ ∈ (0, λ] implies xi′ (λ) ∈ βi′(p∗, l∗i′ , L∗i′), using (4.29), (4.30), and
the fact that xi
′
(λ) ∈ βi′(p∗, li′ , Li′). Since x∗i′ ≺i′ xi′(λ), ∀λ ∈ (0, λ], this implies
x∗i
′
/∈ δi′(p∗, l∗i′, L∗i′), a contradiction. Consequently, Condition 1 of Definition 4.6.1 is
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satisfied by (p∗, l, L, x∗).






ωi = 0N ,
so Condition 2 of Definition 4.6.1 is satisfied by (p∗, l, L, x∗).
That (p∗, l, L, x∗) satisfies Conditions 3 and 4 of Definition 4.6.1 follows immediately
from the definition of l and L. If, moreover, (l, L) ∈ l̇× L̇, then (p∗, l, L, x∗) ∈ P(p,p)× l̇×
L̇×X and, hence, (p∗, l, L, x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ satisfying
(p∗, l, L, x∗) ∼ (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗). Q.E.D.
The following theorem clarifies the relationship between equivalent economies and equiv-
alent rationing systems.
Theorem 4.6.5
Let the economies Ẽ1 = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̇, L̇)) and Ẽ2 = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p),
(̂l̇,
̂̇
L)) be such that for every consumer i ∈ IM the preference relation i is complete,
transitive, and convex, the consumption set X i is convex and X i ⊂ IRN+ , and (l̇, L̇) ∼
(̂l̇,
̂̇
L). Then the economy Ẽ1 is equivalent to the economy Ẽ2.
Proof
Let (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) be an element of Ẽ1, the set of constrained equilibria of Ẽ1, and let
(l̂, L̂) ∈ ̂̇l × ̂̇L be such that (l∗, L∗) ∼ (l̂, L̂).
If, for some i ∈ IM , for some j ∈ IN , l∗ij = x∗ij − ωij , then, since X i ⊂ IRN+ , it holds that
l∗ij ≥ −ωij, and, since l∗ ∼ l̂, it follows that l̂ij = l∗ij .
If, for some i ∈ IM , for some j ∈ IN , l∗ij < x∗ij − ωij, then either l∗ij ≥ −ωij and in this
case l∗ ∼ l̂ implies l̂ij = l∗ij < x∗ij − ωij, or l∗ij < −ωij and in this case l∗ ∼ l̂ and X i ⊂ IRN+
implies l̂ij < −ωij ≤ x∗ij − ωij.




x∗ıj − ωij = ω̃j − ωij,
where for the equality Condition 2 of Definition 4.6.1 is used. This together with L∗ ∼ L̂
implies L̂ij = L
∗i
j . If, for some i ∈ IM , for some j ∈ IN , L∗ij > x∗ij − ωij, then either
L∗ij ≤ ω̃j − ωij and in this case L∗ ∼ L̂ implies L̂ij = L∗ij > x∗ij − ωij, or L∗ij > ω̃j − ωij and
in this case L∗ ∼ L̂ implies
L̂ij > ω̃j − ωij =
∑
ı∈IM
x∗ıj − ωij ≥ x∗ij − ωij,
where for the equality Condition 2 of Definition 4.6.1 is used, and for the last inequality
the assumption that X i ⊂ IRN+ .
Therefore, by Theorem 4.6.4, (p∗, l̂, L̂, x∗) ∈ Ẽ2, the set of constrained equilibria of the
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economy Ẽ2, and (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p∗, l̂, L̂, x∗) according to Definition 4.6.2.
Similarly, it can be shown that for every (p̂∗, l̂∗, L̂∗, x̂∗) ∈ Ẽ2 there exists (l, L) ∈ l̇ × L̇
such that (p̂∗, l, L, x̂∗) ∈ Ẽ1 and (p̂∗, l̂∗, L̂∗, x̂∗) ∼ (p̂∗, l, L, x̂∗). So, Ẽ1 ∼ Ẽ2. Q.E.D.
If the rationing system (l̇, L̇) of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̇, L̇)) is repre-
sented by the rationing function (l̃, L̃), then Theorem 4.6.5 implies that there is no loss of
generality in considering the constrained equilibria of the economy obtained by replacing
the rationing system (l̇, L̇) by the rationing system (l̃(QN), L̃(QN)). In the remainder of
the monograph, it will always be assumed that the rationing system is described by the
rationing function (l̃, L̃). Therefore, from now on the economy Ẽ is defined by a speci-
fication of the consumption sets, preference relations, and initial endowments of all the











4.7 The Existence of Constrained Equilibria
In this section the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) is assumed to be given.
With respect to the economy Ẽ the following assumptions will be often made in the
remainder of this chapter.
A1. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i is non-empty, closed, convex,
X i ⊂ IRN+ , and X i + IRN+ ⊂ X i.
A2. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the preference relation i is complete, transitive,
continuous, weakly monotonic, and convex.
A3. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the initial endowment ωi belongs to int(X i).
A4. The set of admissible price systems, P(p,p), is such that 0
N ≪ p ≤ p≪ +∞N .
A5. The rationing function (l̃, L̃) is flexible, market independent, and continuous.
The requirement of weak monotonicity of the preference relation is weaker than the
assumption usually made in this stream of the literature, where strong monotonicity
with respect to some subset of commodities is made. The assumption with respect to
the set of admissible price systems is motivated by Theorem 3.8.2 and Theorem 3.11.1
stating that a Walrasian equilibrium price system is non-negative. In Chapter 8 it will
be shown that Assumption A4 can be weakened in some cases. However, it will be shown
by means of examples that Assumption A4 is crucial for giving a complete classification
of constrained equilibria as is done in this chapter.
Let the economy Ẽ satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. Let some commodity j ∈ IN be
given. Consider the state of the market of commodity j in a constrained equilibrium
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(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) of the economy Ẽ . Let q∗1 ∈ QN be such that l∗ ∼ l̃(q∗1) and let q∗2 ∈ QN
satisfy L∗ ∼ L̃(q∗2). By Conditions 3 and 4 of Definition 4.6.1 there are three mutually
exclusive possibilities on the market of commodity j. First, it may happen that there




j , so 0 ≤ q∗1j < 1. Then, by Condition 3 of
Definition 4.6.1, x∗ij − ωij < L∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM , so there is no demand rationing on the market
of commodity j according to Theorem 4.3.3. Since the rationing function is flexible
and market independent by Assumption A5 and using Theorem 4.6.4, there is no loss of
generality in assuming that q∗2j = 1.Moreover, by Condition 4 of Definition 4.6.1, p
∗
j = pj.
So, the state of the market of commodity j is in this case completely determined by the




j − ωij < L∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM , so there is no
rationing on the market of commodity j according to Theorem 4.3.3. Since the rationing
function is flexible and market independent by Assumption A5 and using Theorem 4.6.4,
there is no loss of generality in assuming that q∗1j = 1 and q
∗2
j = 1. Clearly, the price
of commodity j is between pj and pj , so pj ≤ p∗j ≤ pj . The state of the market of
commodity j is completely determined by the value of p∗j . Finally, the third possibility is




j , so 0 ≤ q∗2j < 1. Then, by Condition
3 of Definition 4.6.1, x∗ij − ωij > l∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM , so according to Theorem 4.3.3 there is no
supply rationing on the market of commodity j. Since the rationing function is flexible
and market independent by Assumption A5 and using Theorem 4.6.4, there is no loss of
generality in assuming that q∗1j = 1. The state of the market of commodity j is completely
determined by the value of q∗2j .
Let some commodity j ∈ IN be given. Motivated by the remarks in the paragraph
above, any of the three possible regimes on the market of commodity j will be described
by one parameter qj ∈ [0, 1]. If 0 ≤ qj < 13 , then the first possibility described above
will occur with price pj = pj and rationing scheme (lj, Lj) = (l̃j(q
1), L̃j(q
2)), where
q1j = 3qj and q
2
j = 1. If
1
3 ≤ qj ≤ 23 , then the second possibility will result with price
pj = pj(2−3qj)+pj(3qj−1) and rationing scheme (lj , Lj) = (l̃j(q1), L̃j(q2)), where q1j = 1
and q2j = 1. If
2
3 < qj ≤ 1, then the third possibility will occur with price pj = pj and
rationing scheme (lj , Lj) = (l̃j(q
1), L̃j(q
2)), where q1j = 1 and q
2
j = 3−3qj . Therefore, for
every j ∈ IN , component j of the function p̂ : QN → P(p,p) is defined by
p̂j(q) = max
({
pj ,min({pj(2− 3qj) + pj(3qj − 1), pj})
})
, ∀q ∈ QN . (4.31)





, ∀q ∈ QN , (4.32)
L̂(q) = L̃
(
inf({1N , 31N − 3q})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN . (4.33)
The notational conventions used for l̃ and L̃ are also used for l̂ and L̂. Since, for every
j ∈ IN , for every q ∈ QN , qj ∈ [0, 1] uniquely determines the state (p̂j(q), l̂j(q), L̂j(q))
on the market of commodity j, qj is also called the state of the market of commodity
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j, while the vector q itself is often called the state of the markets. For every consumer
i ∈ IM , define the relation γi : P(p,p) → IRN by
γi(p) =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣p · xi = p · ωi
}
, ∀p ∈ P(p,p),












{ωi}, ∀q ∈ QN . (4.35)
The relation δ̂i is called the reduced demand relation of consumer i ∈ IM and the
relation ζ̂ is called the reduced total excess demand relation of the economy Ẽ . If the
preference relation of a consumer i ∈ IM is strongly monotonic, then it holds that
δ̂i(q) = δi(p̂(q), l̂i(q), L̂i(q)), ∀q ∈ QN . Irrespective of the assumptions made with respect
to the economy, it is clear that if (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of the
economy Ẽ , then x∗i ∈ γi(p∗), ∀i ∈ IM , by Condition 2 of Definition 4.6.1. Theorem
4.7.1 makes clear that the relations δ̂i, ∀i ∈ IM , are very useful in showing the existence
of constrained equilibria.
Theorem 4.7.1
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. If,







then (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ .
Proof
From (4.31) it follows that p̂(q∗) ∈ P(p,p). There exists q∗1, q∗2 ∈ QN such that l̂(q∗) =
l̃(q∗1) and L̂(q∗) = L̃(q∗2), so (l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗)) ∈ l̃(QN) × L̃(QN ). Obviously, Conditions
1 and 2 of Definition 4.6.1 are satisfied. Now the Conditions 3 and 4 of Definition





j − ωij ≤ ω̃j − ωij.









ω̃j − ωi′j , therefore q∗j > 23 , and hence l̂ij(q∗) < −ωij ≤ x∗ij − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM , so the first part
of Condition 3 of Definition 4.6.1 is satisfied.








∗) ≥ −ωij ,
therefore q∗j <
1
3 , and hence L̂
i
j(q
∗) > ω̃j − ωij ≥ x∗ij − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM , so the second part of
Condition 3 of Definition 4.6.1 is satisfied.
If, for some j ∈ IN , p̂j(q∗) < pj, then q∗j < 23 and therefore L̂ij(q∗) > ω̃j − ω̃ij ≥
x∗ij − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM . If, for some j ∈ IN , p̂j(q∗) > pj, then q∗j > 13 and therefore l̂ij(q∗) <
−ωij ≤ x∗ij − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM . So, Condition 4 of Definition 4.6.1 is satisfied too. Therefore,
(p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ . Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.7.1 gives an easy characterization of constrained equilibria by using the func-
tions p̂, l̂, and L̂. If, for some q∗ ∈ QN , there exists x∗i ∈ δ̂i(q∗), ∀i ∈ IM , such that






i, then (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is called a constrained equilibrium of
the economy Ẽ induced by q∗.
The following theorem states that every constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ is
equivalent to a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ induced by some q∗ ∈ QN .
Theorem 4.7.2
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. If
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ , then there exists q∗ ∈ QN
such that x∗i ∈ δ̂i(q∗), ∀i ∈ IM , (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of Ẽ ,
and (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗).
Proof
Let q∗1 ∈ QN be such that l∗ = l̃(q∗1) and let q∗2 ∈ QN be such that L∗ = L̃(q∗2). Let










∣∣∣∃i ∈ IM , x∗ij − ωij = L̃ij(q∗2)
}
,
J3 = IN \ (J1 ∪ J2).
By Condition 3 of Definition 4.6.1, {J1, J2, J3} is a partition of IN . By Condition 4 of
Definition 4.6.1, p∗j = pj , ∀j ∈ J1, and p∗j = pj , ∀j ∈ J2. Moreover, pj ≤ p∗j ≤ pj,





j , ∀j ∈ J1,
q∗j = 1− 13q∗2j , ∀j ∈ J2,
q∗j =
1




, ∀j ∈ J3 with pj < pj .
Then it holds that
l̂j(q
∗) = l̃j(q
∗1), ∀j ∈ J1, (4.36)
L̂j(q
∗) = L̃j(q
∗2), ∀j ∈ J2, (4.37)
p̂j(q
∗) = p∗j , ∀j ∈ IN . (4.38)
For every i ∈ IM it holds that
−ωij ≤ x∗ij − ωij < L̃ij(q∗2), ∀j ∈ J1 ∪ J3, (4.39)
l̃ij(q
∗1) < x∗ij − ωij ≤ ω̃j − ωij , ∀j ∈ J2 ∪ J3. (4.40)
Moreover, for every i ∈ IM ,
L̂ij(q
∗) > ω̃j − ωij ≥ x∗ij − ωij , ∀j ∈ J1 ∪ J3, (4.41)
l̂ij(q
∗) < −ωij ≤ x∗ij − ωij, ∀j ∈ J2 ∪ J3. (4.42)
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Clearly, (l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗)) ∈ l̃(QN ) × L̃(QN), and this together with (4.36)-(4.42) implies
by Theorem 4.6.4 that (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of Ẽ satisfy-
ing (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) ∼ (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗). It follows immediately that x∗i ∈ δ̂i(q∗) =
δi(p̂(q∗), l̂i(q∗), L̂i(q∗)) ∩ γi(p̂(q∗)), ∀i ∈ IM . Q.E.D.
From Theorem 4.7.2 it follows that there is no loss of generality in considering only
constrained equilibria of the economy Ẽ being induced by an element q∗ of QN .
It will be shown that many constrained equilibria of the economy Ẽ exist. It is eas-
ily verified that q∗ = 0N induces a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ with full
rationing on supply on every market, called the trivial supply constrained equilibrium,
and, similarly, that q∗ = 1N induces a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ with full
rationing on demand on every market, called the trivial demand constrained equilibrium.
These two constrained equilibria are called the trivial constrained equilibria. Therefore,
there exists a constrained equilibrium induced by the element q∗ of QN where, for a given
j ∈ IN , q∗j = 0, and there exists a constrained equilibrium induced by q∗ ∈ QN where, for
given j ∈ IN , q∗j = 1. In Theorem 4.7.4 it is shown that given any state α ∈ [0, 1] of the
market of a commodity j ∈ IN there is a corresponding constrained equilibrium. Before
showing Theorem 4.7.4 some properties of δ̂i, ∀i ∈ IM , and ζ̂ are derived. These proper-
ties are closely related to the ones derived for demand relations of an economy without
price rigidities, like Walras’ law (Theorem 3.7.2), convex-valuedness (Theorem 3.7.3),
compact-valuedness and upper hemi-continuity (Theorem 3.7.5), boundary behaviour
(Theorem 3.11.1), and continuity (Theorem 3.11.1).
Theorem 4.7.3
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. For
every i ∈ IM , the reduced demand relation of consumer i has the following properties:
1. δ̂i is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence,
2. for every q ∈ QN , for every xi ∈ δ̂i (q) , for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies xij−ωij ≥ 0,
and qj = 1 implies x
i
j − ωij ≤ 0,
3. for every q ∈ QN , for every xi ∈ δ̂i (q) , p̂ (q) · (xi − ωi) = 0.
If, moreover, the preference relation i is strongly convex, then δ̂i is a continuous func-
tion.
The reduced total excess demand relation ζ̂ : QN → IRN of the economy Ẽ has the
following properties:
1. ζ̂ is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence,
2. for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂ (q) , for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies zj ≥ 0, and
qj = 1 implies zj ≤ 0,
3. for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂ (q) , p̂ (q) · z = 0.
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If, moreover, the preference relation i, ∀i ∈ IM , is strongly convex, then ζ̂ is a contin-
uous function.
Proof
Let some i ∈ IM be given. Since the restriction of βi to the set p̂(QN)× l̂i(QN )× L̂i(QN)
is a continuous correspondence by Theorem 4.2.5 and since the functions p̂, l̂i, and L̂i
are continuous, it follows from Theorem 2.5.5 and Theorem 2.5.12 that the relation
ϕi : QN → X i, defined by ϕi(q) = βi(p̂(q), l̂i(q), L̂i(q)), ∀q ∈ QN , is a continuous corre-
spondence. From Lemma 4.2.2 it follows that the correspondence ϕi is compact-valued.
Since X i is convex and i is complete, transitive, and continuous, the preference rela-
tion i can be represented by a continuous utility function ui by Theorem 3.6.1. The
function f i : p̂(QN) × l̂i(QN ) × L̂i(QN ) × X i → IR, defined by f i(p, li, Li, xi) = ui(xi),
∀(p, li, Li, xi) ∈ p̂(QN)× l̂i(QN)× L̂i(QN)×X i, is continuous. Therefore, it follows from





, ∀q ∈ QN ,
is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Since the relation γi is a
compact-valued correspondence having a closed graph and since γi(P(p,p)) is contained
in the compact set {xi ∈ X i | pjxij ≤ p ·ωi, ∀j ∈ IN}, it follows from Theorem 2.5.7 that
γi is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. This together with the continuity of the
function p̂ implies by Theorem 2.5.5 that the relation γi ◦ p̂ is an upper hemi-continuous
correspondence. Since δ̂i(q) = δi(q) ∩ γi(p̂(q)), ∀q ∈ QN , and δi(q) ∩ γi(p̂(q)) 6= ∅,
∀q ∈ QN , by the weak-monotonicity of i, the relation δ̂i is a compact-valued, upper
hemi-continuous correspondence by Theorem 2.5.9. Using the convex-valuedness of βi
shown in Lemma 4.2.1, it follows easily that δi is convex-valued. Moreover, γi is convex-
valued, so δ̂i is also convex-valued.
Let some i ∈ IM and some q ∈ QN be given. For every j ∈ IN , if qj = 0, then xi ∈ δ̂i(q)
implies xij − ωij ≥ l̂ij(q) = 0. For every j ∈ IN , if qj = 1, then xi ∈ δ̂i(q) implies
xij − ωij ≤ L̂ij(q) = 0. If xi ∈ δ̂i(q), then xi ∈ γi(p̂(q)), and it follows immediately that
p̂(q) · (xi − ωi) = 0.
Let some i ∈ IM be given and let i be strongly convex. Let some q ∈ QN be
given. Suppose xi, x̂i ∈ δ̂i(q) with xi 6= x̂i. By Lemma 4.2.1 it holds that 12xi + 12 x̂i ∈
βi(p̂(q), l̂i(q), L̂i(q)). Moreover, p̂(q) · ( 12xi + 12 x̂i) = 12 p̂(q) · ωi + 12 p̂(q) · ωi = p̂(q) · ωi,
so 12x
i + 12 x̂
i ∈ γi(p̂(q)). Since i is strongly convex, it follows that 12xi + 12 x̂i ≻i xi.
So, xi 6∈ δ̂i(q), a contradiction. Hence, δ̂i is a function and since δ̂i is an upper hemi-
continuous correspondence, it is a continuous function.
Using the results derived for δ̂i, ∀i ∈ IM , the corresponding results for ζ̂ are easily
verified. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.7.4
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. Let
some commodity j′ ∈ IN and some α ∈ [0, 1] be given. Then there exists q∗ ∈ QN
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such that q∗j′ = α and q
∗ induces a constrained equilibrium (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) of the
economy Ẽ .
Proof
For every i ∈ IM , let the set X i be defined by
X i =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣pjxij ≤ p · ωi, ∀j ∈ IN
}
,




∣∣∣ qj′ = α
}
.
Notice that, for every q ∈ QN , xi ∈ δ̂i(q) implies xi ∈ X i. Let the relation µj′,α :∏
i∈IM X








∣∣∣q ·∑i∈IM (xi − ωi) ≥ q ·
∑
i∈IM (x
i − ωi), ∀q ∈ QNj′,α
}
.




j − ωij) > 0 and




j −ωij) < 0 and q ∈ µj′,α(x) implies qj = 0. Let














The relation ϕ :
∏
i∈IM X
i → QNj′,α, defined by ϕ(x) = QNj′,α, ∀x ∈
∏
i∈IM X
i, is easily seen




IR, defined by f(x, q) = q · ∑i∈IM (xi − ωi), ∀x ∈
∏
i∈IM X
i, ∀q ∈ QNj′,α, is continuous.
Therefore, it follows from the maximum theorem, Theorem 2.5.17, that the relation µj′,α
is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. It is easily verified that
µj′,α is a convex-valued correspondence. By Theorem 4.7.3 the relation δ̂
i, ∀i ∈ IM , is a
compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Therefore, the
correspondence ϕ is compact-valued and convex-valued, and being the Cartesian product
of compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences, it is upper hemi-continuous
by Theorem 2.5.10. Clearly, the set
∏
i∈IM X
i×QNj′,α is non-empty, compact, and convex.
So, all conditions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, Theorem 2.6.1, are satisfied and
the correspondence ϕ has a fixed point (x∗, q∗) ∈ ∏i∈IM Xi ×QNj′,α satisfying
x∗i ∈ δ̂i(q∗), ∀i ∈ IM ,
and
q∗ ∈ µj′,α(x∗).
It will be shown that (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is a constrained equilibrium of Ẽ . Using
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j1 − ωij1) < 0. Two cases are possible,









j1, a contradiction. If j
1 = j′, then, by (4.43), there








j2. Using the definition of µj′,α it


















Using stronger versions of Assumptions A1 and A2 a similar result has been obtained in
van der Laan and Talman (1990) for the case of the uniform rationing system. Notice
that if α ∈ (0, 13) and the rationing system is not the uniform one, then it cannot be
guaranteed that, for every q ∈ QNj′,α, for every i ∈ IM , there exists j ∈ IN such that
l̂ij(q) < 0. Therefore, the proof of Drèze (1975) of the continuity of the budget relation
βi of a consumer i ∈ IM , see Theorem 4.2.3, cannot be used to prove the existence of a
constrained equilibrium in this case and the more general result given in Theorem 4.2.5
is needed.
From Theorem 4.7.4 it follows immediately that for any given commodity there exists
a constrained equilibrium for any state of the market of this commodity. It is interesting
to consider for example the market of a certain labour service. Then Theorem 4.7.4
makes clear that every state of the market of this labour service can be sustained as a
constrained equilibrium.
By Theorem 4.7.2 the set of all constrained equilibria is obtained by considering the
constrained equilibria corresponding to every possible state α ∈ [0, 1] of the market of
some given commodity j ∈ IN . Hence, Theorem 4.7.4 gives a complete classification
of all constrained equilibria and, moreover, Theorem 4.7.4 makes clear that there are
uncountably many constrained equilibria. Since there are so many constrained equilibria,
one might conclude that the concept is not well-defined. On the other hand one might
argue that the fact that there are many constrained equilibria necessitates a dynamic
study like a study of adjustment processes, specifying which equilibrium will result given
the initial state of the economy.
So far it has not been assumed that some commodity serves as a numeraire commod-
ity, i.e., having a price equal to one, in the economy. On the other hand the existence
of such a commodity is not excluded. In Definition 4.6.1 equilibria with rationing of the
numeraire are considered too in this case. The observation of rationing on the money
market in Western economies provides some motivation for the study of these equilibria.
In Drèze (1975), however, it was assumed that one of the commodities is a numeraire
commodity, and the existence of a constrained equilibrium without rationing on the mar-
ket of the numeraire commodity is shown. The condition that there is no rationing on the
market of at least one commodity guarantees that the constrained equilibrium obtained
is non-trivial. Moreover, this condition guarantees that no problems arise with respect
to the continuity of the budget relation of the consumers and the following specific in-
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terpretation of the model, given in Bénassy (1975a), is possible. In this interpretation,
every non-numeraire commodity can only be exchanged against the numeraire commod-
ity. A consumer does not express his demand for the numeraire commodity, i.e., there
is no separate market for the numeraire commodity, while the total excess demand for
the numeraire commodity in a state of the economy is determined by the transactions
on the markets of the non-numeraire commodities. The numeraire commodity serves as
the unit of account of Chapter 3. The following definition slightly generalizes the above
ideas.
Definition 4.7.5 (Drèze equilibrium)
A Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) with respect to the
market of a commodity j ∈ IN is a constrained equilibrium (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) of Ẽ satisfying
l∗ij < x
∗i
j − ωij < L∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM .
So, in a Drèze equilibrium with respect to some market, there is no rationing on that
market. The existence of a Drèze equilibrium with respect to some given market follows
easily from Theorem 4.7.4.
Corollary 4.7.6
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5.
Then, for every j ∈ IN , there exists a Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ with re-
spect to the market of commodity j.
Proof
Let some j ∈ IN be given. Applying Theorem 4.7.4 with α ∈ [ 13 , 23 ] and j′ = j, it
follows that there exists a constrained equilibrium of Ẽ induced by some q∗ ∈ QN
such that q∗j = α. Clearly, for every i ∈ IM , l̂ij(q∗) < −ωij and L̂ij(q∗) > ω̃j − ωij , so
l∗ij < x
∗i
j − ωij < L∗ij . Q.E.D.
Closely related to the Drèze equilibrium of the economy with respect to the numeraire
commodity are the equilibrium concepts of Bénassy (1975b) and Younès (1975). In
Drèze’s model the demand expressed by a consumer satisfies the constraints imposed by
the rationing schemes. In Bénassy (1975b) a consumer expresses his effective demand.
In his effective demand for a commodity, the consumer takes into account the rationing
schemes on all markets, except on the market of that commodity. The demand expressed
by a consumer without taking into account any constraint imposed by the rationing
schemes is often called the notional demand. In Silvestre (1982) conditions are given
under which the approaches of Bénassy, Drèze, and Younès are equivalent. Moreover, it is
shown that if the preference relations are not of the class C1, then Drèze’s definition yields
the smallest set of equilibria. As is shown in Grandmont (1977b), the equilibrium concept
given in Bénassy (1975b) might cause inconsistencies when the preference relations of
the consumers are not strongly convex, in the sense that the final consumption bundle
obtained by a consumer is not feasible for him, and even if it is feasible, it might not
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be optimal given the constraints the consumer perceives. Since strong convexity of
preference relations is not assumed in this monograph, except in Chapter 12, equilibrium
concepts based on the effective demand of consumers are not further analyzed.
The equilibrium concepts related to the Drèze equilibrium with respect to the nu-
meraire commodity are frequently used in the so-called macro-economic disequilibrium
models, see Malinvaud (1977), Bénassy (1986), and Böhm (1989). In the most basic
model there exists one representative consumer and one representative firm, who are in-
volved in the production and the exchange of three commodities, labour, a consumption
good, and money. The consumer has no initial endowment of the consumption good.
The producer produces the consumption good using labour owned by the consumer. Of-
ten the model is extended by a government consuming the consumption good, levying
taxes, and creating money. In this model a resulting Drèze equilibrium with respect to
the numeraire commodity belongs to one of the following three types. In the first type
the consumer is rationed both on his supply on the market of labour and on his demand
on the market of the consumption good, called a classical unemployment equilibrium, in
the second type the consumer is rationed on his supply on the market of labour, while
the producer is rationed on his supply on the market of the consumption good, called a
Keynesian unemployment equilibrium, and in the third type the consumer is rationed on
his demand on the market of the consumption good, while the producer is rationed on
his demand on the market of labour, called a repressed inflation equilibrium. A producer
is never rationed both on his demand on the market of labour and on his supply on the
market of the consumption good. Even this basic model provides a uniform framework
for both the classical and the Keynesian point of view for the causes of unemployment.
Several authors have considered extensions of this basic framework.
In Assumption A4 the case where the price is zero on some market is excluded. Nev-
ertheless the existence of a Drèze equilibrium with respect to the numeraire commodity
for such an economy is shown in Drèze (1975). It is therefore interesting to consider the
question whether the result of Theorem 4.7.4 can be obtained in this case too. In Exam-
ple 4.2.4 it has been demonstrated that some technical difficulties arise. Example 4.7.7
makes clear that indeed strictly positive prices are necessary for the result of Theorem
4.7.4.
Example 4.7.7
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) be such that for every i ∈ IM the
consumption set X i is a subset of IRN+ . Moreover, assume that j ∈ IN is such that
pj = 0, and that there exists a consumer i
′ ∈ IM such that i′ is monotonic with
respect to commodity j. Hence, xi







j . Suppose q
∗ ∈ QN with q∗j ≤ 13 induces a constrained


















j, a contradiction. Hence, there are no
constrained equilibria of the economy Ẽ where the state of the market of commodity
148 Equilibrium Existence Results for Economies with Price Rigidities
j, q∗j , lies in the interval [0,
1
3 ] and there are no constrained equilibria of Ẽ with supply
rationing on the market of commodity j. Assume that also pj = 0. Then it can be
shown in a similar way that if a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ is induced
by some q∗ ∈ QN , then q∗j > 23 . If the preference relation of every consumer i ∈ IM is
monotonic with respect to commodity j, then it holds for every constrained equilibrium
of the economy Ẽ that there is full rationing on demand on the market of commodity j,
i.e., if q∗ induces a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ , then L̂ij(q∗) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM .
4.8 Supply and Demand Constrained Equilibria
In this section the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) is assumed to be given. In
Kurz (1982) and van der Laan (1980a) it has been remarked that in Western economies
supply rationing occurs more frequently than demand rationing. Examples are supply
rationing on the labour market, resulting in unemployment, and quotas on the supply
of agricultural products. One of the reasons given in van der Laan (1980a) for this
phenomenon is that on many markets supply rationing is more easily realized than
demand rationing since the number of sellers is usually less than the number of buyers.
Although on the labour market the reverse is true, supply rationing of labour is easily
realized by restricting the number of hours worked. Therefore, it is interesting to know
whether there exist constrained equilibria of an economy without demand rationing on
any market, while there is no rationing on at least one market. When the commodity of
the latter market is chosen ex post as a numeraire commodity, then the interpretation
of the model as given in Bénassy (1975a) is again possible. The following definition is
motivated by the ideas presented above.
Definition 4.8.1 (Supply constrained equilibrium)
A supply constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) is a
constrained equilibrium (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) of Ẽ satisfying, for every j ∈ IN ,
x∗ij − ωij < L∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM ,
while there exists j′ ∈ IN such that
l∗ij′ < x
∗i
j′ − ωij′, ∀i ∈ IM .
The existence of a supply constrained equilibrium has been shown in van der Laan
(1982) using the technique of simplicial approximation of equilibria and in van der Laan
and Talman (1990) using a fixed point argument. In van der Laan (1980a) it has been
shown that there exists a constrained equilibrium without demand rationing and without
full rationing on supply on at least one market. Results concerning the existence of
constrained equilibria without demand rationing on any market and without rationing
on an a priori chosen market in a model with a set of admissible price systems given
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by Pπ or P(φ,ψ), see Section 4.4, are obtained in Dehez and Drèze (1984), van der Laan
(1984), Weddepohl (1987), and Wu (1988). However, as has been remarked before, an
equilibrium satisfying the conditions of Definition 4.8.1 might not exist in these models
and therefore these authors consider different equilibrium concepts where in specified
cases supply rationing on a market is allowed, while the price on this market could still
be lowered.
If in a constrained equilibrium of the economy no demand rationing on any market
is allowed, then this can be modelled by requiring that if q∗ ∈ QN induces a constrained
equilibrium (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) of the economy, then q∗j ≤ 23 , ∀j ∈ IN . If, moreover,
it is required that q∗j ≥ 13 for at least one commodity j ∈ IN , then q∗ induces a supply
constrained equilibrium of the economy. Notice that the existence of a Drèze equilibrium
with respect to the market of a commodity j ∈ IN , shown in Theorem 4.7.4, does not
show the existence of a supply constrained equilibrium of the economy since in a Drèze
equilibrium with respect to the market of a commodity j ∈ IN only the state of the
market of commodity j is considered.
Let some α ∈ QN be given. In the following result it is shown that there exists a
constrained equilibrium induced by q∗ ∈ QN , where, for every j ∈ IN , q∗j is less than or
equal to αj, while there exists a commodity j
′ ∈ IN such that qj′ = αj′. In this way it
can be modelled that on some markets a given amount of demand rationing is allowed,
or that on some markets some supply rationing is always present. An example is the
existence of a natural rate of unemployment on the labour market.
Theorem 4.8.2
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. Let
some α ∈ QN be given. Then there exists q∗ ∈ QN such that q∗ ≤ α, q∗j = αj for some
j ∈ IN , and q∗ induces a constrained equilibrium (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) of the economy
Ẽ .
Proof
For every i ∈ IM , let the set X i be defined by
X i =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣pjxij ≤ p · ωi, ∀j ∈ IN
}
.
Notice that, for every q ∈ QN , xi ∈ δ̂i(q) implies xi ∈ Xi. Let the relation µ : ∏i∈IM X i →





∣∣∣s ·∑i∈IM (xi − ωi) ≥ s ·
∑
i∈IM (x
i − ωi), ∀s ∈ ∆N−1
}
.









j2−ωij2), then sj2 = 0 for every s ∈ µ(x). For every j ∈ IN , let component
j of the function f : ∆N−1 → QN be defined by
f j(s) =
αjsj
max({s1, . . . , sN})
, ∀s ∈ ∆N−1.
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, ∀s ∈ ∆N−1,
and let the relation ϕ :
∏
i∈IM X








The relation ϕ :
∏
i∈IM X
i → ∆N−1, defined by ϕ(x) = ∆N−1, ∀x ∈ ∏i∈IM X i, is easily




∆N−1 → IR, defined by f(x, s) = s · ∑i∈IM (xi − ωi), ∀x ∈
∏
i∈IM X
i, ∀s ∈ ∆N−1, is
continuous. Therefore, it follows from the maximum theorem, Theorem 2.5.17, that µ is
a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. It is easily verified that µ is a
convex-valued correspondence. Using the continuity of the function f and the fact that
δ̂i, ∀i ∈ IM , is compact-valued, convex-valued, and upper hemi-continuous by Theorem
4.7.3, it follows from Theorem 2.5.5 that the relation δi, ∀i ∈ IM , is a compact-valued,
convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. By Theorem 2.5.10 the same
result holds for ϕ. Clearly, the set
∏
i∈IM X
i×∆N−1 is non-empty, compact, and convex.
Therefore, all conditions of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, Theorem 2.6.1, are satisfied
and the correspondence ϕ has a fixed point (x∗, s∗) ∈ ∏i∈IM X i ×∆N−1 satisfying




, ∀i ∈ IM ,
and
s∗ ∈ µ(x∗).
Let q∗ ∈ QN be defined by
q∗ = f(s∗).
From the definition of the function f it follows that q∗ ≤ α and q∗j = αj for some j ∈ IN .
Therefore, it remains to be shown that (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is a constrained equilibrium
















j1 − ωij1) < 0. Then, using (4.44), there




j2 − ωij2) > 0. Using the properties of µ this implies
that s∗j1 = 0 and therefore q
∗








∗i − ωi) ≥ 0N and, using (4.44), it follows that
∑
i∈IM (x
∗i − ωi) = 0N . Q.E.D.
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Notice that if α given in Theorem 4.8.2 is such that min({αj |j ∈ IN}) < 13 , then it cannot
be guaranteed that, for every q ∈ f(∆N−1), for every i ∈ IM , there exists j ∈ IN such
that l̂ij(q) < 0, with f as defined in the proof of Theorem 4.8.2. Therefore, the original
proof of Drèze (1975) of the continuity of the budget relation, see Theorem 4.2.3, cannot
be used to prove the existence of a constrained equilibrium if min({αj | j ∈ IN}) < 13
and again the result of Theorem 4.2.5 is needed.
The existence of a supply constrained equilibrium follows immediately from Theorem
4.8.2 by taking for example α = 121
N .
Corollary 4.8.3
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5.
Then there exists a supply constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ .
In Example 4.8.4 it is shown that strictly positive prices are necessary for the result of
Theorem 4.8.2.
Example 4.8.4
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) be such that, for every i ∈ IM ,
X i ⊂ IRN+ . Assume that j ∈ IN is such that pj = 0 and that there exists a consumer
i′ ∈ IM such that the preference relation i′ is monotonic with respect to commodity j.
In Example 4.7.7 it has been shown that if q∗ induces a constrained equilibrium of the
economy Ẽ , then q∗j > 13 . Moreover, if pj = 0 and q∗ induces a constrained equilibrium
of the economy Ẽ , then q∗j > 23 , following the reasoning of Example 4.7.7. Therefore, a
supply constrained equilibrium does not exist in this case.
Given α ∈ QN , it is required in Theorem 4.8.2 that the state on the market of at least
one commodity j ∈ IN is given by αj. Therefore, if q∗1 ∈ QN induces a constrained
equilibrium satisfying the requirements of Theorem 4.8.2 given some α1 ∈ QN , and if
q∗2 induces a constrained equilibrium satisfying the requirements of Theorem 4.8.2 given
some α2 ∈ QN with α2 ≫ α1, then q∗1 6= q∗2. The set of all constrained equilibria is ob-
tained by considering for instance the constrained equilibria satisfying the requirements
of Theorem 4.8.2 for α ∈ QN satisfying α1 = · · · = αN . This gives another complete
classification of all constrained equilibria.
Recent experiences in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union make clear that
demand constrained equilibria are interesting too. In Polterovich (1993) some general
equilibrium type models of centrally planned economies are considered. In none of these
models there is supply rationing on any market, while demand rationing is allowed on
every market. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 4.8.5 (Demand constrained equilibrium)
A demand constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) is
a constrained equilibrium (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) of Ẽ satisfying, for every commodity j ∈ IN ,
x∗ij − ωij > l∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM ,
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while for at least one commodity j′ ∈ IN it holds that
x∗ij′ − ωij′ < L∗ij′ , ∀i ∈ IM .
Demand constrained equilibria are also considered in van der Laan and Talman (1990).
The existence of a demand constrained equilibrium follows easily from the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.8.6
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. Let
some α ∈ QN be given. Then there exists q∗ ∈ QN such that q∗ ≥ α, q∗j = αj for some
j ∈ IN , and q∗ induces a constrained equilibrium (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) of the economy
Ẽ .
Proof
For every i ∈ IM , let the set X i be defined by
X i =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣pjxij ≤ p · ωi, ∀j ∈ IN
}
.
Notice that, for every q ∈ QN , xi ∈ δ̂i(q) implies xi ∈ Xi. Let the relation µ : ∏i∈IM X i →











(xi − ωi) ≤ s ·
∑
i∈IM













j2−ωij2), then sj1 = 0 for every s ∈ µ(x). For every j ∈ IN , let component
j ∈ IN of the function f : ∆N−1 → QN be defined by
f j(s) = 1−
(1− αj)sj
max({s1, . . . , sN})
, ∀s ∈ ∆N−1.





, ∀s ∈ ∆N−1,
and let the relation ϕ :
∏
i∈IM X








Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4.7.4 it can be shown that ϕ satisfies all conditions








, ∀i ∈ IM ,
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and
s∗ ∈ µ(x∗).
Let q∗ ∈ QN be defined by
q∗ = f(s∗).
By definition of the function f it holds that q∗ ≥ α and q∗j = αj for some j ∈ IN .
Therefore, it remains to be shown that (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is a constrained equilibrium
















j1 − ωij1) > 0. Then, using (4.45), there




j2 − ωij2) < 0. Using the properties of µ this implies
that s∗j1 = 0 and therefore q
∗








∗i − ωi) ≤ 0N and, using (4.45), it follows that
∑
i∈IM (x
∗i − ωi) = 0N . Q.E.D.
The existence of a demand constrained equilibrium follows as a corollary of Theorem
4.8.6 by taking for example α = 121
N .
Corollary 4.8.7
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5.
Then there exists a demand constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ .
It should be noticed that all possible constrained equilibria are obtained by consider-
ing the correspondences ϕ used in Theorem 4.7.4, Theorem 4.8.2, or Theorem 4.8.6,
a fixed point of each ϕ inducing a constrained equilibrium. By Theorem 4.7.2 every
constrained equilibrium of an economy Ẽ is equivalent to the constrained equilibrium
(p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) being induced by some q∗ ∈ QN . Such a constrained equilibrium
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.7.4 for every j ∈ IN and for every α ∈ [0, 1] sat-
isfying α = q∗j . It satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.8.2 for every α ∈ QN satisfying
α ≥ q∗ and for some j ∈ IN , αj = q∗j . It also satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.8.6
for every α ∈ QN satisfying α ≤ q∗ and for some j ∈ IN , αj = q∗j .
4.9 The Equilibrium Relation
For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i and the preference relation i are
assumed to be given in this section. Moreover, the rationing system (l̃, L̃) is assumed to
be given. Since in this section the initial endowments may vary, they are again included
in the notation of βi and δi, ∀i ∈ IM . Notice that in the most interesting cases the
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rationing function (l̃, L̃) also depends on the initial endowments. Define the set Ω of all








= int (X) .
It is assumed that l̃ is a function from QN × Ω into −IRMN+ , where, for every ω ∈ Ω,
l̃(QN×{ω}) is the set of admissible rationing schemes on supply if the initial endowments
of the consumers are given by ω. Similarly, it is assumed that L̃ is a function from QN×Ω
into IRMN+ , where, for every ω ∈ Ω, L̃(QN×{ω}) is the set of admissible rationing schemes
on demand if the initial endowments of the consumers are given by ω. In this section
Assumption A5 is replaced by Assumption A6.
A6. The rationing function (l̃, L̃) is continuous, and, for every ω ∈ Ω, the functions
l̃|QN×{ω} and L̃|QN×{ω} are flexible and market independent.
In this section it is shown that the equilibrium relation, which assigns to every specifica-
tion of initial endowments ω in the set Ω and to every specification of a set of admissible
price systems P(p,p), with (p, p) an element of the set P defined by
P =
{



















is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Moreover, it can be shown
that it is continuous on a residual subset of the domain. These are interesting properties
since they imply that the set of equilibrium allocations is stable against perturbations
in the initial endowments or the set of admissible price systems. For every j ∈ IN ,
component j of the function p̂ : QN × P → IRN++ is defined similarly as in (4.31), so
p̂j(q, p, p) = max
({
pj ,min({pj(2− 3qj) + pj(3qj − 1), pj})
})
, ∀(q, p, p) ∈ QN × P ,
and the function l̂ : QN ×Ω→ −IRMN+ and the function L̂ : QN ×Ω→ IRMN+ are defined
similarly as in (4.32) and (4.33), respectively, so
l̂(q, ω) = l̃
(
inf({1N , 3q}), ω
)
, ∀(q, ω) ∈ QN × Ω,
L̂(q, ω) = L̃
(
inf({1N , 31N − 3q}), ω
)
, ∀(q, ω) ∈ QN × Ω.
Again, these functions are used to describe the state of the markets of the economy.
Define the equilibrium relation ξ : P × Ω→ X by
ξ(p, p, ω) =
{
x∗ ∈ X
∣∣∣∃q∗ ∈ QN , (p̂(q∗, p, p), l̂(q∗, ω), L̂(q∗, ω), x∗ ) is a constrained
equilibrium of the economy Ẽ(p, p, ω)
}
, ∀(p, p, ω) ∈ P × Ω.
By Theorem 4.7.2 it is guaranteed that ξ(p, p, ω) contains all constrained equilibrium
allocations of the economy E(p, p, ω).
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Theorem 4.9.1
For every consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i satisfy Assumption A1, let the
preference relation i satisfy Assumption A2, and let the rationing function (l̃, L̃) satisfy
Assumption A6. Then the equilibrium relation ξ : P×Ω→ X is a compact-valued, upper
hemi-continuous correspondence.
Proof
Let some (p, p, ω) ∈ P × Ω be given. By Theorem 4.7.4 it holds that ξ(p, p, ω) 6= ∅.
Let (pn, pn, (ω)n)n∈IN be a sequence in P ×Ω converging to (p, p, ω) and let the sequence
((x)n)n∈IN in X be such that (x)
n ∈ ξ(pn, pn, (ω)n), ∀n ∈ IN. It will be shown that the se-
quence ((x)n)n∈IN has a subsequence with limit contained in ξ(p, p, ω). Then ξ is compact-
valued, and, by Theorem 2.5.6, an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. For every n ∈
IN, there exists qn ∈ QN such that (p̂(qn, pn, pn), l̂(qn, (ω)n), L̂(qn, (ω)n), (x)n) is a con-
strained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ(pn, pn, (ω)n). Consider the sequence (qn, (x)n)n∈IN.
Since, for every i ∈ IM , 0N ≤ xin ≤ ω̃n → ω̃, it follows that the sequence ((x)n)n∈IN is
bounded. Therefore, the sequence (qn, (x)n)n∈IN has a subsequence converging to some
(q, x) ∈ QN ×X. Hence,
(
p̂(q, p, p), l̂(q, ω), L̂(q, ω), x
)
∈ P(p,p) ×−IRMN+ × IRMN+ ×X.








, ∀i ∈ IM , is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence. Clearly, p̂, l̂, and L̂ are continuous functions, so, for every i ∈ IM , the
correspondence δi : QN × P × Ω→ X i, defined by
δi(q, p, p, ω) = δi
(
p̂(q, p, p), l̂i(q, ω), L̂i(q, ω), ωi
)
, ∀(q, p, p, ω) ∈ QN × P × Ω,
is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence, using Theorem 2.5.5. Since
(qn, pn, pn, (ω)n) → (q, p, p, ω) and for every i ∈ IM it holds that xin → xi and δi is a
compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence, it follows from Theorem 2.5.6
that
xi ∈ δi(q, p, p, ω), ∀i ∈ IM .










i, thereby giving Condition 2 of Defi-
nition 4.6.1. By Theorem 4.7.1 the remaining conditions of a constrained equilibrium of
the economy Ẽ(p, p, ω) are satisfied. Q.E.D.
Recall that a subset of a topological space is called residual if it contains a countable
intersection of dense and open sets, see Section 2.3. It follows easily that the equilibrium
relation ξ is a continuous correspondence on a residual subset of P × Ω.
Theorem 4.9.2
For every consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i satisfy Assumption A1, let
156 Equilibrium Existence Results for Economies with Price Rigidities
the preference relation i satisfy Assumption A2, and let the rationing functions (l̃, L̃)
satisfy Assumption A6. Then the equilibrium relation ξ : P × Ω → X is a continuous
correspondence on a residual subset of P × Ω.
Proof
From Theorem 4.9.1 it follows that ξ : P × Ω → X is a compact-valued, upper hemi-
continuous correspondence, so ξ is continuous on a residual subset of P ×Ω by Theorem
2.5.16. Q.E.D.
It is not difficult to verify that for every (p, p, ω) ∈ P × Ω there exists an open subset
O of P × Ω such that (p, p, ω) ∈ O and the closure of O in P × Ω is compact in P × Ω.
Therefore, P×Ω is a locally compact Hausdorff space and it follows from Theorem 2.3.15
that it is a Baire space. Hence, every countable intersection of open, dense subsets of
P × Ω is dense in P × Ω. Therefore, the residual set of Theorem 4.9.2 is large in a
topological sense.
4.10 An Example
In order to illustrate the theory presented in this chapter, the example used in Section
3.10 is extended by a set of admissible price systems and a rationing system. In this
example the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I2 , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) is such that N = 2, X1 = X2 =
IR2+, 1 and 2 can be represented by utility functions u1 : X1 → IR and u2 : X2 → IR,









∀x2 ∈ IR2+, ω1 = (1, 4)⊤, ω2 = (2, 1)⊤,
P(p,p) =
{
p ∈ IR2+ | 16 ≤ p1 ≤ 2 and p2 = 1
}
,
and (l̃, L̃) is the uniform rationing system, where l̃ : Q2 → −IR4+ is defined by
l̃11(q
1) = l̃21(q
1) = −3q11, ∀q1 ∈ Q2,
l̃12(q
1) = l̃22(q
1) = −5q12, ∀q1 ∈ Q2,
and L̃ : Q2 → IR4+ is defined by
L̃11(q
2) = L̃21(q
2) = 18q21, ∀q2 ∈ Q2,
L̃12(q
2) = L̃22(q
2) = 5q22, ∀q2 ∈ Q2.
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Using Theorem 2.9.7 it can be easily verified that the reduced demand relation of con-
sumer 1 is a function, denoted by d̂1 : Q2 → IR2, defined by









)⊤, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 13 , 71360 ≤ q2 ≤ 1,
( 90q2
33q1−10







≤ q1 ≤ 23 , q2 ≤ 1, 33q1 + 360q2 ≥ 82,
(15q2
2







≤ q1 ≤ 211216 , 16 ≤ q2 ≤ 1,
(54− 54q1, 108q1 − 108)⊤, 211216 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, q2 ≤ 1, 36q1 + 5q2 ≥ 36.
Similarly, the reduced demand relation of consumer 2 is a function, denoted by d̂2 : Q2 →
IR2, defined by
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≤ q1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 4960 ,
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2
, 15− 15q2)⊤, 23 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, 4960 ≤ q2 ≤ 1.
Now the reduced total excess demand function, denoted by ẑ : Q2 → IR2, is defined by
ẑ(q) = d̂1(q) + d̂2(q) − ω1 − ω2, ∀q ∈ Q2. Notice that all the assumptions of Theorem
4.7.3 are satisfied and that the functions d̂1, d̂2, and ẑ do satisfy all the conditions given
there.
The zero points of ẑ can be easily determined analytically. It can be verified that













































and the convex combinations of any two successive points. In Figure 4.10.1 the solid line
corresponds to the set of zero points of ẑ.
According to Theorem 4.7.4, for every j ∈ I2, for every α ∈ [0, 1], there is a zero
point q∗ of ẑ satisfying q∗j = α. According to Theorem 4.8.2, for every α ∈ Q2, there is
a zero point q∗ of ẑ satisfying q∗ ≤ α, and q∗1 = α1 or q∗2 = α2. According to Theorem
4.8.6, for every α ∈ Q2, there is a zero point q∗ of ẑ satisfying q∗ ≥ α, and q∗1 = α1 or
q∗2 = α2. Using Figure 4.10.1 these results are easily verified for the example. Moreover,
q∗ = (0, 0)⊤ induces the trivial supply constrained equilibrium, q∗ = (1, 1)⊤ induces the
trivial demand constrained equilibrium, q∗ = ( 12 ,
11
120)
⊤ induces a Drèze equilibrium with
respect to the market of commodity 1, being also a supply constrained equilibrium, and
q∗ = ( 148231 ,
1
2)
⊤ induces a Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of commodity
2, being also a demand constrained equilibrium. It is easily verified that the Drèze
equilibrium with respect to the market of commodity 2 is also a Walrasian equilibrium
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Figure 4.10.1. The set of zero points of ẑ, N = 2.
of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I2), see also Section 3.10. In Table 4.10.2 the main
characteristics of the two trivial constrained equilibria and the two Drèze equilibria are
summarized.
Table 4.10.2 makes clear that consumer 1 prefers the Drèze equilibrium with respect
to the market of commodity 1 to the Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of
commodity 2. This is not unexpected since the price of commodity 1 is lower at the first
Drèze equilibrium, while consumer 1 owns a lot of commodity 2 and prefers commodity 1
to commodity 2 according to his utility function. Nevertheless, the demand of consumer
1 for commodity 1 is higher at the Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of
commodity 2 than at the Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of commodity
1. The intuition behind this result is that consumer 1 would prefer to demand more of
commodity 1 in the Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of commodity 1, but is
not able to supply more of commodity 2 since the demand of commodity 2 of consumer
2 is relatively small. Therefore, consumer 1 is rationed on his supply on the market
of commodity 2 in the Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of commodity 1.
Notice that if consumer 1 is no longer a price taker, but is able to influence the price
of commodity 1, then the Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of commodity
2, i.e., the Walrasian equilibrium, is no longer stable. Consumer 1 would be better
off if the price of commodity 1 decreases compared to the Walrasian equilibrium price
of commodity 1. Such considerations will play an important role in Part III of this
monograph, where the consumers have political power and the price regulations will be
determined endogenously.
Figure 4.10.1 makes clear that the set of zero points of ẑ satisfies an even stronger
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q∗ = (0, 0)⊤ q∗ = ( 12 ,
11
120)
⊤ q∗ = ( 148231 ,
1
2)
⊤ q∗ = (1, 1)⊤
p̂(q∗) ( 16 , 1)
⊤ (1 112 , 1)
⊤ (1 67 , 1)
⊤ (2, 1)⊤
l̂1(q∗) = l̂2(q∗) (0, 0)⊤ (−3,−1 38)⊤ (−3,−5)⊤ (−3,−5)⊤
L̂1(q∗) = L̂2(q∗) (18, 5)⊤ (18, 5)⊤ (18, 5)⊤ (0, 0)⊤
d̂1(q∗) (1, 4)⊤ (2 726 , 2
5
8)




d̂2(q∗) (2, 1)⊤ ( 1926 , 2
3
8)




u1(d̂1(q∗)) 1.414 2.353 2.098 1.414
u2(d̂2(q∗)) 1.189 1.769 2.301 1.189
Table 4.10.2. Some constrained equilibria of the economy Ẽ .
property than the ones guaranteed by Theorem 4.7.4, Theorem 4.8.2, or Theorem 4.8.6.
There exists a connected set of zero points of ẑ containing the points inducing the trivial
constrained equilibria, and the Drèze equilibria with respect to the two markets. In
Chapter 5 it will be examined whether such a property does always hold under the
Assumptions A1-A5.
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Chapter 5
On the Connectedness of the Set of
Constrained Equilibria
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 several constrained equilibrium existence results have been given. In The-
orem 4.7.1 and Theorem 4.7.2 it has been shown that the state of every market can be
represented by a single parameter, determining either the amount of supply rationing,
or the price, or the amount of demand rationing on a market. It has been argued that
the economy has two trivial constrained equilibria, called the trivial supply constrained
equilibrium and the trivial demand constrained equilibrium. In Theorem 4.7.4 it has
been shown that there exists a constrained equilibrium of the economy with an a priori
given state of one of the markets. A special case is given by the Drèze equilibrium with
respect to a given market as defined in Definition 4.7.5, where it holds that there is no
rationing on an a priori specified market. In Theorem 4.8.2 it has been shown that there
exists a constrained equilibrium of the economy such that the value of the parameter
representing the state is less than or equal to some a priori specified value for every
market with equality holding for at least one market. A special case is given by the
supply constrained equilibrium as defined in Definition 4.8.1, where it holds that there is
no demand rationing on any market, while there is no rationing on at least one market.
In Theorem 4.8.6 it has been shown that there exists a constrained equilibrium of the
economy such that the value of the parameter representing the state on any market is
greater than or equal to some a priori specified value for every market with equality
holding for at least one market. A special case is given by the demand constrained equi-
librium as defined in Definition 4.8.5, where it holds that there is no supply rationing on
any market, while there is no rationing on at least one market.
In the example given in Section 4.10 it holds that the set of constrained equilibria
is connected. It is therefore a natural question to ask whether general conditions can
be given such that the set of constrained equilibria of an economy is a connected set.
161
162 On the Connectedness of the Set of Constrained Equilibria
In van der Laan (1982) a theorem is given, stating that there is a connected set of con-
strained equilibria of the economy without demand rationing on any market, containing
both the trivial supply constrained equilibrium of the economy and a supply constrained
equilibrium of the economy. The proof is based on the properties of points generated by
a simplicial algorithm applied to the model of an economy with price rigidities. How-
ever, the proof is not complete since it assumes that a certain sequence of connected
1-manifolds has a subsequence that converges to some connected 1-manifold. This rea-
soning is not valid in general. Nevertheless, the basic idea of the proof, the use of the
properties of the path of points generated by a simplicial algorithm in order to obtain
insight into the structure of the set of constrained equilibria of the economy, will turn
out to be very useful. This idea will be utilized to show the existence of a connected set
of constrained equilibria of the economy containing the two trivial constrained equilibria.
It can be shown that a connected set of constrained equilibria of the economy containing
the two trivial constrained equilibria also contains a supply constrained equilibrium, a
Drèze equilibrium with respect to any market, and a demand constrained equilibrium,
and therefore the result in van der Laan (1982) is generalized. In fact, it can be shown
that such a connected set of constrained equilibria contains an equilibrium of any type
considered in Chapter 4.
In Section 4.7 some properties of a relation related to the total excess demand re-
lation of the economy, called the reduced total excess demand relation of the economy,
have been derived. Under weak assumptions it can be shown that the reduced to-
tal excess demand relation of the economy is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper
hemi-continuous correspondence, satisfying some boundary condition. Moreover, if it is
assumed that the preference relations of the consumers are strongly convex, then the
reduced total excess demand relation of the economy can be shown to be a continuous
function. For the latter case, in Section 5.2 a simplicial algorithm with integer labelling
proposed in van der Laan (1982) is presented. It is applied to the reduced total ex-
cess demand relation of the economy. It is shown that the algorithm generates a path
of points connecting the two trivial constrained equilibria of the economy. Using this
result, it is shown in Section 5.3 that the set of constrained equilibria of the economy
has a component containing the two trivial constrained equilibria. In Section 5.4 it is
shown that the results of Section 5.3 remain valid if weaker assumptions are made with
respect to the economy, guaranteeing only that the reduced total excess demand relation
of the economy is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence instead of
being a continuous function. In Section 5.5 it is shown that all the equilibrium existence
results mentioned in Chapter 4 can be proved by a one line argument using the results
of Section 5.3 and Section 5.4. Thereby it is shown that there exists a continuum, i.e.,
an uncountable connected set, of constrained equilibria of the economy. In Section 5.6
the algorithm is applied to the example considered in Section 3.10 and Section 4.10.
This chapter is based on Herings (1993).
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5.2 A Simplicial Algorithm with Integer Labelling
In this chapter the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) as described in Chapter
4 is assumed to be given. As in Chapter 4 there are M ∈ IN consumers, indexed by
i ∈ IM , and N ∈ IN commodities, indexed by j ∈ IN . Every consumer i ∈ IM has a
consumption set X i, a preference relation i, and an initial endowment ωi. The set of
admissible price systems is given by P(p,p) = {p ∈ IRN | p ≤ p ≤ p} and the rationing
function, specifying the admissible rationing schemes, is given by the pair (l̃, L̃) with
l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ the rationing function on supply and L̃ : QN → IRMN+ the rationing
function on demand. The element (ω1, . . . , ωM) will be denoted by ω.
As in Section 4.2, given a price system p ∈ IRN and a rationing scheme (li, Li) ∈
−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ of a consumer i ∈ IM , the set βi(p, li, Li) = {xi ∈ X i | p · xi ≤ p · ωi,
li ≤ xi − ωi ≤ Li} denotes the budget set of consumer i, and as in Section 4.3 the set of
best elements of βi(p, li, Li) according to i is denoted by δi(p, li, Li). As in Section 4.7,
for every j ∈ IN , component p̂j of the function p̂ : QN → P(p,p) is defined by
p̂j(q) = max
({
pj ,min({pj(2− 3qj) + pj(3qj − 1), pj})
})
, ∀q ∈ QN .





, ∀q ∈ QN ,
L̂(q) = L̃
(
inf({1N , 31N − 3q})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN .
For every consumer i ∈ IM , define the relations γi : P(p,p) → IRN and δ̂i : QN → IRN by





∩ γi (p̂(q)) , ∀q ∈ QN .








{ωi}, ∀q ∈ QN .
In this section the reduced total excess demand relation of the economy is assumed to be
a function, denoted by ẑ : QN → IRN , called the reduced total excess demand function
of the economy. It is often assumed that the reduced total excess demand function of
the economy satisfies the following condition.
Condition A The reduced total excess demand function ẑ : QN → IRN of the economy
Ẽ satisfies
1. ẑ is continuous,
2. for every q ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies ẑj(q) ≥ 0, and qj = 1
implies ẑj(q) ≤ 0,
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3. for every ∀q ∈ QN , p̂(q) · ẑ(q) = 0.
Notice that by Theorem 4.7.3 the reduced total excess demand function of the economy
Ẽ satisfies Condition A if Ẽ satisfies the Assumptions A1-A5 of Section 4.7 and the
preference relations i, ∀i ∈ IM , are strongly convex.
In Theorem 4.7.1 it has been shown that if q∗ ∈ QN satisfies ẑ(q∗) = 0N , then q∗
induces a constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ . Moreover, Theorem 4.7.2 shows
that all constrained equilibria are obtained by considering the zero points of ẑ. From
Condition A.2 and Condition A.3 it follows immediately that ẑ(0N) = 0N . The element
0N induces the trivial supply constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ . From Condition
A.2 and Condition A.3 it follows immediately that ẑ(1N) = 0N . The element 1N induces
the trivial demand constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ .
In this section a simplicial algorithm on QN with integer labelling is presented. The
algorithm is the same as the one used in van der Laan (1982) and is related to the
algorithm in Chapter 5 of van der Laan (1980b) and van der Laan and Talman (1981).
This algorithm will be shown to generate a path of approximate zero points of the reduced
total excess demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ joining the element 0N and the element
1N . An essential part of the algorithm is that to each point in QN a label in the set IN+1
is assigned. For every q ∈ QN , define the set J (q) by
J (q) = {j′ ∈ IN |qj′ 6= 1 and ẑj′ (q) = max({ẑj (q) | j ∈ IN})} ∪ {N + 1}.
Define the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 by
f̂ (q) = min (J(q)) , ∀q ∈ QN . (5.1)
Notice that f̂(1N) = N + 1 and f̂(0N) 6= N + 1.
Definition 5.2.1 (Proper labelling function)
The labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 is proper if, for every q ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN ,
qj = 1 implies f̂ (q) 6= j, and qj = 0 implies f̂ (q) 6= N + 1.
It will be shown in Theorem 5.2.9 that f̂ is a proper labelling function if the reduced
total excess demand function ẑ satisfies Condition A.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN be given. The triangulation Σ might be for instance the
K-triangulation of QN with any grid size, see Definition 2.7.3, or the V -triangulation of
QN with respect to any v ∈ QN and with any grid size, see Definition 2.7.6. For every




∣∣∣ qj = 0, ∀j ∈ IN \ J
}
.
Clearly, A(J) is a convex (#J)-dimensional subset of IRN for every non-empty subset J
of IN . For every non-empty subset J of IN , define the set
Σ (J) = {τ ⊂ A (J) |∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is a (#J)-face of σ} .













Figure 5.2.1. The sets A(J) for non-empty subsets J of IN , N = 2.
If J, Ĵ ⊂ IN with ∅ 6= J ⊂ Ĵ , then A(J) = A(Ĵ) ∩ aff(A(J)). By repeated application
of Theorem 2.7.8 it follows that Σ (J) is a triangulation of A (J) for every non-empty
subset J of IN . All 2
N − 1 possible sets A(J) are illustrated in Figure 5.2.1 for N = 2.
Definition 5.2.2 (J-complete simplices)
Let the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 be given. Let J be a non-empty subset of
IN+1 with #J = t. A (t− 1)-simplex τ(q1, . . . , qt) being a subset of QN is J-complete if
f̂({q1, . . . , qt}) = J.
In general, a (t − 1)-simplex is called complete if it is J-complete for some non-empty
subset J of IN+1 with #J = t. Let the labelling function f̂ : Q
N → IN+1 be proper.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN be given. The algorithm will generate a finite sequence of
complete simplices starting with the {f̂(0N)}-complete simplex {0N} and terminating
with an IN+1-complete simplex. For every (t− 1)-simplex τ in the finite sequence either
there exists a non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t such that τ is a J-complete facet of
a t-simplex of Σ(J) or τ is an IN+1-complete simplex of Σ. Moreover, any two successive
simplices in the finite sequence either are both a facet of the same simplex or one is a
facet of the other. In Lemma 5.2.3 and Lemma 5.2.4 all possible situations are described
that can occur when some (t − 1)-simplex τ being a J-complete facet of a t-simplex of
Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t is given. Lemma 5.2.3 and Lemma
5.2.4 will be used in Theorem 5.2.7 to determine in a unique way the finite sequence of
complete simplices described above. Then the detailed steps of the algorithm yielding
this finite sequence will be given in Algorithm 5.2.8, and it will be shown in Theorem
5.2.10 that if the reduced total excess demand function of the economy satisfies Condition
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Let the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 and a triangulation Σ of QN be given. Let σ
be a t-simplex of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t. Moreover, let a
J-complete facet τ of σ be given. Then exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. the t-simplex σ is (J ∪ {N + 1})-complete,
2. the t-simplex σ is a J-complete facet of a (t+ 1)-simplex of Σ(J) for precisely one
subset J of IN ,
3. the t-simplex σ has exactly one other J-complete facet τ .
Proof
Let q be the vertex of σ not contained in τ.
If f̂(q) /∈ J, then σ is (J ∪ {f̂(q)})-complete and, since every facet of σ not equal to τ
contains q, it holds that τ is the only J-complete facet of σ. Either f̂(q) = N + 1 and
hence σ is (J ∪ {N + 1})-complete, or f̂(q) 6= N + 1 and σ is a (J ∪ {f̂(q)})-complete
facet of a (t+ 1)-simplex of Σ(J ∪ {f̂(q)}). In the latter case, Case 2 holds with J equal
to J ∪ f̂(q).
If f̂(q) ∈ J, then σ is not J-complete for any J ⊂ IN+1. Moreover, since τ is a J-complete
simplex, there is exactly one vertex of τ, say q̂, such that f̂(q̂) = f̂(q). Hence, the facet
of σ opposite q̂ is J-complete, while σ has no other J-complete facets. Q.E.D.
Notice that the set J of Case 2 of Lemma 5.2.3 contains the set J as a proper subset.
Lemma 5.2.4
Let the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 and a triangulation Σ of QN be given. Let τ
be a J-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN with
#J = t. Moreover, let τ be a member of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN . Then
precisely one facet of the (t− 1)-simplex τ is J-complete.
Proof
For exactly one index j′ ∈ IN it holds that {j′} = J \J. Since τ is a J-complete simplex,
it has exactly one vertex, say q, such that f̂(q) = j′. Since J 6= ∅, it holds that τ is at
least 1-dimensional and the facet of τ opposite q is J-complete, while τ has no other
J-complete facet. Q.E.D.
Definition 5.2.5 (Adjacent complete simplices)
Let the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 and a triangulation Σ of QN be given. Then the
(t− 1)-simplices τ and τ̂ are adjacent complete simplices if τ and τ̂ are both J-complete
facets of the same t-simplex σ of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t,
or if τ is a J-complete facet of the complete t-simplex τ̂ of Σ(J) for some non-empty
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subset J of IN with #J = t, or if τ̂ is a J-complete facet of the complete t-simplex τ of
Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t.
The algorithm will generate a finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices. Theorem
5.2.6 makes a statement concerning the number of adjacent complete simplices of some
given complete simplex. Moreover, it is shown that if the t-simplex σ of Σ(J), for some
non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t, is J ∪ {N + 1}-complete and the labelling
function f̂ is proper, then J = IN .
Theorem 5.2.6
Let the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 be proper. Let a triangulation Σ of QN be
given. Let τ be a J-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J
of IN with #J = t. If τ = {0N}, then there exists exactly one adjacent complete simplex
to τ. If τ 6= {0N}, then there exist exactly two adjacent complete simplices to τ. Let the
t-simplex σ of Σ(J), for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t, be (J ∪ {N + 1})-
complete. Then J = IN and there exists exactly one adjacent complete simplex to σ.
Proof
Let τ = {0N}. Then τ is J-complete if and only if J = {f̂(0N)}. Since Σ({f̂(0N)}) is a
triangulation of A({f̂(0N)}) and {0N} is a facet in rb(A({f̂(0N)})), it holds by Definition
2.7.1 that there is a unique 1-simplex σ of Σ({f̂(0N)}) such that {0N} is a facet of σ. By
Lemma 5.2.3, either σ is ({f̂(0N)} ∪ {N + 1})-complete, or σ is a J-complete facet of a
2-simplex of Σ(J) for precisely one non-empty subset J of IN , or σ has exactly one other
{f̂(0N)}-complete facet τ̂ . This yields exactly one adjacent complete simplex to {0N}.
Since {0N} has no facets, there can be no other adjacent complete simplex to {0N}.
Let τ 6= {0N}. Then there are two possibilities, either τ ⊂ rb(A(J)) or τ ⊂ ri(A(J)).
Consider the case in which τ ⊂ rb(A(J)). Then, by the properties of a triangulation,
there is a unique t-simplex σ in A(J) having τ as a facet. By Lemma 5.2.3, either σ
is (J ∪ {N + 1})-complete, or σ is a J -complete facet of a (t + 1)-simplex of Σ(J) for
precisely one non-empty subset J of IN , or σ has exactly one other J-complete facet τ̂ .
This yields one adjacent complete simplex to τ. Since τ ⊂ rb(A(J)), there exists j′ ∈ J
such that xj′ = 1, ∀x ∈ τ, or xj′ = 0, ∀x ∈ τ. Since f̂ is a proper labelling function, the
first case implies that no vertex of τ has the label j′, a contradiction since τ is J-complete
and j′ ∈ J. So, xj′ = 0, ∀x ∈ τ. Notice that j′ is uniquely determined since τ is a (t− 1)-
dimensional simplex. Since τ 6= {0N}, it follows that J \{j′} 6= ∅, so τ ⊂ A(J \{j′}). By
Lemma 5.2.4 it holds that precisely one facet of τ is (J \ {j′})-complete and the second
adjacent complete simplex to τ is obtained. Clearly, there can be no other adjacent
complete simplex to τ.
Consider the case in which τ ⊂ ri(A(J)). Then, by Definition 2.7.1, it holds that τ is
a facet of exactly two simplices of Σ(J). Applying Lemma 5.2.3 twice shows that τ has
exactly two adjacent complete simplices.
Finally, let σ be (J ∪ {N + 1})-complete. Then σ has a vertex, say q, such that f̂(q) =
N + 1. Since f̂ is a proper labelling function, it holds that qj > 0, ∀j ∈ IN . Since
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σ ∈ Σ(J), this implies J = IN . The facet of σ opposite q is an IN -complete facet of the
complete simplex σ of Σ(IN) and is therefore an adjacent complete simplex to σ. Clearly,
σ has no other adjacent complete simplices. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5.2.7
Let the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 be proper and let a triangulation Σ of QN be
given. Then there exists a unique finite sequence of complete simplices τ 1, . . . , τk
′
such
that τ 1 = {0N}, τk′ is an IN+1-complete simplex, and any two successive simplices in the
finite sequence are adjacent complete simplices.
Proof
The argument used is closely related to the well-known door-in door-out principle of
Lemke and Howson (1964), see also Scarf (1973). Let τ 1 = {0N}. Clearly, τ 1 is {f̂(0N)}-
complete. Let τ 2 be the unique adjacent complete simplex to τ 1, that exists according
to Theorem 5.2.6. If τk, for some k ∈ IN \ {1}, is not IN+1-complete and not equal to
{0N}, then there exists by Theorem 5.2.6 a unique adjacent complete simplex τk+1 not
being equal to τk−1. If τk, for some k ∈ IN \ {1}, is IN+1-complete, then there exists by
Theorem 5.2.6 no adjacent complete simplex different from τk−1.
Suppose that two simplices in the sequence are the same. Then there exists k1, k2 ∈ IN




, whereas the simplices τ 1, . . . , τk
2−1 are all different. If k1 =
1, then k2−1 = 2 since, by Theorem 5.2.6, τ 1 has exactly one adjacent complete simplex
and τ 1 is the first simplex generated for the second time. This yields a contradiction since
τk
1 6= τk1+2 by construction. Therefore, k1 > 1. Since τk1 has two adjacent complete
simplices by Theorem 5.2.6, given by τk
1−1 and τk





1+1. Since τ 1, . . . , τk
2−1 are all different, a contradiction is obtained, unless
k1 + 1 = k2 − 1. However, by construction τk1 6= τk1+2 and again a contradiction is
obtained. Consequently, all simplices generated are different.
By Theorem 2.7.2 the collection of all facets of all simplices in Σ(J) is finite for every
non-empty subset J of IN and also the collection Σ is finite. Therefore, all simplices in
the sequence generated being different, it holds that the sequence generated is a finite
sequence. So, τk
′
is IN+1-complete for some k
′ ∈ IN since this is the only way the sequence
can be terminated. Q.E.D.
Now the steps of the algorithm generating the simplices τ 1, . . . , τk
′
of Theorem 5.2.7 are
described in detail.
Algorithm 5.2.8 (Simplicial algorithm with integer labelling)
Let the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 be proper and let a triangulation Σ of QN be
given. The simplicial algorithm on QN with integer labelling has the following steps.
Step 0. Let k = 1, t = 1, τk = τ(0N), J = {f̂(0N)}, and let qt+1 be the unique vertex
of the simplex of Σ(J) containing τk as the facet opposite to it.
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Step 1. Let σ be equal to the convex hull of τk ∪ {qt+1}. If f̂(qt+1) = N + 1, then the
algorithm terminates. If f̂(qt+1) /∈ J, then go to Step 3. Otherwise, there is a
unique vertex q of σ such that q 6= qt+1 and f̂(q) = f̂(qt+1).
Step 2. Increase the value of k by 1 and let τk be the facet of σ opposite q. If there
exists j′ ∈ J such that τk ∈ Σ(J \ {j′}), then let J be equal to J \ {j′} and go to
Step 4. Otherwise, there is exactly one t-simplex σ of Σ(J) such that σ 6= σ and
τk is a facet of σ. Go to Step 1 with qt+1 as the unique vertex of σ opposite τk.
Step 3. Let J be equal to J ∪ {f̂(qt+1)}. There is a unique (t + 1)-simplex σ of Σ(J)
having σ as a facet. Increase the value of both k and t by 1 and go to Step 1 with
qt+1 as the unique vertex of σ opposite σ, J = J, and τk = σ.
Step 4. Let σ be equal to τk. Let q̂ be the unique vertex of σ such that f̂(q̂) = j′. Decrease
the value of t by 1 and go to Step 2 with q = q̂ and J = J.
Consider Algorithm 5.2.8. In Step 0 the algorithm is initiated. In Step 1 it is deter-
mined whether the algorithm should be terminated, or whether a new simplex should be
generated having a higher dimension than the current simplex, or whether the current
simplex should be replaced by a simplex having the same dimension. In Step 2 the
current simplex is replaced by another simplex of the same dimension if this operation
is possible. In Step 3 a new simplex is generated containing the current simplex as a
facet and therefore having a higher dimension than the current simplex. In Step 4 a new
simplex is generated being a facet of the current simplex and therefore having a lower
dimension than the current simplex.
For the case N = 2, Algorithm 5.2.8 is illustrated in Figure 5.2.2 given some proper
labelling function and the K-triangulation of Q2 with grid size 13 .
In Figure 5.2.2 the algorithm starts with the {2}-complete simplex τ 1 = {0N} being a
facet of a uniquely determined 1-simplex τ 2 of Σ({2}). The algorithm terminates with the
{1, 2, 3}-complete simplex τ 11 = co({( 13 , 23)⊤, ( 23 , 23)⊤, ( 23 , 1)⊤}) of Σ({1, 2}) = Σ. After the
starting simplex τ 1 the algorithm generates three {1, 2}-complete simplices being facets
of simplices of Σ({1, 2}). Then the {1}-complete simplex τ 5 and five {1, 2}-complete
simplices are generated. Notice that the 0-simplex τ 1 and the 1-simplex τ 4 are not
adjacent complete simplices. The barycentres of any two adjacent complete simplices
being generated by the algorithm have been joined by a straight line.
Let f̂ : QN → IN+1 be a proper labelling function and let Σ be a triangulation of
QN . In general, it cannot be excluded that there exists a J-complete facet τ of a t-
simplex of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset of IN with #J = t that is not generated by
Algorithm 5.2.8. Then, using Theorem 5.2.6, it can be shown similarly as in the proof of
Theorem 5.2.7 that there exists a finite sequence of complete simplices, say τ 1, . . . , τk
′
,
such that two successive simplices in this finite sequence are adjacent complete simplices,
and either τ = τ 1 = τ k
′
, or τ 1 and τk
′
are different IN+1-complete N -simplices of Σ and
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Figure 5.2.2. Illustration of the algorithm, N = 2.
τ = τk for some k ∈ Ik′. Moreover, this finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices
is uniquely determined in the sense that it is given by τ 1, . . . , τk
′
or by τ k
′
, . . . , τ 1. In
Figure 5.2.3 it is shown that in the example given in Figure 5.2.2 a finite sequence as
just described exists.
Consider the {2}-complete 0-simplex τ 1 = {(0, 23)⊤} in Figure 5.2.3 which is not
generated by Algorithm 5.2.8. It has exactly two adjacent complete simplices, the {1, 2}-
complete 1-simplex τ 2 = co({(0, 13)⊤, (0, 23)⊤}) and the {1, 2}-complete 1-simplex τ 5 =
co({(0, 23)⊤, (0, 1)⊤}). Again, the barycentres of any two adjacent complete simplices are
joined by a straight line.
Now the behaviour of Algorithm 5.2.8 is studied if the reduced total excess demand
function of the economy satisfies Condition A. Theorem 5.2.9 states that the labelling
function is proper in this case.
Theorem 5.2.9
Let the reduced total excess demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition A.
Then the labelling function f̂ : QN → IN+1 is proper.
Proof
Let some q ∈ QN be given. Let qj = 0 for some j ∈ IN , so ẑj(q) ≥ 0. If there exists
j′ ∈ IN such that qj′ = 1, then ẑj′(q) ≤ 0. Hence, J (q) 6= {N + 1} and therefore
f̂(q) 6= N + 1.
Let some q ∈ QN be given and let qj = 1 for some j ∈ IN . Then the definition of J(q)
implies that j /∈ J(q) and therefore f̂(q) 6= j. Q.E.D.
Let the reduced total excess demand function of the economy satisfy Condition A. Let
Σ be a triangulation of QN . Then it can be shown that any point of any simplex of Σ
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Figure 5.2.3. Adjacent complete simplices not generated by the algorithm, N = 2.
containing one of the adjacent complete simplices generated by Algorithm 5.2.8, induces
a state of the markets of the economy at which the total excess demand is arbitrarily
close to zero if the mesh size of Σ is small enough.
Theorem 5.2.10
Let the reduced total excess demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition A.
Let Σ be a triangulation of QN . Then, for every ε ∈ IR++, there exists δ ∈ IR++ such that
if mesh (Σ) < δ and σ ∈ Σ contains one of the adjacent complete simplices generated by
Algorithm 5.2.8, then ‖ẑ (q) ‖∞ < ε, ∀q ∈ σ.
Proof
Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. Let δ ∈ IR++ be such that q1, q2 ∈ QN and ‖q1 − q2‖∞ < δ
implies
‖ẑ(q1)− ẑ(q2)‖∞ <
min({pj | j ∈ IN})∑
j∈IN pj
ε, (5.2)
and let mesh(Σ) < δ. Since ẑ is a continuous function and the set QN is compact,
such a δ exists by Theorem 2.7.10. Let σ be any N -simplex of Σ containing one of the
adjacent complete simplices generated by the algorithm. Then there exists a non-empty
subset J of IN and a J-complete simplex τ ⊂ A(J) being contained by σ. For every
q ∈ τ , for every j ∈ IN \ J, qj = 0 and therefore ẑj (q) ≥ 0. For every j ∈ J, there
exists a vertex q of τ such that f̂(q) = j, and, using Condition A.3, it follows that
ẑj(q) = max({ẑ(q) |  ∈ IN}) ≥ 0. So, for every j ∈ IN , there exists q ∈ τ such that
ẑj(q) ≥ 0.
Let some q ∈ σ be given. Since mesh (Σ) < δ, it follows from the previous paragraph
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and by (5.2) that
ẑj(q) > −
min({p |  ∈ IN})∑
∈IN p
ε > −ε, ∀j ∈ IN . (5.3)
By Condition A.3 and (5.3) it holds that
p̂j (q) ẑj (q) = −
∑
∈IN\{j}
p̂ (q) ẑ (q) <





p̂ (q) , ∀j ∈ IN .
Therefore,
ẑj (q) <
min({p | ∈ IN })
p̂j(q)
ε ≤ ε, ∀j ∈ IN .
Q.E.D.
Finally, it will be proved that 1N is a vertex of the last adjacent complete simplex
generated by Algorithm 5.2.8 if the reduced total excess demand function of the economy
satisfies Condition A. This is done by showing that the only point of QN having label
N + 1 is the point 1N .
Theorem 5.2.11
Let the reduced total excess demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition A.
Then q ∈ QN satisfies f̂(q) = N + 1 if and only if q = 1N .
Proof
Clearly, J(1N) = {N + 1} and hence f̂(1N) = N + 1.
Let some q ∈ QN \ {1N} be given. If qj = 1 for some j ∈ IN , then ẑj(q) ≤ 0. Hence, by
Condition A.3, ẑj(q) ≥ 0 for some j ∈ IN for which qj < 1. Therefore, J(q) 6= {N + 1}
and f̂(q) 6= N + 1. Q.E.D.
Summarizing the results of Theorem 5.2.7, Theorem 5.2.9, and Theorem 5.2.11 it follows
that if the reduced total excess demand relation of the economy satisfies Condition A,
then Algorithm 5.2.8 generates a finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices such
that {0N} is the first simplex generated and 1N is a vertex of the last simplex generated.
This result combined with Theorem 5.2.10 will be used extensively in the next section to
prove the existence of a connected set of constrained equilibria containing the two trivial
constrained equilibria of the economy.
5.3 The Existence of a Continuum of Constrained
Equilibria
In this section the reduced total excess demand relation of the economy Ẽ is again
assumed to be a function. If the reduced total excess demand relation satisfies Condition
A, then it will be shown that there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N , 1N ∈
C̃ and for every q ∈ C̃ it holds that ẑ(q) = 0N . Theorem 5.3.1 first gives an interesting
result for approximations of constrained equilibria.
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Theorem 5.3.1
Let the reduced total excess demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition A.
Then, for every n ∈ IN, there exists a continuous function fn : [0, 1] → QN joining 0N
and 1N and satisfying that ‖ẑ (fn (t)) ‖∞ < 1n , ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
Proof
Let some n ∈ IN be given. Let Σ be a triangulation of QN with mesh (Σ) < δ where
δ is chosen such that Theorem 5.2.10 holds for ε = 1
n
. Consider the finite sequence of
adjacent complete simplices τ 1, . . . , τk
′
generated by Algorithm 5.2.8. For every k ∈ Ik′,
let qk ∈ QN be defined as the barycentre of τk and let qk′+1 be defined by qk′+1 = 1N .
Clearly, q1 = 0N . By Theorem 5.2.11 it holds that 1N ∈ τk′.Moreover, by the definition of
adjacent complete simplices it holds that for every k ∈ Ik′ there exists σ ∈ Σ containing
qk and qk+1. Recall from Section 2.2 that, for t ∈ IR, ⌊t⌋ denotes the greatest integer
which is less than or equal to t. By the convexity of simplices and by Theorem 5.2.10, it
is easily verified that the function fn : [0, 1]→ QN , defined by
fn (t) = (1− k′t+ ⌊k′t⌋) q⌊1+k′t⌋ + (k′t− ⌊k′t⌋) q1+⌊1+k′t⌋, ∀t ∈ [0, 1),
fn (1) = qk
′+1,
satisfies all conditions of the theorem. Q.E.D.
Let the reduced total excess demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition A.
The set Q̃ is defined as the set of all elements of QN inducing a constrained equilibrium




∣∣∣ ẑ (q∗) = 0N
}
.
Clearly, 0N and 1N are elements of Q̃ and therefore Q̃ 6= ∅. Moreover, Q̃ is a closed set
by the continuity of the function ẑ.
Let a non-empty, closed subset S of IRm be given and define the function dS : IR
m → IR
by
dS (s) = min ({‖s− s‖∞ |s ∈ S }) , ∀s ∈ IRm.
Using Theorem 2.3.14 it is not difficult to show that the function dS is well-defined.
Let S1 and S2 be non-empty, compact subsets of IRm. Define e(S1, S2) ∈ IR+ by
e(S1, S2) = min
({
‖s1 − s2‖∞
∣∣∣s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2
})
.
It follows immediately by Theorem 2.3.14 that e(S1, S2) is well-defined. Clearly, if S1
and S2 are disjoint, then e(S1, S2) > 0.
Lemma 5.3.2
Let a non-empty, compact subset S of IRm be given. Then the function dS is continuous.
Proof
Clearly, the relation ϕ : IRm → S, defined by ϕ(s) = S, ∀s ∈ IRm, is a compact-valued,
continuous correspondence and the function f : IRm × S → IR, defined by f(s, s) =
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−max({|sj − sj| | j ∈ Im}), ∀(s, s) ∈ IRm × S, is continuous. From the maximum
theorem, Theorem 2.5.17, it follows that the relation µ : IRm → S, defined by
µ(s) = {ŝ ∈ ϕ(s) |f(s, ŝ) ≥ f(s, s), ∀s ∈ ϕ(s)} , ∀s ∈ IRm,
is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence and it follows that the re-
lation g : IRm → IR, defined by
g(s) = {f(s, ŝ) |ŝ ∈ µ(s)} , ∀s ∈ IRm,
is a continuous function. It is easily verified that g = dS. Q.E.D.
The following theorem shows that the approximations of constrained equilibria given by
the image of the function fn of Theorem 5.3.1 are uniformly close to the set of constrained
equilibria if n is large enough.
Theorem 5.3.3
Let the reduced total excess demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition A. For
every n ∈ IN, let fn : [0, 1] → QN be a continuous function such that ‖ẑ(fn(t))‖∞ < 1n ,
∀t ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for every ε ∈ IR++, there exists n′ ∈ IN such that, for every n ≥ n′, for
every t ∈ [0, 1], d
Q̃
(fn (t)) < ε.
Proof
Suppose there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that for every n ∈ IN there exists mn ≥ n and tn ∈




(tn)) ≥ ε. Consider the sequence (fmn(tn))n∈IN in QN . Without
loss of generality, this sequence can be assumed to converge to some q ∈ QN . By the
continuity of the function d
Q̃






















However, by the continuity of the function ẑ it holds that























So, q ∈ Q̃ and therefore d
Q̃
(q) = 0, a contradiction to (5.4). Q.E.D.
In Theorem 5.3.5 it will be shown that the set Q̃ has a component containing both 0N
and 1N if the reduced total excess demand relation of the economy Ẽ satisfies Condition
A. The main argument used in the proof of this result is that the quasi-component of
0N in Q̃ contains 1N . From this it is tempting to conclude that also the component of
0N in Q̃ contains 1N . Example 2.3.8 makes clear that the quasi-component of a point
in a subset of QN is not necessarily connected. However, if ẑ is a continuous function,
then the set Q̃ is closed, and therefore it cannot be equal to a set like S considered in
Example 2.3.8. The following lemma gives sufficient conditions guaranteeing that the
component and the quasi-component of a point coincide.
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Lemma 5.3.4
Let S be a compact subset of IRm. Then, for every s ∈ S, the component of s in S and
the quasi-component of s in S coincide.
Proof
In the entire proof cl and fr will be used to denote the closure and the frontier in S. Let
some s ∈ S be given.
By Theorem 2.3.7 the component of s in S is contained in the quasi-component of s in
S.
Now the converse will be shown. Let C be the quasi-component of s in S. Since C is
an intersection of sets closed in S, it is closed in S itself. It has to be shown that C is
connected.
Suppose C is not connected. Then there exist two disjoint, non-empty sets C1 and C2
such that C1 ∪ C2 = C, and C1 and C2 are both closed in C, hence in IRm since C is
closed. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that s ∈ C1. Since C1 and C2 are












is non-empty. It follows immediately thatD1 is open in S, C1 ⊂ D1, and C2∩cl (D1) = ∅.














Let some ŝ ∈ C2 be given. In the following step of the proof a set being both open and
closed in S, containing s, but not containing ŝ is constructed. This yields a contradiction
since C is the quasi-component of s and ŝ is an element of C. If fr(D1) = ∅, then D1 is
closed in S and satisfies the requirements mentioned above. So, consider the case that
fr(D1) 6= ∅. For every s ∈ fr (D1) it holds by (5.5) that s /∈ C. Hence, since C is the quasi-
component of s, for every s ∈ fr(D1), there exists Ss such that Ss is open and closed in S,
s ∈ Ss, and s /∈ Ss. The collection {S \ Ss | s ∈ fr(D1)} consists of sets being open in S,
and since fr(D1) ⊂ ∪s∈fr(D1)S \ Ss and fr(D1) is compact, there exists a finite collection,
say {S \ Ss1, . . . , S \ Ssk
′
}, such that fr(D1) ⊂ S \ ∪k∈Ik′Ss
k
. The set ∩k∈Ik′Ss
k
is open
and closed in S and contains the element s. Moreover, fr(D1) ∩ (∩k∈Ik′Ss
k
) = ∅. Finally,
consider the set D1∩ (∩k∈Ik′Ss
k
). Clearly, s ∈ D1∩ (∩k∈Ik′Ss
k
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So, the set D1∩(∩k∈Ik′Ss
k
) is both open and closed in S, contains s, but does not contain
ŝ. This yields a contradiction since C is the quasi-component of s and ŝ is an element of
C. Consequently, C is connected. Q.E.D.
The next theorem finally gives the desired result.
Theorem 5.3.5
Let the reduced total excess demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition A.
Then the set Q̃ contains a component C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃.
Proof
Suppose that the component of 0N in Q̃ does not contain 1N . Then, by Lemma 5.3.4, the
quasi-component of 0N in Q̃ does not contain 1N . Hence, there exists a set Q̃1 being both
open and closed in Q̃, containing 0N , but not containing 1N . Let the set Q̃2 be defined
by Q̃2 = Q̃ \ Q̃1. Clearly, Q̃2 is both open and closed in Q̃ and contains 1N . Since Q̃ is
a closed subset of IRN , it follows that Q̃1 and Q̃2 are compact. Moreover, there exists






since Q̃1 ∩ Q̃2 = ∅. By Theorem 5.3.1 and Theorem 5.3.3 there exists a continuous
function f : [0, 1]→ QN such that
d
Q̃
(f (t)) < 12ε, ∀t ∈ [0, 1], (5.7)
while f(0) = 0N and f(1) = 1N . It will be shown that for some t ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
d
Q̃1
(f (t)) < 12ε and dQ̃2 (f (t)) <
1
2ε. Let the function g : [0, 1]→ IR be defined by




(f (t)) , ∀t ∈ [0, 1].




, see Lemma 5.3.2, it follows that
the function g is continuous. Moreover, using (5.6), g (0) < −ε and g (1) > ε. Since
[0, 1] is connected and g is continuous, it follows from Theorem 2.3.13 that g([0, 1]) is
connected. Hence, there exists t ∈ [0, 1] such that g (t) = 0 and therefore
d
Q̃1
(f (t)) = d
Q̃2
(f (t)) = d
Q̃
(f (t)) < 12ε,
where (5.7) is used for the last inequality. Therefore, there exists q1 ∈ Q̃1 and q2 ∈ Q̃2





≤ ‖q1 − q2‖∞ ≤ ‖f (t)− q1‖∞ + ‖f (t)− q2‖∞ < ε,
a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Since the set Q̃ contains a component C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃, it is tempting to
conclude that there exists a path in Q̃ joining 0N and 1N . That this is not necessarily the
case follows from Example 2.3.6, showing that the component and the path-component
of an element can be different.
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Corollary 5.3.6
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5 given
in Section 4.7 and let the preference relation i, ∀i ∈ IM , be strongly convex. Then
there exists a connected set of constrained equilibria of the economy Ẽ , containing both
the trivial supply constrained equilibrium (p, 0MN , L̂(0N), ω) of Ẽ and the trivial demand
constrained equilibrium (p, l̂(1N), 0MN , ω) of Ẽ .
Proof
For every i ∈ IM it follows from Theorem 4.7.3 that the relation δ̂i is a continuous




obtained by associating with every q ∈ QN the element
f(q) =
(
p̂(q), l̂(q), L̂(q), d̂1
(
p̂(q), l̂1 (q) , L̂1 (q)
)
, . . . , d̂M
(
p̂(q), l̂M (q) , L̂M (q)
))
.
From Theorem 4.7.1 it follows that every element of f(Q̃) is a constrained equilibrium of
Ẽ . The set Q̃ has a component C̃ containing 0N and 1N by Theorem 5.3.5. The continuity
of the functions p̂, l̂, L̂, and d̂i, ∀i ∈ IM , guarantees that the function f is continuous.
From Theorem 2.3.13 it follows that the image of a connected set by a continuous function
is connected, therefore f(C̃) is connected. Moreover, f(0N) = (p, 0MN , L̂(0N), ω) and
f(1N) = (p, l̂(1N), 0MN , ω). Q.E.D.
5.4 The Upper Hemi-Continuous Case
The results given in Theorem 5.3.5 and in Corollary 5.3.6 hold if it is assumed that the
economy Ẽ satisfies the Assumptions A1-A5 of Section 4.7 and the preference relation
i, ∀i ∈ IM , is strongly convex. In this section the same results will be obtained, but the
assumption of strong convexity of the preference relations i, ∀i ∈ IM , will be dropped.
In Theorem 4.7.3 it has been shown that if the economy satisfies the Assumptions A1-A5
of Section 4.7, then the reduced total excess demand relation of the economy satisfies
the following condition.
Condition B The reduced total excess demand relation ζ̂ : QN → IRN of the economy
Ẽ satisfies
1. ζ̂ is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence,
2. for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂(q), for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies zj ≥ 0,
and qj = 1 implies zj ≤ 0,
3. for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂(q), p̂(q) · z = 0.
It is possible to construct examples showing that Theorem 5.3.1 need not be true under
these circumstances. Moreover, a simplicial algorithm with integer labelling like the
one given in Section 5.2 cannot be used when one is considering upper hemi-continuous
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correspondences instead of continuous functions, see Todd (1976), Remark 2.4, page 58.
Therefore, a simplicial algorithm with vector labelling is proposed in Chapter 6. Then
a constructive proof of Theorem 5.3.5 and Corollary 5.3.6 for the case with ζ̂ being
an upper hemi-continuous correspondence can be given that uses many of the ideas of
Section 5.2 and Section 5.3. In this section a non-constructive proof is presented, using
the results obtained in Section 5.3.
Again, the set Q̃ is defined as the set of zero points of ζ̂ , so Q̃ = ζ̂−1({0N}). It follows
immediately that 0N ∈ Q̃ and 1N ∈ Q̃ if the reduced total excess demand relation of the
economy Ẽ satisfies Condition B.
Theorem 5.4.1
Let the reduced total excess demand relation ζ̂ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition B.
Then Q̃ contains a component C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃.
Proof
Since {0N} is closed in IRN and since ζ̂ is upper hemi-continuous, it follows from Theorem
2.5.3 that Q̃ = ζ̂−1({0N}) is closed in QN .
Suppose that the component of 0N in Q̃ does not contain 1N . Since Q̃ is compact, the
quasi-component of 0N does not contain 1N by Lemma 5.3.4. Then, similarly to the
proof of Theorem 5.3.5, there exist two sets Q̃1 and Q̃2 both being closed in Q̃ and










∣∣∣∃ẑ ∈ ζ̂(q), zj = p̂j(q)ẑj, ∀j ∈ IN
}
, ∀q ∈ QN .
For every n ∈ IN, let Σn be a triangulation of QN with mesh(Σn) ≤ 1
n
and let the
function Zn : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ with respect to Σn.
Using the definition of a piecewise linear function it follows that, for every n ∈ IN, Zn
is a continuous function, and, for every q ∈ QN , Znj (q) ≥ 0 if qj = 0 for some j ∈ IN ,
Znj (q) ≤ 0 if qj = 1 for some j ∈ IN , and 1N ·Zn(q) = 0. So, for every n ∈ IN, Zn satisfies
all the properties given in Condition A of the reduced total excess demand function of an
economy with p′ = p′ = 1N . From Theorem 5.3.5 it follows that there exists a connected
set C̃n containing 0N and 1N and satisfying that Zn(q) = 0N , ∀q ∈ C̃n. For every n ∈ IN,





(q) , ∀q ∈ C̃n.




are continuous by Lemma 5.3.2 and
therefore gn is a continuous function. Moreover, by (5.8), gn(0N) < −ε and gn(1N) > ε.
Since C̃n is connected and gn is continuous, it follows from Theorem 2.3.13 that gn(C̃n)
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(qn) ≥ 12ε. (5.9)




let (qk)n be vertices of an N -simplex σn ∈ Σn such that qn = ∑k∈IN+1(λk)n(qk)n, and let
(ẑk)n ∈ ζ̂((qk)n) be such that Znj ((qk)n) = p̂j((qk)n)(ẑk)nj , ∀j ∈ IN . The sequence
(









N × QN remains in a compact set since ζ̂ is a compact-
valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence and QN is compact and therefore ζ̂(QN)
is compact by Theorem 2.5.4. Therefore, without loss of generality, the sequence in
(5.10) converges to an element
(









Since mesh(Σn) ≤ 1
n
, it holds that (qk)n → q, ∀k ∈ IN+1. Since ζ̂ is a compact-valued,
upper hemi-continuous correspondence, it holds by Theorem 2.5.6 that zk ∈ ζ̂(q), ∀k ∈
IN+1. It holds that ζ̂ is a convex-valued relation, so
∑
k∈IN+1 λ
kzk ∈ ζ̂(q). Moreover, since





















kzk = 0N , so 0N ∈ ζ̂(q) and d
Q̃
(q) = 0. From the continuity of the
function d
Q̃

















Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5 of
Section 4.7. Then there exists a connected set of constrained equilibria of the economy
Ẽ , containing the trivial supply constrained equilibrium (p, 0MN , L̂(0N), ω) of Ẽ and the
trivial demand constrained equilibrium (p, l̂(1N), 0MN , ω) of Ẽ .
Proof








i − ωi) = 0N
}
.
Let the relation ϕ : C̃ → P(p,p) ×−IRMN+ × IRMN+ ×
∏
i∈IM IR







S ∩∏i∈IM δ̂i (q)
)
, ∀q ∈ C̃.
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By Theorem 4.7.3 the relation δ̂i, ∀i ∈ IM , is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence, so the relation
∏
i∈IM δ̂
i is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence by Theorem 2.5.10. Clearly, the relation obtained by associating with
every q ∈ C̃ the set S is a closed-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Then
it follows from Theorem 2.5.9 that the intersection of these two relations is a compact-
valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Since the functions p̂, l̂, and L̂ are
continuous, it follows from Theorem 2.5.10 that ϕ is an upper hemi-continuous corre-
spondence. Using the convex-valuedness of δ̂i it follows that the relation ϕ is convex-
valued. Theorem 5.4.2 has been proved if it is shown that the set ϕ(C̃) is connected since
the set ϕ(C̃) contains only constrained equilibria by Theorem 4.7.1, 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃,
ϕ(0N) = {(p, 0MN , L̂(0N), ω)}, and ϕ(1N) = {(p, l̂(1N), 0MN , ω)}.
Suppose ϕ(C̃) is not connected, then there exist two disjoint, non-empty sets T 1 and T 2
such that T 1 and T 2 are both closed in ϕ(C̃) and T 1 ∪ T 2 = ϕ(C̃). Since ϕ is an upper
hemi-continuous correspondence, it follows from Theorem 2.5.3 that the sets ϕ−1(T 1)
and ϕ−1(T 2) are closed in C̃.
Suppose q ∈ ϕ−1(T 1)∩ϕ−1(T 2). Let t1, t2 ∈ ϕ(q) be such that t1 ∈ T 1 and t2 ∈ T 2. Since
ϕ is a convex-valued correspondence, it holds that λt1 +(1−λ)t2 ∈ ϕ(q), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]. So,
there exists a continuous function f : [0, 1] → ϕ(C̃) such that f(0) = t1 and f(1) = t2,
implying that t2 is an element of the path-component of t1 in ϕ(C̃). So, t2 is an element
of the component of t1 in ϕ(C̃) by Theorem 2.3.5, yielding a contradiction with the
existence of the sets T 1 and T 2. Consequently, ϕ−1(T 1) ∩ ϕ−1(T 2) = ∅.
Obviously, ϕ−1(T 1) ∪ ϕ−1(T 2) = C̃. Moreover, since T 1 and T 2 are both non-empty
sets, it holds that ϕ−1(T 1) and ϕ−1(T 2) are both non-empty sets. The properties of
ϕ−1(T 1) and ϕ−1(T 2) imply that the component C̃ is not connected, a contradiction.
Consequently, ϕ(C̃) is connected. Q.E.D.
5.5 Constrained Equilibrium Existence Results
Let the economy Ẽ satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5 of Section 4.7. It is easily seen that
the existence of a Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of a commodity j ∈ IN
of the economy Ẽ , see Definition 4.7.5, is equivalent to the set Q̃∩{q ∈ QN | 13 ≤ qj ≤ 23}
being non-empty. Similarly, a supply constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ , see
Definition 4.8.1, exists if and only if the set Q̃ ∩ {q ∈ QN | 13 ≤ max({qj | j ∈ IN}) ≤ 23}
is non-empty, and a demand constrained equilibrium of Ẽ , see Definition 4.8.5, exists if
and only if the set Q̃∩ {q ∈ QN | 13 ≤ min({qj | j ∈ IN}) ≤ 23 is non-empty. In Theorem




∣∣∣ qj = α
}
6= ∅. (5.11)




∣∣∣ q ≤ α and ∃j ∈ IN , qj = αj
}
6= ∅. (5.12)
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∣∣∣ q ≥ α and ∃j ∈ IN , qj = αj
}
6= ∅. (5.13)
Using Theorem 5.4.1 the equilibrium existence results just mentioned are very easily
shown. The existence results follow as easy corollaries to Theorem 5.5.1.
Theorem 5.5.1
Let the reduced total excess demand relation ζ̂ of the economy Ẽ satisfy Condition B.
Let f : QN → IR be a continuous function satisfying f(0N) ≤ 0 and f(1N) ≥ 0. Then
Q̃ ∩ f−1({0}) 6= ∅.
Proof
By Theorem 5.4.1, the set Q̃ has a component C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃. Since C̃
is connected and f is a continuous function, it follows from Theorem 2.3.13 that f(C̃) is
connected. Since all connected subsets of IR are intervals by Theorem 2.3.12 and since
0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, f(0N) ≤ 0, and f(1N) ≥ 0, it holds that 0 ∈ f(C̃) ⊂ f(Q̃). Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 5.5.1 does not only show the existence of each one of the above
mentioned constrained equilibria, but also shows that the component of the set of con-
strained equilibria of the economy containing the two trivial constrained equilibria con-
tains every constrained equilibrium with properties as given in (5.11), (5.12), and (5.13).
Let some j ∈ IN and some α ∈ [0, 1] be given. Then (5.11) is obtained by defining
f : QN → IR by
f(q) = qj − α, ∀q ∈ QN ,
and applying Theorem 5.5.1.
Let some α ∈ QN be given. Then (5.12) is obtained by defining f : QN → IR by
f(q) = max ({qj − αj | j ∈ IN}) , ∀q ∈ QN ,
and applying Theorem 5.5.1.
Let some α ∈ QN be given. Then (5.13) is obtained by defining f : QN → IR by
f(q) = min ({qj − αj | j ∈ IN}) , ∀q ∈ QN ,
and applying Theorem 5.5.1.
5.6 An Example
In this section Algorithm 5.2.8 will be illustrated by the example used in Section 3.10
and Section 4.10. Consider the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I2 , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)), where N = 2,









4 , ∀x2 ∈ IR2+, respectively, ω1 = (1, 4)⊤,
ω2 = (2, 1)⊤, P(p,p) = {p ∈ IR2+ | 16 ≤ p1 ≤ 2 and p2 = 1}, and (l̃, L̃) is the uniform












































































































































































































































Figure 5.6.1. The finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices generated by
Algorithm 5.2.8, N = 2.
rationing system, where l̃ : Q2 → −IR4+ is defined by l̃11(q1) = l̃21(q1) = −3q11, ∀q1 ∈ Q2,
l̃12(q
1) = l̃22(q
1) = −5q12 , ∀q1 ∈ Q2, and L̃ : Q2 → IR4+ is defined by L̃11(q2) = L̃21(q2) = 18q21,
∀q2 ∈ Q2, and L̃12(q2) = L̃22(q2) = 5q22, ∀q2 ∈ Q2. The corresponding reduced total excess
demand function of this economy, denoted by ẑ, is given in Section 4.10. It can be verified
that the preference relations of the economy Ẽ are not strongly convex. Nevertheless, the
reduced total excess demand function of the economy Ẽ satisfies Condition A. Moreover,
the economy Ẽ does satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. Therefore, all results developed in













































and the convex combinations of any two successive points yield the set Q̃ = ẑ−1({(0, 0)⊤}).
So, by Theorem 5.3.5 the set Q̃ contains a component C̃ such that (0, 0)⊤ ∈ C̃ and
(1, 1)⊤ ∈ C̃. In fact C̃ = Q̃ in the example.
Now it is possible to compare the set of approximate zero points generated by Algo-
rithm 5.2.8 with the set of zero points of ẑ. To illustrate the algorithm a triangulation Σ
of Q2 is needed. In the example Σ will be taken equal to the K-triangulation of Q2 with
mesh size 16 . In Figure 5.6.1 all adjacent complete simplices generated by the algorithm
are drawn.
The finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices τ 1, . . . , τ 17 in Figure 5.6.1 corre-
sponds to the sequence obtained in Theorem 5.2.7. The image of the piecewise linear
path of approximate zero points of ẑ constructed by joining the barycentres of the ad-
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Figure 5.6.2. The set Q̃, dashed line, and the approximate zero points generated by the
algorithm, solid line, N = 2.
jacent complete simplices generated successively by the algorithm and the point (1, 1)⊤,




















































and all convex combinations of two successive points. In Figure 5.6.2 the solid line
corresponds to the set of approximate zero points, while the dashed line corresponds to
the set Q̃.
The algorithm starts with the {1}-complete simplex τ 1 = {(0, 0)⊤}, a facet of a
unique 1-simplex of Σ({1}), being the simplex σ((0, 0)⊤, ( 16 , 0)⊤). This simplex is not
{1, 2}-complete, but it has exactly one {1}-complete facet not being equal to τ 1, being
the simplex τ 2 = {( 16 , 0)⊤}, so Case 3 of Lemma 5.2.3 results. The simplex τ 2 is also a
facet of another 1-simplex of Σ({1}), being the simplex σ(( 16 , 0)⊤, ( 13 , 0)⊤). This simplex
is not {1, 2}-complete, but it has exactly one {1}-complete facet not being equal to τ 2,
being the simplex τ 3 = {( 13 , 0)⊤}. This corresponds to Case 3 of Lemma 5.2.3, and so on.
For the vertices of the K-triangulation of Q2 with mesh size 16 , Figure 5.6.1 shows that
the requirements made with respect to a proper labelling function are satisfied, see also
Theorem 5.2.9. As guaranteed by Theorem 5.2.7, the simplex τ 17 is indeed I3-complete
and, as guaranteed by Theorem 5.2.11, there is exactly one point having the label 3,
being the point (1, 1)⊤. Therefore, the point (1, 1)⊤ is a vertex of the simplex τ 17.
The point q = ( 12 ,
1
12)
⊤ induces an approximation of a supply constrained equilib-
rium of the economy Ẽ . The total excess demand at this approximation of a supply
constrained equilibrium is given by ẑ(q) = (−0.115, 0.125)⊤. The point q̂ = ( 712 , 12)⊤ in-
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duces an approximation of a demand constrained equilibrium of the economy Ẽ . The
total excess demand at this approximation of a demand constrained equilibrium is given
by ẑ(q̂) = (0.358,−0.552)⊤, so it is also rather close to zero.
The total excess demand at any approximation of a constrained equilibrium induced
by the algorithm can be made as small as desired by taking the mesh size of the triangu-
lation used small enough, see Theorem 5.2.10. Moreover, it follows from Theorem 5.3.3
that the approximate zero points generated by the algorithm can be made as close to the
set Q̃ as desired. Nevertheless, Algorithm 5.2.8 should not be used for computational
purposes. The information of the total excess demand function used is very limited, only
the market on which the total excess demand is maximal matters. For example, the point
q = ( 23 ,
5
6)
⊤ is generated by the algorithm, and is an element of the set Q̃. Therefore,
J(q) = {1, 2, 3} and f̂(q) = 1. For the point q̂ = (0, 1)⊤ it holds that ẑ(q̂) = (17 34 ,−2 2324)⊤.
Therefore, J(q̂) = {1, 3} and f̂(q̂) = 1. So, the information used by the algorithm at the
point q is exactly the same as the information used at the point q̂. This lack of complete
information used becomes even more severe when the number of commodities is very
large. Therefore, a much more efficient algorithm using the information of the value of
all components of ẑ(q) at a point q ∈ QN will be proposed in the following chapter.
Chapter 6
The Computation of a Continuum of
Constrained Equilibria
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter again an economy as described in Chapter 4 is considered. In Section
5.4 it has been shown that, under weak assumptions, the set of constrained equilibria
of such an economy has a component containing the two trivial constrained equilibria.
In Section 5.3 the same results have been shown under somewhat stronger assumptions.
In Section 5.2 a simplicial algorithm with integer labelling has been presented and it
has been used to show the results of Section 5.3. Next, the results of Section 5.3 were
used to show those of Section 5.4. As is argued by Todd (1976), Remark 2.4, page 58, a
simplicial algorithm with integer labelling cannot be used when one is considering upper
hemi-continuous correspondences instead of continuous functions. Therefore, although
the results of Section 5.3 are proved in a constructive way, this does not hold for the re-
sults of Section 5.4. Moreover, only a limited amount of information concerning the total
excess demand function is used in an integer labelling algorithm. Only the component
corresponding to the market having the largest total excess demand matters. Therefore,
the integer labelling algorithm of Section 5.2 is not intended to be a good computational
device. On the other hand, the integer labelling algorithm is relatively easy to explain,
degeneracy problems do not occur, and the results obtained by using it can be employed
to prove theoretical results for the case of upper hemi-continuous correspondences.
In this chapter a simplicial algorithm with vector labelling is proposed. Such an algo-
rithm is much more efficient than a simplicial algorithm with integer labelling. Moreover,
it will be shown that it can also be used when the reduced total excess demand relation
of the economy is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence instead of being a continu-
ous function. In fact, a correspondence on the N -dimensional unit cube satisfying very
weak conditions is assumed to be given. The reduced total excess demand relation of
an economy with N commodities can be shown to satisfy these conditions under the as-
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sumptions used in Section 4.7. The proposed simplicial algorithm with vector labelling
is shown to generate a piecewise linear path contained in a finite sequence of adjacent
simplices of varying dimension and joining the two extreme points of the N -dimensional
unit cube, 0N and 1N . It will be proved that every point on the path generated by the
algorithm yields an approximate zero point. By using a limit argument it will be shown
that the set of zero points of the correspondence has a component containing both the
points 0N and 1N . Therefore, by the results of Section 5.5, the method allows one to find
all kinds of constrained equilibria of an economy. The algorithm proposed in this chapter
differs from other simplicial algorithms with vector labelling in the sense that a path of
approximate zero points of the reduced total excess demand relation is generated. In
order to do this, specific degeneracy problems have to be dealt with.
In Section 6.2 a correspondence on the N -dimensional unit cube having some specific
properties is given. Then the steps of a simplicial algorithm with vector labelling to
compute approximate zero points of the correspondence are presented in detail. It is
shown that the algorithm converges in a finite number of steps. In Section 6.3 it is
proved that the set of zero points of the correspondence has a component containing
the points 0N and 1N , and that the zero points of the correspondence are approximated
by the algorithm. Such a component is easily seen to be an uncountable set and hence
a continuum of zero points is approximated by the algorithm. The accuracy of the
approximate solutions obtained by the algorithm is analyzed in Section 6.4. Finally, an
illustration of the algorithm can be found in Section 6.5, where the same example is used
as in Section 3.10, Section 4.10, and Section 5.6.
This chapter is based on Herings, Talman, and Yang (1994).
6.2 A Simplicial Algorithm with Vector Labelling
A correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN is assumed to be given in this chapter. It will often be
assumed that ζ̂ satisfies the following condition.
Condition B The correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfies
1. ζ̂ is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence,
2. for every q ∈ QN , there exists z ∈ ζ̂(q) such that, for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0
implies zj ≥ 0, and qj = 1 implies zj ≤ 0,
3. for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂(q), there exists p ∈ IRN++ such that p · z = 0.
Notice that by Theorem 4.7.3 the reduced total excess demand relation ζ̂ of the economy
Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) as described in Chapter 4 satisfies Condition B if the
economy satisfies the Assumptions A1-A5 given in Section 4.7. Notice that Condition B
given above is weaker than Condition B used in Section 5.4.
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If N = 1 and the correspondence ζ̂ satisfies Condition B, then it necessarily equals
the correspondence associating with every element of Q1 = [0, 1] the set {0}. A picture
of a correspondence ζ̂ : Q2 → IR2 satisfying Condition B is drawn in Figure 6.2.1.
Figure 6.2.1. A correspondence ζ̂ : Q2 → IR2 satisfying Condition B.
In Figure 6.2.1 only the z1-axis has been drawn, which is sufficient to determine the
zero points of ζ̂ by Condition B.3. For every q ∈ Q2, the set ζ̂(q) in Figure 6.2.1 consists
of one element, except when q1 = 1 or q2 = 0. Notice that in Figure 6.2.1 the set of zero
points of ζ̂ is given by {q ∈ Q2 | q1 = 1 or q2 = 0}.
Recall from Section 2.2 that for every sign vector s ∈ SN the sets I−(s), I0(s), and
I+(s) are defined by I−(s) = {j ∈ IN | sj = −1}, I0(s) = {j ∈ IN | sj = 0}, and
I+(s) = {j ∈ IN | sj = +1}. Moreover, the numbers i−(s), i0(s), and i+(s) are defined
by i−(s) = #I−(s), i0(s) = #I0(s), and i+(s) = #I+(s). For every sign vector s ∈ SN ,




∣∣∣qj = 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), and qj = 1, ∀j ∈ I+(s)
}
.
It is easily seen that the dimension of A(s) is equal to i0(s). Notice that the set A(0N)
equals the set QN . All 3N possible sets A(s) are illustrated in Figure 6.2.2 for N = 2.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN be given. The triangulation might be for instance the
K-triangulation of QN with any grid size, see Definition 2.7.3, or the V -triangulation of
QN with respect to any v ∈ QN and with any grid size, see Definition 2.7.6. For every






























































Figure 6.2.2. The sets A(s), for s ∈ SN , N = 2.




∣∣∣∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is an i0(s)-face of σ
}
.
If s, ŝ ∈ SN with I0(s) ⊂ I0(ŝ), then A(s) = A(ŝ) ∩ aff(A(s)). Therefore, by repeated
application of Theorem 2.7.8, it follows that Σ(s) is a triangulation of A(s) for every
s ∈ SN . Let some sign vector s ∈ SN with i0(s) ≥ 1 be given. Then the relative boundary
of A(s) is given by the union of the sets A(s) over all sign vectors s with i0(s) = i0(s)−1,
I−(s) ⊂ I−(s), and I+(s) ⊂ I+(s). Now it follows from the definition of a triangulation,
Definition 2.7.1, that a simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN with i0(s) = i0(s)− 1, I−(s) ⊂
I−(s), and I+(s) ⊂ I+(s) is the facet of a unique simplex of Σ(s).
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B and let Σ be a triangulation of QN .
Let Z : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ such that
for every vertex q of any σ ∈ Σ it holds that Zj(q) ≥ 0 if qj = 0 for some j ∈ IN and
Zj(q) ≤ 0 if qj = 1 for some j ∈ IN . Condition B.2 guarantees that such a piecewise
linear approximation Z exists. Moreover, it follows immediately that Z satisfies the
following condition.
Condition C The function Z : QN → IRN is such that, for every q ∈ QN , Zj(q) ≥ 0 if
qj = 0 for some j ∈ IN and Zj(q) ≤ 0 if qj = 1 for some j ∈ IN .
To approximate a connected set of zero points of ζ̂ containing 0N and 1N , it is proved in a
constructive way that for any piecewise linear approximation Z of ζ̂ satisfying Condition
C it holds that there exists a piecewise linear path f : [0, 1] → QN joining 0N and 1N ,
and satisfying that for every q ∈ f([0, 1]) there is a number β ∈ IR such that, for all
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j ∈ IN ,
0 ≤ Zj(q) ≤ β if qj = 0,
Zj(q) = β if 0 < qj < 1,
0 ≥ Zj(q) ≥ β if qj = 1.
(6.1)
In the next section it will be shown that β is arbitrarily close to zero for every q ∈ f([0, 1])
if mesh(Σ) is taken small enough. So, every q ∈ f([0, 1]) is an approximate zero point of
ζ̂ in this case. However, in spite of Condition B.3, it cannot be guaranteed that β = 0
and so Z(q) = 0N for all q ∈ f([0, 1]). This is caused by the fact that Condition B.3
is not necessarily satisfied for a piecewise linear approximation Z of ζ̂ . However, notice
that β must be zero if q = 0N , or if q = 1N , or if both qj1 = 0 for some j
1 ∈ IN and
qj2 = 1 for some j
2 ∈ IN .
Given a sign vector s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t, the indices j1, . . . , jN−t ∈ IN are chosen
such that j1 < · · · < jN−t and I−(s) ∪ I+(s) = {j1, . . . , jN−t}.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN and a piecewise linear approximation Z of ζ̂ with respect
to Σ be given. Let σ(q1, . . . , qt+1) ⊂ QN be a t-simplex and let s ∈ SN be a sign vector
with i0(s) = t. Consider solutions (λ1, . . . , λt+1, µj
1
, . . . , µj
N−t





























If λk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ It+1, and µjk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ IN−t, then (λ1, . . . , λt+1, µj1, . . . , µjN−t, β)
is called an admissible solution to (6.2). Notice that there are no restrictions with
respect to β. Clearly, it holds that
∑
k∈It+1 λ
k = 1. If σ(q1, . . . , qt+1) is a simplex of
Σ(s), (λ1, . . . , λt+1, µj
1
, . . . , µj
N−t
, β) is an admissible solution to (6.2), and Z satisfies
Condition C, then the point q given by q =
∑
k∈It+1 λ
kqk is an element of σ(q1, . . . , qt+1)
and satisfies (6.1). Notice that the linear system (6.2) has N + 1 equations and N + 2
variables and hence there is one degree of freedom. A piecewise linear path joining 0N
and 1N will be obtained by an algorithm that generates a finite sequence of simplices of
varying dimension such that with respect to each simplex of this finite sequence there
exists a set of admissible solutions to (6.2).
An admissible solution (λ1, . . . , λt+1, µj
1
, . . . , µj
N−t
, β) to (6.2) is said to be degenerate
if at least two of the variables λk, k ∈ It+1, and µjk , k ∈ IN−t, are equal to zero. If the
correspondence ζ̂ satisfies Condition B and Z is a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂
with respect to any triangulation Σ of QN satisfying Condition C, then it holds that
Z(0N) = 0N and Z(1N) = 0N . Hence, λ1 = 1, µj = 0, ∀j ∈ IN , and β = 0 yields a
degenerate admissible solution to (6.2) corresponding to the 0-simplex σ(0N) and any
s ∈ SN with i0(s) = 0, unless N = 1. A similar degenerate admissible solution exists
corresponding to the 0-simplex σ(1N). So, the usual assumption made in the literature
that there exist no degenerate admissible solutions, given any sign vector s ∈ SN and
any simplex σ ∈ Σ(s), makes no sense for the problem under consideration. The way the
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degeneracy problem is solved for is inspired by Todd (1976) and Wright (1981), where
algorithms are presented to compute a zero point of a correspondence ϕ : IRm → IRm.
In their work lexicographic pivot steps are used in order to circumvent degeneracy. By
adapting their notion of a lexicopositive matrix the problem of degeneracy will be solved
for.
A row vector of IRm is said to be lexicographically positive if it is non-zero and its
first non-zero component is positive. A matrix A is said to be lexicopositive if each row
is lexicographically positive. A matrix A is said to be semi-lexicopositive if each row,
except possibly the last row, is lexicographically positive.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN and a piecewise linear approximation Z of ζ̂ with respect
to Σ be given. For a (t − 1)-simplex τ(q1, . . . , qt) ⊂ QN and a sign vector s ∈ SN with
i0(s) = t, the (N + 1)× (N + 1) matrix As,τ is defined by
As,τ =

 1 1 0 0 0· · · · · ·
Z(q1) Z(qt) −sj1eN (j1) −sjN−teN(jN−t) −1N

 .
Definition 6.2.1 (s-complete simplices)
Let a triangulation Σ of QN and a piecewise linear approximation Z of ζ̂ with respect
to Σ be given. Let τ ⊂ QN be a (t − 1)-simplex and let s ∈ SN be a sign vector with
i0(s) = t. Then τ is s-complete if A−1s,τ exists and is semi-lexicopositive.
In general, a (t − 1)-simplex is called complete if it is s-complete for some sign vector
s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t. When τ is an s-complete (t − 1)-simplex for some sign vector
s ∈ SN , then the first column of A−1s,τ yields an admissible solution to (6.2) for a t-simplex
σ being the convex hull of τ and an arbitrary vertex qt+1 ∈ QN , where in addition λt+1
is chosen to be equal to 0.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN and a piecewise linear approximation Z of ζ̂ with respect
to Σ satisfying Condition C be given. An algorithm will be described that generates a
finite sequence of simplices starting with the 0-simplex {0N} and terminating with the
0-simplex {1N}. Moreover, related to every (t− 1)-simplex τ in the finite sequence there
exists a sign vector s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t such that τ is an s-complete simplex being a
facet of a t-simplex of Σ(s). Moreover, any two successive simplices in the finite sequence
either are (t − 1)-simplices being facets of the same t-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN
with i0(s) = t, or one is a (t−1)-simplex being a facet of the other one, that one being a
t-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t. It is shown in Lemma 6.2.2 and Lemma
6.2.3 that τ(0N ) and τ(1N), respectively, are s-complete facets of a 1-simplex of Σ(s)
for a uniquely determined sign vector s ∈ SN with i0(s) = 1. Lemma 6.2.5 and Lemma
6.2.6 will describe all possible situations that can occur when some (t − 1)-simplex τ
being an s-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN is obtained. Lemma
6.2.2, Lemma 6.2.3, Lemma 6.2.5, and Lemma 6.2.6 will then be used in Theorem 6.2.8
to determine in a unique way the finite sequence of complete simplices described above.
Finally, the detailed steps of the algorithm yielding this finite sequence will be given
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in Algorithm 6.2.10 and it will be shown in Theorem 6.2.11 that the algorithm yields
a piecewise linear path joining 0N and 1N such that each point on the path has the
properties given in (6.1).
Lemma 6.2.2
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and let Z
be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying Condition C. Let
the sign vector s ∈ SN be such that sj = −1, ∀j ∈ IN−1, and sN = 0. Then τ(0N ) is an
s-complete facet of a 1-simplex of Σ(s) and is not an s-complete facet of a 1-simplex of
Σ(s) for any other sign vector s ∈ SN .
Proof
Suppose that τ(0N ) is an s-complete facet of a 1-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN . Then
it has to hold that i0(s) = 1 and I+(s) = ∅. From Condition B.3 and Condition C it
follows that Z(0N) = 0N . Therefore, As,τ is given by
As,τ =
(
1 0 0 0· · ·
0N eN(j1) eN(jN−1) −1N
)
.
Let the integers j0 and jN be given by j0 = 0 and jN = N + 1. Let k ∈ IN be such that
jk−1 < j < jk, where j is the unique element in the set I0(s). Then
A−1s,τ =
(
1 0 0 0 0 0· · · · · ·
0N eN (j1) eN (jk−1) −1N eN(jk − 1) eN(jN−1 − 1)
)
.
It is clear that this matrix is semi-lexicopositive if and only if k = N. Consequently,
s = s. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.2.3
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and let Z
be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying Condition C. Let
the sign vector s ∈ SN be such that s1 = 0 and sj = +1, ∀j ∈ IN \ {1}. Then τ(1N ) is
an s-complete facet of a 1-simplex of Σ(s) and is not an s-complete facet of a 1-simplex
of Σ(s) for any other sign vector s ∈ SN .
Proof
Suppose that τ(1N ) is an s-complete facet of a 1-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN . Then
it has to hold that i0(s) = 1 and I−(s) = ∅. From Condition B.3 and Condition C it
follows that Z(1N) = 0N . Hence, As,τ is given by
As,τ =
(
1 0 0 0· · ·
0N −eN (j1) −eN(jN−1) −1N
)
.
Let the integers j0 and jN be given by j0 = 0 and jN = N + 1. Let k ∈ IN be such that
jk−1 < j < jk, where j is the unique element in the set I0(s). Then it is easily verified





1 0 0 0 0 0· · · · · ·
1N−10N −eN (j1) −eN(jk−1) −eN (jk − 1) −eN (jN−1 − 1)−1

 .
It is clear that this matrix is semi-lexicopositive if and only if k = 1. Consequently, s = s.
Q.E.D.
The following lemma is well-known in linear programming theory, see for example Murty
(1983). It will be very useful in proving Lemma 6.2.5 and Lemma 6.2.6.
Lemma 6.2.4
Let an invertible m×m matrix A, a vector z of IRm, and some k ∈ Im be given. Define
the m ×m matrix A by A = (A·1 . . . A·k−1 z A·k+1 . . . A·m). Then either (A−1z)k = 0




























Lemma 6.2.4 is easily shown by calculating A−1A.
Let Σ be a triangulation of QN and let Z be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂
with respect to Σ. The next lemma describes all cases that may occur when a t-simplex
σ of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t has at least one s-complete facet τ.
Lemma 6.2.5
Let Σ be a triangulation of QN and let Z be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with
respect to Σ. Let a sign vector s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t and a t-simplex σ of Σ(s) be given.
Moreover, let an s-complete facet τ of σ be given. Then exactly one of the following
cases holds:
1. the t-simplex σ is an s-complete facet of a (t+1)-simplex of Σ(s) for precisely one
sign vector s ∈ SN ,
2. the t-simplex σ has exactly one other s-complete facet τ .
Proof










N+1 and since (As,τ)1· = (1
t⊤ , 0N−t+1
⊤









s,τ)kj = 0, ∀j ∈ IN+1 \ {1}.




























a contradiction. Consequently, yk > 0 for some k ∈ IN .
Let k′ ∈ IN be such that 1yk′ (A
−1
s,τ)k′· is minimal according to the lexicographic ordering
over all row vectors 1
yk
(A−1s,τ)k· for which yk > 0 and k ∈ IN . It is clear that k′ is
uniquely determined since otherwise A−1s,τ would not be invertible. Now it holds that
either k′ ∈ IN \ It or k′ ∈ It.
If k′ ∈ IN \ It, then let s ∈ SN be defined by sjk′−t = 0 and sj = sj , ∀j ∈ IN \ {jk
′−t}.
Clearly, σ is a facet of a simplex of Σ(s) and i0(s) = t+ 1. The matrix As,σ is obtained
by deleting column k′ of As,τ and adding the vector (1, Z(q
t+1)⊤)⊤ between columns t
and t + 1. Using Lemma 6.2.4 it follows that A−1s,σ exists and is semi-lexicopositive. So,
σ is an s-complete facet of a (t+ 1)-simplex of Σ(s).
If k′ ∈ It, then let τ be the facet of σ opposite qk′. Using Lemma 6.2.4 and the choice of
k′ it follows that A−1s,τ exists and is semi-lexicopositive. Hence, τ is an s-complete facet
of σ.
It follows directly from Lemma 6.2.4 that if some other column is replaced, then the
inverse of the matrix obtained is not semi-lexicopositive. This guarantees that Case 1
and Case 2 are mutually exclusive, that the sign vector s of Case 1 is uniquely determined,
and that the facet τ of Case 2 is uniquely determined. Q.E.D.
The operation used in the proof of Lemma 6.2.5, where a column of As,τ is determined
in a unique way and is replaced by the vector (1, Z(qt+1)⊤)⊤, i.e., the column in (6.2)
corresponding to the vertex qt+1 of σ opposite τ, is called a lexicographic pivot step.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN and a piecewise linear approximation Z of ζ̂ with respect
to Σ be given. The next lemma gives all cases that may occur when an s-complete facet
τ of a t-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t is a member of Σ(s) for some
s ∈ SN . Clearly, I−(s) ⊂ I−(s), I0(s) ⊂ I0(s), and I+(s) ⊂ I+(s).
Lemma 6.2.6
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and let Z
be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying Condition C. Let a
sign vector s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t and an s-complete facet τ of some t-simplex of Σ(s) be
given. Moreover, let τ be a (t − 1)-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN . Then exactly one
of the following cases holds:
1. the 0-simplex τ is equal to {0N} or equal to {1N},
2. the (t− 1)-simplex τ is an ŝ-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(ŝ) for precisely one
sign vector ŝ ∈ SN \ {s},
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3. precisely one facet of τ is s-complete.
Proof






Exactly one of the following three possibilities occurs:
1. sj′ = −1 and yk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ IN ,
2. sj′ = +1 and yk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ IN ,
3. ∃k ∈ IN such that yk > 0.











(As,τ )j′+1,kyk = −yN+1,





















Therefore, t = 1 and sjk = −1, ∀k ∈ IN−t. So, sj = −1, ∀j ∈ IN , and τ = {0N}.
Suppose sj′ = +1 and yk ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ IN . Then, again, yk = 0, ∀k ∈ It. So, since


























Therefore, t = 1 and sjk = +1, ∀k ∈ IN−t. So, sj = +1, ∀j ∈ IN , and τ = {1N}.
Suppose there exists k ∈ IN such that yk > 0. Then it is possible to choose k′ ∈ IN as in
the proof of Lemma 6.2.5. Again, either k′ ∈ IN \ It or k′ ∈ It.
If k′ ∈ IN \ It, then let ŝ ∈ SN be defined by ŝjk′−t = 0 and ŝj = sj , ∀j ∈ IN \ {jk
′−t},
and consider Aŝ,τ . Using Lemma 6.2.4, the choice of k
′ guarantees that A−1ŝ,τ is semi-
lexicopositive and therefore τ is an ŝ-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(ŝ).
If k′ ∈ It, then let ς be the facet of τ opposite qk′. By Lemma 6.2.4 and the choice of k′,
A−1s,ς is semi-lexicopositive and hence ς is an s-complete facet of the (t− 1)-simplex τ of
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Σ(s).
From Lemma 6.2.2 and Lemma 6.2.3 it follows that Case 1 on the one hand and the Cases
2 and 3 on the other hand are mutually exclusive. It follows directly from Lemma 6.2.4
that if some other column of As,τ is replaced, then the inverse of the matrix obtained
is not semi-lexicopositive. This shows that Case 2 and Case 3 are mutually exclusive.
Moreover, it shows that the sign vector ŝ of Case 2 is uniquely determined and that the
facet of Case 3 is uniquely determined. Q.E.D.
The operation used in the proof of Lemma 6.2.6, where a column of As,τ is determined
in a unique way and is replaced by the vector (0,−sj′eN (j′)⊤)⊤, i.e., the column in (6.2)
corresponding to the unique element j′ in the set (I−(s) ∪ I+(s)) \ (I−(s) ∪ I+(s)), is
also called a lexicographic pivot step.
Definition 6.2.7 (Adjacent complete simplices)
Let Σ be a triangulation of QN and let Z be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with
respect to Σ. Then the (t − 1)-simplices τ and τ̂ are adjacent complete simplices if τ
and τ̂ are both s-complete facets of the same t-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN with
i0(s) = t, or if τ is an s-complete facet of the t-simplex τ̂ of Σ(s) and τ̂ is an ŝ-complete
facet of a (t+ 1)-simplex of Σ(ŝ) for some s, ŝ ∈ SN with i0(s) = t and i0(ŝ) = t+ 1, or
if τ̂ is an ŝ-complete facet of the t-simplex τ of Σ(ŝ) and τ is an s-complete facet of a
(t+ 1)-simplex of Σ(s) for some s, ŝ ∈ SN with i0(ŝ) = t and i0(s) = t+ 1.
Using the lemmas above it can be shown that there exists a finite sequence of adjacent
complete simplices of varying dimension connecting the simplices {0N} and {1N} if ζ̂
satisfies Condition B and Z is a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to a
triangulation Σ of QN satisfying Condition C. The proof will be given in Theorem 6.2.9.
Theorem 6.2.8 makes a statement concerning the number of adjacent complete simplices
when an s-complete t-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t is given.
Theorem 6.2.8
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and let
Z : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying
Condition C. Let τ be an s-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN with
i0(s) = t. If τ = {0N} or τ = {1N}, then there exists exactly one adjacent complete
simplex to τ. If both τ 6= {0N} and τ 6= {1N}, then there exist exactly two adjacent
complete simplices to τ.
Proof
Let τ = {0N}. From Lemma 6.2.2 it follows that s = (−1N−1⊤ , 0)⊤. Clearly, {0N} is a
subset of rb(A(s)) and therefore, by Definition 2.7.1, there is a unique 1-simplex σ of
Σ(s) such that {0N} is a facet of σ. By Lemma 6.2.5, either σ is an s-complete facet
of a 2-simplex of Σ(s) for precisely one sign vector s ∈ SN , or σ has exactly one other
s-complete facet. Hence, there exists exactly one adjacent complete simplex to {0N}.
The argument for τ = {1N} is similar.
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Let τ be such that both τ 6= {0N} and τ 6= {1N}. Then there are two possibilities, either
τ ⊂ rb(A(s)) or τ ⊂ ri(A(s)).
Consider the case that τ ⊂ rb(A(s)). Then there is a unique t-simplex σ of Σ(s) having
τ as a facet. By Lemma 6.2.5, either σ is an s-complete facet of a (t+1)-simplex of Σ(s)
for precisely one sign vector s ∈ SN , or σ has exactly one other s-complete facet τ . This
yields one adjacent complete simplex to τ. Since τ ⊂ rb(A(s)), it holds that τ ∈ Σ(ŝ)
for a unique sign vector ŝ ∈ SN with i0(ŝ) = t− 1. By Lemma 6.2.6, either τ = {0N} or
τ = {1N}, or τ is an s̃-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(s̃) for precisely one sign vector
s̃ ∈ SN \ {s}, or τ has exactly one ŝ-complete facet. The first case is excluded since by
assumption both τ 6= {0N} and τ 6= {1N}. In the second case, since τ ⊂ rb(A(s̃)), there
is exactly one t-simplex σ̃ of Σ(s̃) having τ as a facet. Applying Lemma 6.2.5 again
yields that either σ̃ is an s̃-complete facet of a (t+ 1)-simplex of Σ(s′) for precisely one
sign vector s′ ∈ SN , or σ̃ has exactly one other s̃-complete facet. This yields the second
adjacent complete simplex to τ. In the third case the second adjacent complete simplex
is obtained immediately. Clearly, there can be no other adjacent complete simplices to
τ.
Consider the case that τ ⊂ ri(A(s)). Then τ is a facet of exactly two t-simplices of Σ(s).
Applying Lemma 6.2.5 twice shows that τ has exactly two adjacent complete simplices.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 6.2.9
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and let
Z : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying
Condition C. Then there exists a unique finite sequence of complete simplices τ 1, . . . , τk
′
such that τ 1 = {0N}, τk′ = {1N}, and any two successive simplices in the finite sequence
are adjacent complete simplices.
Proof
Let τ 1 = {0N}. Let τ 2 be the unique adjacent complete simplex to τ 1, that exists
according to Theorem 6.2.8. Given τk for some k ∈ IN \ {1}, not equal to {0N} and not
equal to {1N}, there exists by Theorem 6.2.8 a unique adjacent complete simplex τk+1
not equal to τk−1. As in the proof of Theorem 5.2.7 it can be shown that all simplices in
the sequence generated above are different. By Theorem 2.7.2 the collection of all facets
of all simplices of Σ(s) is finite for every s ∈ SN . Therefore, all simplices in the sequence
generated being different, it holds that the sequence generated is a finite sequence, and
since τ 1 = {0N}, it follows that τk′ = {1N} for some k′ ∈ IN. Q.E.D.
Now the steps of the algorithm generating the simplices τ 1, . . . , τk
′
of Theorem 6.2.9 are
described in detail.
Algorithm 6.2.10 (Simplicial algorithm with vector labelling)
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and let
Z : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying
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Condition C. The simplicial algorithm on QN with vector labelling has the following
steps.
Step 0. Let k = 1, t = 1, τk = τ(0N), s = (−1N−1⊤ , 0)⊤, and let qt+1 be the unique
vertex of the simplex of Σ(s) containing τk as the facet opposite to it.
Step 1. Let σ be equal to the convex hull of τk∪{qt+1}. Pivot (0, Z(qt+1)⊤)⊤ lexicograph-
ically into the linear system (6.2) corresponding to As,τk, yielding, as described in
Lemma 6.2.5, a unique column k′ ∈ IN of As,τk which has to be replaced. If
k′ ∈ IN \ It, then go to Step 3 with j′ = jk′−t.
Step 2. Increase the value of k by 1 and let τk be the facet of σ opposite qk
′
. If τk = {1N},
then the algorithm terminates. If τk ∈ Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN , then go to Step 4.
Otherwise, there is exactly one t-simplex σ of Σ(s) such that σ 6= σ and τk is a
facet of σ. Go to Step 1 with qt+1 as the unique vertex of σ opposite τk.
Step 3. Let s ∈ SN be defined by sj′ = 0 and sj = sj , ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}. There is a unique
simplex σ of Σ(s) having σ as a facet. Increase the value of both k and t by 1 and
go to Step 1 with qt+1 as the unique vertex of σ opposite σ, s = s, and τk = σ.
Step 4. Let σ be equal to τk. Pivot (0,−sjeN (j)⊤)⊤ lexicographically into the linear
system (6.2) determined by As,τk, where j ∈ IN is such that sj = 0 and sj 6= 0. By
Lemma 6.2.6 there is a unique column k′ ∈ IN of As,τk which has to be replaced.
If k′ ∈ IN \ It, then decrease the value of both k and t by 1 and go to Step 3 with
j′ = jk
′−t and s = s. Otherwise, decrease the value of t by 1 and go to Step 2 with
s = s.
It is worthwhile to mention that it is also possible to define an algorithm that starts with
the 0-simplex {1N} and terminates with the 0-simplex {0N}.
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and
let Z : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying
Condition C. In general, it cannot be excluded that there exists an s-complete facet τ of
a t-simplex of Σ(s) for some s ∈ SN with i0(s) = t that is not generated by Algorithm
6.2.10. Then, using Theorem 6.2.8, it can be shown similarly as in the proof of Theorem
6.2.9 that there exists a finite sequence of complete simplices, say τ 1, . . . , τ k
′
, such that
τ 1 = τ , τ k
′
= τ , and two successive simplices in this finite sequence are adjacent complete
simplices. Moreover, this finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices is uniquely
determined in the sense that it is either given by τ 1, . . . , τk
′
or by τ k
′
, . . . , τ 1.
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and let
Z : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying Con-





successively generated by Algorithm 6.2.10 such that, for every k ∈ Ik′′, τk is an sk-
complete facet of a tk-simplex of Σ(sk), where tk = i0(sk). Notice that k′′ ≥ k′, where k′
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is as in Theorem 6.2.8, with k′′ > k′ only if Case 2 of Lemma 6.2.6, which corresponds
to the first case in Step 4 of Algorithm 6.2.10, occurs. In this case a (t − 1)-simplex τ
is generated by the algorithm, being both s-complete and ŝ-complete for some s, ŝ ∈ SN
with i0(s) = i0(ŝ) = t and s 6= ŝ. Clearly, A−1
sk,τk
is semi-lexicopositive for every k ∈ Ik′′.
































































and define the function fZ : [0, 1]→ QN by
fZ(t) = (1− (k′′ − 1)t+ ⌊(k′′ − 1)t⌋)q⌊1+(k′′−1)t⌋
+((k′′ − 1)t− ⌊(k′′ − 1)t⌋)q1+⌊1+(k′′−1)t⌋, ∀t ∈ [0, 1),
fZ(1) = q
k′′ .
In Theorem 6.2.11 it is shown that the function fZ generated by the algorithm is a
piecewise linear path joining 0N and 1N and is such that every point q ∈ fZ([0, 1])
satisfies (6.1), i.e., for every j ∈ IN , 0 ≤ Zj(q) ≤ β if qj = 0, Zj(q) = β if 0 < qj < 1,
and 0 ≥ Zj(q) ≥ β if qj = 1.
Theorem 6.2.11
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B, let Σ be a triangulation of QN , and let
Z : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σ satisfying
Condition C. Then fZ : [0, 1] → QN is a piecewise linear path joining 0N and 1N , and
satisfying that for every q ∈ fZ([0, 1]) there is a number β ∈ IR such that, for all j ∈ IN ,
0 ≤ Zj(q) ≤ β if qj = 0,
Zj(q) = β if 0 < qj < 1,
0 ≥ Zj(q) ≥ β if qj = 1.
Proof
Let (sk, τk)k∈Ik′′ be all different pairs of sign vectors and simplices successively generated
by Algorithm 6.2.10 such that, for every k ∈ Ik′′, τk is an sk-complete facet of a tk-
simplex of Σ(sk). Notice that, for every k ∈ Ik′′−1, Ask,τk and Ask+1,τk+1 have N columns
in common. Let Bsk,σk be the (N + 1) × (N + 2) matrix containing all the columns of
Ask,τk and Ask+1,τk+1, ∀k ∈ Ik′′−1. Then the matrix Bsk,σk yields the system as in (6.2)
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for a simplex σk being the convex hull of τk and τk+1 and for a sign vector sk ∈ SN
being such that I−(sk) = I−(sk) ∪ I−(sk+1) and I+(sk) = I+(sk) ∪ I+(sk+1). Using
(6.3) it is easily verified that for every k ∈ Ik′′−1 the first columns of both A−1sk,τk and
A−1
sk+1,τk+1
, extended with a zero component, yield admissible solutions to the system in
(6.2) induced by Bsk,σk and that σ
k ∈ Σ(sk). Finally, when y, ŷ ∈ IRN+2 are admissible
solutions to the system Bsk,σky = (1, 0
N⊤)⊤, then λy + (1 − λ)ŷ is also an admissible
solution to this system for every λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since σk ∈ Σ(sk), ∀k ∈ Ik′′−1, it follows from
(6.2) and the fact that Z satisfies Condition C that every q ∈ fZ([0, 1]) satisfies (6.1).
Q.E.D.
6.3 The Existence of a Continuum of Constrained
Equilibria
It will be argued in Theorem 6.3.1 and Corollary 6.3.2 that the points lying on the path
given in Theorem 6.2.11 are indeed all approximate zero points of ζ̂ . To show this, a
sequence of triangulations (Σn)n∈IN with mesh size converging to zero and a sequence
(Zn)n∈IN, such that Z
n is a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σn
satisfying Condition C for every n ∈ IN, is taken. If ζ̂ satisfies Condition B, then, for every
n ∈ IN, this yields according to Theorem 6.2.11 a piecewise linear function fZn : [0, 1]→
QN joining 0N and 1N . It will be shown that if qn is an arbitrary point in fZn([0, 1]) and
the sequence (qn)n∈IN converges to an element q, then 0
N ∈ ζ̂(q). By the compactness
of QN , every sequence of points in QN has a converging subsequence. Hence, for every
ε ∈ IR++, there exists n′ ∈ IN such that, for every n ≥ n′, for every q ∈ fZn([0, 1]),
it holds that ‖Zn(q)‖∞ < ε, or, equivalently, max({‖Zn(q)‖∞ | q ∈ fZn([0, 1])}) → 0.
Finally, it will be shown in Theorem 6.3.3 that there exists a connected set of zero points
of ζ̂ , containing 0N and 1N , that is being approximated.
Theorem 6.3.1
Let the correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfy Condition B, for every n ∈ IN, let Σn be
a triangulation of QN such that mesh(Σn) < 1
n
, and let Zn : QN → IRN be a piecewise
linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σn satisfying Condition C. Let ((q)n)n∈IN be an
arbitrary sequence of points in QN with (q)n ∈ fZn([0, 1]), ∀n ∈ IN, such that (q)n → q.
Then 0N ∈ ζ̂(q).
Proof
Let (













k)n = 1, while σ((q1)n, . . . , (qN+1)n) is a simplex of Σn such that (q)n =
∑
k∈IN+1(λ
k)n(qk)n and (zk)n = Zn((qk)n), ∀k ∈ IN+1. By definition of a piecewise linear




k)n(zk)n, ∀n ∈ IN. For every n ∈ IN it holds that











for some βn ∈ IR and some µn ≥ 0, ∀ ∈ {j ∈ IN | (qj)n = 0 or (qj)n = 1}. Since ζ̂ is
a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence and QN is compact, it follows
from Theorem 2.5.4 that ζ̂(QN) is compact. Therefore, without loss of generality, it can
be assumed that the sequence in (6.4) converges to an element
(












Let z ∈ IRN be defined by z = ∑k∈IN+1 λkzk. Since, for every n ∈ IN, mesh(Σn) < 1n ,
it holds that qk = q, ∀k ∈ IN+1. Since ζ̂ is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous








k)n(zk)n → ∑k∈IN+1 λkzk = z.
If there is a subsequence ((q)n
m
)m∈IN of ((q)
n)n∈IN such that, for every m ∈ IN, 0 <
(q)n
m










)→ z. Since z ∈ ζ̂(q),
there is some p ∈ IRN++ such that p · z = 0. Consequently, z = 0N . If there is not




for some j′ ∈ IN , (qj′)nm = 0, ∀m ∈ IN, or (qj′)nm = 1, ∀m ∈ IN. In the first case,
using that Zn satisfies Condition C, it holds that 0 ≤ Znmj′ ((q)n
m
) ≤ βnm and therefore
0N ≤ Znm((q)nm), ∀m ∈ IN. Since Znm((q)nm) → z, it holds that z ≥ 0N . In the second
case, using again that Zn satisfies Condition C, it follows that 0 ≥ Znmj′ ((q)n
m
) ≥ βnm
and therefore 0N ≥ z. In both cases the existence of a p ∈ IRN++ such that p · z = 0
implies that z = 0N . Hence, 0N ∈ ζ̂(q). Q.E.D.
From Theorem 6.3.1 the next result follows almost immediately.
Corollary 6.3.2
Let the correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfy Condition B, for every n ∈ IN, let Σn be
a triangulation of QN such that mesh(Σn) < 1
n
, and let Zn : QN → IRN be a piecewise
linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σn satisfying Condition C. Then, for every
ε ∈ IR++, there exists n′ ∈ IN such that, for every n ≥ n′, for every qn ∈ fZn([0, 1]),
‖Zn(qn)‖∞ < ε.
Proof
Suppose the statement of the corollary is not true. Then, without loss of generality,
there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that for every n ∈ IN there exists qn ∈ fZn([0, 1]) satisfying
‖Zn(qn)‖∞ ≥ ε. As in the proof of Theorem 6.3.1 it can be shown that, without loss of
generality, the sequence (qn, Zn(qn))n∈IN inQ
N×IRN converges to some (q, z) ∈ QN×IRN ,
where z ∈ ζ̂(q). Clearly, ‖z‖∞ ≥ ε > 0. However, as in the proof of Theorem 6.3.1 it can
be shown that z = 0N , yielding a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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Let the correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfy Condition B, for every n ∈ IN, let Σn be
a triangulation of QN such that mesh(Σn) < 1
n
, and let Zn : QN → IRN be a piecewise
linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σn satisfying Condition C. It is shown in the
next two paragraphs that approximations of several types of constrained equilibrium can
be computed in this case.
Let some j ∈ IN and some α ∈ [0, 1] be given. For every n ∈ IN, since (fZn)j is a con-
tinuous function and [0, 1] is connected, it follows from Theorem 2.3.13 that (fZn)j([0, 1])
is connected, hence an interval by Theorem 2.3.12. Therefore, since, for every n ∈ IN,
(fZn)j(0) = 0 and (fZn)j(1) = 1, there exists t
n ∈ [0, 1] such that (fZn)j(tn) = α. Let the
sequence (qn)n∈IN in Q
N be defined by qn = fZn(t
n), ∀n ∈ IN. Without loss of generality,
it can be assumed that the sequence (qn)n∈IN converges to some q ∈ QN . By Theorem
6.3.1 it holds that 0N ∈ ζ̂(q). Clearly, qj = α. Therefore, an approximation of an equi-
librium whose existence is shown in Theorem 4.7.4 can be computed. By taking α = 12 ,
an approximation of a Drèze equilibrium with respect to market j is computed, see Def-
inition 4.7.5. An alternative way to compute an approximation of a Drèze equilibrium
with respect to market j is given in Cornielje and van der Laan (1986).
Let some α ∈ QN be given. Consider the set S = {q ∈ QN | q ≤ α and ∃j ∈ IN ,
qj = αj}. It is again easily shown that for every n ∈ IN there exists tn ∈ [0, 1] such
that fZn(t
n) ∈ S. Let the sequence (qn)n∈IN in QN be defined by qn = fZn(tn), ∀n ∈ IN.
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that the sequence (qn)n∈IN converges to
some q ∈ QN . By Theorem 6.3.1 it holds that 0N ∈ ζ̂(q). Obviously, q ∈ S. Therefore, an
approximation of an equilibrium whose existence is shown in Theorem 4.8.2 is computed.
Similarly, it can be shown that an approximation of an equilibrium whose existence is
shown in Theorem 4.8.6 can be computed.
Now it will be shown that for a correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfying Condition
B there exists a component C̃ of the set Q̃, defined by
Q̃ = ζ̂−1({0N}),
such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃. The proof uses the ideas of the proof of Theorem 5.3.5,
but instead of taking the limit of a sequence of paths generated by the algorithm with
integer labelling given in Algorithm 5.2.8, the limit of a sequence of paths generated
by the algorithm with vector labelling given in Algorithm 6.2.10 is taken. This gives a
constructive proof of the existence of the set C̃ if ζ̂ satisfies Condition B. Moreover, it
makes clear that a continuum of zero points of ζ̂ is approximated by Algorithm 6.2.10.
Let a non-empty, compact subset S of IRm be given, and define the function dS :
IRm → IR by
dS (s) = min ({‖s− s‖∞ |s ∈ S }) , ∀s ∈ IRm.
Clearly, the function dS is well-defined and is continuous by Lemma 5.3.2.
Let S1 and S2 be non-empty, compact subsets of IRm. Define e(S1, S2) by
e(S1, S2) = min
({
‖s1 − s2‖∞
∣∣∣s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2
})
.
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It follows immediately that e(S1, S2) is well-defined. Clearly, if S1 and S2 are disjoint,
then e(S1, S2) > 0.
Theorem 6.3.3
Let the correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfy Condition B. Then the set Q̃ contains a
component C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃.
Proof
Clearly, 0N ∈ Q̃, 1N ∈ Q̃, and Q̃ is compact. Suppose the statement of the theorem is
false. Then 1N is not an element of the component of Q̃ containing 0N . By Lemma 5.3.4
the quasi-component of 0N in Q̃ does not contain 1N . Hence, there exists a set Q̃1 being
both open and closed in Q̃, containing 0N , but not containing 1N . Define Q̃2 = Q̃ \ Q̃1.
Then Q̃2 is both open and closed in Q̃ and contains 1N . Since Q̃ is compact, it holds






for some ε ∈ IR++. For every n ∈ IN, let Σn be a triangulation of QN with mesh(Σn) < 1n
and let Zn : QN → IRN be a piecewise linear approximation of ζ̂ with respect to Σn
satisfying Condition C. For every n ∈ IN, let the function gn : [0, 1]→ IR be defined by
gn(t) = d
Q̃1
(fZn(t))− dQ̃2 (fZn(t)) , ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
Let some n ∈ IN be given. Clearly, gn is continuous, gn(0) < −ε, and gn(1) > ε.
Moreover, since [0, 1] is connected, it follows from Theorem 2.3.13 that gn([0, 1]) is a
connected subset of IR and therefore an interval by Theorem 2.3.12. Hence, there exists











Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that the sequence (fZn(t
n))n∈IN in Q
N
















n)) ≥ 12ε > 0.
From Theorem 6.3.1 it follows that d
Q̃
(q) = 0, yielding a contradiction. Q.E.D.
6.4 Accuracy Analysis
In this section it is assumed that the correspondence ζ̂ satisfies Condition B and, more-
over, is a continuous function. It will be denoted by ẑ. Moreover, let some ε ∈ IR++
be given and let δ ∈ IR++ be such that q1, q2 ∈ QN and ‖q1 − q2‖∞ < δ implies
‖ẑ(q1) − ẑ(q2)‖∞ < ε. By the compactness of QN and the continuity of ẑ such a real
number δ exists by Theorem 2.7.10. Furthermore, a triangulation Σ of QN such that
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mesh(Σ) < δ, the piecewise linear approximation Z of ẑ with respect to Σ, and a point q
in fZ([0, 1]) are assumed to be given. Notice that Z satisfies Condition C if the relation
ζ̂ is a function.
By Condition B.3 there exists a function p : QN → IRN++, not necessarily being
continuous, such that p(q) · ẑ(q) = 0. There exists λk ∈ IR+, ∀k ∈ IN+1, µj ∈ IR+,
∀j ∈ IN , and β ∈ IR such that
∑
k∈IN+1 λ
k = 1, q =
∑
k∈IN+1 λ
kqk with σ(q1, . . . , qN+1)
an N -simplex of Σ containing q, and, for every j ∈ IN ,
Zj(q) = β − µj if qj = 0,
Zj(q) = β if 0 < qj < 1,
Zj(q) = β + µ











Z(q)− ε1N ≪ ẑ(q)≪ Z(q) + ε1N . (6.5)
If there exists j ∈ IN such that qj = 0, then β − µj = Zj(q) ≥ 0, so β ≥ µj ≥ 0. If there
exists j ∈ IN such that qj = 1, then β+µj = Zj(q) ≤ 0, so β ≤ −µj ≤ 0. Now four cases
have to be distinguished.
1. ∃j1 ∈ IN , qj1 = 0, and ∃j2 ∈ IN , qj2 = 1. It follows immediately that β = 0 and,
for every j ∈ IN such that qj = 0 or qj = 1, it follows that µj = 0. So, Z(q) = 0N and
therefore, by (6.5), −ε1N ≪ ẑ(q) ≪ ε1N . Moreover, for every j ∈ IN , if qj = 0, then
0 ≤ ẑj(q) < ε, and if qj = 1, then −ε < ẑj(q) ≤ 0.








Therefore, it holds that |β| < ε and, by (6.5), (β − ε)1N ≪ ẑ(q)≪ (β + ε)1N .
3. 0N ≪ q and ∃j1 ∈ IN , qj1 = 1. Clearly, β + µj1 ≤ 0, so β ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ µj1 ≤ −β.
Moreover,
0 = p(q) · ẑ(q) <
∑
∈{j∈IN |0<qj<1}




where (6.5) is used for the last inequality. Therefore, β + ε > 0 and −ε < β ≤ 0.
Hence, for every j ∈ IN , if 0 < qj < 1, then β − ε < ẑj(q) < β + ε, and if qj = 1, then
β − ε < ẑj(q) ≤ 0, with −ε < β ≤ 0,
4. q ≪ 1N and ∃j1 ∈ IN , qj1 = 0. As in Case 3 it can be shown that 0 ≤ β < ε
and, for every j ∈ IN , if qj = 0, then 0 ≤ ẑj(q) < β + ε, and if 0 < qj < 1, then
β − ε < ẑj(q) < β + ε.
All the cases are summarized in Theorem 6.4.1.
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Theorem 6.4.1
Let ẑ be a continuous function satisfying Condition B. Let ε ∈ IR++ be given and let δ ∈
IR++ be such that, for every q
1, q2 ∈ QN , ‖q1−q2‖∞ < δ implies ‖ẑ(q1)−ẑ(q2)‖∞ < ε. Let
Σ be a triangulation of QN with mesh(Σ) < δ, let Z be the piecewise linear approximation
of ẑ with respect to Σ, and let q in fZ([0, 1]) be given. Then there exists β ∈ IR such that
−ε < β < ε and, for every j ∈ IN , if qj = 0, then 0 ≤ β, if qj = 1, then β ≤ 0, and
0 ≤ ẑj(q) < β + ε if qj = 0,
β − ε < ẑj(q) < β + ε if 0 < qj < 1,
β − ε < ẑj(q) ≤ 0 if qj = 1.
6.5 An Example
In this section the algorithm will be illustrated by the example used in Section 3.10,
Section 4.10, and Section 5.6. The correspondence ζ̂ is given by the reduced total excess
demand function ẑ of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I2, P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)), where N = 2,









4 , ∀x2 ∈ IR2+, respectively, ω1 = (1, 4)⊤,
ω2 = (2, 1)⊤, P(p,p) = {p ∈ IR2+ | 16 ≤ p1 ≤ 2 and p2 = 1}, and (l̃, L̃) is the uniform
rationing system, where l̃ : Q2 → −IR4+ is defined by l̃11(q1) = l̃21(q1) = −3q11, ∀q1 ∈ Q2,
l̃12(q
1) = l̃22(q
1) = −5q12 , ∀q1 ∈ Q2, and L̃ : Q2 → IR4+ is defined by L̃11(q2) = L̃21(q2) = 18q21,
∀q2 ∈ Q2, and L̃12(q2) = L̃22(q2) = 5q22, ∀q2 ∈ Q2. The corresponding reduced total excess













































and the convex combinations of any two successive points yield the set Q̃. Next, Al-
gorithm 6.2.10 is used to compute approximate zero points of ẑ by generating a finite
sequence of adjacent complete simplices for the K-triangulation of Q2 with mesh size
equal to 16 . The piecewise linear approximation of ẑ with respect to this triangulation is
denoted by Z. In Figure 6.5.1 all adjacent complete simplices are drawn.
The finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices τ 1, . . . , τ 22 in Figure 6.5.1 corre-
sponds to the one given in Theorem 6.2.11. The piecewise linear path fZ([0, 1]) of points


































































and all convex combinations of two successive points. In Figure 6.5.2 the solid line
corresponds to the set fZ([0, 1]), while the dashed line corresponds to the set Q̃.
The algorithm starts with the s1-complete simplex τ 1 = {(0, 0)⊤}, a facet of a unique
1-simplex, σ((0, 0)⊤, (0, 16)
⊤), of Σ(s1), where s1 = (−1, 0)⊤. Notice that although τ 1 is



















































































































































































































Figure 6.5.1. The finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices generated by
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Figure 6.5.2. The set Q̃, dashed line, and the set fZ([0, 1]), solid line, N = 2.
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also (0,+1)⊤-complete, τ 1 is not a facet of a 1-simplex of Σ((0,+1)⊤). The simplex τ 1 is
not s-complete for s = (0,−1)⊤ since A−1(0,−1)⊤ ,τ1 is not semi-lexicopositive, although the
system A(0,−1)⊤,τ1y = (0, 0, 0)
⊤ does have a solution satisfying y1 ≥ 0, y2 ≥ 0. This is in
accordance with Lemma 6.2.2. In this way the lexicographic pivot steps determine in a
unique way the direction the algorithm will follow. So, the next vertex brought into the
system is the vertex (0, 16)
⊤ of the 1-simplex σ((0, 0)⊤, (0, 16)
⊤) opposite {(0, 0)⊤}. Remark
that the direction determined by the lexicographic pivot steps is orthogonal to the set of
zero points of ẑ around (0, 0)⊤. It can be easily verified that the 0-simplex τ((0, 16)
⊤) is not
(−1, 0)⊤-complete. However, the 1-simplex τ 2 = σ((0, 0)⊤, (0, 16)⊤) is (0, 0)⊤-complete.
Therefore, Case 1 of Lemma 6.2.5 results. The unique 2-simplex of Σ((0, 0)⊤) having
τ 2 as a facet is given by σ((0, 0)⊤, (0, 16)
⊤, ( 16 ,
1
6)




is the unique (0, 0)⊤-complete facet of the simplex σ((0, 0)⊤, (0, 16)




equal to τ 2. This corresponds to Case 2 of Lemma 6.2.5, and so on.
From Figure 6.5.2 it can be seen that although the lexicographic pivot steps determine
an initial direction to leave τ 1 being orthogonal to the set of zero points of ẑ around
(0, 0)⊤, the points on the piecewise linear path of approximate zero points generated
by the simplices τ 1, . . . , τ 6 are zero points of ẑ. An interesting situation occurs at the
simplex τ 15 = τ(( 12 ,
2
3)
⊤, ( 23 ,
2
3)
























The vertex brought into the system is given by q3 = ( 23 ,
5
6)
⊤, with Z(q3) = (0, 0)⊤. So,
y = A−1(0,0)⊤,τ15(1, Z(q





⊤. Now there occurs a degeneracy problem
since both y1 and y2 are positive and equal to the corresponding element of the first
column of A−1(0,0)⊤,τ15 . However, since the vector
(A−1(0,0)⊤,τ15)1·
y1




the vertex ( 23 ,
2
3)
⊤ of τ 15 corresponding to the second column of A(0,0)⊤,τ15 should be
replaced by the vertex ( 23 ,
5
6)
⊤, yielding the 1-simplex τ 16.Moreover, it has to be remarked
that the last column of A(0,0)⊤,τ15 would have been replaced by the column corresponding
to the vertex ( 23 ,
5
6)
⊤ if it had not been required that the last column can never leave
the system. Another interesting case occurs at τ 21. The 1-simplex τ 21 is a member
of Σ((0,+1)⊤) and therefore (0, 0,−1)⊤ is the new column brought into the system.
This corresponds to Case 3 of Lemma 6.2.6, where τ 22 is the unique (0,+1)⊤-complete
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facet of τ 21. The 0-simplex τ 22 is a member of Σ((+1,+1)⊤) = {(1, 1)⊤} and Case 1 of
Lemma 6.2.6 occurs. The algorithm now terminates with the (0,+1)⊤-complete simplex
{(1, 1)⊤}. It is clear from Figure 6.5.2 that the approximate zero points of fZ([0, 1]) are
everywhere very close to the zero points of ẑ. Moreover, most approximate zero points are
much closer to the set Q̃ than the approximate zero points computed by the algorithm
with integer labelling of Chapter 5, see Figure 5.6.2.
The point q = ( 12 ,
11
120)
⊤ induces an approximation of a supply constrained equilibrium
and the total excess demand corresponding to this point is zero, ẑ(q) = (0, 0)⊤. This con-
strained equilibrium is also a Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of commodity
1. The point q̂ = ( 277429 ,
1
2) induces an approximation of a Drèze equilibrium with respect
to the market of commodity 2, being also a demand constrained equilibrium. The total
excess demand corresponding to this point is close to zero, ẑ(q̂) = (−0.0255, 0.0480)⊤.
Notice that the total excess demand at these approximations of constrained equilibria
is closer to zero than the total excess demand at the corresponding approximations of
constrained equilibria generated by the algorithm of Chapter 5.
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Chapter 7
Intersection Theorems with a
Continuum of Intersection Points
7.1 Introduction
Intersection theorems state conditions under which the members of a certain subset of
a cover of some set have a non-empty intersection. Well-known intersection theorems
on the unit simplex are given in Knaster, Kuratowski, and Mazurkiewicz (1929) (KKM
Lemma), Sperner (1928) and Scarf (1967) (Sperner Lemma), Shapley (1973) (KKMS
Lemma), Gale (1984) (Gale Lemma), and Ichiishi (1988) (Ichiishi Lemma). Intersection
theorems can be used to prove the existence of solutions to mathematical programming
problems, of solutions to problems in general equilibrium theory, and of solutions to
game theoretic problems. The KKM Lemma and the Sperner Lemma can be used to
prove Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and also to show the existence of a Walrasian equi-
librium of an economy. Both the KKMS Lemma and the Ichiishi Lemma are very useful
when showing the non-emptiness of the core of a cooperative game, see Shapley (1973),
Ichiishi (1988), and Shapley and Vohra (1991). The Gale Lemma is used in Gale (1984)
to show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in an economy with indivisible com-
modities. In van der Laan and Talman (1987c, 1993) intersection theorems on the unit
cube and the simplotope are formulated, which can be used to prove the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game.
It is possible to generalize the intersection theorems mentioned above and to formu-
late intersection theorems on a polytope. In for example Ichiishi and Idzik (1991) an
intersection theorem on a polytope is derived generalizing the KKM Lemma. In van der
Laan, Talman, and Yang (1994) a more general theorem on the polytope is stated. Most
of the results mentioned above can be derived from this theorem. Moreover, this theo-
rem makes it possible to formulate analogs of the KKM, Sperner, KKMS, and Ichiishi
Lemma on the polytope.
In all the intersection theorems mentioned above conditions are given under which
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the members of a certain subset of a cover of some set, for instance the unit simplex, the
unit cube, a simplotope, or a polytope, have a non-empty intersection. In this chapter
intersection theorems on the unit cube are formulated with a continuum of intersection
points. Conditions are given on a closed cover of the N -dimensional unit cube such that
the members of a certain subset of this cover have an intersection consisting of a contin-
uum of points. Moreover, the intersection has some interesting topological properties.
It will be shown that it has a component containing both the element 0N and the ele-
ment 1N . Therefore, these intersection theorems belong to a new class. The intersection
theorems formulated in this chapter will be shown to generalize the KKM Lemma, the
Sperner Lemma, the KKMS Lemma, and the Ichiishi Lemma and will also be shown
to lead to a strengthening of the usual formulation of the Sperner Lemma on the unit
cube. There is a close relationship between the intersection theorems of this chapter
and the equilibrium existence problem in the economy as described in Chapter 4. The
intersection theorems of this chapter give a more abstract formulation of the equilibrium
existence problem in such an economy and they can be used to show Theorem 5.3.5.
There seems to be some relationship to an intersection theorem on the unit simplex
formulated in Freidenfelds (1974). This intersection theorem generalizes the Sperner
Lemma. Often it has a continuum of intersection points, although this is not necessarily
the case as opposed to the intersection theorems treated in this chapter.
In Section 7.2 a correspondence on the N -dimensional unit cube with the same prop-
erties as in Section 6.2 is given. The reduced total excess demand relation of the economy
as described in Chapter 4 has been shown to satisfy these properties under suitable as-
sumptions. In Theorem 6.3.3 it has been shown by means of constructive methods that
the set of zero points of the reduced total excess demand relation has a component con-
taining both the element 0N and the element 1N . In Section 7.2 the same result will
be shown in a non-constructive way by using Browder’s fixed point theorem. These re-
sults are used in Section 7.3 to formulate several intersection theorems on the unit cube,
among which the analogs of the KKM Lemma and the Sperner Lemma. Conditions are
given under which the members of a cover of the unit cube have a non-empty inter-
section, whereas the intersection has a component containing both the element 0N and
the element 1N . Using one of these intersection theorems it is possible to strengthen the
usual formulation of the Sperner Lemma on the unit cube. In Section 7.3 also intersec-
tion theorems with a continuum of intersection points generalizing the KKMS Lemma
and the Ichiishi Lemma are given. The proofs of all intersection theorems of Section
7.3 are derived from the correspondence introduced in Section 7.2. Therefore, this cor-
respondence unifies these intersection theorems. In Section 7.4 attention is focused on
some well-known intersection theorems on the unit simplex, where the existence of a
non-empty intersection (in general not a continuum of points) of the members of a cer-
tain subset of a cover of the unit simplex is guaranteed. Both the Sperner Lemma and
the KKM Lemma, which are in some sense dual to each other, will be derived from an
intersection theorem stated in Section 7.3. It is also possible to derive the KKMS Lemma
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and its dual, the Ichiishi Lemma, from another intersection theorem given in Section 7.3.
In Section 7.5 it will be shown that Theorem 5.3.5 can be derived from the intersection
theorems formulated in Section 7.3.
This chapter is based on Herings and Talman (1994).
7.2 A Non-Constructive Constrained Equilibrium Ex-
istence Proof
In this section a correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN is assumed to be given. For the main
results the correspondence ζ̂ is required to satisfy the following condition.
Condition B The correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfies
1. ζ̂ is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence,
2. for every q ∈ QN , there exists z ∈ ζ̂(q) such that, for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0
implies zj ≥ 0, and qj = 1 implies zj ≤ 0,
3. for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂(q), there exists p ∈ IRN++ such that p · z = 0.
This is the same condition as the one given in Section 6.2. The reduced total excess de-
mand relation ζ̂ of an economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) as described in Chapter
4 satisfies these conditions by Theorem 4.7.3. In Theorem 7.2.4 a non-constructive proof
of Theorem 6.3.3, stating that the set of zero points of ζ̂ has a component containing
both the element 0N and the element 1N if ζ̂ satisfies Condition B, will be given.
Define the set Q̃ as the set of zero points of ζ̂ , so
Q̃ = ζ̂−1({0N}).
It will be useful for the proof of Theorem 7.2.4 to extend the correspondence ζ̂ such that
it is defined on IRN . For that three lemmas are needed, resulting in a correspondence
ζ̂2 : IRN → IRN .
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B. For every q ∈ QN , choose an element
of the set ζ̂(q), denoted by ẑ(q), such that, for every j ∈ IN , ẑj(q) ≥ 0 if qj = 0 and
ẑj(q) ≤ 0 if qj = 1. Condition B guarantees that ẑ(q) can be chosen in this way for every
q ∈ QN .
For a non-empty, compact subset S of IRm define the relation πS : IR
m → S as the
orthogonal projection on S, so
πS(s) = {ŝ ∈ S |‖s− ŝ‖2 ≤ ‖s− s‖2, ∀s ∈ S } , ∀s ∈ IRN .
Lemma 7.2.1
Let a non-empty, compact, convex subset S of IRm be given. Then the relation πS is a
continuous function.
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Proof
Clearly, the relation ϕ : IRm → S, defined by ϕ(s) = S, ∀s ∈ IRm, is a compact-valued,
upper hemi-continuous correspondence and the function f : IRm × S → IR, defined by
f(s, s) = −‖s − s‖2, ∀(s, s) ∈ IRm × S, is continuous. From the maximum theorem,
Theorem 2.5.17, it follows that the relation µ : IRm → S, defined by
µ(s) = {ŝ ∈ ϕ(s) | f(s, ŝ) ≥ f(s, s), ∀s ∈ ϕ(s)}, ∀s ∈ IRm,
is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. It is easily verified that
µ = πS. To prove that πS is a function, it will be shown that µ(s), ∀s ∈ IRm, consists of
one element.
Suppose that s1, s2 ∈ µ(s) with s1 6= s2 for some given s ∈ IRm. Hence, ‖s − s1‖2 =
‖s− s2‖2. Let some λ ∈ (0, 1) be given. Then λs1 + (1− λ)s2 ∈ S and
(‖s− (λs1 + (1− λ)s2)‖2)2
= λ2(‖s− s1‖2)2 + 2λ(1− λ)(s− s1) · (s− s2) + (1− λ)2(‖s− s2‖2)2
< (λ2 + λ(1− λ))(‖s− s1‖2)2 + ((1− λ)2 + λ(1− λ))(‖s− s2‖2)2
= λ(‖s− s1‖2)2 + (1− λ)(‖s− s2‖2)2 = (‖s− s1‖2)2,
where for the inequality it is used that s− s1 6= s− s2. Therefore, a contradiction with
s1 ∈ µ(s) is obtained. Q.E.D.
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B. The correspondence ζ̂1 : IRN → IRN is







Notice that component j ∈ IN of the projection function πQN is defined by (πQN )j(q) =
max({0,min({qj , 1})}), ∀q ∈ IRN .
Lemma 7.2.2
Let the correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfy Condition B. Then ζ̂1 is a compact-valued,
upper hemi-continuous correspondence. For every q ∈ IRN , ζ̂1(q) ⊂ ζ̂(πQN (q)). More-
over, for every q ∈ IRN , for every z ∈ ζ̂1(q), for every j ∈ IN , qj < 0 implies zj ≥ 0, and
qj > 1 implies zj ≤ 0.
Proof
It is easily verified that ζ̂1 is compact-valued and ζ̂1(IRN) ⊂ ζ̂(QN ). Since QN is com-
pact and ζ̂ is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence, it follows from
Theorem 2.5.4 that the set ζ̂(QN ) is compact. Moreover, ζ̂1 has a closed graph, so it
follows from Theorem 2.5.7 that ζ̂1 is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
The second statement of the lemma follows immediately from the fact that ζ̂ is a compact-
valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Let some q ∈ IRN , some z ∈ ζ̂1(q), and some j ∈ IN such that qj < 0 be given.
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Then there exists a sequence (qn, zn)n∈IN such that z
n = ẑ(πQN (q
n)), ∀n ∈ IN, and
limn→+∞(q
n, zn) = (q, z). Since qj < 0, there exists n
′ ∈ IN such that n ≥ n′ implies
qnj < 0, hence (πQN (q
n))j = 0 and z
n
j ≥ 0. Therefore, zj ≥ 0. It can be shown in a similar
way that, for every q ∈ IRN , for every z ∈ ζ̂1(q), for every j ∈ IN , qj > 1 implies zj ≤ 0.
Q.E.D.
Let the correspondence ζ̂ satisfy Condition B. Define the correspondence ζ̂2 : IRN → IRN
by ζ̂2(q) = ζ̂(q), ∀q ∈ QN , and ζ̂2(q) = co(ζ̂1(q)), ∀q ∈ IRN \QN .
Lemma 7.2.3
Let the correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfy Condition B. Then ζ̂2 is a compact-valued,
convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. For every q ∈ IRN , z ∈ ζ̂2(q) im-
plies z ∈ ζ̂(πQN (q)). Moreover, for every q ∈ IRN , for every z ∈ ζ̂2(q), for every j ∈ IN ,
qj < 0 implies zj ≥ 0, and qj > 1 implies zj ≤ 0.
Proof
Since ζ̂ is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence and QN is compact,
it follows from Theorem 2.5.4 that ζ̂(QN ) is compact. Using Lemma 7.2.2, Theorem
2.5.7, and Theorem 2.5.8, it follows easily that ζ̂2 is a compact-valued, convex-valued
correspondence with a graph being closed in IRN× ζ̂(QN). Therefore, it follows from The-
orem 2.5.7 that ζ̂2 is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. The other statements
of the lemma follow immediately from Lemma 7.2.2. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.2.4
Let the correspondence ζ̂ : QN → IRN satisfy Condition B. Then the set Q̃ contains a
component C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃.
Proof
Since ζ̂ is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence and QN is compact,
it follows from Theorem 2.5.4 that ζ̂(QN) is compact. Let Z be a compact, convex set






j∈INsj = 0 and sj ≥ −1, ∀j ∈ IN
}
.
Clearly, S is non-empty, compact, and convex. Let the relation ϕ1 : Z → S be defined
by
ϕ1(z) = {s ∈ S | s · z ≥ s · z, ∀s ∈ S}, ∀z ∈ Z.
Using the maximum theorem, Theorem 2.5.17, it follows immediately that ϕ1 is a
compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. It is easily verified that ϕ1
is also a convex-valued correspondence. Let the correspondence ϕ2 : S × [1−N, 2]→ Z
be defined by
ϕ2(s, t) = ζ̂2(s+ t1N ), ∀(s, t) ∈ S × [1−N, 2].
From Lemma 7.2.3 it follows that ϕ2 is a compact-valued, convex-valued correspondence.
Moreover, ϕ2 is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence by Theorem 2.5.5 because
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of the upper hemi-continuity of ζ̂2 shown in Lemma 7.2.3 and the continuity of the
function associating s + t1N with (s, t) ∈ S × [1 − N, 2]. Let the correspondence ϕ :
Z × S × [1−N, 2]→ Z × S be defined by
ϕ(z, s, t) = ϕ2(s, t)× ϕ1(z), ∀(z, s, t) ∈ Z × S × [1−N, 2].
Since ϕ1 and ϕ2 are compact-valued, convex-valued correspondences, it follows immedi-
ately that ϕ is a compact-valued, convex-valued correspondence. Since ϕ1 and ϕ2 are
also upper hemi-continuous correspondences, it follows from Theorem 2.5.10 that ϕ is
an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. The set Z×S is easily seen to be non-empty,
compact, and convex. Using Browder’s fixed point theorem, Theorem 2.6.3, it follows
that there exists a component F cϕ of the set
Fϕ = {(z, s, t) ∈ Z × S × [1−N, 2] |(z, s) ∈ ϕ(z, s, t)}
such that F cϕ∩(Z×S×{1−N}) 6= ∅ and F cϕ∩(Z×S×{2}) 6= ∅. Clearly, (z∗, s∗, t∗) ∈ F cϕ
implies






Suppose max({z∗j | j ∈ IN}) > 0. Since z∗ ∈ ζ̂(πQN (s∗+t∗1N)), there exists by Condition
B.3 some p ∈ IRN++ such that p · z∗ = 0. Therefore, there exists j′ ∈ IN with z∗j′ < 0.
It is easily verified that s ∈ ϕ1(z) for any z ∈ Z with zj1 > zj2, j1, j2 ∈ IN , implies
sj2 = −1. Therefore, s∗j′ = −1. If t∗ < 1, then s∗j′ + t∗ < 0. Since z∗ ∈ ζ̂2(s∗ + t∗1N),
this implies z∗j′ ≥ 0 by Lemma 7.2.3, a contradiction. Consider the case t∗ ≥ 1. By
definition of ϕ1 there exists j′′ ∈ IN such that z∗j′′ = max({z∗j | j ∈ IN}) > 0 and s∗j′′ > 0.
Hence, s∗j′′ + t
∗ > 1. Since z∗ ∈ ζ̂2(s∗ + t∗1N), this implies z∗j′′ ≤ 0 by Lemma 7.2.3, a
contradiction. Consequently, max({z∗j | j ∈ IN}) ≤ 0. Since p ∈ IRN++ and p · z∗ = 0, this
implies z∗ = 0N .
Consider the continuous function f : Z × S × [1 − N, 2] → QN , defined by f(z, s, t) =
πQN (s+ t1
N), ∀(z, s, t) ∈ Z×S× [1−N, 2]. By Theorem 2.3.13 the image of a connected
set by a continuous function is connected, so it holds that f(F cϕ) ⊂ QN is connected. If
q∗ ∈ f(F cϕ), then q∗ = πQN (s∗ + t∗1N) for some (z∗, s∗, t∗) ∈ F cϕ. Hence,






Therefore, f(F cϕ) ⊂ Q̃. Next, let s1, s2 ∈ S be such that (0N , s1, 1 − N) ∈ F cϕ and
(0N , s2, 2) ∈ F cϕ. By definition, f(0N , s1, 1−N) = πQN (s1 + (1−N)1N). Since s1 ∈ S, it
holds that s1j ≤ N − 1, ∀j ∈ IN , so πQN (s1 + (1 − N)1N) = 0N . Since s2 ∈ S, it holds
that s2j ≥ −1, ∀j ∈ IN , so πQN (s2 + 21N) = 1N . Therefore, 0N ∈ f(F cϕ) and 1N ∈ f(F cϕ),
so the set Q̃ contains a component C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.2.4 will turn out to be a very useful tool for proving a number of intersection
theorems in the next section. Since Theorem 7.2.4 is used in the proof of all these
intersection theorems, Theorem 7.2.4 can be seen as a unifying theorem.
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7.3 Intersection Theorems with a Continuum of In-
tersection Points
In this section a new class of intersection theorems on the unit cube with a continuum
of intersection points is introduced. More precisely, conditions will be given such that
the members of a certain subset of a closed cover of the N -dimensional unit cube have a
non-empty intersection. Moreover, the intersection will be shown to contain a connected
set of points among which the elements 0N and 1N . For every q ∈ QN , define the sets
I0(q) and I1(q) by
I0(q) = {j ∈ IN |qj = 0} ,
I1(q) = {j ∈ IN |qj = 1} .
Moreover, for every q ∈ QN , define the integers i0(q) and i1(q) by i0(q) = #I0(q) and
i1(q) = #I1(q), and define the integer i(q) by i(q) = i0(q) + i1(q).
In Theorem 7.3.1 it is assumed that if an index j ∈ IN is taken and if j = N, then
j + 1 = 1, while if j = 1, then j − 1 = N.
Theorem 7.3.1
Let C1, . . . , CN be closed subsets of QN satisfying ∪j∈INCj = QN . Moreover, for every
q ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 or qj+1 = 1 implies q ∈ Cj . Then there exists a
connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj .
Proof
For every q ∈ QN , let the set J(q) be defined by J(q) = {j ∈ IN | q ∈ Cj} and let j(q)







∣∣∣ j ∈ J(q)
})
.
It will first be verified that ζ̂ satisfies Condition B. Using that the set Cj , ∀j ∈ IN ,
is closed, it follows easily from Theorem 2.5.7 and Theorem 2.5.8 that ζ̂ is a compact-
valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Hence, Condition B.1 is
satisfied by ζ̂ .
If there exists j ∈ IN such that qj = 0, then q ∈ Cj, so eN(j) − 1N 1N ∈ ζ̂(q). If there
exists j ∈ IN such that qj = 1, then q ∈ Cj−1, so eN(j − 1)− 1N 1N ∈ ζ̂(q). Three cases
have to be considered.







1N) = 0N . So, zj ≤ 0,
∀j ∈ I1(q).
2. I1(q) = ∅. Consider z ∈ ζ̂(q) given by z = ∑j∈J(q) 1j(q)(eN (j) − 1N 1N). Then zj =
1
j(q) − 1N ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I0(q).
3. ∅ 6= I1(q) 6= IN . There exists j′ ∈ IN such that qj′ = 1 and qj′−1 6= 1. Consider





1N . Then zj ≥ 1N − 1N = 0,
∀j ∈ I0(q), and zj = − 1N < 0, ∀j ∈ I1(q).
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Figure 7.3.1. Illustration of Theorem 7.3.1, N = 2.
The Cases 1, 2, and 3 show that ζ̂ satisfies Condition B.2.
Since, for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂(q), it holds that 1N · z = 0, also Condition B.3
is satisfied by ζ̂ .
Let q∗ ∈ QN be such that 0N ∈ ζ̂(q∗). Then, obviously, q∗ ∈ Cj, ∀j ∈ IN , so q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INCj.
Therefore, by Theorem 7.2.4, there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃,
1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj . Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.3.1 is illustrated in Figure 7.3.1 for the case N = 2.
The set C1 ∩C2 in Figure 7.3.1 consists of four components, one of these containing
both the elements (0, 0)⊤ and (1, 1)⊤. It should be mentioned that Figure 7.3.1 illustrates
a rather nice case in the sense that the sets C1 and C2 have a fairly easy structure.
However, in Theorem 7.3.1 the only requirements made is that these two sets cover
Q2, are closed, and satisfy some boundary condition. Hence, in general, much more
complicated situations might arise. The above remark is true for all illustrations in this
chapter. In Section 7.4 it will be shown that Theorem 7.3.1 immediately leads to the
well-known Sperner Lemma, see Sperner (1928), Fan (1968), and Scarf (1967, 1973).
It should be noticed that it is possible to replace the boundary condition that, for
every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 or qj+1 = 1 implies q ∈ Cj, by the more general condition that there
exists a permutation π : IN → IN such that there is no non-empty, proper subset J of
IN satisfying π(J) = J, whereas, for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 or qπ(j) = 1 implies q ∈ Cj.
Theorem 7.3.1 corresponds to the choice π = (2, . . . , N, 1).
Figure 7.3.2 gives an easy counterexample for the case in which the condition that
there exists no non-empty, proper subset J of IN satisfying π(J) = J is not satisfied.
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Figure 7.3.2. Counterexample, N = 2.
Figure 7.3.2 corresponds to the case π = (1, 2). The set C1 ∩ C2 consists of two
components, one containing the element (0, 0)⊤ and the other one the element (1, 1)⊤.
In Example 7.3.2 a counterexample is given for any permutation π : IN → IN such that
there exists a non-empty, proper subset J of IN such that π(J) = J.
Example 7.3.2
Let π : IN → IN be a permutation and let J be a non-empty, proper subset of IN such




∣∣∣0 ≤ qj ≤ 14 or 34 ≤ qπ(j) ≤ 1
}




Notice that the conditions of the more general specification of Theorem 7.3.1 using the
permutation π are satisfied by this choice of the sets Cj, ∀j ∈ IN .
Suppose there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and
C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj . Let the function f : QN → IR be defined by f(q) =
∑
j∈J qj − 12#J. Notice
that f(0N) = −12#J < 0 and f(1N) = 12#J > 0. Using the same arguments as in the
proof of Theorem 5.5.1, it follows that there exists q ∈ C̃ such that f(q) = 0. Therefore,
there exists j1 ∈ J such that 14 < qj1 < 34 . Let j2 ∈ J be given by j2 = π(j1). Since
q ∈ Cj1, it follows that 34 ≤ qj2 ≤ 1. Let j3 ∈ J be given by j3 = π(j2). Since q ∈ Cj
2
,
it follows that 34 ≤ qj3 ≤ 1. Since π(J) = J, there exists k ∈ I#J such that π(jk) = j1.
Hence, 34 ≤ qj1 ≤ 1, a contradiction. Consequently, there exists no connected subset C̃
of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj.
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The following theorem generalizes both Theorem 7.3.1 and the more general specification
with the permutation π.
Theorem 7.3.3
Let C1, . . . , CN be closed subsets of QN satisfying ∪j∈INCj = QN . Moreover, for every
q ∈ QN \ {1N}, for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies q ∈ Cj , and qj = 1 implies q ∈ Cj′ for
some j′ ∈ IN \ I1(q). Then there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃,
1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj .
Proof
For every q ∈ QN , let the set J(q) be defined by J(q) = {j ∈ IN | q ∈ Cj} and let the






∣∣∣ j ∈ J(q)
})
.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.3.1 it can be shown that ζ̂ is a compact-valued, convex-
valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Moreover, for every q ∈ QN , for every
z ∈ ζ̂(q), it holds that 1N · z = 0. So, the Conditions B.1 and B.3 are satisfied by ζ̂ .
Condition B.2 remains to be verified.
Let q be equal to 1N . For every ε ∈ (0, 1], for every j ∈ IN , it holds that 1N−εeN(j) ∈ Cj.
Since Cj is closed for every j ∈ IN , this implies that 1N ∈ ∩j∈INCj and hence 0N ∈ ζ̂(1N).
Let q be an element of QN \{1N} such that I0(q)∪I1(q) 6= ∅. There exists j′ ∈ IN \I1(q)












For every j ∈ IN , if qj = 0, then zj ≥ 1i(q) − 1N ≥ 0, and if qj = 1, then zj = − 1N < 0.
Hence, Condition B.2 is satisfied by ζ̂ . By Theorem 7.2.4 there exists a connected subset
C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and 0N ∈ ζ̂(q∗) if q∗ ∈ C̃. It is easily seen that
0N ∈ ζ̂(q∗) implies q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INCj. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.3.1 and Theorem 7.3.3 are the same for the case N = 2. Theorem 7.3.3 is
more general for the case N ≥ 3. Therefore, it is also possible to derive the Sperner
Lemma directly from Theorem 7.3.3.
By symmetry considerations the following dual theorem follows as a corollary to
Theorem 7.3.3.
Theorem 7.3.4
Let C1, . . . , CN be closed subsets of QN satisfying ∪j∈INCj = QN . Moreover, for every
q ∈ QN \ {0N}, for every j ∈ IN , qj = 1 implies q ∈ Cj , and qj = 0 implies q ∈ Cj′ for
some j′ ∈ IN \ I0(q). Then there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃,
1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj .
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It will be shown in Section 7.4 that the well-known KKM Lemma presented in Knaster,
Kuratowski, and Mazurkiewicz (1929) follows almost immediately from Theorem 7.3.4.
Since Theorem 7.3.3 and Theorem 7.3.4 are completely symmetric, it should be clear
that the KKM Lemma can also be easily derived from Theorem 7.3.3. Similarly, the
Sperner Lemma can be derived from Theorem 7.3.4.
So far intersection theorems have been considered where a statement is made about
the intersection of all the members of a closed cover of QN . However, in for example
the KKMS Lemma and the Ichiishi Lemma on ∆N−1 (see Shapley (1973) and Ichiishi
(1988), respectively) a statement is made about the intersection of members in a certain
subset of the cover of ∆N−1. Theorem 7.3.5 is also an intersection theorem in this spirit.
Moreover, unlike Theorem 7.3.1, Theorem 7.3.3, and Theorem 7.3.4, it is completely
symmetric with respect to the assumptions made on the sets in the cover of QN .
Theorem 7.3.5
Let C1, . . . , CN , D1, . . . , DN be closed subsets of QN satisfying (∪j∈INCj) ∪ (∪j∈INDj) =
QN . Moreover, for every q ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies q ∈ Cj, and qj = 1
implies q ∈ Dj. Then there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃ and
1N ∈ C̃. Moreover, q∗ ∈ C̃ implies q∗ ∈ Cj ∩ Dj for some j ∈ IN , or q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INCj, or
q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INDj .
Proof
For every q ∈ QN , let the sets J0(q) and J1(q) be defined by J0(q) = {j ∈ IN | q ∈ Cj}
and J1(q) = {j ∈ IN | q ∈ Dj}. Obviously, for every q ∈ QN , I0(q) ⊂ J0(q) and













∣∣∣ j ∈ J1(q)
})
.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.3.1 it can be shown that ζ̂ is a compact-valued, convex-
valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Hence, Condition B.1 is satisfied by ζ̂ .
Since, for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂(q), it holds that 1N · z = 0, Condition B.3 is
also satisfied by ζ̂ .




























i(q)N ≥ 0, and it can be
shown in a similar way that qj = 1 implies zj ≤ i
1(q)−N
i(q)N ≤ 0. Hence, ζ̂ satisfies Condition
B.2.
By Theorem 7.2.4 there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃,
and 0N ∈ ζ̂(q∗) if q∗ ∈ C̃.
Let some q∗ ∈ QN satisfying 0N ∈ ζ̂(q∗) be given. Then there exist λj ∈ IR+, ∀j ∈ IN ,
















1N − eN (j)
)
= 0N ,
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Figure 7.3.3. Illustration of Theorem 7.3.5, N = 2.
where λj = 0 if q∗ 6∈ Cj, µj = 0 if q∗ 6∈ Dj, and ∑j∈IN λj +
∑
j∈IN µ
j = 1. Let the real
numbers λ and µ be defined by λ =
∑
j∈IN λ
j and µ =
∑
j∈IN µ
j. For every j ∈ IN it
holds that λj − 1
N
λ = µj − 1
N
µ, so λj − µj = 1
N
(λ − µ), being independent of j. Three
possibilities can occur.
If λ > µ, then λj − µj > 0, ∀j ∈ IN , hence λj > 0, ∀j ∈ IN , and consequently
q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INCj .
If λ = µ, then λj = µj, ∀j ∈ IN . Since there exists j′ ∈ IN such that λj′ > 0 or µj′ > 0,
it holds that q∗ ∈ Cj′ ∩Dj′.
If λ < µ, then q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INDj . Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.3.5 is illustrated in Figure 7.3.3 for the case N = 2. It is easily verified that
the set (C1 ∩ D1) ∪ (C2 ∩ D2) ∪ (C1 ∩ C2) ∪ (D1 ∩ D2) in Figure 7.3.3 consists of two
components, one of them containing both (0, 0)⊤ and (1, 1)⊤.
It will be shown that at least one element of the set C̃ given in Theorem 7.3.5 lies
in the intersection of Cj and Dj for some j ∈ IN . It is even possible to show that
(∩∈INC ) ∩Dj 6= ∅ for some j ∈ IN and (∩∈IND) ∩ Cj 6= ∅ for some j ∈ IN .
Theorem 7.3.6
Let C1, . . . , CN , D1, . . . , DN be closed subsets of QN satisfying (∪j∈INCj) ∪ (∪j∈INDj) =
QN . Moreover, for every q ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies q ∈ Cj, and qj = 1
implies q ∈ Dj. Then there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃ and
1N ∈ C̃. Moreover, q∗ ∈ C̃ implies q∗ ∈ Cj ∩ Dj for some j ∈ IN , or q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INCj, or
q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INDj . Furthermore, there exists q1, q2 ∈ C̃ such that q1 ∈ ∪j∈IN ((∩∈INC )∩Dj)
and q2 ∈ ∪j∈IN ((∩∈IND) ∩ Cj).
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Proof
By Theorem 7.3.5 there exists a connected set C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and if q∗ ∈ C̃,
then q∗ ∈ Cj ∩ Dj for some j ∈ IN , or q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INCj, or q∗ ∈ ∩j∈INDj. By Theorem
2.3.11, the closure of C̃ is connected, and since the sets Cj , ∀j ∈ IN , and Dj, ∀j ∈ IN ,
are closed, the set C̃ can be chosen such that it is closed, and therefore also compact.
For every q ∈ QN , let the sets J0(q) and J1(q) be defined by J0(q) = {j ∈ IN | q ∈ Cj}
and J1(q) = {j ∈ IN | q ∈ Dj}, and let the integers j0(q) and j1(q) be defined by
j0(q) = #J0(q) and j1(q) = #J1(q). The relation ϕ0 : C̃ → IR is obtained by defining,
for every q ∈ C̃,
ϕ0(q) = ∅ if j0(q) = 0,
ϕ0(q) = {j0(q)} if j0(q) > 0.
The relation ϕ1 : C̃ → IR is obtained by defining, for every q ∈ C̃,
ϕ1(q) = ∅ if j1(q) = 0,
ϕ1(q) = {−j1(q)} if j1(q) > 0.





, ∀q ∈ C̃.
Using Theorem 2.5.7 and Theorem 2.5.8 it is easily shown that ϕ is a compact-valued,
convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Since C̃ is compact and con-
nected, and ϕ is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspon-
dence, it follows as in the proof of Theorem 5.4.2 that ϕ(C̃) is a connected subset of IR
and hence an interval by Theorem 2.3.12. Since 0N ∈ C̃, it follows that N ∈ ϕ(0N).
Since 1N ∈ C̃, it follows that −N ∈ ϕ(1N). Therefore, ϕ(C̃) = [−N,N ].
Suppose that, for every j ∈ IN , (∩∈INC )∩Dj ∩ C̃ = ∅. Then ϕ((∩∈INC )∩ C̃) = {N},
and, since ϕ(C̃ \ ∩∈INC ) ⊂ [−N,N − 1], it holds that ϕ(C̃) ⊂ [−N,N − 1] ∪ {N},
a contradiction. Consequently, there exists q1 ∈ C̃ such that q1 ∈ (∩∈INC ) ∩ Dj for
at least one j ∈ IN . Similarly, it can be shown that there exists q2 ∈ C̃ such that
q2 ∈ (∩∈IND) ∩ Cj for at least one j ∈ IN . Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.3.6 strengthens the usual formulation of the Sperner Lemma on the unit cube
(see Freund (1986) and van der Laan, Talman, and Yang (1994)), given in Corollary 7.3.7.
Corollary 7.3.7 (Sperner Lemma on the unit cube)
Let C1, . . . , CN , D1, . . . , DN be closed subsets of QN satisfying (∪j∈INCj) ∪ (∪j∈INDj) =
QN . Moreover, for every q ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies q ∈ Cj, and qj = 1
implies q ∈ Dj . Then Cj ∩Dj 6= ∅ for some j ∈ IN .
Next, intersection theorems with a continuum of intersection points generalizing the
KKMS Lemma and the Ichiishi Lemma will be considered. In order to do this the
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definition of a balanced collection of sets is given first. Define for every non-empty
subset J of IN the vector e
J of IRN by
eJj =
1
#J if j ∈ J,
eJj = 0 if j 6∈ J.




The collection of all subsets of IN is denoted by JN . Notice that ∅ ∈ JN .
Definition 7.3.8 (Balancedness)
Let J be a non-empty subset of JN , say J = {J1, . . . , Jk′} for some k′ ∈ IN. The










Definition 7.3.8 is slightly more general than the usual definition of balancedness since
the empty set is not excluded as an element of a balanced collection of sets. Notice
that the empty set itself is balanced since e∅ = eIN . If only non-empty subsets of IN
are considered, then Definition 7.3.8 reduces to the usual definition of balancedness. In
Section 7.4 it will be shown that the next theorem generalizes the KKMS Lemma and
the Ichiishi Lemma. Remark that some of the sets are allowed to be empty.
Theorem 7.3.9
Let {CJ | J ∈ JN} be a collection of closed subsets of QN satisfying ∪J∈JNCJ = QN .
Moreover, for every q ∈ QN with ∅ 6= I0(q) 6= IN , q ∈ CJ for a set J ∈ JN satisfying
I0(q) ⊂ J, and for every q ∈ QN with ∅ 6= I1(q) 6= IN , q ∈ CJ for a set J ∈ JN satisfying
I1(q) ⊂ IN \J. Then there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃,
and for every q∗ ∈ C̃ there is a balanced collection {J1, . . . , Jk′} of members of JN such




For every q ∈ QN , let the set J (q) be defined by J (q) = {J ∈ JN | q ∈ CJ}. Let the






∣∣∣ J ∈ J (q)
})
.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.3.1 it can be shown that ζ̂ is a compact-valued,
convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. So, Condition B.1 is satisfied by
ζ̂ . Since, for every q ∈ QN , for every z ∈ ζ̂(q), it holds that 1N · z = 0, Condition B.3 is
also satisfied by ζ̂ .
Clearly, for every ε ∈ (0, 1], for every j ∈ IN , 0N+εeN(j) ∈ CIN\{j} or 0N+εeN(j) ∈ CIN .
Hence, since CJ is closed for every J ∈ JN , 0N ∈ ∩j∈INCIN\{j} or 0N ∈ CIN . Clearly,
both the collections {IN \ {j} ∈ JN | j ∈ IN} and {IN} are balanced. Therefore,
0N ∈ ζ̂(0N). Similarly, since, for every ε ∈ (0, 1], for every j ∈ IN , 1N − εeN(j) belongs
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to C{j} or to C∅, it holds that 1N ∈ ∩j∈INC{j} or 1N ∈ C∅. Hence, 0N ∈ ζ̂(1N) since
both the collections {{j} ∈ JN | j ∈ IN} and {∅} are balanced.
Let some q ∈ QN \ {0N , 1N} with I0(q) ∪ I1(q) 6= ∅ be given. Three cases have to be
considered.
1. I0(q) = ∅. Let J1 ∈ JN be a set satisfying I1(q) ⊂ IN \ J1 and q ∈ CJ1 . Consider
z ∈ ζ̂(q) given by z = eJ1− 1
N
1N . If J1 = ∅, then z = 0N , so, obviously, zj ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ I1(q).
If J1 6= ∅, then zj = − 1N < 0, ∀j ∈ I1(q).
2. I1(q) = ∅. Let J0 ∈ JN be a set satisfying I0(q) ⊂ J0 and q ∈ CJ0 . Consider z ∈ ζ̂(q)
given by z = eJ
0 − 1
N
1N . Then zj = 1#J0 − 1N ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I0(q).
3. I0(q) 6= ∅ and I1(q) 6= ∅. Let J0 ∈ JN be a set satisfying I0(q) ⊂ J0 and q ∈ CJ0, and
let J1 ∈ JN be a set satisfying I1(q) ⊂ IN \ J1 and q ∈ CJ1. If J1 = ∅, then 0N ∈ ζ̂(q)


















#J0 − 1N = 0. For every j ∈ I1(q) it follows




#J0 − 1N = 0.
The Cases 1, 2, and 3 show that ζ̂ satisfies Condition B.2.
By Theorem 7.2.4 there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃,
and 0N ∈ ζ̂(q∗) if q∗ ∈ C̃. Clearly, 0N ∈ ζ̂(q∗) if and only if there exists a collection
{J1, . . . , Jk′} of sets in JN such that q∗ ∈ ∩k∈Ik′CJ
k
















Therefore, {J1, . . . , Jk′} is balanced and ∩k∈Ik′CJ
k 6= ∅. Q.E.D.
Since the boundary condition in Theorem 7.3.9 is not specified for q = 0N and q = 1N ,
it is possible that C∅ = ∅ or CIN = ∅. It should be noticed that the boundary condition
specified in Theorem 7.3.9 is weaker than the condition that for every q ∈ QN with
∅ 6= I0(q) 6= IN or ∅ 6= I1(q) 6= IN it holds that q ∈ CJ for a set J ∈ JN satisfying
I0(q) ⊂ J and I1(q) ⊂ IN \ J. Theorem 7.3.9 is illustrated in Figure 7.3.4 for the case
N = 2.
If N = 2, then the only difference with Theorem 7.3.1 or Theorem 7.3.3 is the
possibility of non-empty sets C∅ or C{1,2}. If N = 2, the minimal balanced collections
of sets are given by {C∅}, {C{1,2}}, and {C{1}, C{2}}. It is easily verified that in Figure
7.3.4 the union over all balanced collections of sets J of the intersection of the members
of J consists of three components, with one component containing both the elements 0N
and 1N . If N ≥ 3, then the situation may be much more complicated than in Theorem
7.3.1 and Theorem 7.3.3.
By symmetry considerations, Theorem 7.3.10 follows immediately as a corollary to
Theorem 7.3.9. It will be shown in the next section that it is easy to derive the KKMS
Lemma using Theorem 7.3.10.
Theorem 7.3.10
Let {CJ | J ∈ JN} be a collection of closed subsets of QN satisfying ∪J∈JNCJ = QN .
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Figure 7.3.4. Illustration of Theorem 7.3.9, N = 2.
Moreover, for every q ∈ QN with ∅ 6= I0(q) 6= IN , q ∈ CJ for a set J ∈ JN satisfying
I0(q) ⊂ IN \ J, and, for every q ∈ QN with ∅ 6= I1(q) 6= IN , q ∈ CJ for a set J ∈ JN
satisfying I1(q) ⊂ J. Then there exists a connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃,
1N ∈ C̃, and for every q∗ ∈ C̃ there is a balanced collection {J1, . . . , Jk′} of members of
JN such that q∗ ∈ ∩k∈Ik′CJ
k
.
7.4 Intersection Theorems on the Unit Simplex
In this section a number of well-known intersection theorems on the (N−1)-dimensional
unit simplex ∆N−1 will be shown to follow as immediate results of the theorems of Section
7.3. Theorem 7.3.1 leads to the Sperner Lemma on ∆N−1. This lemma is illustrated for
the case N = 3 in Figure 7.4.1.
The Sperner Lemma states that the sets C1, . . . , CN have a non-empty intersection if
these sets form a closed cover of ∆N−1 such that, for every q ∈ ∆N−1, for every j ∈ IN ,
qj = 0 implies q ∈ Cj . In Figure 7.4.1 there is exactly one intersection point. In the proof
of Theorem 7.4.1 a cover {C1, . . . , CN} of ∆N−1 satisfying the conditions of Theorem
7.4.1 is extended in a straightforward way to a cover {C1, . . . , CN} of QN satisfying the
conditions of Theorem 7.3.1. Then it follows that there exists a connected set C̃ such
that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj . It will be shown that this connected set
C̃ has a non-empty intersection with the unit simplex ∆N−1. Finally, it is shown that
Cj ∩∆N−1 = Cj, ∀j ∈ IN . In Theorem 7.4.1 it is again assumed that if an index j ∈ IN
is taken, then j + 1 = 1 if j = N, and j − 1 = N if j = 1.
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Figure 7.4.1. Illustration of Sperner Lemma, N = 3.
Theorem 7.4.1 (Sperner Lemma)
Let C1, . . . , CN be closed subsets of ∆N−1 satisfying ∪j∈INCj = ∆N−1. Moreover, for
every q ∈ ∆N−1, for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 implies q ∈ Cj . Then ∩j∈INCj 6= ∅.
Proof















∣∣∣ qj+1 = 1
}
.
It will be shown that the sets C1, . . . , CN satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7.3.1. Using
that the sets C1, . . . , CN are closed, that the function π∆N−1 is continuous, see Lemma
7.2.1, and that ∪j∈INCj = ∆N−1, it is easily verified that the set Cj, ∀j ∈ IN , is closed
and that ∪j∈INCj = QN . For every q ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN , qj = 0 or qj+1 = 1 implies
q ∈ Cj. So, the sets C1, . . . , CN satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7.3.1. Hence, there
exists a connected set C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj . Let the function
f : C̃ → IR be defined by f(q) = ∑j∈IN qj , ∀q ∈ C̃. Since the image of a connected set
under a continuous function is connected by Theorem 2.3.13, a connected subset of IR is
an interval by Theorem 2.3.12, f(0N) = 0, and f(1N) = N, there exists q ∈ C̃ such that
f(q) = 1, or, equivalently,





Clearly, Cj ⊂ Cj ∩∆N−1, ∀j ∈ IN .
Suppose there exists j′ ∈ IN and q̂ ∈ (Cj′ ∩∆N−1) \ Cj′. Then, since q̂ ∈ ∆N−1 implies
π∆N−1(q̂) = q̂, it holds that q̂j′ = 0 or q̂j′+1 = 1. Since q̂j′ = 0 implies q̂ ∈ Cj
′
, it
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Figure 7.4.2. Illustration of KKM Lemma, N = 3.
holds that q̂j′+1 = 1 and q̂j′ > 0, yielding a contradiction since q̂ ∈ ∆N−1 with N ≥ 2.
Consequently, Cj ∩ ∆N−1 = Cj, ∀j ∈ IN , and this implies by (7.1) that q ∈ ∩j∈INCj.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 7.3.4 leads to the KKM Lemma on ∆N−1. This lemma is illustrated in Figure
7.4.2 for the case N = 3.
The KKM Lemma states that the sets C1, . . . , CN have a non-empty intersection
if the collection of these sets is a closed cover of ∆N−1 and for every q ∈ rb(∆N−1)
there exists j ∈ IN such that qj > 0 and q ∈ Cj . In the proof of Theorem 7.4.2 a
cover {C1, . . . , CN} of ∆N−1 satisfying the conditions of Theorem 7.4.2 is extended in
more or less the same straightforward way as in the proof of Theorem 7.4.1 to yield
a cover {C1, . . . , CN} of QN satisfying the conditions of Theorem 7.3.4. Recall from
Section 2.2 that, for every J ∈ JN , ∆N−1(J) = {q ∈ ∆N−1 | qj = 0, ∀j ∈ J} and
QN(J) = {q ∈ QN | qj = 0, ∀j ∈ J}. Notice that QN (∅) = QN , ∆N−1(∅) = ∆N−1, and
∆N−1(J) 6= ∅ if and only if J is a proper subset of IN . Denote the collection of all proper
subsets of IN by J ′N , so J ′N = JN \ {IN}.
Theorem 7.4.2 (KKM Lemma)
Let C1, . . . , CN be closed subsets of ∆N−1 satisfying ∪j∈INCj = ∆N−1. Moreover, for
every q ∈ rb(∆N−1), there exists j ∈ IN \ I0(q) such that q ∈ Cj. Then ∩j∈INCj 6= ∅.
Proof
For every j ∈ IN , let the set Cj be given by
Cj = ∪J∈J ′
N
{






∣∣∣ qj = 1
}
.
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Figure 7.4.3. Illustration of Ichiishi Lemma, N = 3.
It will be shown that the sets C1, . . . , CN satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7.3.4. Using
that the sets C1, . . . , CN are closed, that the function π∆N−1(J) is continuous for every
proper subset J of IN as shown in Lemma 7.2.1, and the fact that ∪j∈INCj = ∆N−1, it
holds that the set Cj, ∀j ∈ IN , is closed and ∪j∈INCj = QN . Clearly, for every q ∈ QN ,
for every j ∈ IN , qj = 1 implies q ∈ Cj .
For every q ∈ QN \ {0N} such that I0(q) 6= ∅, it holds that q ∈ QN (I0(q)) and that there
exists j′ ∈ IN such that π∆N−1(I0(q))(q) ∈ Cj
′
and j′ ∈ IN \I0(π∆N−1(I0(q))(q)) ⊂ IN \I0(q),
so q ∈ Cj′. Therefore, the sets C1, . . . , CN satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7.3.4 and
there exists a connected set C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj. As in the
proof of Theorem 7.4.1 it follows that there exists





Clearly, Cj ⊂ Cj ∩∆N−1.
Suppose there exists j′ ∈ IN and q̂ ∈ (Cj′ ∩ ∆N−1) \ Cj′. Since π∆N−1(J)(q̂) = q̂ if
q̂ ∈ QN(J) ∩ ∆N−1, it follows that q̂j′ = 1. If q̂j = 0 for every j ∈ IN \ {j′}, then it
follows from the assumptions of Theorem 7.4.2 that q̂ ∈ Cj′, a contradiction. Hence,
q̂j > 0 for some j 6= j′, giving a contradiction since q̂j′ = 1 and q̂ ∈ ∆N−1. Consequently,
Cj ∩∆N−1 = Cj , ∀j ∈ IN , and from (7.2) it follows that q ∈ ∩j∈INCj . Q.E.D.
In Theorem 7.4.3 the Ichiishi Lemma (see Ichiishi (1988)) is derived from Theorem 7.3.9.
The Ichiishi Lemma is illustrated in Figure 7.4.3.
Denote the collection of all non-empty subsets of IN by J ′′N , so J ′′N = JN \ {∅}. The
Ichiishi Lemma states that if a collection with as members the sets CJ , ∀J ∈ J ′′N , is
a closed cover of ∆N−1 such that for every q ∈ rb(∆N−1) there exists J ∈ J ′′N with
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I0(q) ⊂ J and q ∈ CJ , then there is a balanced subset of this cover whose members
have a non-empty intersection. In Figure 7.4.3 there is exactly one element for which
there is a balanced collection of sets in the cover having an intersection containing this
element. In the illustration this balanced collection is not uniquely determined. Both
the balanced collections {{1, 2}, {3}} and {{1, 3}, {2}} have a non-empty intersection
consisting of the same element. Notice that in Figure 7.4.3 it holds that C{1} = ∅ and
C{1,2,3} = ∅.
Theorem 7.4.3 (Ichiishi Lemma)
Let {CJ | J ∈ J ′′N} be a collection of closed subsets of ∆N−1 satisfying ∪J∈J ′′NC
J = ∆N−1.
Moreover, for every q ∈ rb(∆N−1), there exists J ∈ J ′′N such that q ∈ CJ and I0(q) ⊂ J.
Then there is a balanced collection {J1, . . . , Jk′} of sets in J ′′N such that ∩k∈Ik′CJ
k 6= ∅.
Proof
The case where CIN 6= ∅ is trivial, hence consider the case where CIN = ∅. Let the sets














∣∣∣IN \ J ′ ⊂ I1(q)
}
.
It will be shown that the collection {CJ | J ∈ JN} satisfies the conditions of Theorem
7.3.9. Clearly, CJ , ∀J ∈ JN , is closed and ∪J∈JNCJ = QN . Moreover, for every q ∈
QN \ {0N} with I0(q) 6= ∅, it holds that q ∈ QN(I0(q)) and there exists J ∈ JN such
that π∆N−1(I0(q))(2q) ∈ CJ and I0(π∆N−1(I0(q))(2q)) ⊂ J. So, for every q ∈ QN \{0N} with
I0(q) 6= ∅, there exists J ∈ JN such that q ∈ CJ while I0(q) ⊂ I0(π∆N−1(I0(q))(2q)) ⊂ J.
For every q ∈ QN \ {1N} with I1(q) 6= ∅, it holds that q ∈ CIN\I1(q). Therefore, the
collection {CJ | J ∈ JN} satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7.3.9 and there exists a
connected subset C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and for every q∗ ∈ C̃ there is a
balanced collection J1, . . . , Jk
′
of members of JN such that q∗ ∈ ∩k∈Ik′CJ
k
. As in the
proof of Theorem 7.4.1 it follows that there exists










Hence, there is a balanced collection {J1, . . . , Jk′} of members of JN \ {∅, IN} such that
q ∈ ∩k∈Ik′CJ
k
. Since qj 6= 1, ∀j ∈ IN , it holds that for every k ∈ Ik′ there exists J ∈ J ′N
such that q ∈ QN (J) and π∆N−1(J)(2q) ∈ CJ
k
. Since, for every J ∈ J ′N , q ∈ QN (J) and∑
j∈IN qj =
1
2 implies π∆N−1(J)(2q) = 2q, it holds that 2q ∈ ∩k∈Ik′CJ
k
. Q.E.D.
In Theorem 7.4.3 a cover of ∆N−1 with sets in J ′′N = JN \ {∅} is considered, which is
the usual formulation. Clearly, the statement of Theorem 7.4.3 is still true if a cover
with sets in JN is considered since C∅ 6= ∅ implies that Theorem 7.4.3 is trivially true.
It is clear that also Theorem 7.3.10 can be used to derive the Ichiishi Lemma. Similarly,
the KKMS Lemma as stated in Theorem 7.4.4 can be easily derived from both Theorem
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Figure 7.4.4. Illustration of KKMS Lemma, N = 3.
7.3.9 and Theorem 7.3.10. In Theorem 7.4.4 the derivation using Theorem 7.3.10 will be
shown. Theorem 7.4.4 is illustrated in Figure 7.4.4 for the case N = 3.
The KKMS Lemma states that if a collection with as members the sets CJ , ∀J ∈ J ′′N ,
is a closed cover of ∆N−1 such that for every q ∈ rb(∆N−1) there exists J ∈ J ′′N with
q ∈ CJ and I0(q) ⊂ IN \ J, then there is a balanced subset of this cover whose members
have a non-empty intersection. In Figure 7.4.4 there is a unique intersection point, given
by the intersection of the sets in the balanced collection {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
Theorem 7.4.4 (KKMS Lemma)
Let {CJ | J ∈ J ′′N} be a collection of closed subsets of ∆N−1 satisfying ∪J∈J ′′NC
J =
∆N−1. Moreover, for every q ∈ rb(∆N−1), there exists J ∈ J ′′N such that q ∈ CJ and




The proof goes along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 7.4.3 by using Theorem
7.3.10 instead of Theorem 7.3.9 and by defining the set CJ
′
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7.5 The Existence of a Continuum of Constrained
Equilibria
In this section it is shown that the existence of a continuum of constrained equilibria as
stated in Theorem 5.3.5 can be shown using the intersection theorems of Section 7.3. The
more general result of Theorem 5.4.1 can then be derived from this result as in Chapter 5.
Indeed, the result of Theorem 5.4.1 has already been obtained in Theorem 7.2.4 and the
intersection theorems of Section 7.3 have been shown using Theorem 7.2.4. However,
it is also possible to give a constructive proof of any of the intersection theorems of
Section 7.3, which can then be used to show the existence of a continuum of constrained
equilibria. In Theorem 7.5.1 the intersection result given in Theorem 7.3.1 is used since
this one should be considered as the least general result.
Theorem 7.5.1
Let ẑ : QN → IRN be a continuous function satisfying Condition B. Then the set Q̃ =
ẑ−1({0N}) contains a component C̃ such that 0N ∈ C̃ and 1N ∈ C̃.
Proof









∣∣∣ qj = 0 or qj+1 = 1
}
.
Due to the continuity of ẑ, the set Cj , ∀j ∈ IN , is closed. Moreover, the sets C1, . . . , CN
satisfy the other conditions of Theorem 7.3.1. Therefore, there exists a connected subset
C̃ of QN such that 0N ∈ C̃, 1N ∈ C̃, and C̃ ⊂ ∩j∈INCj. It remains to be shown that
q ∈ C̃ implies ẑ(q) = 0N .
Let some q ∈ C̃ be given. If I1(q) = ∅, then, for every j ∈ IN , either qj = 0 and so
ẑj(q) ≥ 0, or qj > 0 and ẑj(q) = max({ẑ(q) |  ∈ IN}) ≥ 0, implying in both cases that
ẑ(q) = 0N by Condition B.3. If ∅ 6= I1(q) 6= IN , then there exists j′ ∈ IN such that
qj′ = 1 and qj′+1 6= 1, hence, 0 ≥ ẑj′(q) = max ({ẑj(q) |j ∈ IN }) ≥ 0, so ẑ(q) = 0N by










Often government behaviour is considered to be exogenous in economic modelling. How-
ever, there exists no reason why government behaviour should not be explained, while the
behaviour of other agents acting in the economy is endogenously determined. The influ-
ence of the government on for example minimum wages is substantial and the existence
of minimum wages clearly influences economic behaviour of producers and consumers.
Moreover, the producers and consumers influence the level of the minimum wages by
voting or by forming pressure groups. High levels of unemployment for example might
increase the pressure on the government to lower the minimum wages. Hence, in order
to explain the existence of minimum wages and to give an analysis of the most important
determinants of the level of minimum wages, government behaviour should be modelled
endogenously. The existence of minimum wages is just one example of a price rigidity.
Other examples are price controls to reduce inflation (see Cox (1980)), minimum prices
for agricultural products, fixed exchange rates, price indexation, and the linkage between
the wages of civil servants and the wages paid in industry. The existence of price regula-
tions and price rigidities is a frequently occurring real world phenomenon. Nguyen and
Whalley (1990, p. 667) make the same observation, stating: “Price controls have been
employed by governments all over the world, during war and peace, in response to all
manners of threats (both real and imaginary), and in all ages”, and Levy (1991, p. 157)
writes: “Price controls are pervasive in developing countries”.
An important reason for the existence of price regulations is that they can be used to
influence the redistribution of initial endowments. As Coughlin (1986) argues, redistri-
bution has become one of the most important political issues of the last three decades.
A drawback of price regulations is the misallocation of resources resulting in efficiency
losses.
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In this paper a formal model capturing the ideas above is given. A stylized model of
the political system corresponding to a democracy is described. The government consists
of two political parties or candidates who compete for the votes of the consumers in the
economy. For the sake of simplicity, as in Part II it is assumed that there are no producers
in the economy. The candidates have the possibility to propose a price regulation in order
to influence the redistribution of the initial endowments of the consumers.
The economic system will be modelled by the general equilibrium model of the econ-
omy as described in Chapter 4. Given a proposal of a political candidate for some
price regulation, including the case that there is no regulation, an economy as described
in Chapter 4 results. When a price regulation is proposed, then it is assumed in this
chapter that a Drèze equilibrium results in the economy. In most of the existing lit-
erature on models of an economy with price rigidities, some constraints on the set of
admissible price systems are exogenously given. Some exceptions worth mentioning are
Hart (1982), Böhm, Maskin, Polemarchakis, and Postlewaite (1983), Madden (1983),
and Silvestre (1988). In these papers (some of the) agents in the economy with three
commodities are price setters on some of the markets. In this way the resulting price
system is endogenously determined and may be non-Walrasian and therefore involve un-
employment. However, it seems to be difficult to extend the results of these papers to
general cases with more than three commodities.
In the model presented in this chapter political candidates may impose a price regu-
lation on the markets. Both government behaviour and price rigidities are endogenously
determined. The control of prices by government is also the subject of Nguyen and
Whalley (1986) and Ginsburgh and Van der Heyden (1988). In these papers government
behaviour and price rigidities are not endogenously determined, but the attention is fo-
cused on non-rationing mechanisms to solve the mismatch between supply and demand
resulting from a price regulation. This mismatch is solved by endogenously determined
equilibrium buying and selling prices in Nguyen and Whalley (1986) and by government
sales and purchases in Ginsburgh and Van der Heyden (1988).
In Section 8.2 the assumptions made with respect to the consumption set, the initial
endowment, and the preference relation of every consumer are given. Moreover, some
results concerning the demand relation of a consumer and the set of Drèze equilibria
of an economy where no price regulations are specified on some markets are presented.
The voting behaviour of the consumers and the political system are described in Section
8.3. The concept of a political economic equilibrium of the political economic system
is specified as being the Nash equilibrium of a certain game. In Section 8.4 sufficient
conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy and a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the game defined in Section 8.3 are given. In order to prove existence it is shown
that for every economy there exists an upper bound, being chosen independently of the
price regulation imposed, such that if the price on a market is above this upper bound,
then in every possible Drèze equilibrium no trade takes place on this market. This result
is quite intuitive and has some interest in itself. In Section 8.5 an example with two
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commodities and Cobb-Douglas utility functions is presented in which both political
candidates impose a price regulation excluding the Walrasian equilibrium price system,
and therefore the resulting Drèze equilibrium is characterized by rationing.
This chapter is based on Herings (1994c).
8.2 The Economic System
In this chapter the model of the economic system as described in Chapter 4 is used. It is
assumed that there are M ∈ IN consumers, indexed by i ∈ IM , and N ∈ IN commodities,
indexed by j ∈ IN . For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i, the utility
function ui : X i → IR representing the preference relation i, and the initial endowment
ωi are assumed to be given. The rationing function, specifying the admissible rationing
schemes, is given by the pair (l̃, L̃) with l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ the rationing function on supply
and L̃ : QN → IRMN+ the rationing function on demand. The set
∏
i∈IM X
i is denoted by
X. If x = (x1, . . . , xM) is an element of X, then xj = (x
1
j , . . . , x
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . Moreover,
ω = (ω1, . . . , ωM), ωj = (ω
1
j , . . . , ω
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN , and ω̃ =
∑
i∈IM ω
i denotes the total
initial endowment. For every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN , component (i − 1)N + j of l̃ is
denoted by l̃ij. Moreover, l̃
i = (l̃i1, . . . , l̃
i
N)
⊤, ∀i ∈ IM , and l̃j = (l̃1j , . . . , l̃Mj )⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . The
same notation is used for the function L̃, for a rationing scheme on supply l ∈ −IR∗MN+ ,
and for a rationing scheme on demand L ∈ IR∗MN+ . The following assumptions are needed
for the main results of this chapter.
A1. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i is closed, convex, X i ⊂ IRN+ ,
and X i + IRN+ ⊂ X i.
A2. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the utility function ui : X i → IR is continuous and rep-
resents the preference relation i being complete, transitive, continuous, strongly
monotonic, and convex.
A3. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the initial endowment ωi belongs to int(X i).
A4. The rationing function (l̃, L̃) is flexible, market independent, and continuous.
As stated in Theorem 3.6.1, it is possible to represent a complete, transitive, continuous
preference relation on a convex consumption set by a continuous utility function.
Political candidates are assumed to make proposals with respect to price regulations.
It is assumed that a proposal of a political candidate consists of the specification of a
lower bound on the price system, p ∈ IR∗N , and an upper bound on the price system,
p ∈ IR∗N , such that p ≤ p, p≪ +∞N , and p≫ −∞N . Commodity N is assumed to be a
numeraire commodity with price equal to 1. Therefore, it is assumed that pN = pN = 1.
Moreover, it is assumed that N ≥ 2 since N = 1 implies that there are no prices left
to be regulated. The special interpretation of the model given in Bénassy (1975a) and
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described in Section 4.7 is again possible. This motivates the use of either the equilibrium
concept of Bénassy (1975b), or of Drèze (1975), or of Younès (1975), where there is
no rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity. Since Drèze’s equilibrium
concept yields the smallest set of equilibria, see Silvestre (1982), and because of the
mathematical convenience of Drèze’s definition, this equilibrium concept is chosen in
this chapter. Moreover, only price systems in IRN+ will be considered since this is the
economically interesting case if the preference relations of the consumers satisfy some
weak monotonicity assumptions. Therefore, to guarantee that the set of admissible price
systems is non-empty, it will be assumed that p ≥ 0N . The case where price systems
may be any element of IRN is mathematically the same.
To a proposal (p, p) of a political candidate corresponds the set of admissible price




∣∣∣p ≤ p ≤ p
}
,











As in Section 4.2 the budget set of a consumer i ∈ IM at a price system p ∈ IRN and a
rationing scheme (li, Li) ∈ −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ is denoted by βi(p, li, Li), so
βi(p, li, Li) =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣p · xi ≤ p · ωi and li ≤ xi − ωi ≤ Li
}
,
and as in Section 4.3 the set δi(p, li, Li) is defined by
δi(p, li, Li) =
{
xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li)
∣∣∣xi i xi, ∀xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li)
}
.
The following result gives conditions such that a certain restriction of the demand relation
of any consumer is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. For every
i ∈ IM , define the set of price systems and rationing schemes P by
P =
{
(p, li, Li) ∈ IRN+ ×−IRN+ × IRN+
∣∣∣p · li < 0
}
.
Notice that the set P is independent of the choice of i ∈ IM . As opposed to Chapter 4,
it is not excluded that the price of a commodity is equal to zero.
Theorem 8.2.1
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i of consumer i be closed, convex,
X i ⊂ IRN+ , and X i + IRN+ ⊂ X i, let the utility function ui : X i → IR of consumer i be
continuous, and let the initial endowment ωi of consumer i belong to int(X i). Then the
relation δi|P : P → IRN is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
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Proof
The relation βi|P : P → IRN is a compact-valued, continuous correspondence by Lemma
4.2.2 and by Theorem 4.2.3. The function f : P ×X i → IR, defined by f(p, li, Li, xi) =




xi ∈ βi|P(p, li, Li)
∣∣∣f(p, li, Li, xi) ≥ f(p, li, Li, xi), ∀xi ∈ βi|P(p, li, Li)
}
,
and hence it follows from the maximum theorem, Theorem 2.5.17, that δi|P is a compact-
valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Q.E.D.
Let some consumer i ∈ IM be given. For every α ∈ IR+, define the set of price systems
and rationing schemes Pα by
Pα =
{
(p, li, Li) ∈ IRN+ ×−IRN+ × IRN+
∣∣∣
li ≥ −ω̃, Li ≤ ω̃, pN = 1, liN = −ω̃N , and LiN = ω̃N ,
∃j1 ∈ IN−1, pj1 ≥ α and lij1 = −ω̃j1 ,
∀j ∈ IN−1, lij < 0 implies ∃j2 ∈ IN−1, pj2 ≥ pj and lij2 = −ω̃j2
}
.
Notice that the set Pα is independent of the choice of i. Let some α ∈ IR+ and some
(p, li, Li) ∈ Pα be given. Then there is at least one commodity j1 ∈ IN−1 with price
greater than or equal to α and with lij1 = −ω̃j1, guaranteeing under weak conditions, see
Theorem 4.3.3, that consumer i is not rationed on his supply on the market of commodity
j1. Moreover, if a commodity j ∈ IN−1 is such that consumer i has the possibility to
supply a positive amount of this commodity, i.e., lij < 0, then there exists a commodity
j2 ∈ IN−1 with price at least as high as pj and with lij2 = −ω̃j2. Finally, for every j ∈ IN
it holds that −ω̃j ≤ lij ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ Lij ≤ ω̃j, so the rationing schemes in Pα are bounded.
It should be noticed that α1 < α2 implies Pα2 ⊂ Pα1 , and that Pα ⊂ P, ∀α ∈ IR+.
Theorem 8.2.3 states that if α ∈ IR+ is chosen large enough, then the demand of a
consumer i ∈ IM of commodity N at price systems and rationing schemes in the set Pα
exceeds the total initial endowment of commodity N. Theorem 8.2.3 is closely related
to theorems providing boundary conditions on demand functions without taking into
account the possibility of rationing, see for example Theorem 3.11.1. Theorem 8.2.3 can
therefore be considered as an extension of those theorems to the case where rationing is
allowed. Theorem 8.2.3 will play an important role in the proofs of Theorem 8.2.5 and
Theorem 8.4.2. First, the following preliminary lemma is needed.
Lemma 8.2.2
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A3. Let some N
′ ∈ Z+ satisfying N ′ < N
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Then, for every i ∈ IM , X i∗ is closed, convex, X i∗ ⊂ IRN−N
′




+ ⊂ X i∗, i∗
is complete, transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic, and convex, and ωi∗ ∈ int(X i∗).
Proof
Let some i ∈ IM be given.
Let (xi
n
∗ )n∈IN be a sequence in X
i




. Then the sequence












⊤ ∈ X i since X i is closed.
Therefore, xi∗ ∈ X i∗ and hence X i∗ is closed.
Let xi∗, x̂
i
∗ ∈ X i∗ and λ ∈ [0, 1] be given. Since X i is convex, (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, xi
⊤
∗ )
⊤ ∈ X i,





⊤ ∈ X i, it follows that
λ
(













)⊤ ∈ X i.
Therefore, λxi∗ + (1− λ)x̂i∗ ∈ X i∗ and hence X i∗ is convex.
Clearly, X i∗ ⊂ IRN−N
′
+ .
Let xi∗ ∈ X i∗ and s ∈ IRN−N
′
+ be given. Then (0
N ′
⊤







, s⊤)⊤ ∈ X i since X i + IRN+ ⊂ X i. Hence, xi∗ + s ∈ X i∗.
For every xi∗, x̂
i














⊤ i (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, xi
⊤
∗ )
⊤, so xi∗ i∗ x̂i∗ or x̂i∗ i xi∗.
Hence, i∗ is complete.




∗ ∈ X i∗, if it holds that (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, xi
⊤
∗ )









⊤ i (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, x̃i
⊤
∗ )









by the transitivity of i . So, xi∗ i∗ x̂i∗ and x̂i∗ i∗ x̃i∗ implies xi∗ i∗ x̃i∗. Hence, i∗ is
transitive.
Let x̂i∗ ∈ X i∗ be given and let (xi
n




∗ i∗ x̂i∗, ∀n ∈ IN,











⊤ i (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, x̂i
⊤
∗ )






X i, and, since i is continuous, (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, xi
⊤
∗ )




xi∗ i∗ x̂i∗ and hence the set {xi∗ ∈ X i∗ | xi∗ i∗ x̂i∗} is closed in X i∗. Similarly, it can be
shown that the set {xi∗ ∈ X i∗ | xi∗ i∗ x̂i∗} is closed in X i∗. Hence, i∗ is continuous.
Let xi∗, x̂
i
∗ ∈ X i∗ with xi∗ < x̂i∗ be given. Then (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, xi
⊤
∗ )











⊤ ≺i (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, x̂i
⊤
∗ )
⊤ since i is strongly monotonic. Therefore,
xi∗ ≺i∗ x̂i∗ and hence it follows that i∗ is strongly monotonic.
Let xi∗, x̂
i
∗ ∈ X i∗ be such that xi∗ ≺i∗ x̂i∗ and let λ ∈ (0, 1) be given. Then λxi∗ + (1 −
λ)x̂i∗ ∈ X i∗, (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, xi
⊤
∗ )
⊤ ≺i (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, x̂i
⊤
∗ )





⊤ + (1 −





⊤ ∈ X i, so (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, xi
⊤
∗ )
⊤ ≺i (ωi1, . . . , ωiN ′, λxi
⊤




since i is convex. Therefore, xi∗ ≺i∗ λxi∗ + (1 − λ)x̂i∗ and hence it follows that i∗ is
convex.
Since ωi ∈ int(X i), there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that BN (ωi, ε) ⊂ X i. If xi∗ ∈ BN−N
′
(ωi∗, ε),





⊤ ∈ BN(ωi, ε) ⊂ X i, so BN−N ′(ωi∗, ε) ⊂ X i∗. Hence, ωi∗ ∈ int(X i∗).
Q.E.D.
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Theorem 8.2.3
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A3. Then there exists α ∈ IR+ such that,
for every α ≥ α, for every i ∈ IM , for every (p, li, Li) ∈ Pα, xi ∈ δi(p, li, Li) implies
xiN > ω̃N .
Proof



























in QN × [−ω̃, 0N ] × [0N , ω̃] × [0N , 2ω̃]. Without loss of generality, the sequence in (8.1)
can be assumed to converge to some





) ∈ Pn, ∀n ∈ IN, it follows that max({pnj | j ∈ IN−1}) → +∞ if
n→ +∞, so p′N = 0, and it follows that lij = −ω̃j for some j ∈ IN−1. It is easily verified
that xi






), ∀n ∈ IN.
Suppose p′ · li < 0. Then δi|P is upper hemi-continuous at (p′, li, Li) by Theorem 8.2.1.







) ∈ P, ∀n ∈ IN. Therefore, xi ∈
δi(p′, li, Li) by Theorem 2.5.6. By the strong monotonicity of the preference relation and
since p′N = 0, it holds that x
i
N − ωiN = LiN = ω̃N . This contradicts xi
n
N ≤ ω̃N , ∀n ∈ IN.
Consequently, p′ · li = 0.









)m∈IN of the sequence in





j′ − ωij′, ∀m ∈
IN. Then, by Theorem 4.3.3, xi
























)m∈IN, one obtains a contradiction in the same way as in the
previous paragraph. Consequently, without loss of generality, for every j ∈ IN−1 with




j − ωij, ∀n ∈ IN.









)m∈IN of the sequence in
(8.1) such that there exists j′ ∈ IN−1 with p′j′ > 0 and li
nm













m = −ω̃jnm .
This contradicts p′ · li = 0. Consequently, without loss of generality, for every j ∈ IN−1
with p′j > 0, l
in
j = 0, ∀n ∈ IN.
Since there exists j1 ∈ IN−1 such that lij1 = −ω̃j1 and there exists j2 ∈ IN−1 such that
p′j2 = 1, while p
′ · li = 0, the set J, defined by J = {j ∈ IN−1 | p′j > 0}, is a non-empty,
proper subset of IN−1. From the previous paragraphs it follows that, for every j ∈ J,
xi
n
j − ωij = li
n
j = 0, ∀n ∈ IN. Without loss of generality, there exists N ′ ∈ IN−2 such that
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+ ⊂ X i∗, i∗ is complete, transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic, and con-




j, ∀j ∈ IN ′, ∀n ∈ IN, it is clear that


















, respectively, and pn∗ and x
in
∗ denote the last N − N ′ compo-
nents of pn and xi
n
, respectively. Let ω̃∗ denote the last N − N ′ components of ω̃ and






+ | p∗ · li∗ < 0}.
Since lij = 0, ∀j ∈ IN ′ , the definition of Pn implies that there exists n′ ∈ IN such that
for every n ≥ n′ there exists jn ∈ IN−1 \ IN ′ satisfying pnjn ≥ n and li
n















′ × [−ω̃∗, 0N−N ′] × [0N−N ′ , ω̃∗] × [0N−N ′ , 2ω̃∗]. Without loss of generality, the








′ × [−ω̃∗, 0N−N
′
]× [0N−N ′ , ω̃∗]× [0N−N
′
, 2ω̃∗].
Suppose p′∗ · li∗ < 0, then δi∗|P∗ is upper hemi-continuous at (p′∗, li∗, Li∗) by Theorem 8.2.1,







∗ ) ∈ P∗, ∀n ∈ IN. Therefore,
xi∗ ∈ δi∗(p′∗, li∗, Li∗) by Theorem 2.5.6, yielding a contradiction in the same way as before.
Repeating the arguments used before, the finiteness of N − 1 and the definition of Pα,
for α ∈ IR+, guarantees that in a finite number of steps the case where p′∗ · li∗ < 0 will be
reached, contradicting that xi
n
N ≤ ω̃N , ∀n ∈ IN. Consequently, there exists α ∈ IR+ such
that, for every α ≥ α, for every i ∈ IM , for every (p, li, Li) ∈ Pα, xi ∈ δi(p, li, Li) implies
xiN > ω̃N . Q.E.D.
Let some (p, p) ∈ IR∗N × IR∗N be given, where p ≤ p, p ≪ +∞N , 0N ≤ p, and pN =
pN = 1. The constrained equilibrium (p
∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) of the economy Ẽ(p, p), see Definition
4.6.1, is a Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ(p, p) with respect to the market of commodity N if
l∗iN < x
∗i
N − ωiN < L∗iN , ∀i ∈ IM , see Definition 4.7.5. It follows that it is not necessary
to specify Condition 3 and Condition 4 of a constrained equilibrium for the market
of commodity N when considering a Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of
commodity N. Therefore, a Drèze equilibrium with respect to the market of commodity
N, also called a Drèze equilibrium in the remaining chapters, is defined as follows.
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Definition 8.2.4 (Drèze equilibrium)
Let some (p, p) ∈ IR∗N × IR∗N be given, where p ≤ p, p ≪ +∞N , 0N ≤ p, and pN =
pN = 1. A Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ(p, p) = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) is
an element
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ P(p,p) × l̃(QN )× L̃(QN)×X
satisfying




∗i −∑i∈IM ωi = 0N ,




j for some consumer i
′ ∈ IM implies






j for some consumer i
′ ∈ IM implies
x∗ij − ωij > l∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM ,
4. for every commodity j ∈ IN−1, p∗j > pj implies l∗ij < x∗ij −ωij , ∀i ∈ IM , and p∗j < pj
implies L∗ij > x
∗i
j − ωij , ∀i ∈ IM ,
5. l∗iN < x
∗i
N − ωiN < L∗iN , ∀i ∈ IM .
The set of Drèze equilibria of the economy Ẽ(p, p) is denoted by ẼD(p, p).
Let J ⊂ IN−1 denote the possibly empty set of commodities on the market of which
a minimum price is present, so
J = {j ∈ IN−1 | pj ≥ 0},
and let J ⊂ IN−1 denote the possibly empty set of commodities on the market of which
a maximum price prevails, so
J = {j ∈ IN−1 | pj < +∞}.
Notice that j ∈ IN−1 \ J implies l∗ij < x∗ij − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM , and j ∈ IN−1 \ J implies
L∗ij > x
∗i
j − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM . Hence, there is no supply rationing on a market if no minimum
price is specified on this market and there is no demand rationing on a market if no
maximum price is present on this market. If J = J = ∅, then one obtains the definition
of a Walrasian equilibrium, see Definition 3.8.1, since non-binding rationing schemes are
irrelevant. Therefore, the concept of a Drèze equilibrium generalizes the concept of a
Walrasian equilibrium. Define the set P by
P =
{
(p, p) ∈ IRN+ × IRN+
∣∣∣p ≤ p, pN = pN = 1
}
.
In Theorem 8.2.5 it will be shown that there is no loss of generality in assuming that for
every commodity a minimum price and a maximum price is given, so to consider only
proposals (p, p) of political candidates belonging to the set P . Therefore, P will be called
the set of price regulations.
242 Endogenously Determined Price Rigidities
Theorem 8.2.5
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let (p, p) ∈ IR∗N × IR∗N be
such that p ≤ p, p ≪ +∞N , 0N ≤ p, and pN = pN = 1. Then there exists (p′, p′) ∈ P
such that ẼD(p′, p′) = ẼD(p, p).
Proof
Let α ∈ IR+ be as in Theorem 8.2.3 and let α̂ ∈ IR+ be such that α̂ ≥ α and α̂ > pj,
∀j ∈ IN . Let p′ ∈ IRN+ be defined by p′j = pj , ∀j ∈ J ∪ {N}, and p′j = 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ J,
and let p′ ∈ IRN+ be defined by p′j = pj, ∀j ∈ J ∪ {N}, and p′j = α̂, ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ J.
Suppose (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p) satisfies ‖p∗‖∞ > α̂. Let l ∈ −IRMN+ and L ∈ IRMN+ be
obtained by defining, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN , lij = −ω̃j if l∗ij < x∗ij −ωij , lij = l∗ij
if l∗ij = x
∗i
j −ωij , Lij = ω̃j if L∗ij > x∗ij −ωij , and Lij = L∗ij if L∗ij = x∗ij −ωij . From Theorem
4.6.4 it follows that x∗i ∈ δi(p∗, li, Li), ∀i ∈ IM . Since (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p), it holds
that li ≥ −ω̃, ∀i ∈ IM , and Li ≤ ω̃, ∀i ∈ IM . For every j ∈ IN−1 with p∗j ≥ α̂ it follows
that lij = −ω̃j since α̂ > pj. Now it is easily verified that (p∗, li, Li) ∈ P α̂, ∀i ∈ IM .







N . Consequently, for every (p
∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p), ‖p∗‖∞ ≤ α̂.
Now it follows immediately that ẼD(p, p) ⊂ ẼD(p′, p′).
Suppose (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p′, p′) \ ẼD(p, p). Then, either there exists i1 ∈ IM and






j1, or there exists i
2 ∈ IM and j2 ∈ IN−1




















j1, where for the inequality Condition 3 of the definition
of a Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ(p′, p′), Definition 8.2.4, is used, yielding a contradiction.
Consider the second case. Let li
2 ∈ −IRN+ and Li
2 ∈ IRN+ be obtained by defining, for



































j . For every j ∈ IN with p∗j = α̂







j . Hence, it follows that l
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) ∈ P α̂. From Theorem 4.6.4 it follows that x∗i2 ∈ δi2(p∗, li2 , Li2). So, by
Theorem 8.2.3, x∗i
2









x∗iN ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ IM . Consequently, ẼD(p′, p′) ⊂ ẼD(p, p). Q.E.D.
The function p̂ : QN−1×P → IRN+ and the functions l̂ : QN−1 → −IRMN+ and L̂ : QN−1 →
IRMN+ are obtained by defining, for every j ∈ IN−1,
p̂j(q, p, p) = max
({
pj,min({pj(2− 3qj) + pj(3qj − 1), pj})
})
, ∀(q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 × P ,
l̂j(q) = l̃j
(
inf({1N , (3q⊤, 1)⊤})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1,
L̂j (q) = L̃j
(
inf({1N , 31N − (3q⊤, 2)⊤})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1,
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and by defining
p̂N(q, p, p) = 1, ∀(q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 × P ,
l̂N(q) = l̃N
(
inf({1N , (3q⊤, 1)⊤})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1,
L̂N (q) = L̃N
(
inf({1N , 31N − (3q⊤, 2)⊤})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1.
The notational conventions used for l̃ and L̃ are also used for l̂ and L̂. For every i ∈ IM ,
the relation δ̂i : QN−1 × P → IRN , called the reduced demand relation of consumer i, is
defined by
δ̂i(q, p, p) = δi
(
p̂(q, p, p), l̂i(q), L̂i(q)
)
, ∀(q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 × P .
The proof of the following result is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.7.1.
Theorem 8.2.6
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4. Let some (p, p) ∈ P be given.






i, then (p̂(q∗, p, p), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p).







i, then (p̂(q∗, p, p), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) is called a Drèze equilibrium
of Ẽ(p, p) induced by q∗. The set of elements q∗ of QN−1 inducing a Drèze equilibrium of
Ẽ(p, p) is denoted by Q̃D(p, p). Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4.7.2 the following
result can be shown.
Theorem 8.2.7
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4. Let some (p, p) ∈ P be given.
If (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p), then there exists q∗ ∈ Q̃D(p, p) such that (p̂(q∗, p, p), l̂(q∗),
L̂(q∗), x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p) and (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p̂(q∗, p, p), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗), i.e., (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗)
is equivalent to (p̂(q∗, p, p), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) in the sense of Definition 4.6.2.
Therefore, it follows immediately that there is no loss of generality in considering only
Drèze equilibria of the economy Ẽ(p, p) induced by some q∗ ∈ Q̃D(p, p). The following
result is closely related to Theorem 4.7.3.
Theorem 8.2.8
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4. For every i ∈ IM , the reduced
demand relation δ̂i of consumer i has the following properties:
1. δ̂i is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence,
2. for every (q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 ×P , for every xi ∈ δ̂i(q, p, p), for every j ∈ IN−1, qj = 0
implies xij − ωij ≥ 0, and qj = 1 implies xij − ωij ≤ 0,
3. for every (q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 × P, for every xi ∈ δ̂i(q, p, p), p̂(q, p, p) · (xi − ωi) = 0.
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Proof
By the continuity of the functions p̂, l̂, and L̂, and since δi|P , ∀i ∈ IM , is a compact-valued,
upper hemi-continuous correspondence by Theorem 8.2.1, it follows from Theorem 2.5.5
that δ̂i, ∀i ∈ IM , is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Using the
convex-valuedness of βi shown in Lemma 4.2.1, it follows easily that δ̂i is a convex-valued
correspondence.
Let some i ∈ IM and some (q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 × P be given. For every j ∈ IN−1, if qj = 0,
then xi ∈ δ̂i(q, p, p) implies xij − ωij ≥ l̂ij(q) = 0. For every j ∈ IN−1, if qj = 1, then
xi ∈ δ̂i(q, p, p) implies xij − ωij ≤ L̂ij(q) = 0. From the strong monotonicity of i it
follows that p̂(q, p, p) · (xi − ωi) = 0. Q.E.D.
This theorem concludes the description of the economic system.
8.3 The Political System
For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i, the utility function ui representing
the preference relation i, and the initial endowment ωi are assumed to be given in this
section. Moreover, the rationing function (l̃, L̃) is assumed to be given. Now the political
system can be described. The behaviour of the government will be modelled as being the
result of the competition for votes between two political candidates, indexed by k ∈ I2.
It is not difficult to extend the model in a similar way as in Wittman (1984) and to allow
for an arbitrary number of political candidates. The electorate consists of the consumers
in the economy and chooses between the political candidates by majority voting.
The political candidates are assumed to have the possibility to propose price regula-
tions on the markets. For every k ∈ I2, a non-empty subset Ak of P is given, denoting
the set of admissible price regulations among which political candidate k can choose. An
element ak of Ak corresponds with the choice of a lower bound and an upper bound on
the set of admissible price systems by a political candidate k ∈ I2. If a political candidate
k ∈ I2 chooses some ak ∈ Ak, then the proposed set of admissible price systems of the




∣∣∣akj ≤ pj ≤ akN+j , ∀j ∈ IN
}
,
and the resulting economy is given by Ẽ(ak) = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , Pak , (l̃, L̃)). In general, it
is possible that there is more than one Walrasian or Drèze equilibrium price system and
allocation in this economy. For instance, Theorem 3.13.1 implies that economies exist
with an arbitrary number of Walrasian equilibria. It will be assumed that a political
candidate proposes together with the chosen price regulation also a corresponding Drèze
equilibrium price system, the amount of supply rationing (also called unemployment),
and the amount of demand rationing on each market, i.e., the state on every market.
The set Ak will denote the set of admissible actions of political candidate k ∈ I2 and is




(ak, qk) ∈ Ak ×QN−1
∣∣∣ qk ∈ Q̃D(ak)
}
. (8.3)
In case Ak = P, the corresponding set of admissible actions Ak is denoted by A. Clearly,
a huge amount of rationality of the political candidates is assumed. An alternative would
be that political candidates have expectations with respect to the resulting state of the
economy given any price regulation. However, such an analysis would involve quite some
arbitrariness with respect to the expectations of the political candidates. Moreover, it is
interesting to know whether price regulations may result in the economic system, even
if political candidates behave fully rational. Another alternative is to assume that some
status quo is given, and that political candidates either choose to stay at the status quo
or choose directions of motion away from the status quo, a possibility investigated in
Chapter 9.
The indirect utility function ṽi : A → IR of a consumer i ∈ IM is defined by associ-
ating with every (a, q) ∈ A the real number ṽi(a, q) satisfying
ṽi(a, q) = ui(x∗i), ∀x∗i ∈ δ̂i(q, a).
Clearly, this function is well-defined.
In order to describe the assumptions with respect to the set of admissible price
regulations of the political candidates, a mathematical concept will be introduced first.
Recall that, for every t ∈ IR+, [−t1m, t1m] denotes the set {s ∈ IRm | −t1m ≤ s ≤ t1m}.
For every t ∈ IR+, the projection function πm,t : IRm → [−t1m, t1m] associates with every
element s ∈ IRm the element of [−t1m, t1m] that minimizes ‖s−s‖2 over s ∈ [−t1m, t1m].
So, for every t ∈ IR+,
πm,t(s) = inf ({sup({−t1m, s}), t1m}) , ∀s ∈ IRm. (8.4)
It follows from (8.4) or from Lemma 7.2.1 that πm,t is a continuous function for every
t ∈ IR+. Now it is possible to give the definition of a property of a subset of a Euclidean
space, being weaker than compactness but stronger than closedness, and hence called
semi-compactness.
Definition 8.3.1 (Semi-compactness)
A subset S of IRm is semi-compact if πm,t(S) is closed for every t ∈ IR+.
The following lemma states that semi-compactness is a weaker property than compact-
ness.
Lemma 8.3.2
If a subset S of IRm is compact, then it is semi-compact.
Proof
For every t ∈ IR+, since S is compact and πm,t is continuous, it follows from Theorem
2.3.13 that πm,t(S) is compact and therefore closed. Q.E.D.
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Next, it is shown that a semi-compact set is closed.
Lemma 8.3.3
If a subset S of IRm is semi-compact, then it is closed.
Proof
Suppose S is not closed. Then there exists a sequence (sn)n∈IN in S converging to some
s ∈ IRm \ S. Let t ∈ IR+ be such that t > ‖s‖∞. Then (sn)n∈IN has a subsequence in
πm,t(S) converging to s. Obviously, s ∈ IRm \ πm,t(S), so πm,t(S) is not closed. This
contradicts the semi-compactness of S. Q.E.D.
Two examples of semi-compact sets not being compact are the sets IRm and INm. An
example of a closed set not being semi-compact is the set {s ∈ IR2 | s2 = arctan(s1)}.
It is not difficult to show that for subsets of IR the concepts of semi-compactness and
closedness coincide. When verifying the semi-compactness of a set the following property
is useful.
Lemma 8.3.4
Let S be a subset of IRm and let t ∈ IR+ be such that πm,t(S) is closed. Then πm,t(S) is
closed for every t ∈ [0, t].
Proof
From (8.4) it follows that πm,t(πm,t(S)) = πm,t(S), ∀t ≤ t. Since πm,t(S) is bounded
and closed, it is compact. Moreover, the function πm,t is continuous for every t ∈ [0, t].
Therefore, it follows from Theorem 2.3.13 that the set πm,t(πm,t(S)) is compact and
therefore closed for every t ∈ [0, t]. Q.E.D.
The following assumption is used in the main results of this chapter.
A5. For every political candidate k ∈ I2, the set of admissible price regulations Ak is
non-empty and semi-compact, and Ak ⊂ P.
The assumptions made with respect to the set of admissible price regulations Ak of a
political candidate k ∈ I2 are very weak. For every t ∈ [1,→) it holds that π2N,t(P ) =
[−t12N , t12N ] ∩ P, an intersection of two closed sets and therefore closed. So, the set P
itself satisfies Assumption A5. Hence, the case Ak = P, ∀k ∈ I2, is not excluded. This
is conceptually the most interesting case since it corresponds to the situation where in
a democratic society price regulations are chosen by the political candidates, and where
there are no restrictions on the set of admissible price regulations.
However, it is also possible to model that a political candidate is not capable of
setting arbitrarily chosen lower and upper bounds on the prices, for example because
of institutional reasons. This might be the more realistic case since regulators are not
capable of enforcing every possible price regulation, see also Cox (1980). This can be
modelled by restricting the set Ak of admissible price regulations of a political candidate
k ∈ I2 to be some non-empty, semi-compact subset of P. Another possibility is that
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each political candidate is only capable of considering a finite number of possibilities,
in which case the set Ak is a finite set. Assumption A5 also admits many intermediate
possibilities for the set Ak, for example cases where political candidates are only able
to regulate prices on some markets. An example for the case N = 3 is given by the
semi-compact set Ak = {(p, p) ∈ P | p2 = p2 = p3 = p3 = 1}.
If the set of admissible actions is more than one-dimensional, as is clearly allowed to be
the case in this chapter, then according to Kramer (1973) deterministic voting equilibria
only exist under extremely restrictive assumptions. This is why attention will also be
focused on probabilistic voting models, where political candidates do not necessarily
have perfect information about the voting decision of consumers. Voting models with
some probabilistic aspects were first rigorously analyzed in Hinich and Ordeshook (1969,
1971), and Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook (1972). For the sake of simplicity, in this
chapter probabilistic voting models without abstentions will be considered following the
approach of among others, Comanor (1976), Coughlin and Nitzan (1981b), and Feldman
and Lee (1988). In Wittman (1984) the following two arguments for the probabilistic
voting model are given. The first argument is that political candidates do not have
perfect information about the preference relations and actions of the voters. This is also
the point of view taken in Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell (1990), where in the preferences
of the voters there is a bias in favour of or against a political candidate not perfectly
known to the political candidates. The second argument is that voters do not have
perfect information about the admissible action chosen by the political candidates when
casting their vote.
It will be assumed that political candidates have the same subjective expectations
about the voting behaviour of the consumers. This assumption can easily be relaxed, but
is made for notational convenience. For every political candidate k ∈ I2, for every con-
sumer i ∈ IM , a voting function πik : ṽi(A1)× ṽi(A2)→ [0, 1] is assumed to be given, de-
scribing the expectations of political candidate k about the voting behaviour of consumer
i. If the political candidates have chosen admissible actions (a1, q1) ∈ A1 and (a2, q2) ∈
A2, then πik(ṽi(a1, q1), ṽi(a2, q2)) is the probability political candidate k ∈ I2 assigns to
the event that consumer i ∈ IM votes for him. This completes the description of the po-
litical economic system, to be denoted by Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2).
Deterministic voting without abstentions corresponds to the case where, for every
i ∈ IM , for every (vi1, vi2) ∈ ṽi(A1)× ṽi(A2), πi1(vi1, vi2) = 1 if vi1 > vi2, πi1(vi1, vi2) = 12
if vi1 = vi2, πi1(vi1, vi2) = 0 if vi1 < vi2, and πi2(vi1, vi2) = 1−πi1(vi1, vi2). As a matter of
realism the assumption that, for every i ∈ IM , for every k ∈ I2, πik is non-decreasing in
vik and non-increasing in vik
′
, k′ 6= k, is often made. For the main results of this chapter
the only assumption needed with respect to the voting functions is the following.
A6. For every consumer i ∈ IM , for every political candidate k ∈ I2, the function
πik : ṽi(A1)× ṽi(A2)→ [0, 1] is continuous.
In case both ṽi(A1) and ṽi(A2) have no accumulation points, Assumption A6 does not
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exclude any function πik and therefore does not exclude deterministic voting without
abstentions. This is for example the case if the sets A1 and A2 are finite. Moreover,
voting functions satisfying Assumption A6 are good approximations of any kind of voting
behaviour.
Let some consumer i ∈ IM be given, let the consumption setX i be convex, and let the
utility function ui be continuous, representing the complete, transitive, and continuous
preference relation i . Now consider the case where another representation of i, say
ui, (not necessarily continuous) is chosen. Since the voting functions depend on the
representation chosen, it is a natural question to ask whether the voting function πik,
∀k ∈ I2, associated with ui is continuous if πik, ∀k ∈ I2, is continuous, or in other words
whether Assumption A6 is independent of the representation chosen for the preference
relation. Let vi : A → IR denote the indirect utility function of consumer i corresponding
to the utility function ui. Notice that for every k ∈ I2 the voting function πik : vi(A1)×
vi(A2)→ [0, 1] associated with ui is uniquely determined since
πik
(












For some consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i be convex, let the utility function
ui be continuous, representing the complete, transitive, and continuous preference relation
i, and let the voting function πik, ∀k ∈ I2, be continuous. Let ui : X i → IR be a utility
function representing i . Then the voting function πik, ∀k ∈ I2, associated with ui is
continuous.
Proof
Let the function f i : ui(X i)→ ui(X i) be defined by f i(ui(xi)) = ui(xi), ∀xi ∈ X i.
Suppose that f i is not continuous. Then there exists t ∈ ui(X i), ε ∈ IR++, and a
sequence (tn)n∈IN in u
i(X i) such that tn → t and, for every n ∈ IN, |f i(tn) − f i(t)| > ε.
Since the set {tn | n ∈ IN} ∪ {t} is compact, it has a minimum and a maximum,
denoted by t− and t+, respectively. Let xi−, xi+ ∈ X i be such that ui(xi−) = t− and
ui(xi+) = t+. Since the set X i, defined by X i = {λxi− + (1 − λ)xi+ | λ ∈ [0, 1]}, is
path-connected and hence connected by Theorem 2.3.5, Xi ⊂ X i, and ui is continuous,
it follows that ui(X i) is a connected subset of IR by Theorem 2.3.13 and therefore an
interval by Theorem 2.3.12. Hence, f i({tn | n ∈ IN} ∪ {t}) ⊂ ui(Xi). For every n ∈ IN,
choose xi
n ∈ X i such that ui(xin) = f i(tn). Let xi ∈ X i be such that ui(xi) = f i(t).
Since Xi is compact, it follows that (xi
n




to some x̂i ∈ X i. From the continuity of ui it follows that f i(tnm) = ui(xin
m
) → ui(x̂i).
Moreover, ui(x̂i) 6= f i(t) = ui(xi). If ui(x̂i) < ui(xi), then there exists x̃i ∈ X i such that
ui(x̂i) < ui(x̃i) < ui(xi). In this case it follows from the continuity of ui that there exists
m′ ∈ IN such that, for every m ≥ m′, ui(xin
m
) < ui(x̃i), so ui(xi
nm
) < ui(x̃i) and hence








) ≤ ui(x̃i) < ui(xi),
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a contradiction. If ui(xi) < ui(x̂i), then a contradiction is obtained similarly. Conse-
quently, the function f i is continuous.
Let vi : A → IR be the indirect utility function associated with ui and let (vi1, vi2) ∈
vi(A1) × vi(A2) be given. Then πik(vi1, vi2) = πik(f i(vi1), f i(vi2)), so πik is continuous
by the continuity of the functions πik and f i. Q.E.D.
The political candidates are assumed to maximize either both their expected plurality
or both their probability of winning the elections. In the first case the pay-off function
K1 : A1 ×A2 → IR of political candidate 1 is defined by
K1
(


















(a1, q1), (a2, q2)
)
∈ A1 ×A2. (8.5)
The pay-off function K2 : A1 × A2 → IR of political candidate 2 is easily seen to be
given by K2 = −K1. If the political candidates maximize their probability of winning




































(a1, q1), (a2, q2)
)
∈ A1 ×A2. (8.6)
Notice that the probability of political candidate 1 winning the elections is obtained
by summation over all sets containing at least half of the consumers of the probability
that all the consumers in this set vote for political candidate 1, while the consumers
in the complement of this set vote for political candidate 2. In case of a tie, the toss
with a fair coin determines the outcome of the elections. Empty sets are included in
the summation in (8.6) and, as mentioned in Section 2.2, the convention is made that
∏
i∈∅ π
ik(ṽi(a1, q1), ṽi(a2, q2)) = 1. Notice that the subtraction of 12 implies that the pay-
off function K2 : A1 × A2 → IR of political candidate 2 is given by K2 = −K1. Now
the price rigidities ruling in the economic system will be determined endogenously as
the price regulations resulting in a Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension of the game
with sets of admissible actions A1 and A2 and pay-off functions K1 and K2, where K1
and K2 are either as defined by (8.5) or as defined by (8.6).
For every k ∈ I2, let M(Ak) be the collection of Borel probability measures on Ak.
Then a Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension of the game G = (A1,A2, K1, K2), where
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K1 and K2 are either as defined by (8.5) or as defined by (8.6), is a pair of probability
measures (µ∗1, µ∗2) ∈ M(A1)×M(A2) such that
∫
A1×A2
K1d(µ∗1 × µ∗2) ≥
∫
A1×A2
K1d(µ1 × µ∗2), ∀µ1 ∈M(A1),
∫
A1×A2
K2d(µ∗1 × µ∗2) ≥
∫
A1×A2
K2d(µ∗1 × µ2), ∀µ2 ∈M(A2),
see for example Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). A Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension
of the game G is also called a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. A Nash equilibrium
of the game G = (A1,A2, K1, K2), where K1 and K2 are either as defined in (8.5) or as
defined in (8.6), is a pair of admissible actions ((a∗1, q∗1), (a∗2, q∗2)) ∈ A1×A2 such that
K1
(




(a1, q1), (a∗2, q∗2)
)
, ∀(a1, q1) ∈ A1,
K2
(




(a∗1, q∗1), (a2, q2)
)
, ∀(a2, q2) ∈ A2.
A Nash equilibrium of the game G is also called a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Definition 8.3.6 (Political economic equilibrium)
A political economic equilibrium of the political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ,
(l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) is a Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension of the game G =
(A1,A2, K1, K2), where K1 and K2 are either as defined by (8.5) or as defined by (8.6).
Usually, theorists in voting theory are reluctant to use an equilibrium in mixed strategies
as a solution to the game as described in Definition 8.3.6. The main objection against
mixed strategies is that the game in Definition 8.3.6 does not take into account the
dynamic features of campaigns in real world elections. During the campaign political
candidates have the possibility to sequentially adjust their proposals. In case a Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies exists, a political candidate can use his pure strategy
during the entire campaign. In case political candidates adopt a mixed strategy, the
proposals made by them at a specific point in time will in general not be best responses
to each other. Therefore, at the next point in time a political candidate might want
to adjust his strategy. However, as has been pointed out in McKelvey and Ordeshook
(1976) this criticism is not completely justified and it is interesting to consider mixed
strategy equilibria too, their main reasons being the following. First, if one wants to
analyze dynamic issues, then this should be explicitly incorporated in the game defined.
Considering mixed strategy equilibria for the static game of Definition 8.3.6 is an essential
first step. Secondly, it is possible to give several reasonable dynamic models where indeed
equilibria corresponding to the mixed strategy equilibria of the static game are obtained.
Moreover, it seems reasonable that also in a dynamic context the political candidates
make proposals in the support set of mixed strategy equilibria of the static game.
8.4 The Existence of a Political Economic Equilibrium 251
8.4 The Existence of a Political Economic Equilib-
rium
The political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) is as-
sumed to be given in this section. Sufficient conditions for both the existence of a
political economic equilibrium in mixed strategies and the existence of a political eco-
nomic equilibrium in pure strategies of the political economic system Ê will be given.
The first step is to show that the set of admissible actions of each political candidate
is non-empty. Theorem 8.4.1 guarantees the existence of a Drèze equilibrium for given
lower and upper bounds on the prices. Notice that Theorem 8.4.1 does not follow from
Corollary 4.7.6 since it is not assumed that p≫ 0N .
Theorem 8.4.1
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let (p, p) ∈ P be given.
Then ẼD(p, p) 6= ∅.
Proof
It will be shown that there exists q∗ ∈ Q̃D(p, p). Since QN−1 is compact and L̂ is a con-
tinuous function, it follows from Theorem 2.3.13 that L̂(QN−1) is compact and therefore
bounded from above. Let L ∈ IRMN+ be such that L ≤ L, ∀L ∈ L̂(QN−1). For every
i ∈ IM , let the set X i be defined by
X i =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣xi ≤ ωi + Li
}
.
Notice that for every i ∈ IM the set X i is compact and that, for every q ∈ QN−1,
xi ∈ δ̂i(q, p, p) implies xi ∈ Xi. Let the relation µ : ∏i∈IM X i → QN−1 be defined by




























Let the relation ϕ :
∏
i∈IM X











i × QN−1 is a non-empty, compact, convex set. As in the proof of
Theorem 4.7.4 it can be shown that µ is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-









j−ωij) < 0 and
q ∈ µ(x) implies qj = 0. Since δ̂i, ∀i ∈ IM , is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper
hemi-continuous correspondence by Theorem 8.2.8, it follows using Theorem 2.5.10 that
ϕ is a compact-valued, convex-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. There-
fore, from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, Theorem 2.6.1, it follows that ϕ has a fixed
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point (x∗, q∗) ∈ ∏i∈IM X i ×QN−1 satisfying
x∗i ∈ δ̂i(q∗, p, p), ∀i ∈ IM ,
and
q∗ ∈ µ(x∗).
It remains to be shown that
∑
i∈IM (x
∗i − ωi) = 0N . From Theorem 8.2.8 it follows that
















j1 − ωij1) ≥ 0 by Theorem 8.2.8, a contradiction. If j1 = N, then, by (8.7),




j2 − ωij2) > 0. It follows that




j2 − ωij2) ≤ 0 by Theorem 8.2.8, a contradiction. Consequently,∑
i∈IM (x
∗i − ωi) ≥ 0N .

















∗i − ωi) = 0N . Q.E.D.
In Theorem 8.4.2 it will be shown that there exists α ∈ IR+ such that, for every price
regulation (p, p) ∈ P , for every Drèze equilibrium (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p), it holds
that if p∗j ≥ α for some commodity j ∈ IN−1, then every consumer keeps his initial
endowments of this commodity. Notice that α can be chosen independently of the price
regulation imposed. This is quite remarkable since the following intuition behind this
result is wrong. If the price of a commodity is very high, then every consumer wants
to supply this commodity. Therefore, full rationing on supply on the market of this
commodity results in a Drèze equilibrium of the economy. This intuition is not correct
since there might be prices of other commodities being even higher. It is therefore not
possible to give an upper bound on the price of a commodity such that no consumer
demands this commodity. The right argument goes along the following lines. If, although
the price of a commodity is very high, a consumer demands this commodity, then he
certainly demands an amount of the numeraire commodity exceeding the total initial
endowment of the numeraire commodity, giving a contradiction since this cannot happen
in a Drèze equilibrium of the economy. It has to be remarked that it is possible that an
equilibrium price of a commodity exceeds α since the lower bound on the price of this
commodity could be greater than α. In case the assumptions of Theorem 8.4.2 are not
satisfied, it is possible that a real number α with the desired properties does not exist.
This follows immediately from the example in Section 6 of Bénassy (1975b). In that
example (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) is given such that for every price regulation (p, p) ∈ P
some trade occurs on every market in the unique Drèze equilibrium of ẼD(p, p). In that
example the preference relations of every consumer satisfy weak monotonicity, but not
strong monotonicity, and the initial endowment of every consumer is an element of the
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boundary of the consumption set, whereas the other assumptions made in Theorem 8.4.2
are satisfied.
Theorem 8.4.2
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let α ∈ IR+ be as in The-
orem 8.2.3. Then, for every (p, p) ∈ P, for every Drèze equilibrium (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈
ẼD(p, p), for every j ∈ IN−1 with p∗j ≥ α, for every i ∈ IM , l∗ij = 0 and x∗ij = ωij.
Proof
Suppose, for some (p, p) ∈ P, there exists (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p), j′ ∈ IN−1 with
p∗j′ ≥ α, and i1 ∈ IM such that l∗i
1
j′ < 0. Moreover, j
′ can be chosen such that, for









j′ < 0, a contradiction. So, there exists i







j′ . Let l
i2 ∈ −IRN+ and Li
2 ∈ IRN+ be obtained by defining, for every j ∈ IN ,
li
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) ∈ Pα. From Theorem
4.6.4 it follows that x∗i
2 ∈ δi2(p∗, li2 , Li2). Therefore, by Theorem 8.2.3, x∗i2N > ω̃N , a
contradiction. Consequently, for every (p, p) ∈ P , for every (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p),
for every j ∈ IN−1 with p∗j ≥ α, for every i ∈ IM , l∗ij = 0. So, for every j ∈ IN−1 with








j , it holds that
x∗ij = ω
i
j, ∀i ∈ IM . Q.E.D.
In Theorem 8.4.3 it is shown that there is a compact subset of P such that for every
element of P outside this compact set, the set of corresponding Drèze equilibrium al-
locations is the same as the set of Drèze equilibrium allocations corresponding to some
element of P in this compact set. The proof is based on the result of Theorem 8.4.2.
Theorem 8.4.3
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let α ∈ IR+ be as in
Theorem 8.2.3. Let some (p, p) ∈ P be given. Let (p′, p′) ∈ P be given by p′j =
min({α, pj}), ∀j ∈ IN−1, p′N = 1, p′j = min({α, pj}), ∀j ∈ IN−1, and p′N = 1. Then
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p, p) for some p∗ ∈ P(p,p) if and only if (p∗′, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ ẼD(p′, p′)
for some p∗′ ∈ P(p′,p′).
Proof
Let (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗)∈ ẼD(p, p) be given. Let p∗′∈P(p′,p′) be defined by p∗′j = min({α, p∗j}),
∀j ∈ IN−1, and p∗′N = 1. Clearly, Condition 2, Condition 3, and Condition 5 of the defi-
nition of a Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ(p′, p′), Definition 8.2.4, are satisfied by (p∗′, l∗, L∗, x∗).
For every j ∈ IN−1, if p∗′j < p′j, then p∗j < pj , and if p∗′j > p′j, then p∗j > pj . Therefore, Con-
dition 4 of the definition of a Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ(p′, p′) is satisfied by (p∗′, l∗, L∗, x∗).
Let the set J be defined by
J = {j ∈ IN−1 | p∗′j = α}.
Then,
p∗j ≥ α, ∀j ∈ J, and p∗′j = p∗j , ∀j ∈ IN \ J. (8.8)
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Moreover, by (8.8) and by Theorem 8.4.2,
0 = l∗ij = x
∗i
j − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM , ∀j ∈ J, (8.9)
so x∗i ∈ βi(p∗′, l∗i, L∗i), ∀i ∈ IM . It remains to be shown that x∗i ∈ δi(p∗′, l∗i, L∗i),
∀i ∈ IM . Let l ∈ −IRMN+ and L ∈ IRMN+ be obtained by defining, for every i ∈ IM , for
every j ∈ IN , lij = −ω̃j if l∗ij < x∗ij −ωij , lij = l∗ij if l∗ij = x∗ij −ωij, Lij = ω̃j if L∗ij > x∗ij −ωij,






j −ωij. By Theorem 4.6.4 it holds that x∗i ∈ δi(p∗, li, Li), ∀i ∈ IM .
From (8.9) it follows that
lij = l
∗i
j = 0, ∀i ∈ IM , ∀j ∈ J. (8.10)
It will be shown that x∗i ∈ δi(p∗′, li, Li), ∀i ∈ IM , from which it follows that x∗i ∈
δi(p∗′, l∗i, L∗i), ∀i ∈ IM , by Theorem 4.6.4.
Let some consumer i ∈ IM be given. Suppose x∗i /∈ δi(p∗′, li, Li).
For every λ ∈ [0, 1], let p(λ) ∈ IRN+ be given by p(λ) = λp∗′ + (1 − λ)p∗. Let some
λ ∈ (0, 1] be given such that x∗i /∈ δi(p(λ), li, Li). Let xi be any consumption bundle in















































j−ωij). Since, by (8.10), xij−ωij ≥ lij = 0,
∀j ∈ J, it follows that xij > ωij for some j ∈ J. So,








implies ∃j ∈ J, xij − ωij > 0.
(8.11)
Let λ ∈ [0, 1] be defined by
λ = sup
({
λ ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣∣x∗i ∈ δi(p(λ), li, Li)
})
.
So, there exists a sequence (λn)n∈IN in [0, 1] such that λ
n → λ, and, for every n ∈ IN,
0 ≤ λn ≤ λ and x∗i ∈ δi(p(λn), li, Li). Clearly, p(λn) · li < 0, ∀n ∈ IN, and p(λ) · li < 0, so
(p(λn), li, Li) ∈ P, ∀n ∈ IN, and (p(λ), li, Li) ∈ P. Since δi|P is a compact-valued, upper
hemi-continuous correspondence by Theorem 8.2.1, it follows that x∗i ∈ δi(p(λ), li, Li)
by Theorem 2.5.6.
Now let (λn)n∈IN be a sequence in [0, 1] such that λ
n → λ, λn ≥ λ, ∀n ∈ IN, and
x∗i /∈ δi(p(λn), li, Li), ∀n ∈ IN. Notice that such a sequence exists since it has been
supposed that x∗i /∈ δi(p(1), li, Li). Then, for every n ∈ IN, by (8.11) there exists xin ∈
δi(p(λn), li, Li) and jn ∈ J such that xinjn−ωijn > 0. Hence, for every n ∈ IN, by Theorem
4.6.4, xi




j , ∀j ∈ IN \{jn}. Without loss





N , 2ω̃]× [−ω̃, 0N ] converges to some (xi, li) ∈
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[0N , 2ω̃]× [−ω̃, 0N ]. Clearly, there exists j′ ∈ J such that lij′ = −ω̃j′ and lij = lij, ∀j ∈ IN \
{j′}. Moreover, xi ∈ δi(p(λ), li, Li) by Theorem 2.5.6 since (p(λn), lin , Li) ∈ P, ∀n ∈ IN,
(p(λ), li, Li) ∈ P, and δi|P is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence
by Theorem 8.2.1. Since xi
n ∈ δi(p(λn), li, Li), ∀n ∈ IN, it follows similarly that xi ∈
δi(p(λ), li, Li). So, x∗i ∼i xi and therefore x∗i ∈ δi(p(λ), li, Li). It is easily verified that
(p(λ), li, Li) ∈ Pα, so x∗iN > ω̃N , a contradiction. Consequently, x∗i ∈ δi(p∗′, li, Li),
∀i ∈ IM .










∣∣∣p∗′j = α and ∃i ∈ IM , l∗ij = x∗ij − ωij
}
.
Let p∗ ∈ P(p,p) be defined by p∗j = pj , ∀j ∈ J1, p∗j = pj, ∀j ∈ J2, and p∗j = p∗′j ,
∀j ∈ IN \(J1∪J2). It is easily verified that (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) satisfies Condition 2, Condition
3, Condition 4, and Condition 5 of the definition of a Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ(p, p),
Definition 8.2.4. For every j ∈ IN−1, if p∗′j < α, then p∗j = p∗′j , and if p∗′j = α, then
p∗j ≥ p∗′j and, by Theorem 8.4.2, 0 = l∗ij = x∗ij −ωij, ∀i ∈ IM . Therefore, for every i ∈ IM ,
x∗i ∈ βi(p∗, l∗i, L∗i) ⊂ βi(p∗′, l∗i, L∗i) and hence x∗i ∈ δi(p∗, l∗i, L∗i). So, (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗)
satisfies Condition 1 of a Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ(p, p). Q.E.D.
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let α ∈ [1,→) be as in
Theorem 8.2.3. For every political candidate k ∈ I2, define the set Ak,α by Ak,α =
π2N,α(A
k) and define the set Ak,α as in (8.3) where Ak is replaced by Ak,α. Notice that
Ak,α ⊂ P, ∀k ∈ I2. The requirement α ∈ [1,→) guarantees that, for every k ∈ I2,
for every ak ∈ Ak,α, akN = ak2N = 1. Theorem 8.4.4 states that the set of actions Ak,α,
∀k ∈ I2, is non-empty and compact.
Theorem 8.4.4
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (A
k)k∈I2 satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. Let α ∈ [1,→) be as
in Theorem 8.2.3. Then the set Ak,α, ∀k ∈ I2, is non-empty and compact.
Proof
Let some k ∈ I2 be given. It follows immediately, from Theorem 8.4.1 and the set Ak
being non-empty, that the set Ak,α is non-empty. Clearly, the set Ak,α is bounded. It
remains to be shown that the set Ak,α is closed. Let (pn, pn, qn)n∈IN be a sequence in
Ak,α converging to some (p′, p′, q) ∈ IRN × IRN × QN−1. Since Ak is semi-compact, it
follows that Ak,α is closed. So, (p′, p′, q) ∈ Ak,α ×QN−1. By definition of Ak,α, for every
n ∈ IN, there exists (x)n ∈ X such that (p̂(qn, pn, pn), l̂(qn), L̂(qn), (x)n) ∈ ẼD(pn, pn).
The sequence ((x)n)n∈IN in X is obviously bounded and X is closed. Therefore, there
exists a subsequence ((x)n
m
)m∈IN converging to some x ∈ X. It will be shown that
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→ max
({




























inf({1N , 31N−(3q⊤, 2)⊤})
)
= L̂(q).
For every i ∈ IM it follows from Theorem 8.2.1 that δi|P is a compact-valued, upper hemi-










)) ∈ P, ∀m ∈
IN, and (p̂(q, p′, p′), l̂i(q), L̂i(q)) ∈ P. Hence, it follows from Theorem 2.5.6 that xi ∈
























Hence, (p̂(q, p′, p′), l̂(q), L̂(q), x) ∈ ẼD(p′, p′) by Theorem 8.2.6. Therefore, (p′, p′, q) ∈
Ak,α. Q.E.D.
Let (X i, ui, ωi), (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let α ∈ [1,→) be as in Theorem
8.2.3. For every political candidate k ∈ I2, define the function Kk,α : A1,α ×A2,α → IR
by (8.5) or by (8.6). For every consumer i ∈ IM it follows from Theorem 8.4.3 that
ṽi(Ak) = ṽi(Ak,α), ∀k ∈ I2, so the function πik : ṽi(A1) × ṽi(A2) → [0, 1], ∀k ∈ I2, is
well-defined on ṽi(A1,α)× ṽi(A2,α). Therefore, the function Kk,α, ∀k ∈ I2, is well-defined
on A1,α × A2,α. In the next theorem it is shown that the function Kk,α, ∀k ∈ I2, is
continuous.
Theorem 8.4.5
Let the political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) satisfy
the Assumptions A1-A6. Let α ∈ [1,→) be as in Theorem 8.2.3. Then, for every political
candidate k ∈ I2, the function Kk,α : A1,α × A2,α → IR as defined by (8.5) or (8.6) is
continuous.
Proof
Let some i ∈ IM be given. It is first shown that ṽi is continuous. Let (pn, pn, qn)n∈IN be
a sequence in A converging to (p′, p′, q) ∈ A. For every n ∈ IN, let xin ∈ δ̂i(qn, pn, pn)
be given. Since δ̂i is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence by The-
orem 8.2.8, it follows from Theorem 2.5.6 that the sequence (xi
n
)n∈IN has a subsequence
converging to some xi ∈ δ̂i(q, p′, p′). Hence, using the continuity of ui,
ṽi(pn, pn, qn) = ui(xi
n
)→ ui(xi) = ṽi(p′, p′, q).
Let some k′ ∈ I2 be given. By Theorem 8.4.3 it holds that ṽi(Ak′) = ṽi(Ak′,α), so the
function πik
′
is continuous on ṽi(A1,α)× ṽi(A2,α) by Assumption A6. Now the continuity
of Kk
′,α follows from the continuity of ṽi, ∀i ∈ IM , and the continuity of πik, ∀i ∈ IM ,
∀k ∈ I2. Q.E.D.
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The following result is given in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and has first been shown in
Glicksberg (1952) as an application of Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem, Theorem 2.6.2.
It yields the final step in proving the existence of a political economic equilibrium of the
political economic system Ê .
Theorem 8.4.6
The mixed extension of the game G = (A1,A2, K1, K2) has a Nash equilibrium if A1 and
A2 are non-empty, compact sets and K1 and K2 are continuous functions.
See Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Theorem 3, page 6.
In the next theorem the existence of a political economic equilibrium of the political
economic system Ê is shown using Theorem 8.4.6.
Theorem 8.4.7
Let the political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ), (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) satisfy
the Assumptions A1-A6. Then there exists a political economic equilibrium of the politi-
cal economic system Ê .
Proof
In order to show the existence of a political economic equilibrium of Ê , the existence
of a Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension of the game G = (A1,A2, K1, K2) has
to be shown. Let α ∈ [1,→) be as in Theorem 8.2.3 and consider the game Gα =
(A1,α,A2,α, K1,α, K2,α). According to Theorem 8.4.4, A1,α and A2,α are non-empty, com-
pact sets. By Theorem 8.4.5, K1,α and K2,α are continuous functions on A1,α × A2,α.
Hence, by Theorem 8.4.6, the mixed extension of Gα has at least one Nash equilibrium
(µ∗1, µ∗2) ∈M(A1,α)×M(A2,α). Obviously, using Theorem 8.4.3, this Nash equilibrium
yields a Nash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the game G. Q.E.D.
It is interesting to have sufficient conditions for the existence of a political economic
equilibrium in pure strategies of the political economic system Ê . Usually, it is sufficient
to assume certain concavity and convexity conditions with respect to the pay-off functions
and strategy sets in order to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies,
see for example Feldman and Lee (1988). However, since the set of admissible actions
Ak of a political candidate k ∈ I2 is not necessarily convex, these conditions might not
be satisfied. In Theorem 8.4.9 other sufficient conditions for the existence of a political
economic equilibrium in pure strategies of the political economic system Ê will be given.
It is clear that these conditions are very strong since the following assumption is needed.
A7. For every consumer i ∈ IM , there exists a function πi1+ : ṽi(A1) → IR and a
function πi1− : ṽi(A2) → IR such that πi1(vi1, vi2) = πi1+(vi1) − πi1−(vi2) + 12 ,
∀(vi1, vi2) ∈ ṽi(A1)× ṽi(A2).
Voting functions satisfying Assumption A7 are said to be separable. Clearly, if Assump-
tion A7 holds, then, for every i ∈ IM , πi2(vi1, vi2) = 1 − πi1(vi1, vi2) = πi1−(vi2) −
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πi1+(vi1) + 12 , ∀(vi1, vi2) ∈ ṽi(A1)× ṽi(A2), and hence πi2 is separable. It is not difficult
to show that if the voting function πi1 of a consumer i ∈ IM is a continuous function,
then πi1+ and πi1− are continuous functions.
Since the voting functions depend on the utility representation chosen for the pref-
erence relation of a consumer, it is important to show that Assumption A7 holds inde-
pendent of this representation.
Lemma 8.4.8
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let the consumption set X i be convex, let the utility function
ui be continuous, representing the complete, transitive, continuous preference relation
i, and let the voting functions πik, ∀k ∈ I2, be separable. Let ui : X i → IR be a utility
function representing i . Then the voting functions πi1 and πi2 associated with ui are
separable.
Proof
Let the function f i : ui(X i) → ui(X i) be defined by f i(ui(xi)) = ui(xi), ∀xi ∈ X i.
Let vi : A → IR be the indirect utility function associated with ui and let (vi1, vi2) ∈
vi(A1)× vi(A2) be given. Then
πi1(vi1, vi2) = πi1
(











so πi1 is separable. Q.E.D.
The next theorem gives sufficient conditions for the existence of a political economic
equilibrium in pure strategies of the political economic system Ê .
Theorem 8.4.9
Let the political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) sat-
isfy the Assumptions A1-A7. Then there exists a political economic equilibrium in pure
strategies of the political economic system Ê when the functions K1 and K2 are defined
by (8.5).
Proof











∣∣∣ (a1, q1) ∈ A1
})











∣∣∣ (a2, q2) ∈ A2
})
.
Let α ∈ [1,→) be as in Theorem 8.2.3. For every i ∈ IM , for every k ∈ I2, ṽi(Ak,α) =
ṽi(Ak) by Theorem 8.4.3. The set Ak,α, ∀k ∈ I2, is compact by Theorem 8.4.4, and the
function ṽi, ∀i ∈ IM , is continuous as is shown in the proof of Theorem 8.4.5, so the
set ṽi(Ak), ∀i ∈ IM , ∀k ∈ I2, is compact by Theorem 2.3.13. Since, for every i ∈ IM ,
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πi1− and πi1+ are continuous functions, it follows from Theorem 2.3.14 that (a∗1, q∗1)
and (a∗2, q∗2) are well-defined. Moreover,
K1
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, ∀(a1, q1) ∈ A1,
K2
(






























, ∀(a2, q2) ∈ A2.
So, ((a∗1, q∗1), (a∗2, q∗2)) is a political economic equilibrium in pure strategies of the
political economic system Ê . Q.E.D.
Although Assumption A7 is restrictive, it is of interest. The voting model given in
Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell (1990), for instance, satisfies this assumption. Let
((a1, q1), (a2, q2)) ∈ A1 ×A2 be given. In the model of Coughlin, Mueller and Murrell a
consumer i ∈ IM votes for political candidate 1 if ṽi (a1, q1)−ṽi (a2, q2) > bi, does not vote
if ṽi (a1, q1)− ṽi (a2, q2) = bi, and votes for political candidate 2 if ṽi (a1, q1)− ṽi (a2, q2) <
bi, where the information of the political candidates is that bi is a random variable being
uniformly distributed in some given interval [−αi, αi] ⊂ IR. For every consumer i ∈ IM it
is assumed that |ṽi (a1, q1)− ṽi (a2, q2) | ≤ αi, ∀((a1, q1), (a2, q2)) ∈ A1×A2. This implies,
for every i ∈ IM , for every ((a1, q1), (a2, q2)) ∈ A1 ×A2,
πi1
(

















ṽi(a2, q2)− ṽi(a1, q1)
)
,
so in this case the choice πi1+(vi1) = 12αi v
i1, ∀vi1 ∈ ṽi(A1), and πi1−(vi2) = 12αi vi2,
∀vi2 ∈ ṽi(A2), satisfies Assumption A7.
8.5 An Example
In this section an example of the model of the previous sections will be examined. The
example makes clear that by the imposition of price regulations it is possible to obtain
allocations being politically more desired than the Walrasian equilibrium allocation.
Consider the economy Ẽ(p, p) = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I2, P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)), where N = 2,
X1 = X2 = IR2+,
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5 , ∀x2 ∈ X2,
respectively,
ω1 = ω2 = (1, 4)⊤,
(p, p) ∈ P with p1 = p1, and (l̃, L̃) represents the uniform rationing system, where
l̃ : Q2 → −IR4+ is defined by
l̃11(q) = l̃
2
1(q) = −2q1, ∀q ∈ Q2,
l̃12(q) = l̃
2
2(q) = −8q2, ∀q ∈ Q2,
and L̃ : Q2 → IR4+ is defined by
L̃11(q) = L̃
2
1(q) = 2q1, ∀q ∈ Q2,
L̃12(q) = L̃
2
2(q) = 8q2, ∀q ∈ Q2.
Notice that (p, p) ∈ P implies p
2
= p2 = 1. Since the reduced demand relation of
both consumer 1 and consumer 2 is a function in this example, it will be denoted by
d̂1 : Q1 × P → IR2 and d̂2 : Q1 × P → IR2, respectively. Notice that the preference
relations 1 and 2 are not strongly monotonic. However, strong monotonicity does
hold when the preference relation i of a consumer i ∈ I2 is restricted to the non-empty,
closed, convex set X i = {xi ∈ X i | xi i 12ωi} satisfying that X i ⊂ IR2+, X i + IR2+ ⊂ X i,
and ωi ∈ int(X i). Considering X i instead of X i, it follows that the Assumptions A1-A4
are satisfied in this example. Therefore, all results obtained in this chapter do hold for
this example.
After some computations it follows that, for (q, p, p) ∈ Q1 × P, if 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1611 , then
d̂1(q, p, p) =
{
(3, 4− 2p1)⊤, 0 ≤ q ≤ 23 ,
(7− 6q, 4− 6p1 + 6p1q)⊤, 23 ≤ q ≤ 1,
if 1611 ≤ p1 ≤ 16, then








)⊤, 0 ≤ q ≤ −16+31p1
30p1
,
(7− 6q, 4− 6p1 + 6p1q)⊤, −16+31p130p1 ≤ q ≤ 1,
if 16 ≤ p1 ≤ 56, then











≤ q ≤ 1,
and if 56 ≤ p1, then









≤ q ≤ 1.
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For (q, p, p) ∈ Q1 × P, if 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 27 , then
d̂2(q, p, p) =
{
(3, 4− 2p1)⊤, 0 ≤ q ≤ 23 ,
(7− 6q, 4− 6p1 + 6p1q)⊤, 23 ≤ q ≤ 1,
if 27 ≤ p1 ≤ 1, then








)⊤, 0 ≤ q ≤ −2+17p1
15p1
,
(7− 6q, 4− 6p1 + 6p1q)⊤, −2+17p115p1 ≤ q ≤ 1,
if 1 ≤ p1 ≤ 11, then











≤ q ≤ 1,
and if 11 ≤ p1, then









≤ q ≤ 1.
For every (p, p) ∈ P, by solving ∑i∈I2 d̂i(q, p, p) =
∑
i∈I2 ω
i all Drèze equilibria of the
economy Ẽ(p, p), up to equivalence in the sense of Definition 4.6.2, are obtained. Let the
set of admissible price regulations for both political candidates be a non-empty, closed
subset A of P satisfying A ⊂ {(p, p) ∈ P | p = p}. It can be verified that Assumption A5
is satisfied. It follows with the previous calculations that the set A of admissible actions
corresponding to the set of admissible price regulations A is given by
A =
{
(p, p, q) ∈ A×Q1
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 and q = 1, or 1 ≤ p1 ≤ 4 and q = 2+13p115p1 , or
p1 = 4 and 110 ≤ q ≤ 910 , or




Notice that ẼD(p, p) 6= ∅, ∀(p, p) ∈ A, see Theorem 8.4.1. Although there is an interval of
elements of Q1 inducing a Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ((4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤), all these
Drèze equilibria are equivalent in the sense of Definition 4.6.2 and correspond to the
unique Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I2). Thus, considering
the remarks made above Theorem 8.2.5, the possibility of not specifying price regulations
is not excluded. Moreover, there is no loss of generality in considering only the admissible
action corresponding to q = 12 in this case. It can be verified that 0 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 or p1 ≥ 16
implies that both consumers keep their initial endowments in a Drèze equilibrium of the
economy corresponding to these values of p1. If the price regulation is this extreme, no
trade takes place. So, α = 16 satisfies the requirements of Theorem 8.4.2. Notice that
also Theorem 8.4.3 is satisfied for α = 16.
Using the functions ui and d̂i, it is easy to derive the restriction of the indirect utility
function ṽi of a consumer i ∈ I2 to A, ṽi|A : A → IR. The voting functions of both
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consumers are assumed to be the same as in Coughlin and Nitzan (1981b), i.e., for every




, ∀vi1, vi2 ∈ ṽi(A).
Notice that Assumption A6 is satisfied. Therefore, a political economic equilibrium of the
political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈I2, (l̃, L̃), (A, (πik)i∈I2)k∈I2) exists according
to Theorem 8.4.7.
Suppose political candidates attempt to maximize their expected plurality. It is easy












ṽi(a1, q1), ṽi(a2, q2)
)
≥ 0


















Now suppose political candidates attempt to maximize their probability of winning the
elections. Then it is easy to show that for every ((a1, q1), (a2, q2)) ∈ A×A it holds that
π11
(






















ṽ2(a1, q1), ṽ2(a2, q2)
)
− 12 ≥ 0


















Using the symmetry of the game, it is then easily seen that both in the case where political
candidates maximize expected plurality and in the case where political candidates maxi-
mize their probability of winning the elections, in a political economic equilibrium of the




i(ak, qk) over (ak, qk) ∈ A. Consider the case where A is given by
A =
{(








(5, 1)⊤, (5, 1)⊤
)}
.
Hence, A is given by
A =
{(








(5, 1)⊤, (5, 1)⊤, 11150
)}
.
The Drèze equilibria of the economy Ẽ(p, p) for p = (3, 1)⊤, p = (4, 1)⊤, and p = (5, 1)⊤,
respectively, are given in Table 8.5.1.
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d̂1(q, p, p) (1 815 , 2
2
5)
⊤ (1 35 , 1
3
5)




d̂2(q, p, p) ( 715 , 5
3
5)
⊤ ( 25 , 6
2
5)




l̂1(q) = l̂2(q) (−2,−8)⊤ (−2,−8)⊤ (−1125 ,−8)⊤
L̂1(q) = L̂2(q) ( 815 , 8)
⊤ (2, 8)⊤ (2, 8)⊤
ṽ1(p, p, q) 1.677 1.6 1.506
ṽ2(p, p, q) 3.407 3.676 3.833
∑
i∈I2 ṽ
i(p, p, q) 5.084 5.276 5.339
Table 8.5.1. The Drèze equilibria in the example.
From Table 8.5.1 it follows immediately that in the political economic equilibrium
of the political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈I2 , (l̃, L̃), (A, (πik)i∈I2)k∈I2) with A =
{((3, 1)⊤, (3, 1)⊤), ((4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤), ((5, 1)⊤, (5, 1)⊤)}, both political candidates choose
for a price regulation where p1 = p1 = 5. Consumer 2 is rationed on his supply on
the market of commodity 1 in this case. Compared with the Walrasian equilibrium
allocation, this price regulation is advantageous for consumer 2 and disadvantageous for
consumer 1. It should be remarked that the action where p1 = 5 and p1 = +∞ yields
exactly the same pay-offs for both candidates.
Now consider the case where A1 = A2 = P .Using the definition of a Drèze equilibrium
and the remarks made below (8.12) it is not difficult to show that the set of admissible
actions A corresponding to the set of admissible price regulations
{
(p, p) ∈ P
∣∣∣ 1 ≤ p1 ≤ 16
}
gives each political candidate the same strategic possibilities as the set of admissible
actions corresponding to the set P. In a political economic equilibrium of the political






ṽi(ak, qk), ∀(ak, qk) ∈ A.
Clearly, (a∗k, q∗k) 6= ((4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤, 12), ∀k ∈ I2. So, when every price regulation is
allowed, a price regulation is chosen at which no Walrasian equilibrium price system
and no Walrasian equilibrium allocation results. It can be shown that (a∗k, q∗k) ≈
((5.035, 1)⊤, (5.035, 1)⊤, 0.07259), ∀k ∈ I2, yields a political economic equilibrium of the
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political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈I2, (l̃, L̃), (P, (πik)i∈I2)k∈I2). The correspond-
ing Drèze equilibrium is therefore characterized by supply rationing on the market of
commodity 1.
Finally, consider the case where the political candidates have different sets of admis-
sible actions, for example due to institutional or historical reasons. Notice that in this
asymmetric set-up, it is no longer allowed to determine the political economic equilib-




i(ak, qk) over (ak, qk) ∈ Ak. Suppose that one political candidate has
the possibility of lowering the price of commodity 1 compared to the Walrasian equilib-

















(5, 1)⊤, (5, 1)⊤
)}
.
The pay-offs of the political candidates of the game where the political candidates max-
imize their expected plurality in the elections, G = (A1,A2, K1, K2) with K1 and K2
defined by (8.5), are given in Figure 8.5.2.
Political candidate 2
(
(4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤, 12
) (
(5, 1)⊤, (5, 1)⊤, 11150
)
(
(3, 1)⊤, (3, 1)⊤, 4145
)
(−95, 95) (−124, 124)
Political candidate 1 (
(4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤, 12
)
(0, 0) (−31, 31)
Figure 8.5.2. Pay-offs ×1000 of political candidates maximizing plurality.
From Figure 8.5.2 it follows immediately that the political economic equilibrium is
given by (((4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤, 12), ((5, 1)
⊤, (5, 1)⊤, 11150), so political candidate 1 proposes
the Walrasian equilibrium, while political candidate 2 proposes to increase the price
of commodity 1. Notice that the expected plurality of candidate 2 is positive in this
equilibrium.
The pay-offs of the political candidates of the game where the political candidates
maximize the probability of winning the elections, G = (A1,A2, K1, K2) with K1 and
K2 defined by (8.6), are given in Figure 8.5.3.
From Figure 8.5.3 it follows immediately that the political economic equilibrium
is again given by (((4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤, 12), ((5, 1)
⊤, (5, 1)⊤, 11150)), so political candidate 1
proposes the Walrasian equilibrium, while political candidate 2 proposes to increase the
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Political candidate 2
(
(4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤, 12
) (
(5, 1)⊤, (5, 1)⊤, 11150
)
(
(3, 1)⊤, (3, 1)⊤, 4145
)
(−24, 24) (−31, 31)
Political candidate 1 (
(4, 1)⊤, (4, 1)⊤, 12
)
(0, 0) (−8, 8)
Figure 8.5.3. Pay-offs ×1000 of political candidates maximizing probability of winning.
price of commodity 1. Notice that political candidate 2 has a higher probability of
winning the elections than political candidate 1 in this equilibrium.
Grandmont (1977a, 1982) explains the occurrence of temporary price rigidities and
quantity rationing by making the observation that in the short run quantities move
faster than prices. The example considered in this section demonstrates that government
intervention may cause price rigidities to exist in the long run too.
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Chapter 9
Regulation of Prices, the Generic
Case?
9.1 Introduction
In Chapter 8 a model of the political economic system has been given such that the
price regulations imposed on the economic system resulted endogenously. Moreover, in
Section 8.5 an example has been given where the price regulations are chosen in such a
way by the political candidates that the Walrasian equilibrium price system is excluded.
However, it is not clear whether this is the typical case. Moreover, it is clear that it is
possible to construct examples where both political candidates propose price regulations
such that a Walrasian equilibrium results.
In this chapter different assumptions are made with respect to the economy, guaran-
teeing that the indirect utility functions of the consumers satisfy certain differentiability
properties. Then it will be possible to answer the question whether, generically, political
candidates choose price regulations excluding a Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, under
these assumptions it is possible to formulate another appealing model of the political
economic system where political candidates are considered to choose only among local
options given some status quo. More precisely, political candidates have the possibil-
ity to choose directions of motion away from the status quo and the possibility to stay
at the status quo. Acquiring information concerning proposals very far away from the
status quo, like voting behaviour at such a proposal, is often very expensive. Moreover,
institutional restrictions or commitments made in the past may rule out large changes.
This provides some motivation for the restriction to local options. The pay-offs for the
political candidates are determined by the marginal change in the number of votes corre-
sponding to a certain direction of motion. An equilibrium of the resulting game is called
a directional political economic equilibrium. This way of modelling the political system
is inspired by Coughlin and Nitzan (1981a).
In Section 9.2 the assumptions made with respect to the political economic system
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are described and some work is devoted to show that under these assumptions the re-
sults developed in the previous chapters hold. In Section 9.3 some known results with
respect to the partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions of the consumers are
given. Moreover, the model of a political economic system where political candidates
choose between local options given some status quo is presented. The status quo will
be assumed to be some Walrasian equilibrium of the economy. It is shown that a direc-
tional political economic equilibrium in pure strategies exists and a characterization of
the equilibrium actions of the political candidates is given. In Section 9.4 it is shown
that, generically, both in the model of Chapter 8 and in the model of Section 9.3, a Wal-
rasian equilibrium is unstable in a political economic system, unless there is only one
consumer in the economy, or there is only one commodity. For the model of Chapter 8
it is shown that, generically, given a proposal of a political candidate corresponding to a
Walrasian equilibrium, there exist price regulations excluding this Walrasian equilibrium
and being better responses than proposing this Walrasian equilibrium. For the model of
Section 9.3 it is shown that, generically, both political candidates choose to move away
from the status quo, being any Walrasian equilibrium. In Section 9.5 the directional
political economic equilibrium is determined for the example of Section 8.5. It will be
shown that in this example the unique Walrasian equilibrium is indeed unstable.
This chapter is based on Herings (1995b).
9.2 The Political Economic System
As in Chapter 8 it is assumed in this chapter that there are M ∈ IN consumers, indexed
by i ∈ IM , N ∈ IN \ {1} commodities, indexed by j ∈ IN , and two political candidates,
indexed by k ∈ I2. Every consumer i ∈ IM is characterized by the consumption set X i,
the utility function ui : X i → IR, representing the preference relation i, and the initial
endowment ωi. Notice that there is no loss of generality in assuming that ui(X i) ⊂ (0, 1).
Together this constitutes the economy E = (X i,i, ωi)i∈IM .
The rationing function, specifying the admissible rationing schemes, is given by the
pair (l̃, L̃) with l̃ : QN → −IRMN+ the rationing function on supply and L̃ : QN → IRMN+
the rationing function on demand. The set
∏
i∈IM X
i is denoted by X. If x = (x1, . . . , xM)
is an element of X, then xj = (x
1
j , . . . , x
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . Moreover, ω = (ω1, . . . , ωM) and
ωj = (ω
1
j , . . . , ω
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . For every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN , component (i−1)N+j
of l̃ is denoted by l̃ij . Moreover, l̃
i = (l̃i1, . . . , l̃
i
N)
⊤, ∀i ∈ IM , and l̃j = (l̃1j , . . . , l̃Mj )⊤,
∀j ∈ IN . The same notation is used for the function L̃, for a rationing scheme on supply
l ∈ −IR∗MN+ , and for a rationing scheme on demand L ∈ IR∗MN+ .
As in Section 4.2, given a price system p ∈ IRN and a rationing scheme (li, Li) ∈
−IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ of consumer i ∈ IM , the budget set βi(p, li, Li) of consumer i is defined
by βi(p, li, Li) = {xi ∈ X i | p · xi ≤ p · ωi and li ≤ xi − ωi ≤ Li} and as in Section 4.3
the set δi(p, li, Li) is the set of best elements of βi(p, li, Li) for i . The set P of price
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regulations is defined by P = {(p, p) ∈ IRN+ × IRN+ | p ≤ p, pN = pN = 1}. An element
(p, p) ∈ P induces the set of admissible price systems P(p,p), defined by P(p,p) = {p ∈
IRN+ | p ≤ p ≤ p}. So, commodity N is assumed to be a numeraire commodity with price
equal to 1. Given (X i,i, ωi)i∈IM and (l̃, L̃), (p, p) yields the economy Ẽ(p, p) = ((X i,i
, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)). The set of Drèze equilibria of the economy Ẽ(p, p), see Definition
8.2.4, is denoted by ẼD(p, p).
The function p̂ : QN−1 × P → IRN+ and the functions l̂ : QN−1 → −IRMN+ and
L̂ : QN−1 → IRMN+ are obtained by defining, for every j ∈ IN−1,
p̂j(q, p, p) = max
({
pj,min({pj(2− 3qj) + pj(3qj − 1), pj})
})
, ∀(q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 × P ,
l̂j(q) = l̃j
(
inf({1N , (3q⊤, 1)⊤})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1,
L̂j (q) = L̃j
(
inf({1N , 31N − (3q⊤, 2)⊤})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1,
and by defining
p̂N(q, p, p) = 1, ∀(q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 × P ,
l̂N(q) = l̃N
(
inf({1N , (3q⊤, 1)⊤})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1,
L̂N (q) = L̃N
(
inf({1N , 31N − (3q⊤, 2)⊤})
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1.
For every consumer i ∈ IM , the reduced demand relation δ̂i : QN−1×P → IRN is defined
by
δ̂i(q, p, p) = δi
(
p̂(q, p, p), l̂i(q), L̂i(q)
)
, ∀(q, p, p) ∈ QN−1 × P .
The notational conventions used for l̃ and L̃ are also used for l̂ and L̂. Let some (p, p) ∈







i, then, under weak assumptions, (p̂(q∗, p, p), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), x∗) ∈
ẼD(p, p), called a Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ(p, p) induced by q∗, see Theorem 8.2.6. The set
Q̃D(p, p) is defined by Q̃D(p, p) = {q∗ ∈ QN−1 | ∑i∈IM ωi ∈
∑
i∈IM δ̂
i(q∗, p, p)}. Moreover,
no Drèze equilibria are lost by restricting attention to the Drèze equilibria induced by
some element of Q̃D(p, p), see Theorem 8.2.7.
Every political candidate k ∈ I2 has a set of admissible price regulations Ak ⊂ P,
determining the set of admissible actions Ak, defined by Ak = {(ak, qk) ∈ Ak × QN−1 |
qk ∈ Q̃D(ak)}. The set of admissible actions corresponding to the set of price regu-
lations P is denoted by A. The indirect utility function ṽi : A → [0, 1] of consumer
i ∈ IM is defined by associating with every (a, q) ∈ A the real number ṽi(a, q) satis-
fying ṽi(a, q) = ui(x∗i), ∀x∗i ∈ δ̂i(q, a). For every i ∈ IM , for every k ∈ I2, the voting
function πik : (0, 1) × (0, 1) → [0, 1] describes the expectations of a political candi-
date about the voting behaviour of consumer i concerning political candidate k, i.e.,
πik(v1, v2) is the probability a political candidate assigns to the event that consumer
i ∈ IM votes for political candidate k if the proposal of political candidate 1 yields con-
sumer i a utility level v1 and the proposal of political candidate 2 yields consumer i a
utility level v2. For the sake of simplicity it is assumed that both political candidates
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have the same expectations and that there are no abstentions, so, for every i ∈ IM ,
πi1(ṽi(a1, q1), ṽi(a2, q2)) + πi2(ṽi(a1, q1), ṽi(a2, q2)) = 1, ∀((a1, q1), (a2, q2)) ∈ A1 ×A2.
In this chapter it is assumed that political candidates maximize their expected plu-
rality in the elections. Therefore, the pay-off function K1 : A1 × A2 → IR of political
candidate 1 is defined by
K1
(


















(a1, q1), (a2, q2)
)
∈ A1 ×A2.
The pay-off function K2 : A1×A2 → IR of political candidate 2 is easily seen to be given
by K2 = −K1. As in Chapter 8 a political economic equilibrium of the political economic
system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) is defined as a Nash equilibrium
of the mixed extension of the game G = (A1,A2, K1, K2), see Definition 8.3.6.
For the main results of this chapter the following assumptions are made.
A1. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i is equal to IRN++.
A2. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the utility function ui : X i → (0, 1) is twice continuously
differentiable, ui(X i) = (0, 1), has no critical point, and represents the preference
relation i being complete, transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic, strongly
convex, of the class C2, satisfying the boundary condition, and having non-zero
Gaussian curvature.
A3. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the initial endowment ωi belongs to X i.
A4. The rationing function (l̃, L̃) is flexible, market independent, continuously dif-
ferentiable, monotonic, and, for every j ∈ IN , ∂qj l̃j(q) 6= 0M , ∀q ∈ QN , and
∂qj L̃j(q) 6= 0M , ∀q ∈ QN .
A5. For every political candidate k ∈ I2, Ak = {(p, p) ∈ P | p = p}.
A6. For every consumer i ∈ IM , for every political candidate k ∈ I2, the voting function
πik : (0, 1)× (0, 1)→ [0, 1] is continuously differentiable.
For some results it is sufficient to take Assumption A6, but for other results Assumption
A7 is needed.
A7. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the voting function πi1 : (0, 1) × (0, 1) → [0, 1] is
twice continuously differentiable, ∂v1π
i1(v1, v2) > 0, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1), and
∂v2π
i1(v1, v2) < 0, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1). For every consumer i ∈ IM , the
voting function πi2 : (0, 1) × (0, 1) → [0, 1] is twice continuously differentiable,
∂v1π
i2(v1, v2) < 0, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1), and ∂v2πi2(v1, v2) > 0, ∀(v1, v2) ∈
(0, 1)× (0, 1).
9.2 The Political Economic System 271
In Theorem 3.6.3 it is stated that for every consumer i ∈ IM a preference relation
i satisfying the conditions given in Assumption A2 can indeed be represented by a
twice continuously differentiable utility function having no critical point. Moreover,
there is no loss of generality involved in assuming that ui(X i) = (0, 1) since, due to the
Assumptions A1 and A2, there is no worst and no best element ofX i for i . Assumption
A7 guarantees that voters react in a natural way to decreases or increases in proposed
utility levels. Notice that Assumption A7 implies that, for every i ∈ IM , for every k ∈ I2,
0 < πik(v1, v2) < 1, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1).
For a consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++, let the preference relation i be complete,
transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic, strongly convex, of the class Cr for some
r ∈ IN∗ \ {1}, have non-zero Gaussian curvature, and satisfy the boundary condition,
and let ωi belong to X i. Similarly as in Section 3.6, d̃i(p, wi) denotes the demand of a
consumer i ∈ IM at the price system p ∈ IRN++ and wealth wi ∈ IR++, i.e., the best element
of {xi ∈ X i | p ·xi ≤ wi} for i . Theorem 9.2.1 shows that d̃i ∈ Cr−1(IRN++× IR++, IRN).
Theorem 9.2.1
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++, let the preference relation i be complete,
transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic, strongly convex, of the class Cr for some
r ∈ IN∗ \{1}, have non-zero Gaussian curvature, and satisfy the boundary condition, and
let ωi belong to X i. Then d̃i ∈ Cr−1(IRN++ × IR++, IRN).
See Mas-Colell (1985), Proposition 2.7.2, page 85.
Theorem 9.2.1 immediately yields Corollary 9.2.2, showing that the Assumptions A1-
A3 guarantee that the restriction of the relation δi of consumer i ∈ IM to the set
IRN++ × {−∞N} × {+∞N}, denoted by di : IRN++ → IRN , so involving no rationing, is a
continuously differentiable function.
Corollary 9.2.2
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++, let the preference relation i be complete,
transitive, continuous, strongly monotonic, strongly convex, of the class Cr for some
r ∈ IN∗ \{1}, have non-zero Gaussian curvature, and satisfy the boundary condition, and
let ωi belong to X i. Then di ∈ Cr−1(IRN++, IRN).
In the preceding chapters, many results have been shown under the assumption that the
consumption set X i of a consumer i ∈ IM is a closed subset of IRN+ . Theorem 9.2.5 will
be helpful in showing that such results are also valid when the consumption set X i of
a consumer i ∈ IM is equal to IRN++. First some preliminary results are needed. Let a
non-empty, closed subset S of IRm be given, and define the function dS : IR
m → IR by
dS(s) = min ({‖s− s‖2 |s ∈ S }) , ∀s ∈ IRm.
Let an element ŝ of IRm and an element s of S be given. It follows that dS(ŝ) is equal to
the minimum of the function f : IRm → IR, defined by f(s) = ‖ŝ− s‖2, ∀s ∈ IRm, on the
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set S ∩Bm(ŝ, ‖ŝ− s‖2). The set S ∩Bm(ŝ, ‖ŝ− s‖2) is non-empty, closed, and bounded,
and therefore also compact. Moreover, the function f is continuous and therefore the
minimum of f on S∩Bm(ŝ, ‖ŝ−s‖2) exists by Theorem 2.3.14. So, dS(ŝ) is well-defined.
Lemma 9.2.3
Let S be a non-empty, closed subset of IRm. Then dS is a continuous function.
Proof
Let s1, s2 ∈ IRm be given. Let s1, s2 ∈ S be such that dS(s1) = ‖s1 − s1‖2 and dS(s2) =
‖s2 − s2‖2. Since
‖s1 − s1‖2 ≤ ‖s1 − s2‖2 ≤ ‖s1 − s2‖2 + ‖s2 − s2‖2
and
‖s2 − s2‖2 ≤ ‖s2 − s1‖2 ≤ ‖s2 − s1‖2 + ‖s1 − s1‖2,
it follows that
−‖s1 − s2‖2 ≤ ‖s1 − s1‖2 − ‖s2 − s2‖2 ≤ ‖s1 − s2‖2,
so |dS(s1) − dS(s2)| ≤ ‖s1 − s2‖2. Let a sequence (sn)n∈IN in IRm converging to some
s ∈ IRm be given. Then
0 ≤ |dS(sn)− dS(s)| ≤ ‖sn − s‖2 → 0.
Therefore, dS(s
n)→ dS(s), so dS is a continuous function. Q.E.D.
As in Section 3.6, for a consumer i ∈ IM and a consumption bundle xi ∈ X i, the set
P (i, xi) denotes the set of consumption bundles xi of X i being at least as desired as xi
by consumer i, i.e.,
P (i, xi) =
{





For some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++, let the preference relation i be reflexive,
continuous, and satisfy the boundary condition, and let ωi belong to X i. Then dP (i,ωi)
is a continuous function.
Proof
Since ωi ∈ X i and since i is reflexive and continuous, it follows that P (i, ωi) is a
non-empty set being closed in IRN++. Since i satisfies the boundary condition, it follows
that P (i, ωi) is closed. Therefore, dP (i,ωi) is a continuous function by Lemma 9.2.3.
Q.E.D.
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++, let the preference relation i be reflexive,
continuous, and satisfy the boundary condition, and let ωi belong to X i. The preference
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relation i∗ on IRN+ is defined as follows. For every xi, x̂i ∈ IRN+ , it holds that xi i∗ x̂i if
and only if
ωi i xi, ωi i x̂i, and xi i x̂i, or
not ωi i xi, and dP (i,ωi)(xi) ≥ dP (i,ωi)(x̂i).
(9.1)
Notice that xi ∈ IRN+ \IRN++ implies not ωi i xi. Moreover, for every xi ∈ IRN+ , dP (i,ωi) =
0 if ωi i xi, and dP (i,ωi) > 0 if not ωi i xi. The preference relation i∗ is defined
such that preferences for consumption bundles being at least as desired as the initial
endowment of consumer i do not change, while preferences with respect to consumption
bundles not at least as desired as the initial endowment are determined by the smallest
distance to such a consumption bundle.
Theorem 9.2.5
For some consumer i ∈ IM , let X i = IRN++, let the preference relation i be complete,
transitive, continuous, and satisfy the boundary condition, and let ωi belong to X i. Then
the preference relation i∗ is complete, transitive, continuous, and satisfies, for every xi ∈
P (i, ωi), P (i∗, xi) = P (i, xi). Moreover, if i is non-satiated, locally non-satiated,
weakly monotonic, monotonic, strongly monotonic, weakly convex, convex, or strongly
convex, respectively, then i∗ is non-satiated, locally non-satiated, weakly monotonic,
monotonic, strongly monotonic, weakly convex, convex, or strongly convex, respectively.
Proof
Clearly, i∗ is complete, transitive, and, for every xi ∈ P (i, ωi), P (i∗, xi) = P (i, xi).
Now the continuity of i∗ is shown. Let some xi ∈ IRN+ be given. If ωi i∗ xi, then










a set being closed in IRN+ since i is continuous and satisfies the boundary condition. If








∣∣∣dP (i,ωi)(xi) ≥ dP (i,ωi)(xi)
}
,
a set being closed in IRN+ using the continuity of the function dP (i,ωi) shown in Lemma













∣∣∣not xi i xi
}
,
the first set being closed in IRN+ by the continuity of dP (i,ωi) shown in Lemma 9.2.4, and
the second set being open in IRN++ since i is continuous and therefore also open in IRN+ .








∣∣∣dP (i,ωi)(xi) ≥ dP (i,ωi)(xi)
}
,
a set being closed in IRN+ by the continuity of the function dP (i,ωi) shown in Lemma
9.2.4. So, the preference relation i∗ is continuous.
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Obviously, if i is non-satiated and locally non-satiated, respectively, then i∗ is non-
satiated and locally non-satiated, respectively.
Let i be weakly monotonic and let xi, x̂i ∈ IRN+ be given such that xi ≤ x̂i. Moreover,
let xi ≺i∗ ωi and x̂i ≺i∗ ωi, the only difficult case. Let xi ∈ P (i, ωi) be such that
dP (i,ωi)(x
i) = ‖xi − xi‖2. Then, using the weak monotonicity of i,
ωi i xi i xi + x̂i − xi,
so
dP (i,ωi)(x
i) = ‖x̂i − (xi + x̂i − xi)‖2 ≥ dP (i,ωi)(x̂i).
Therefore, xi i∗ x̂i, so i∗ is weakly monotonic.
Let i be monotonic and let xi, x̂i ∈ IRN+ be given such that xi ≪ x̂i. Moreover, let xi ≺i∗
ωi and x̂i ≺i∗ ωi, the only difficult case. Let xi ∈ P (i, ωi) be such that dP (i,ωi)(xi) =
‖xi − xi‖2. Then, using the monotonicity of i,
ωi i xi ≺i xi + x̂i − xi.
Using that i is complete, continuous, and satisfies the boundary condition, there exists
ε ∈ IR++ such that xi ≺i xi, ∀xi ∈ BN (xi + x̂i − xi, ε). Therefore,
dP (i,ωi)(x
i) = ‖x̂i − (xi + x̂i − xi)‖2 > dP (i,ωi)(x̂i).
Hence, xi ≺i∗ x̂i, so i∗ is monotonic. If i is strongly monotonic, then it can be shown
in the same way that i∗ is strongly monotonic.
Let i be weakly convex, let xi, x̂i ∈ IRN+ be such that xi i∗ x̂i, and let some λ ∈ (0, 1)
be given. Moreover, let xi ≺i∗ ωi, the only difficult case. Let xi, ̂̂xi ∈ P (i, ωi) be such
that dP (i,ωi)(x
i) = ‖xi − xi‖2 and dP (i,ωi)(x̂i) = ‖x̂i − ̂̂xi‖2. Obviously, dP (i,ωi)(xi) ≥
dP (i,ωi)(x̂
i). From the transitivity and the weak convexity of i it follows that ωi i
λxi + (1− λ)̂̂xi. So,
dP (i,ωi)(λx
i + (1− λ)x̂i) ≤ ‖λxi + (1− λ)x̂i − (λxi + (1− λ)̂̂xi)‖2.
Notice that
(‖λxi + (1− λ)x̂i − (λxi + (1− λ)̂̂xi)‖2)2
= λ2(‖xi − xi‖2)2 + 2λ(1− λ)(xi − xi) · (x̂i − ̂̂xi) + (1− λ)2(‖x̂i − ̂̂xi‖2)2
≤ (λ2 + λ(1− λ))(‖xi − xi‖2)2 + ((1− λ)2 + λ(1− λ))(‖x̂i − ̂̂xi‖2)2
= λ(‖xi − xi‖2)2 + (1− λ)(‖x̂i − ̂̂xi‖2)2 ≤ (‖xi − xi‖2)2,
where for the first inequality it is used that, for every s1, s2 ∈ IRN , 2s1 · s2 ≤ (‖s1‖2)2 +
(‖s2‖2)2 with inequality holding if and only if s1 6= s2. Therefore,
dP (i,ωi)(λx
i + (1− λ)x̂i) ≤ dP (i,ωi)(xi).
9.2 The Political Economic System 275
Hence, xi i∗ λxi + (1− λ)x̂i, so i∗ is weakly convex.
Let i be convex, let xi, x̂i ∈ IRN+ be such that xi ≺i∗ x̂i, and let some λ ∈ (0, 1) be
given. Moreover, let xi ≺i∗ ωi, the only difficult case. Let xi, ̂̂xi ∈ P (i, ωi) be such
that dP (i,ωi)(x
i) = ‖xi − xi‖2 and dP (i,ωi)(x̂i) = ‖x̂i − ̂̂xi‖2. Obviously, dP (i,ωi)(xi) >
dP (i,ωi)(x̂
i). It follows easily that ωi i λxi + (1− λ)̂̂xi. So,
dP (i,ωi)(λx




i))2 + (1− λ)(dP (i,ωi)(x̂i))2
< dP (i,ωi)(x
i).
Therefore, xi ≺i∗ λxi + (1− λ)x̂i, so i∗ is convex.
Let i be strongly convex, let xi, x̂i ∈ IRN+ be such that xi ∼i∗ x̂i and xi 6= x̂i, and
let some λ ∈ (0, 1) be given. Moreover, let xi ≺i∗ ωi, the only difficult case. Let
xi, ̂̂xi ∈ P (i, ωi) be such that dP (i,ωi)(xi) = ‖xi − xi‖2 and dP (i,ωi)(x̂i) = ‖x̂i − ̂̂xi‖2.
Obviously, dP (i,ωi)(x
i) = dP (i,ωi)(x̂
i). It follows easily that ωi i λxi + (1− λ)̂̂xi. So,
dP (i,ωi)(λx




i))2 + (1− λ)(dP (i,ωi)(x̂i))2
= dP (i,ωi)(x
i).
The second inequality holds with equality if and only if xi−xi = x̂i− ̂̂xi. But then it holds
that xi 6= ̂̂xi, hence ωi ≺i λxi+(1−λ)̂̂xi. Sincei is complete, continuous, and satisfies the
boundary condition, there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that ωi ≺i xi, ∀xi ∈ BN (λxi+(1−λ)̂̂xi, ε),
and dP (i,ωi)(λx
i + (1 − λ)x̂i) < ‖λxi + (1 − λ)x̂i − (λxi + (1 − λ)̂̂xi)‖2. Therefore,
xi ≺i∗ λxi + (1− λ)x̂i, so i∗ is strongly convex. Q.E.D.
Using Theorem 9.2.5 it follows that the set of political economic equilibria of the polit-
ical economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) satisfying the As-
sumptions A1-A3 is the same as the set of political economic equilibria of the political
economic system obtained by replacing, for every consumer i ∈ IM , X i by IRN+ and i
by i∗, since the preferences of a consumer for consumption bundles less desired than the
initial endowment do not matter. Therefore, using Theorem 8.4.7, the following result
is obtained.
Theorem 9.2.6
Let the political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ), (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) satisfy
the Assumptions A1-A6. Then there exists a political economic equilibrium of the political
economic system Ê .
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9.3 The Existence of a Directional Political Economic
Equilibrium
First a few concepts introduced in Laroque (1978) have to be discussed. These concepts
are needed to study some properties of the Drèze equilibria of the economy Ẽ(p, p) and
of the indirect utility functions of the consumers at price regulations (p, p) with p = p
being close to p∗, where (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy
E , see Definition 3.8.1.
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let a Walrasian equi-
librium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) be given, where
((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) is assumed to denote the economy ((X
i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) with, for every
i ∈ IM , i the preference relation being represented by ui. Using Theorem 9.2.5, it fol-
lows from Theorem 3.8.2 and Theorem 3.11.1 that such a Walrasian equilibrium does










∣∣∣L̂(q) ≥ x∗ − ω
})
.














∗)) = x∗ij − ωij
}
,
so these sets contain the consumers with in some sense minimal and maximal excess
demand on the market of commodity j, respectively. Notice that l̂N(q) < x
∗
N − ωN <
L̂N (q), ∀q ∈ QN−1.
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4 and let a Walrasian equi-
librium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) be given. Let a
sign vector s ∈ SN−1 with I0(s) = ∅ be given. For every consumer i ∈ IM , for every
(p1,..., pN−1)








xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣(p1,..., pN−1, 1)⊤ · xi = (p1,..., pN−1, 1)⊤ · ωi,
xij−ωij = l̂ij(q(x∗))+aj if i∈I j(x∗) and j∈I−(s),
xij−ωij = L̂ij(q(x∗))+aj if i∈I j(x∗) and j∈I+(s)
}
,










∣∣∣xi i xi, ∀xi∈βi,s((p1,..., pN−1)⊤, a)
}
.
For every (p1,..., pN−1)
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In this way a relation ζs : IRN−1 × IRN−1 → IRN−1 is obtained. In Laroque (1978),
Proposition 5.1, page 1134, it is shown that there exists a set O, being open in IRN−1 ×
IRN−1 and containing ((p∗1,..., p
∗
N−1)
⊤, 0N−1), such that ζs|O is a continuously differentiable





⊤, 0N−1) is well-defined. The following definition is given in Laroque
(1978), Definition 5.1, page 1135.
Definition 9.3.1 (Regular Walrasian equilibrium)
A Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) is





⊤, 0N−1) is invertible.
The following result shows the importance of regular Walrasian equilibria. Notice that a
Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E is said to be locally unique
if there exists a set being open in IRN × IRMN and containing (p∗, x∗), but not containing
any other Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of E .
Theorem 9.3.2
Let the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4, and let
(p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 be a locally unique, regular Walrasian equilibrium of the economy
E such that, for every j ∈ IN−1, #I j(x∗) = #Ij(x∗) = 1. Then, for every (p, p) ∈ P,
there exists q(p) ∈ Q̃D(p, p) such that for every i ∈ IM the function v̂i : IRN−1+ → (0, 1),
defined by associating with every (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤ ∈ IRN−1+ the element




⊤, (p1,..., pN−1, 1)




satisfies that v̂i(p∗1,..., p
∗
N−1) = u
i(x∗i) and ∂v̂i(p∗1,..., p
∗
N−1) exists. Moreover, for every








, ∀j ∈ IN−1.
See Laroque (1978), Proposition 7.1, page 1144.
It follows from the results shown by Laroque that for every price system p ∈ P being
close to p∗, there exists a uniquely determined Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ(p, p)
being close to (p∗, x∗).
The following three results show that the conditions given in Theorem 9.3.2 are
satisfied for a typical economy. The set of all utility functions of a consumer i ∈ IM
satisfying Assumption A2 is denoted by U i. This set is given the topology induced by
the C2-topology. Define the set U by U =
∏
i∈IM U
i and give this set the product
topology. Notice that, for every u ∈ U, u = (u1, . . . , uM) with ui denoting the utility
function of consumer i ∈ IM . The set of initial endowments satisfying Assumption A3 is
denoted by Ω. The following result shows that, generically, an economy is regular.
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Theorem 9.3.3
Let (X i)i∈IM satisfy Assumption A1. Then there exists an open and dense set U1 in
U × Ω such that for every (u, ω) ∈ U1 every Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1
of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) is regular.
See Wiesmeth (1979), Theorem, page 25.
The following result shows that a typical economy has a finite number of Walrasian
equilibria (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1, so every Walrasian equilibrium of a typical economy is
locally unique. The finiteness of the number of Walrasian equilibria of a typical economy
was first shown in Debreu (1970). Debreu (1970) gives a result with the demand functions
of the consumers as primitive concepts. Theorem 3.11.1, Corollary 9.2.2, and Theorem
9.2.5 guarantee that the assumptions made by Debreu are implied by the assumptions
made in Theorem 9.3.4.
Theorem 9.3.4
Let (X i, ui)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2. Then there exists a set Ω
1 open in
Ω such that Ω \ Ω1 has Lebesgue measure zero and for every ω ∈ Ω1 the number of
Walrasian equilibria (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) is fi-
nite. Moreover, for every ω ∈ Ω1, there exists a set O being open in Ω and containing
ω, and there exist continuous functions fk : O → IRN++ × X, ∀k ∈ Ik(ω), for some
k(ω) ∈ IN, such that, for every ω ∈ O, f 1(ω), . . . , fk(ω)(ω) are all the different Wal-
rasian equilibria (p(ω, k), x(ω, k))k∈Ik(ω) with p(ω, k)N = 1, ∀k ∈ Ik(ω), of the economy
E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ).
See Debreu (1970), Theorem, page 388, and Remark, page 390.
The following extension of Theorem 9.3.4 is due to Smale (1974).
Theorem 9.3.5
Let (X i)i∈IM satisfy Assumption A1. Then there exists an open and dense set U2 in U×Ω
such that for every (u, ω) ∈ U2 the number of Walrasian equilibria (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1
of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) is finite. Moreover, for every (u, ω) ∈ U2, there
exists a set O being open in U × Ω and containing (u, ω), and there exist continuous
functions fk : O → IRN++ × X, ∀k ∈ Ik(u,ω), for some k(u, ω) ∈ IN, such that, for
every (u, ω) ∈ O, f 1(u, ω), . . . , fk(u,ω)(u, ω) are all the different Walrasian equilibria
(p(u, ω, k), x(u, ω, k))k∈Ik(u,ω) with p(u, ω, k)N = 1, ∀k ∈ Ik(u,ω), of the economy E =
((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ).
See Smale (1974), Theorem 1, page 3, and Proposition 4, page 7.
The following theorem states that in every Walrasian equilibrium of a typical economy it
holds that on every market there is exactly one consumer having the minimal and exactly
one consumer having the maximal excess demand in the sense as mentioned previously.
A similar result is shown in Laroque (1978) for the uniform rationing system.
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Theorem 9.3.6
Let (X i, ui)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and A4. Then there exists a subset
Ω2 of Ω such that Ω \ Ω2 has Lebesgue measure zero and, for every ω ∈ Ω2, for every
Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ), for
every j ∈ IN−1, #Ij(x∗) = #Ij(x∗) = 1.
Proof
If M = 1, then the proof is trivial, so assume M ≥ 2 for the remainder of the proof. It
is easily seen that Assumption A4 guarantees that, for every ω ∈ Ω, for every Walrasian
equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ), #Ij(x∗) ≥ 1,
∀j ∈ IN−1, and #Ij(x∗) ≥ 1, ∀j ∈ IN−1. Moreover, using Theorem 9.2.5, it follows from
Theorem 3.11.1 that every Walrasian equilibrium price system is strictly positive. Let
some j′ ∈ IN−1, ω ∈ Ω, and (p′, x) ∈ IRN++×X with p′N = 1 be given. Using Theorem 2.9.7
it follows that if (p′, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM )
and #Ij′(x) > 1, then there exists i
1, i2 ∈ IM with i1 6= i2, λi ∈ IR, ∀i ∈ IM , and
qj′ ∈ [0, 1] such that
∂xiu












j = 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1, (9.4)
xij′ − ωij′ − l̃ij′(q) = 0, ∀i ∈ {i1, i2}, (9.5)
with q1, . . . , qj′−1, qj′+1, . . . , qN arbitrarily given elements of [0, 1]. Notice that in (9.4)
the condition that on the market of the numeraire commodity the total excess demand
is equal to zero is not specified. This condition is implied by the equations in (9.3) and
(9.4).
Since the function l̃ is assumed to be continuously differentiable and ∂qj′ l̃j′(q) 6= 0M ,
∀q ∈ QN , there exists a continuously differentiable extension of l̃, also denoted by l̃,
satisfying ∂qj′ l̃j′(q) 6= 0M when qj′ ∈ (−ε, 1 + ε) and qj ∈ [0, 1], ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}. The
function
ψ : X × IRM × IRN−1++ × Ω× (−ε, 1 + ε)→ IRMN+M+N+1
is defined such that, for every (x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤, ω, qj′) ∈ X × IRM × IRN−1++ × Ω ×
(−ε, 1 + ε), ψ(x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)⊤, ω, qj′) is given by the left-hand side of (9.2)-(9.5). For
every ω ∈ Ω, the function
ψω : X × IRM × IRN−1++ × (−ε, 1 + ε)→ IRMN+M+N+1
is defined by associating with every (x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤, qj′) ∈ X×IRM×IRN−1++ ×(−ε, 1+
ε) the element ψω(x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤, qj′) = ψ(x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤, ω, qj′).
Let ξ = (x, λ, (p′1,..., p
′
N−1)
⊤, ω, qj′) ∈ X × IRM × IRN−1++ × Ω × (−ε, 1 + ε) be such that
ψ(ξ) = 0MN+M+N+1 The matrix of partial derivatives of ψ evaluated at ξ is denoted by
M and given in Table 9.3.1. Again, q1, . . . , qj′−1, qj′+1, . . . , qN are arbitrarily chosen
















. . . 0M×M
...




j −ωMj )j∈IN−1 (−p′j)j∈IN−1 −1
IN−1 0N−1 · · · IN−1 0N−1 0(N−1)×M 0(N−1)×(N−1) −IN−1 0N−1 · · · −IN−1 0N−1 0N−1 N−1
eMN ((i1 − 1)N + j′)⊤ 0M⊤ 0N−1⊤ −eMN ((i1 − 1)N + j′)⊤ −∂qj′ l̃i
1
j′ (q) 1
eMN ((i2 − 1)N + j′)⊤ 0M⊤ 0N−1⊤ −eMN ((i2 − 1)N + j′)⊤ −∂qj′ l̃i
2
j′ (q) 1
MN M N−1 MN 1
Table 9.3.1. The matrix M.
elements of [0, 1]. It will be shown that the matrix M has rank MN +M +N + 1. Let
y ∈ IRMN+M+N+1 be such that y⊤M = 02MN+M+N⊤. Then, y⊤∂ωi
N
ψ(ξ) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM ,
implies
yMN+i = 0, ∀i ∈ IM . (9.6)
Moreover, (9.6) and y⊤∂ω1jψ(ξ) = 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ {j
′}, implies
yMN+M+j = 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ {j′}. (9.7)










ψ(ξ) = −yMN+M+j′ − yMN+M+N+1 = 0, (9.9)
y⊤∂ωi
j′
ψ(ξ) = −yMN+M+j′ = 0, ∀i ∈ IM \ {i1, i2}, (9.10)
y⊤∂qj′ψ(ξ) = −∂qj′ l̃i
1
j′ (q)yMN+M+N − ∂qj′ l̃i
2
j′ (q)yMN+M+N+1 = 0. (9.11)
If M ≥ 3, then (9.10) implies yMN+M+j′ = 0, so then it follows from (9.8) and (9.9)
that yMN+M+N = yMN+M+N+1 = 0. If M = 2, then (9.8) and (9.9) implies yMN+M+N =









9.3 The Existence of a Directional Political Economic Equilibrium 281
so yMN+M+j′ = 0 since ∂qj′ l̃j′(q) 6= (0, 0) by Assumption A4. Therefore,
yMN+M+j′ = 0, yMN+M+N = 0, and yMN+M+N+1 = 0. (9.12)









6= 0, ∀i ∈ IM .
So, the first N rows of this matrix are independent. Since ∂xiu
i(xi) = λi(p′1,..., p
′
N−1, 1),










N⊤, ∀i ∈ IM ,
it follows that, for every i ∈ IM ,
y(i−1)N+j = 0, ∀j ∈ IN .
Therefore, y = 0MN+M+N+1, so M has rank MN + M + N + 1, and ψ intersects
{0MN+M+N+1} transversally, ψ ⊤   {0MN+M+N+1}. Let the set Ωj′ be defined by
Ωj′ =
{
ω ∈ Ω | ψω ⊤   {0MN+M+N+1}
}
.
Since X×IRM×IRN−1++ ×Ω×(−ε, 1+ε) is an (2MN+M+N)-dimensional C∞ manifold,
IRMN+M+N+1 is an (MN +M + N + 1)-dimensional C∞ manifold, 0MN+M+N+1 is a 0-
dimensional C∞ manifold, and ψ ∈ C1(X×IRM×IRN−1++ ×Ω×(−ε, 1+ε), IRMN+M+N+1),
it follows from the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.10.18, that the set Ω \ Ωj′ has
Lebesgue measure zero in Ω. Since Ω is an MN -dimensional C∞ manifold, being a subset
of IRMN , it follows that the set Ω \Ωj′ has Lebesgue measure zero, see the remark below
Theorem 2.10.17. For every ω ∈ Ωj′, ψω is a function from an (MN+M+N)-dimensional
C∞ manifold into an (MN +M +N + 1)-dimensional C∞ manifold, {0MN+M+N+1} is a
0-dimensional C∞ manifold, ψω ∈ C1(X× IRM × IRN−1++ × (−ε, 1+ ε), IRMN+M+N+1), and
ψω ⊤   {0MN+M+N+1}, so ψω−1({0MN+N+M+1}) = ∅ by Theorem 2.10.16. Hence, the set
of initial endowments ω of Ω such that there exists a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with
p∗N = 1 and #I j′(x
∗) > 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) has Lebesgue measure
zero. Similarly, it can be shown the set of initial endowments ω of Ω such that there
exists a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 and #Ij′(x
∗) > 1 of the economy
E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) has Lebesgue measure zero. Since a finite union of sets with
Lebesgue measure zero has Lebesgue measure zero, it follows that, for every Walrasian
equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ), for every j ∈ IN ,
#Ij(x
∗) = #Ij(x
∗) = 1, except for a set of initial endowments ω of Ω having Lebesgue
measure zero. Q.E.D.
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The results of Theorem 9.3.3, Theorem 9.3.5, and Theorem 9.3.6 yield the following
theorem.
Theorem 9.3.7
Let (X i)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃) satisfy the Assumptions A1 and A4. Then there exists an open and
dense set U3 in U × Ω such that for every (u, ω) ∈ U3 every Walrasian equilibrium
(p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) is locally unique and regu-
lar, while, for every j ∈ IN , #Ij(x∗) = #Ij(x∗) = 1. Moreover, for every (u, ω) ∈ U3,
there exists a set O being open in U × Ω and containing (u, ω), and there exist contin-
uous functions fk : O → IRN++ × X, ∀k ∈ Ik(u,ω), for some k(u, ω) ∈ IN, such that,
for every (u, ω) ∈ O, f 1(u, ω), . . . , fk(u,ω)(u, ω) are all the different Walrasian equi-
libria (p(u, ω, k), x(u, ω, k))k∈Ik(u,ω) with p(u, ω, k)N = 1, ∀k ∈ Ik(u,ω), of the economy
E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ).
Proof
Let U1 and U2 denote the sets given in Theorem 9.3.3 and Theorem 9.3.5, respectively.
Clearly, the set U1 ∩ U2 is open and dense in U × Ω being an intersection of two open
and dense sets. Let U3 be the set of utility functions and initial endowments (u, ω) of
U1 ∩ U2 such that, for every Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy
E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ), for every j ∈ IN−1, #Ij(x∗) = #Ij(x∗) = 1. It will be shown that
U3 is open and dense in U × Ω. Notice that this is trivial if M = 1, so assume M ≥ 2
for the remainder of the proof.
For every u ∈ U, let Ωu denote the set of initial endowments such that, for every
Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ),
for every j ∈ IN−1, #Ij(x∗) = #Ij(x∗) = 1. Obviously, by Theorem 9.3.6, the set
{(u, ω) ∈ U × Ω | ω ∈ Ωu} is dense in U × Ω. Now U1 ∩ U2 ∩ {(u, ω) ∈ U × Ω | ω ∈ Ωu}
is dense in U ×Ω as an intersection of an open and dense sets in U ×Ω and a dense set
in U ×Ω. Since U1 ∩U2 ∩ {(u, ω) ∈ U ×Ω | ω ∈ Ωu} = U3, it follows that U3 is dense in
U × Ω.
Let some (u, ω) ∈ U3 be given and let fk : O → IRN++ ×X, ∀k ∈ Ik(u,ω), be the continu-
ous functions given in Theorem 9.3.5. For every j ∈ IN−1, for every k ∈ Ik(u,ω), denote
the elements q(x(u, ω, k)) and q(x(u, ω, k)), and the sets Ij(x(u, ω, k)) and Ij(x(u, ω, k)),
corresponding to the Walrasian equilibrium fk(u, ω) = (p(u, ω, k), x(u, ω, k)), by qk, qk,
Ikj , and I
k
j , respectively. Let the function f
0 : O → Ω be defined by f 0(u, ω) = ω,
∀(u, ω) ∈ O. Clearly, f 0 is continuous. For every k ∈ Ik(u,ω), for every j ∈ IN−1, let
the function gkj : IR
N
++ × X × Ω → IR be defined by associating with every (p, x, ω) ∈
IRN++ ×X × Ω the element
gkj (p, x, ω) = min
({
xij−ωij−l̂ij(qk)






∣∣∣ i ∈ IM \ Ikj
})
.
Clearly, gkj is continuous. Let the function h : O → IR be defined by
h(u, ω) = min
({
gkj (f
k(u, ω), f 0(u, ω))
∣∣∣ j ∈ IN−1, k ∈ Ik(u,ω)
})
, ∀(u, ω) ∈ O.
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Clearly, h is continuous. Notice that h(u, ω) > 0. Since (l̃, L̃) is monotonic and continu-
ous, there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that, for every (u, ω) ∈ O with |h(u, ω)−h(u, ω)| < ε, for
every Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ),
for every j ∈ IN−1, #Ij(x∗) = #Ij(x∗) = 1. The set h−1((h(u, ω)−ε, h(u, ω)+ε)) is open
in O by the continuity of h, hence also open in U × Ω, and contains (u, ω). Therefore,
U3 is open in U × Ω. Q.E.D.
For the remainder of this section, let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), ((π
ik)i∈IM )k∈I2 be given such
that the Assumptions A1-A4 and A6 are satisfied and (u, ω) is an element of the set U3
given in Theorem 9.3.7.
Let a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM )
be given. From Theorem 9.3.7 it follows that (p∗, x∗) is a locally unique and regular
Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E , while, for every j ∈ IN−1, Ij(x∗) = Ij(x∗) = 1.
From the remark below Theorem 9.3.2 it follows that for every price system p ∈ P
being close to p∗ there exists a uniquely determined Drèze equilibrium of the economy
Ẽ(p, p) being close to (p∗, x∗). This suggests a very appealing alternative model for the
competition of votes between political candidates. Consider the Walrasian equilibrium
(p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E as the status quo of the economy. The political
candidates can choose either a direction of change with respect to the status quo or to
stay at the status quo. If a political candidate chooses a specific direction of change, then
it is assumed that the uniquely determined Drèze equilibrium specified in Theorem 9.3.2
being close to the Walrasian equilibrium results. So, political candidates are no longer
assumed to choose a specific Drèze equilibrium, but are restricted to choose between
local options. Moreover, from Theorem 9.3.2 it follows that the change in utility of the
consumers is uniquely determined if a political candidate chooses a specific direction of
change. It is again assumed that political candidates maximize their expected plurality
in the elections, or, more precisely, political candidates choose a direction of change
affecting their marginal expected plurality optimally. Notice that this way of modelling
the political system captures some interesting real world phenomena. First of all, the
cost of acquiring information for political candidates is usually very high for actions far
removed from the status quo. Moreover, institutional reasons and commitments made in
the past often require political candidates to stay near the status quo. Finally, political
candidates need only bother about the price regulations to implement, they no longer
need to specify the resulting Drèze equilibrium if there is more than one.
Let a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E be the status quo.
The set of admissible actions Ãk of a political political candidate k ∈ I2 is given by a











The action p̃k ∈ Ãk of a political candidate k ∈ I2 corresponds to a change of (p∗1,..., p∗N−1)⊤
in the direction p̃k. If p̃k = 0N−1, then political candidate k ∈ I2 chooses to stay at the
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status quo (p∗, x∗). For the main results, the following very weak assumption is made.
A8. For every political candidate k ∈ I2, the set of admissible actions Ãk is non-empty,
closed, and Ãk ⊂ Ã.
The pay-off function K̃1 : Ã1×Ã2 → IR of political candidate 1 is defined by associating










































































The pay-off function K̃2 : Ã1×Ã2 → IR of political candidate 2 is easily seen to be given
by K̃2 = −K̃1.
Definition 9.3.8 (Directional political economic equilibrium)
A directional political economic equilibrium of the political economic system E = ((X i,
ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ãk, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) with status quo the locally unique, regular Wal-
rasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 and Ij(x
∗) = Ij(x
∗) = 1, ∀j ∈ IN−1, of the
economy E = (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ), is a Nash equilibrium of the mixed extension of the game
G̃ = (Ã1, Ã2, K̃1, K̃2).
Let a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E be the status quo. A
closer look at the pay-off functions K̃1 and K̃2 shows that they have properties closely
related to separability of voting functions as defined in Chapter 8. For every k ∈ I2, let
k′ ∈ I2 be such that k′ 6= k, and define the function K̃k+ : Ãk → IR by associating with





































Now, the following theorem is shown in a similar way as Theorem 8.4.9.
Theorem 9.3.9
Let the political economic system E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ãk, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) with
status quo (p∗, x∗) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4, A6, and A8, where (u, ω) is an el-
ement of the set U3 given in Theorem 9.3.7 and (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 is a Walrasian
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equilibrium of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ). Then there exists a directional politi-
cal economic equilibrium in pure strategies of the political economic system E with status
quo (p∗, x∗). Moreover, (p̃∗1, p̃∗2) ∈ Ã1×Ã2 is a directional political economic equilibrium















For every k ∈ I2, the set Ãk is compact and the function K̃k+ is continuous, so, by








K̃1(p̃∗1, p̃∗2) = K̃1+(p̃∗1)− K̃2+(p̃∗2) ≥ K̃1+(p̃1)− K̃2+(p̃∗2)
= K̃1(p̃1, p̃∗2), ∀p̃1 ∈ Ã1,
K̃2(p̃∗1, p̃∗2) = K̃2+(p̃∗2)− K̃1+(p̃∗1) ≥ K̃2+(p̃2)− K̃1+(p̃∗1)
= K̃2(p̃∗1, p̃2), ∀p̃2 ∈ Ã2.
So, (p̃∗1, p̃∗2) is a directional political economic equilibrium in pure strategies of the
political economic system E with status quo (p∗, x∗).
Let (p̃∗1, p̃∗2) ∈ Ã1 × Ã2 be any political economic equilibrium in pure strategies of the
economy E with status quo (p∗, x∗). Then,
K̃1(p̃∗1, p̃∗2) = K̃1+(p̃∗1)− K̃2+(p̃∗2) ≥ K̃1(p̃1, p̃∗2)
= K̃1+(p̃1)− K̃2+(p̃∗2), ∀p̃1 ∈ Ã1,
K̃2(p̃∗1, p̃∗2) = K̃2+(p̃∗2)− K̃1+(p̃∗1) ≥ K̃2(p̃∗1, p̃2)
= K̃2+(p̃2)− K̃1+(p̃∗1), ∀p̃2 ∈ Ã2.
So, K̃1+(p̃∗1) = max({K̃1+(p̃1) | p̃1 ∈ Ã1}) and K̃2+(p̃∗2) = max({K̃2+(p̃2) | p̃2 ∈ Ã2}).
Q.E.D.
9.4 Generically Chosen Price Regulations
The existence of a political economic equilibrium of the political economic system Ê has
been shown in Chapter 8 and Section 9.2. In the example of Section 8.5 price regulations
incompatible with the Walrasian equilibrium price system were chosen by the political
candidates in the political economic equilibrium. The existence of a directional political
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economic equilibrium of the political economic system E with status quo a Walrasian
equilibrium has been shown in Section 9.3. In the example of Section 9.5 the political
candidates will choose directions of movement away from the Walrasian equilibrium
price system in the directional political economic equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is not
clear whether this is the typical case. To answer this question, the following assumption
with respect to the model of Section 9.3 will be made in the main results of this section.
A9. For every political candidate k ∈ I2, Ãk = Ã.
Making Assumption A9 and using Theorem 9.3.9 it is possible to show the even stronger
result of Theorem 9.4.1, where the directional political economic equilibria in pure strate-
gies of E with status quo (p∗, x∗) are characterized.
Let (X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), ((π
ik)i∈IM )k∈I2 be given such that the Assumptions A1-
A4 and A6 are satisfied and (u, ω) is an element of the set U3 given in Theorem
9.3.7. Moreover, let a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy
E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) be given. For every k ∈ I2, let k′ ∈ I2 be such that k′ 6= k,









































Let the political economic system E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ãk, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) with
status quo (p∗, x∗) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4, A6, and A9, where (u, ω) is an el-
ement of the set U3 given in Theorem 9.3.7 and (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 is a Walrasian
equilibrium of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ). Let (p̃∗1, p̃∗2) be a directional political
economic equilibrium of the political economic system E with status quo (p∗, x∗). For ev-
ery k ∈ I2, either Kk = 0N−1, or Kk 6= 0N−1 and p̃∗k = Kk/‖Kk‖2.
Proof













For every k ∈ I2, since K̃k+(p̃k) = Kk · p̃k, ∀p̃k ∈ Ãk, and since Ãk is the union of the
unit sphere B̃N−2(0N−1, 1) and {0N−1}, the theorem follows immediately. Q.E.D.
If in Theorem 9.4.1 it holds that Kk = 0N−1 for a political candidate k ∈ I2, then, given
the action chosen by his opponent, every admissible action yields political candidate k
the same pay-off. If both K1 6= 0N−1 and K2 6= 0N−1, then the directional political
economic equilibrium is unique.
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It could be the case that in a typical political economic equilibrium both political
candidates propose a price regulation corresponding to the same Walrasian equilibrium
or that in a typical directional political economic equilibrium both political candidates
choose to stay at the Walrasian equilibrium, being the status quo. It is clear that it is
always possible to construct examples where this happens. Moreover, since it is well-
known that Drèze equilibria not corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium are usually
not Pareto efficient, it would not be completely surprising if this would turn out to be
the case generically, or at least for a non-degenerate class of economies. Nevertheless,
in this section it is shown that the situation in the example of Section 8.5 and in the
example to be presented in Section 9.5 are typical cases. Moreover, it is shown that if
the opponent of a political candidate chooses an action corresponding to a Walrasian
equilibrium, then the generic case is that the action of the political candidate leading
to the same Walrasian equilibrium can be improved upon by playing an action not cor-
responding to a Walrasian equilibrium. Similarly, it is shown that, generically, political
candidates propose directions of movement away from the status quo.
Consider the political economic system Ê . Suppose political candidate 2 chooses an
action (p∗, p∗, q∗) ∈ A2 corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E . Then
it will be shown that only in degenerate cases the best response of political candidate 1 is
also to choose the action (p∗, p∗, q∗). More precisely, it will be shown that, generically, for









⊤ ∈ O such that (p1, p1, q1) is a better response against (p∗, p∗, q∗) than
the action (p∗, p∗, q∗) itself, p1 not being a Walrasian equilibrium price system. This
means that, generically, proposing price regulations which exclude the Walrasian equi-
librium price system is a better response against a certain Walrasian equilibrium than
proposing this Walrasian equilibrium.
Consider the political economic system E with status quo a Walrasian equilibrium
(p∗, x∗) of the economy E with p∗N = 1. Suppose political candidate 2 chooses the action
0N−1 ∈ Ã2, i.e., political candidate 2 proposes to stay at the status quo. Then it will
be shown that only in degenerate cases the best response of political candidate 1 is also
choosing action 0N−1. Even stronger, it will be shown that, generically, K1 6= 0N−1. Using
symmetry considerations it follows that, generically, K2 6= 0N−1. So, from Theorem 9.4.1
it follows that in a directional political economic equilibrium, generically, both political
candidates choose to move away from the status quo.
Assumptions which have to be made are that there is at least one non-numeraire
commodity, as is always assumed in this chapter, and that there are at least two con-
sumers. Otherwise, every consumer will keep his initial endowments in every Walrasian
or Drèze equilibrium. Hence, it is impossible to influence the voting decision of consumers
by proposing price regulations. The set of all possible voting functions of a consumer
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i ∈ IM for political candidate 1 satisfying Assumption A7 is denoted by Πi. Hence,
Πi = {πi1 ∈ C2((0, 1)× (0, 1), (0, 1))| ∂v1πi1(v1, v2) > 0, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)
∂v2π
i1(v1, v2) < 0, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)} .
This set is given the topology induced by the C1-topology. Notice that Πi, ∀i ∈ IM , is
open in C2((0, 1) × (0, 1), IR). Define the set Π by Π = ∏i∈IM Πi and give this set the
product topology. Notice that, for every π ∈ Π, π = (π11, . . . , πM1) with πi1 denoting
the voting function of consumer i ∈ IM . For some consumer i ∈ IM , let πi1 ∈ Πi be given
and let ǫ ∈ C0((0, 1)× (0, 1), IR++) be given. Define the set Vπi1,ǫ by
Vπi1,ǫ = {f ∈ C2((0, 1)× (0, 1), (0, 1)) |
|πi1(v1, v2)− f(v1, v2)| < ǫ(v1, v2), ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1),
|∂v1πi1(v1, v2)− ∂v1f(v1, v2)| < ǫ(v1, v2), ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1),
|∂v2πi1(v1, v2)− ∂v2f(v1, v2)| < ǫ(v1, v2), ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1)}.
Then Vπi1,ǫ is a member of the base for the C
1-topology on C2((0, 1)× (0, 1), (0, 1)), see
Definition 2.9.4.
Let the political economic system Ê be given. Let (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 and #Ij(x∗) =
#Ij(x
∗) = 1, ∀j ∈ IN−1, be a locally unique, regular Walrasian equilibrium of the econ-
omy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ). Let q∗ ∈ QN−1 be such that the proposal (p∗, p∗, q∗) corre-
sponds to this Walrasian equilibrium. Suppose political candidate 2 proposes (p∗, p∗, q∗).
Then it holds that (p∗, p∗, q∗) is a best response for political candidate 1 if and only if
K1((p∗, p∗, q∗), (p∗, p∗, q∗)) = max(a1,q1)∈A1 K
1((a1, q1), (p∗, p∗, q∗)). From Theorem 2.9.7
and Theorem 9.3.2 it follows that a necessary condition for (p∗, p∗, q∗) to be a best re-



































From Theorem 9.4.1 and the remark made below it, it follows that (9.13) is a necessary
and sufficient condition for 0N−1 to be a possible action of political candidate 1 in a
directional political economic equilibrium of the political economic system E with status
quo (p∗, x∗). Using that πi1(v1, v2) + πi2(v1, v2) = 1, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) and using














= 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1. (9.14)
Notice that the expression in (9.14) does not depend on πi2, ∀i ∈ IM . For the remainder
of this section, the voting function πi1, ∀i ∈ IM , will therefore be denoted by πi.
Let (X i, ui)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2. Let the set Ω
1 be as in Theorem
9.3.4. For every ω ∈ Ω1, let k(ω) be the number of Walrasian equilibria in the economy
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E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ). By Theorem 9.3.4, for every ω ∈ Ω1, there exists an open set O
containing ω and being such that, for every ω ∈ O, k(ω) = k(ω) and the vector of Wal-
rasian equilibria ((p(ω, 1), x(ω, 1)), . . . , (p(ω, k(ω)), x(ω, k(ω)))) depends in a continuous
way on ω. Define the set W1 by
W1 =
{
(ω, π) ∈ Ω1 ×Π





































In Theorem 9.4.2 it is shown that W1 is open in Ω× Π and in Theorem 9.4.3 that W1
is dense in Ω×Π.
Theorem 9.4.2
Let (X i, ui)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let M ∈ IN \ {1}. Then the set W1
is open in Ω× Π.
Proof
Let some i ∈ IM be given. Let the function gi : Πi× (0, 1)× (0, 1)→ IR++ be defined by
gi(πi, v1, v2) = ∂v1π
i(v1, v2), ∀(πi, v1, v2) ∈ Πi × (0, 1)× (0, 1).
It will be shown that gi is continuous. Let O be an open set in IR++ and let (π̂
i, v̂1, v̂2) ∈
gi
−1
(O) be given. Let ε ∈ IR++ be such that B1(gi(π̂i, v̂1, v̂2), ε) ⊂ O. Let the function
ǫ : (0, 1)× (0, 1)→ IR++ be defined by
ǫ(v1, v2) = 12ε, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1).
Since ∂v1 π̂
i : (0, 1) × (0, 1) → IR++ and ∂v2 π̂i : (0, 1) × (0, 1) → −IR++ are continuous








For every (πi, v1, v2) ∈ Vπ̂i,ǫ × B2((v̂1, v̂2)⊤, δ) it holds that
|∂v1πi(v1, v2)− ∂v1 π̂i(v̂1, v̂2)|




so gi(πi, v1, v2) ∈ B1(gi(π̂i, v̂1, v̂2), ε) ⊂ O. Hence, gi−1(O) is open, concluding the proof
that gi is a continuous function.
Let some ω ∈ Ω1 be given. Let O be a set open in Ω1, containing ω, and being such that
k(ω) = k(ω), ∀ω ∈ O, while for every k ∈ Ik(ω) the function fk,i : O → IRN , defined by
fk,i(ω) = xi(ω, k), ∀ω ∈ O,
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is continuous. Let the function h : O×Π→ IRk(ω)M be defined by associating with every





π1, u1(f 1,1(ω)), u1(f 1,1(ω))
)
∂xNu
1(f 1,1(ω)), . . . ,
gM
(






Using the continuity of the functions fk,i, ∀k ∈ Ik(ω), ∀i ∈ IM , and gi, ∀i ∈ IM , and the
fact that ui is continuously differentiable, it follows easily that h is a continuous function.











Clearly, the set Wω, defined by Wω = h−1(Tω), is open in O × Π and therefore open in
Ω×Π. So, W1 = ∪ω∈Ω1Wω is open in Ω×Π. Q.E.D.
Theorem 9.4.3
Let (X i, ui)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let M ∈ IN \ {1}. Then the set W1
is dense in Ω×Π.
Proof
It will be shown that the closure of W1 in Ω × Π contains Ω1 × Π, a set being dense in
Ω×Π, thereby showing the result. Let an element ω ∈ Ω1 and a set O being open in Π
be given. Let πi ∈ Πi, ∀i ∈ IM , and ǫi ∈ C0((0, 1)× (0, 1), IR++), ∀i ∈ IM , be such that∏
i∈IM Vπi,ǫi ⊂ O. It will be shown that W1 ∩ ({ω} ×
∏
i∈IM Vπi,ǫi) 6= ∅, thereby showing
that the closure of W1 in Ω× Π contains Ω1 × Π.
For every k ∈ Ik(ω), for every i ∈ IM , let the real numbers vk,i and dk,i be defined by
vk,i = ui(xi(ω, k)) and dk,i = ∂xNu




∣∣∣∂v1π1(vk,1, vk,1)dk,1 = ∂v1πi(vk,i, vk,i)dk,i, ∀i ∈ IM
}
.
If K1 = ∅, then the proof is finished. Consider the case where K1 6= ∅. Let K2 be
a maximal subset of K1 such that k1, k2 ∈ K2 and k1 6= k2 implies vk1,1 6= vk2,1. So,
{vk,1 | k ∈ K1} = {vk,1 | k ∈ K2}. Let the, possibly empty, set K3 be defined by
K3 =
{
k ∈ Ik(ω) \K1
∣∣∣∂v1π1(vk,1, vk,1)dk,1 6= ∂v1π2(vk,2, vk,2)dk,2
}
.
For every v̂ ∈ (0, 1), for every δ ∈ IR++ satisfying B2((v̂, v̂)⊤, δ) ⊂ (0, 1)×(0, 1), for every
ε ∈ IR++, let the function fv̂,δ,ε ∈ C∞((0, 1)× (0, 1), IR+) have the following properties:
1. fv̂,δ,ε(v
1, v2) = 0, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ ((0, 1)× (0, 1)) \B2((v̂, v̂)⊤, δ),
2. ‖∂(v1,v2)⊤fv̂,δ,ε(v1, v2)‖2 < ε, ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1),
3. ∂v1fv̂,δ,ε(v̂ − 12δ, v̂ − 12δ) > 0.
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Using Theorem 2.9.2 it is not difficult to show that such a function fv̂,δ,ε exists. Let the
function π̂ ∈ Π be defined by




1, v2), ∀(v1, v2) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1),




2 |vk,1 − vk
′,1|

































For every k ∈ K2, the choice of δk guarantees that π̂ is a perturbation of π on non-
intersecting neighbourhoods of utilities consumer 1 derives at Walrasian equilibria of
the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ). For every k ∈ K2, the choice of v̂k guarantees that
the voting behaviour of consumer 1 is indeed perturbed at the utility he derives at
Walrasian equilibrium k. Finally, εk, ∀k ∈ K2, is chosen such that π̂ ∈ ∏i∈IM Vπi,ǫi and
the perturbation is so small that for every k ∈ K3 the already existing inequality of
∂v1π
1(vk,1, vk,1)dk,1 and ∂v1π
2(vk,1, vk,1)dk,2 remains. The fact that dk,i > 0, ∀k ∈ Ik(ω),
∀i ∈ IM , guarantees that
∂v1 π̂
1(vk,1, vk,1)dk,1 6= ∂v1 π̂2(vk,2, vk,2)dk,2, ∀k ∈ K1.
Clearly,
∂v1 π̂
1(vk,1, vk,1)dk,1 6= ∂v1 π̂2(vk,2, vk,2)dk,2, ∀k ∈ K3.
Let k′ ∈ Ik(ω) \ (K1 ∪K3) be given. Then ∂v1π1(vk′,1, vk′,1)dk′,1 = ∂v1π2(vk′,2, vk′,2)dk′,2,















′,1 6= ∂v1 π̂2(vk′,2, vk′,2)dk′,2.
If vk
















So, it follows that (ω, π̂) ∈ W1, whereas, clearly, (ω, π̂) ∈ {ω} ×∏i∈IM Vπi,ǫi. Q.E.D.
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Theorem 9.4.4
Let (X i, ui)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let M ∈ IN\{1}. Then there exists an
open and dense set W2 in Ω× Π such that, for every (ω, π) ∈ W2, for every Walrasian
equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ), it holds that
−∑i∈IM ∂v1πi(ui(x∗i), ui(x∗i))∂xNui(x∗i)(x∗ij − ωij) 6= 0 for some j ∈ IN−1.
Proof
By Theorem 9.4.2 and Theorem 9.4.3 the set W1 is open and dense in Ω×Π. Let π ∈ Π




∣∣∣(ω, π) ∈ W1
}
,
is non-empty. Since W1 is open in Ω × Π, it holds that Ωπ is open in Ω. Let ω ∈
Ωπ and (p
′, x) ∈ IRN++ × X with p′N = 1 be given. By Theorem 2.9.7 it holds that
if (p′, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) satisfying
−∑i∈IM ∂v1πi(ui(xi), ui(xi))∂xNui(xi)(xij −ωij) = 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1, then there exists λi ∈ IR,
∀i ∈ IM , such that
∂xiu


















i(xi) (xi1 − ωi1) = 0. (9.18)
Notice that the condition that on the market of the numeraire commodity the total excess
demand is equal to zero is not specified. This condition is implied by the equations in
(9.16) and (9.17). Let the function
ψ : X × IRM × IRN−1++ × Ωπ → IRMN+M+N
be defined such that ψ(x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤, ω) is the left-hand side of (9.15)-(9.18), for
every (x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤, ω) ∈ X × IRM × IRN−1++ × Ωπ. For every ω ∈ Ω, the function
ψω : X × IRM × IRN−1++ → IRMN+M+N
is defined by associating with every (x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤) ∈ X× IRM × IRN−1++ the element
ψ(x, λ, (p1,..., pN−1)
⊤, ω). The matrix of partial derivatives of ψ evaluated at a point
ξ = (x, λ, (p′1,..., p
′
N−1)
⊤, ω) ∈ X × IRM × IRN−1++ × Ωπ such that ψ(ξ) = 0MN+M+N is
denoted by M and is given in Table 9.4.1.







i(xi), ∀i ∈ IM , (9.19)
∂ωijψMN+M+N(ξ) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM , ∀j ∈ IN \ {1}. (9.20)
The partial derivatives of ψMN+M+N at ξ with respect to x are quite complicated, but
do not matter in the following.
















. . . 0M×M
...




j −ωMj )j∈IN−1 (−p′j)j∈IN−1 −1





MN M N−1 MN
Table 9.4.1. The matrix M.
Let y ∈ IRMN+M+N be such that y⊤M = 02MN+M+N−1⊤. Then, y⊤∂ωi
N
ψ(ξ) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM ,
implies, using (9.20), that
yMN+i = 0, ∀i ∈ IM . (9.21)
By the definition of Ωπ there exists i









































































































implying by (9.22) that yMN+M+N = 0. Now it can be shown similarly as in the proof
of Theorem 9.3.6 that y = 0MN+M+N , so M has rank MN + M + N, and ψ intersects




∣∣∣ψω ⊤   {0MN+M+N}
}
.
294 Regulation of Prices, the Generic Case?
From the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.10.18, it follows that the set Ωπ \ Ωπ has
Lebesgue measure zero in Ωπ. Since Ωπ is an MN -dimensional C
∞ manifold, being a
subset of IRMN , it follows that the set Ωπ \ Ωπ has Lebesgue measure zero, see the
remark below Theorem 2.10.17. For every ω ∈ Ωπ, ψω is a function from an (MN +M+
N − 1)-dimensional C∞ manifold into an (MN + M + N)-dimensional C∞ manifold,
{0MN+M+N} is a 0-dimensional C∞ manifold, ψω ∈ C1(X × IRM × IRN−1++ , IRMN+M+N),
and ψω ⊤   {0MN+M+N}, so it follows from Theorem 2.10.16 that ψω−1({0MN+M+N}) = ∅.
Let the set W be defined by
W =
{




Clearly, the closure ofW inW1 is equal toW1. SinceW1 is dense in Ω×Π, it holds that
W is dense in Ω×Π. Let the setW2 be defined by the elements (ω, π) ∈ Ω1×Π such that
every Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM )
satisfies −∑i∈IM ∂v1πi(ui(x∗i), ui(x∗i))∂xNui(x∗i)(x∗ij −ωij) 6= 0 for some j ∈ IN−1. Clearly,
W ⊂ W2 and hence W2 is dense in Ω × Π. Similar to the case where it is shown that
W1 is open in Ω×Π, it can be shown that W2 is open in Ω× Π. Q.E.D.
Combining the results of Theorem 9.3.7 and Theorem 9.4.4, the following result is ob-
tained.
Theorem 9.4.5
Let (X i)i∈IM satisfy Assumption A1 and let M ∈ IN\{1}. Then there exists an open and
dense set V in U × Ω×Π such that for every (u, ω, π) ∈ V every Walrasian equilibrium
(p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) is locally unique, regular, for




















Let the set V1 be defined by V1 = U3×Π, where U3 is as in Theorem 9.3.7. The set W2
obtained in Theorem 9.4.4 depends on the choice of u ∈ U and will therefore be denoted
by W2u , ∀u ∈ U. Let the set V2 be defined by
V2 =
{
(u, ω, π) ∈ U × Ω×Π
∣∣∣(ω, π) ∈ W2u
}
.
Let the set V be defined as the set of elements (u, ω, π) ∈ V1 such that, for every















for some j ∈ IN−1. Notice that V1 ∩ V2 ⊂ V. Since V ⊂ V1, it holds that for every
(u, ω, π) ∈ V every Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E =
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((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) is locally unique, regular, and, for every j ∈ IN−1,#Ij(x∗) = #Ij(x∗) =
1. It remains to be shown that V is open and dense in U ×Ω×Π. Since U3 is open and
dense in U × Ω, it holds that V1 = U3 ×Π is open and dense in U ×Ω×Π. Clearly, V2
is dense in U × Ω× Π. Since the intersection of an open and dense set with a dense set
is dense, it holds that V1 ∩ V2 is dense in U × Ω× Π, so V is dense in U × Ω× Π.
The Walrasian equilibrium set moves continuously in (u, ω) for every (u, ω) ∈ U3, see
Theorem 9.3.7. Since the voting functions have no influence on the Walrasian equilibrium
set, it clearly holds that the Walrasian equilibrium set moves continuously in (u, ω, π)
for every (u, ω, π) ∈ V1. In the proof of Theorem 9.4.2 it has been shown that for every
i ∈ IM the function gi : Πi×(0, 1)×(0, 1)→ IR++, defined by gi(πi, v1, v2) = ∂v1πi(v1, v2),
∀(πi, v1, v2) ∈ Πi × (0, 1) × (0, 1), is continuous. Similarly, it can be shown that for
every i ∈ IM the function f i : U i × IRN++ → IR, defined by f i(ui, xi) = ∂xNui(xi),
∀(ui, xi) ∈ U i × IRN++, is continuous. Therefore, it follows easily that V is open in V1.
Hence, V is open in U × Ω× Π. Q.E.D.
Let the political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) satisfy
the Assumptions A1-A5 and A7, let M ∈ IN \ {1}, and let (u, ω, π) ∈ V with V as
in Theorem 9.4.5. Suppose political candidate 2 proposes the Walrasian equilibrium
(p∗, p∗, q∗) ∈ A2. Using (9.13) and Theorem 9.4.5, it is clear that it is not optimal
for political candidate 1 to choose the action (p∗, p∗, q∗) ∈ A1. Such a proposal can be
improved by proposing (p1, p1, q(p1)) ∈ A1, where p1 can be chosen arbitrarily close to p∗.
Since the Walrasian equilibria of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) are locally unique,
p1 can be chosen such that it is not a Walrasian equilibrium price system. By symmetry,
there exists an open and dense set V in U ×Ω×Π, for which the statements made above
are true with the roles of the political candidates 1 and 2 reversed. Moreover, the set
V ∩ V is open and dense in U × Ω× Π.
Let the political economic system E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ãk, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2)
with status quo a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the economy E =
((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A4, A7, and A9, let M ∈ IN \ {1}, and let
(u, ω, π) ∈ V with V as in Theorem 9.4.5. It follows from Theorem 9.4.1 and Theorem
9.4.5 that political candidate 1 proposes K1/‖K1‖2 6= 0N−1 in a directional political
economic equilibrium of the political economic system E with status quo (p∗, x∗). By
symmetry, there exists an open and dense set V in U ×Ω×Π, for which the statements
made above are true with the roles of the political candidates 1 and 2 reversed. Moreover,
the set V ∩ V is open and dense in U × Ω× Π.
Corollary 9.4.6 and Corollary 9.4.7 are immediately obtained from Theorem 9.4.5
and the remarks being made in the previous two paragraphs.
Corollary 9.4.6
Let (X i)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (A
k)k∈I2 satisfy the Assumptions A1 and A4-A5, and let M ∈ IN\{1}.
Then there exists an open and dense set of utility functions, initial endowments, and
voting functions (u, ω, π) ∈ U×Ω×Π such that there is no political economic equilibrium
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of the political economic system Ê = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ak, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) where
both political candidates choose an action (p∗, p∗, q∗) ∈ A1 = A2 corresponding to a
Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ).
Corollary 9.4.7
Let (X i)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃), (Ãk)k∈I2 satisfy the Assumptions A1, A4, and A9, and let M ∈
IN\{1}. Then there exists an open and dense set of utility functions, initial endowments,
and voting functions (u, ω, π) ∈ U × Ω × Π such that in every directional political eco-
nomic equilibrium (p̃∗1, p̃∗2) of the political economic system E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃),
(Ãk, (πik)i∈IM )k∈I2) with status quo a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗N = 1 of the
economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈IM ), both p̃∗1 6= 0N−1 and p̃∗2 6= 0N−1.
Therefore, it can be concluded that, generically, both in a political economic equilibrium
and a directional political economic equilibrium, Walrasian equilibria are unstable and
rationally behaving political candidates have incentives to impose price regulations on
the economic system.
9.5 An Example
In this section the same example as used in Chapter 8 will be analyzed. Consider the
political economic system E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈I2 , (l̃, L̃), (Ãk, (πik)i∈I2)k∈I2) with status quo
the Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗2 = 1 of the economy E = ((X i, ui, ωi)i∈I2),














5 , ∀x2 ∈ X2, respectively, ω1 = ω2 = (1, 4)⊤, (l̃, L̃) represents the uniform
rationing system, where l̃ : Q2 → −IR4+ is defined by l̃11(q) = l̃21(q) = −2q1, ∀q ∈ Q2,
l̃12(q) = l̃
2
2(q) = −8q2, ∀q ∈ Q2, and L̃ : Q2 → IR4+ is defined by L̃11(q) = L̃21(q) = 2q1,
∀q ∈ Q2, L̃12(q) = L̃22(q) = 8q2, ∀q ∈ Q2,
Ã1 = Ã2 = {−1, 0, 1},




, ∀vi1, vi2 ∈ IR++ × IR++.
The unique Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) with p∗2 = 1 of the economy E is given by
p∗1 = 4, x
∗1 = (1 35 , 1
3
5)
⊤, and x∗2 = ( 25 , 6
2
5)
⊤, see Section 8.5.
Notice that the Assumptions A1-A4, A6, and A8 are satisfied, except that the range
of the utility functions is IR++ instead of (0, 1) and hence the domain of the voting
functions is given by IR++ × IR++ instead of (0, 1) × (0, 1). Obviously, it is possible
to take a monotone transformation of the utility function such that its range becomes
(0, 1). Notice that also the voting functions have to be transformed in that case. So, a
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directional political economic equilibrium of the political economic system E with status
quo (p∗, x∗) is guaranteed to exist by Theorem 9.3.9.
A political candidate k ∈ I2 has three possibilities in this example. Either decrease
the price of commodity 1, i.e., p̃k1 = −1, or stay at the status quo, i.e., p̃k1 = 0, or
increase the price of commodity 1, i.e., p̃k1 = 1. Using the demand functions and the















































5 , 4 ≤ p1 ≤ 11.
It is easily verified that ∂p1 v̂
1(4) = − 325 and ∂p1 v̂2(4) = 3254
3
5 ≈ 0.276. Notice that this
corresponds to the result of Theorem 9.3.2 since








( 35) = − 325 ,











It follows that an increase in the price of commodity 1 is harmful to consumer 1, while
consumer 2 benefits from such an increase, even when taking into account the resulting
supply rationing on the market of commodity 1. This is not surprising since consumer 1
demands commodity 1, while consumer 2 supplies commodity 1. Notice that the benefits
for consumer 2 exceed the detrimental effects for consumer 1.





i(p∗1)) have to be computed for every

































































5 − 1) (p̃21 − p̃11) , ∀p̃11 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, ∀p̃21 ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
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Political candidate 2
−1 0 1
−1 (0, 0) (−78, 78) (−156, 156)
Political candidate 1 0 (78,−78) (0, 0) (−78, 78)
1 (156,−156) (78,−78) (0, 0)
Figure 9.5.1. Pay-offs ×1000 of the political candidates in the example.
The pay-offs of the political candidates of the game G̃ = (Ã1, Ã2, K̃1, K̃2) are given in
Figure 9.5.1.
From Figure 9.5.1 it follows immediately that both political candidates choose to
increase the price of commodity 1 in a directional political economic equilibrium of the
political economic system E with status quo (p∗, x∗) since (1, 1) is a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies of the game G̃, so the Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) is unstable as a
status quo.
Finally, consider the case where the political candidates have different sets of admis-
sible actions, for example because of commitments made in the past. One political can-
didate is assumed to have the possibility of lowering the price of commodity 1 compared
to the Walrasian equilibrium price, while the other political candidate might propose
to increase the price of this commodity. Both political candidates have the possibility
to stay at the status quo. Hence, Ã1 = {−1, 0} and Ã2 = {0, 1} . The pay-offs of the
political candidates of the resulting game G̃ = (Ã1, Ã2, K̃1, K̃2) are given in Figure 9.5.2.
Political candidate 2
0 1
−1 (−78, 78) (−156, 156)
Political candidate 1
0 (0, 0) (−78, 78)
Figure 9.5.2. Pay-offs ×1000 of the political candidates in the example.
From Figure 9.5.2 it follows immediately that the directional political economic equi-
librium of the political economic system E with status quo (p∗, x∗) is given by (0, 1),
so political candidate 1 proposes to stay at the status quo, while political candidate 2
proposes to increase the price of commodity 1. Notice that the expected plurality of
political candidate 2 is positive in this equilibrium.
Part IV
Dynamic Aspects of Disequilibrium
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Chapter 10
A Globally and Universally Stable
Price Adjustment Process
10.1 Introduction
At least since Walras (1874), economists have been interested in the problem of finding a
price adjustment process that generates, for a given economy and an arbitrarily specified
starting price system, a path of price systems converging to a price system at which
the total excess demand is equal to zero. In Section 3.12 it has been shown that the
classical Walrasian tatonnement process may fail to converge if some rather restrictive
assumptions on the economy are not satisfied. Therefore, it is interesting to look for
alternative price adjustment processes that reach a Walrasian equilibrium price system
given any total excess demand function, i.e., any function defined for strictly positive
price systems, satisfying homogeneity of degree zero, Walras’ law, continuity, and some
boundary behaviour, see Theorem 3.7.1, Theorem 3.7.2, and Theorem 3.11.1. These
conditions are the only properties which may be expected for the total excess demand
function of an economy, see Theorem 3.13.1.
A universally stable process to generate a fixed point of a function has been presented
in Kellog, Li, and Yorke (1976, 1977) and a universally stable price adjustment process
to obtain a zero point of a total excess demand function defined for non-negative price
systems has been given in Smale (1976). In Varian (1977) it has been shown that
the boundary conditions on the total excess demand function used by Smale can be
relaxed if the price adjustment process is extended in a particular way outside IRN+ . For a
generic economy, for almost every starting price system in the boundary of the domain,
Smale’s process reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price system. However, an actual price
adjustment process should allow for a start with any price system in the interior of the
domain. In Keenan (1981) it has been shown that Smale’s process is not globally stable,
there may exist an open set of starting price systems for which the process does not
converge to some Walrasian equilibrium price system.
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A globally and universally stable price adjustment process has been presented in
Kamiya (1990). Under rather weak conditions on the total excess demand function,
among which the boundary condition that the total excess demand function is also
defined if the price of some commodities is equal to zero and the total excess demand of
a commodity is positive if its price is zero, convergence to a Walrasian equilibrium price
system of the economy is guaranteed for almost every starting price system in the relative
interior of the unit simplex. It might be possible to weaken this boundary condition in
a similar way as in Varian (1977) for Smale’s process. However, from an economic point
of view such a solution is not completely satisfactory since outside the original domain
the price adjustment process is artificially defined and, for example, does not depend
on the total excess demand at the price system reached, but instead on the total excess
demand at another price system.
In this chapter an alternative globally and universally stable price adjustment process
is considered, proposed in van der Laan and Talman (1987a). This process has an
appealing economic interpretation. In this chapter it is shown that for a typical economy
this price adjustment process converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price system given
any starting price system, while standard conditions on utility functions, consumption
sets, and initial endowments are made. Under these conditions the total excess demand
function is only well-defined for strictly positive price systems. Moreover, it is not
excluded that the total excess demand of a commodity becomes negative if its price goes
to zero.
In Section 10.2 the price adjustment process is described and a definition of stability
of the price adjustment process is given. The adjustment of the price system is based
on the sign of the total excess demand on all markets and on the change in the price
system compared to the starting price system. In the definition of stability of the price
adjustment process no differentiability requirements are made with respect to the total
excess demand function. In Section 10.3 the price adjustment process is illustrated using
Scarf’s example, see Section 3.12. For the economy given in this example the price
adjustment process converges for every starting price system in the relative interior of
the unit simplex. In Section 10.4 the main result holding for a typical exchange economy
satisfying standard assumptions is presented. Corollaries of this result are the global and
universal stability of the price adjustment process, and the well-known result, first shown
in Dierker (1972), that, generically, the number of Walrasian equilibria of an economy is
odd. In Section 10.5 the proof of the main result is given. Finally, in Section 10.6 the
price adjustment process is analyzed for the special case where a total excess demand
function satisfying gross substitutability in the finite increment form is given. In this
special case global stability does not only hold generically as in the results of Smale
(1976), Kamiya (1990), and the results of Section 10.4, but, instead, occurs always. It
can even be shown that prices of commodities for which there is a negative (positive) total
excess demand are strictly decreasing (increasing) during the price adjustment process.
Therefore, the price adjustment process has some features which are qualitatively the
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same as for the Walrasian tatonnement process. In the gross substitutability case it is
also shown that if a market reaches an equilibrium situation during the price adjustment
process, then it stays in equilibrium for the remainder of the price adjustment process.
In fact, it will be proved that on every market the absolute value of the total excess
demand is monotonically decreasing in time, an even stronger result.
This chapter is based on Herings (1994a).
10.2 The Price Adjustment Process
In this section the price adjustment process for the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) as
described in Chapter 3 is defined. There are M ∈ IN consumers, indexed by i ∈ IM , and
N ∈ IN\{1} commodities, indexed by j ∈ IN . A consumer i ∈ IM has a consumption set
X i, a preference relation i, and an initial endowment ωi. The element (ω1, . . . , ωM) is
denoted by ω, while ωj = (ω
1
j , . . . , ω
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . The starting price system is denoted
by v. It determines the initial state of the process.
As in Section 3.7, given a price system p ∈ IRN , the budget set βi(p) of a consumer
i ∈ IM is defined by
βi(p) =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣p · xi ≤ p · ωi
}
,




∣∣∣xi i xi, ∀xi ∈ βi(p)
}
.







{ωi}, ∀p ∈ IRN .
In Theorem 3.7.1, Theorem 3.7.2, and Theorem 3.11.1 assumptions with respect to
consumption sets, preference relations, and initial endowments are given such that the
restriction of the total excess demand relation ζ of the economy E to IRN++ is a continuous
function, being homogeneous of degree zero and satisfying Walras’ law. In this case it
makes sense to consider the restriction of ζ to IRN++ given by the total excess demand
function z : IRN++ → IRN . In this section a total excess demand function z is assumed to be
given. In Theorem 3.11.1, sufficient conditions on consumption sets, initial endowments,
and preference relations are given such that if p∗ ∈ IRN is a Walrasian equilibrium price
system, i.e., z(p∗) = 0N , see Definition 3.8.1 of a Walrasian equilibrium, then p∗ ∈ IRN++.
Then, using the homogeneity of degree zero of the total excess demand function, there
is no loss of generality in normalizing the price systems such that they belong to ∆̇N−1,
being the relative interior of the (N − 1)-dimensional unit simplex ∆N−1.
A sign vector s ∈ SN is called an admissible sign vector if there exists j1 ∈ IN such
that sj1 = −1 and there exists j2 ∈ IN such that sj2 = +1. The set S denotes the
set of admissible sign vectors of SN . Recall from Section 2.2 that for every sign vector
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s ∈ SN the sets I−(s), I0(s), and I+(s) are defined by I−(s) = {j ∈ IN | sj = −1},
I0(s) = {j ∈ IN | sj = 0}, and I+(s) = {j ∈ IN | sj = +1}, whereas i−(s), i0(s), and
i+(s) denote the number of elements in the sets I−(s), I0(s), and I+(s), respectively.
Notice that for an admissible sign vector s ∈ S it holds that i0(s) ≤ N − 2.
Let some starting price system v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be given. For every admissible sign vector










∣∣∣  ∈ IN
})







∣∣∣  ∈ IN
})






∣∣∣zj(p) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s),
zj(p) = 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s),
zj(p) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s)
}
,
C(s) = A(s) ∩ B(s).
The sets defined above are used to describe the price adjustment process. Let an admis-
sible sign vector s ∈ S and a price system p ∈ C(s) be given. The admissible sign vector
s characterizes the state of every market. For every j ∈ IN , if sj = −1 (sj = +1), then
there is a non-positive (non-negative) total excess demand on the market of commodity j
and pj is relatively, i.e., with respect to the starting price vj , minimal (maximal), whereas
sj = 0 implies that the market of commodity j is in equilibrium, while, obviously, pj is
relatively between the relative minimum price and the relative maximum price.
The set C is defined as the set of price systems belonging to C(s) for some s ∈ S, so
C = ∪s∈SC(s).
The price adjustment process will be defined such that, under weak assumptions, it
follows a path of price systems in the set C.
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy Walras’ law and let a starting price
system v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be given. Clearly, there exists a sign vector s ∈ SN such that, for every
j ∈ IN , zj(v) > 0 implies sj = +1, and zj(v) < 0 implies sj = −1, while Walras’ law
guarantees that indeed s can be chosen such that it is an element of S. Then it holds
that v ∈ B(s), obviously v ∈ A(s), hence v ∈ C(s) ⊂ C. Now consider a Walrasian
equilibrium price system p∗ ∈ ∆̇N−1. Clearly, there exists an admissible sign vector
















|  ∈ IN}). Then it holds that p∗ ∈ A(ŝ), clearly p∗ ∈ B(ŝ), and
therefore p∗ ∈ C(ŝ) ⊂ C. Hence, the set C contains both the starting price system v and
all Walrasian equilibrium price systems of ∆̇N−1.
Definition 10.2.1 (Price adjustment process)
The price adjustment process for the total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IRN and
the starting price system v ∈ ∆̇N−1 is given by the component of v in C.
10.2 The Price Adjustment Process 305
The price adjustment process is therefore described by considering explicitly the price
systems generated by it. Since in the definition of the price adjustment process under
consideration no continuity or differentiability assumptions with respect to the total
excess demand function are used, one should also give a definition of convergence without
using such assumptions.
Definition 10.2.2 (Convergence)
The price adjustment process for the total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IRN and
the starting price system v ∈ ∆̇N−1 is convergent if either z(v) = 0N , or z(v) 6= 0N and
the component of v in C is an arc having v and a Walrasian equilibrium price system as
its boundary points.
The definition of convergence given in Definition 10.2.2 implies convergence of a dynamic
process as defined in Section 3.11. If the price adjustment process is convergent according
to the latter definition, then there exists a continuous function π : [0, 1] → IRN++ such
that π(0) = v and π(1) is a Walrasian equilibrium price system, so z(π(1)) = 0N . When
the price adjustment process is convergent according to Definition 10.2.2, then such a
function π clearly exists, whereas, moreover, π is injective and has a continuous inverse.
In Section 10.5 the price adjustment process will be shown to be convergent, gener-
ically. Then there exists a unique, continuous trajectory of price systems leading from
the starting price system v to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Let the function
π with domain [0, 1] and being such that π(0) = v and π(1) is a Walrasian equilibrium
price system describe this trajectory. An element of the set [0, 1] can be considered as
a normalized time parameter. Although the arc π([0, 1]) is uniquely determined, the
function π is not unique, and different functions correspond to different speeds of adjust-
ment. Notice that it is only required that the arc contains some Walrasian equilibrium
price system, which means that even if the starting price system is “sufficiently close”
to a certain Walrasian equilibrium price system, then the price adjustment process may
converge to another Walrasian equilibrium price system. So, in the terminology of Saari
and Simon (1978) or Saari (1985), Definition 10.2.2 does not correspond to a locally
effective or locally convergent mechanism.
The price adjustment process can be followed numerically arbitrarily close using the
(2N − 2)-ray algorithm described in Doup, van der Laan, and Talman (1987). This algo-
rithm is a simplicial algorithm with vector labelling defined on ∆N−1. It can be applied
to a piecewise linear approximation of the total excess demand function with respect to a
triangulation being such that a proper subset of the collection of faces of the simplices in
the triangulation yields a triangulation of the set A(s), ∀s ∈ S. Theorem 2.7.5 guarantees
that the V -triangulation of ∆N−1 with respect to v and with grid size 1
n
for some n ∈ IN
satisfies these properties. The (2N − 2)-ray algorithm generates a piecewise linear path
of points corresponding to the price adjustment process in a similar way as the piecewise
linear path of points generated by the simplicial algorithm with vector labelling of Chap-
ter 6, see Theorem 6.2.11, corresponds to the set of constrained equilibria of an economy
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with price rigidities. The information needed at some price system p reached by the
algorithm is given by a finite number (at most N) of price systems already generated by
the algorithm, the total excess demands at these price systems, and the starting price
system v. This means that the amount of information needed is roughly the same as the
amount indicated in Saari and Simon (1978) as being necessary for convergence.
The price adjustment process for the total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IRN
and the starting price system v ∈ ∆̇N−1 has an appealing economic interpretation which
can be described as follows. First, the sign of the total excess demand is evaluated at
the starting price system v. Consider the case where zj(v) 6= 0, ∀j ∈ IN . In Section 10.5
this will be shown to be the generic case. Initially, the price of a commodity j ∈ IN
with zj(v) < 0 will be decreased, while the price of a commodity j ∈ IN with zj(v) > 0
will be increased. Define the admissible sign vector s0 ∈ S by s0j = +1 if zj(v) > 0 and
s0j = −1 if zj(v) < 0. Then the process starts by leaving v along the ray A(s0) of price
systems. The ratio of prices of commodities for which there is a negative total excess
demand is kept constant among those commodities for which there is a negative total
excess demand, and similarly for the ratio of prices of commodities for which there is a
positive total excess demand. The price system is adjusted in this way until a market,
say the market of a commodity j1 ∈ IN , attains an equilibrium state.
Assume that there is a single market attaining an equilibrium. This will be shown
to be the generic case in Section 10.5. Then the price adjustment process continues by
keeping the market of commodity j1 in equilibrium, while the price pj1 is relatively in-
creased (decreased) if there was a negative (positive) total excess demand on the market
of commodity j1 before attaining equilibrium. Other prices are kept relatively minimal
in case of a negative total excess demand and relatively maximal in case of a positive
total excess demand. Hence, a path of price systems in C(s1) is followed, where s1j1 = 0
and s1j = s
0
j , ∀j ∈ IN \ {j1}. It will be shown in Section 10.4 that the set C(s), ∀s ∈ S,
is compact and in Section 10.5 that, generically, it is a finite collection of arcs and loops.
Now two situations can occur at the other end point of the arc of C(s1) being followed
by the price adjustment process. Either another market, say the market of a commodity
j2, attains an equilibrium situation. In this case the price system is adjusted in such a
way that the markets of commodities j1 and j2 are kept in equilibrium, while the price
on the market of commodity j2 is relatively increased (decreased) when there was a
negative (positive) total excess demand on the market of commodity j2 before attaining
equilibrium. Again, other prices are kept either relatively minimal or relatively maxi-





∀j ∈ IN \ {j2}. Or the price on the market of commodity j1 becomes relatively minimal
or maximal. In this case the market of commodity j1 is no longer kept in equilibrium
but its total excess demand is allowed to become negative or positive, respectively, while
pj1 is kept relatively minimal or relatively maximal, respectively. Then a path of price
systems in C(s2) is followed, where s2j1 = −1 or s2j1 = +1, respectively, and s2j = s1j ,
∀j ∈ IN \ {j1}.
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The general case is as follows. Suppose the price adjustment process follows a path
of price systems in C(sn) for some n ∈ IN. Then at the end point either the market of a
commodity jn+1 ∈ I−(sn)∪I+(sn) attains an equilibrium situation, in which case a path




j , ∀j ∈ IN \ {jn+1},
so the price adjustment process continues by keeping the market of commodity jn+1
in equilibrium, while pjn+1 is relatively increased (decreased) if there was a negative
(positive) total excess demand on the market of commodity jn+1 before attaining equi-
librium, the markets of commodities j ∈ I0(sn) are kept in equilibrium, for commodities
j ∈ I−(sn)\{jn+1}, pj is kept relatively minimal, and for commodities j ∈ I+(sn)\{jn+1},
pj is kept relatively maximal. Or the price of some commodity j
n+1 ∈ I0(sn) becomes
relatively minimal (maximal) in which case a path of price systems in C(sn+1) is fol-
lowed, where sn+1jn+1 = −1 (sn+1jn+1 = +1) and sn+1j = snj , ∀j ∈ IN \ {jn+1}. Now the market
of commodity jn+1 is no longer kept in equilibrium, the total excess demand on the
market of commodity jn+1 is allowed to become negative (positive), while pjn+1 is kept
relatively minimal (maximal). It will be shown that, generically, the process described
above converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price system.
In the Walrasian tatonnement process as formulated in Samuelson (1941), see Sec-
tion 3.11, it is possible that after some time the price adjustment process reaches a price
system being such that the price of a commodity is higher (lower) than its starting price,
while there is a negative (positive) total excess demand on the market of this commod-
ity. This is a remarkable phenomenon since initially the Walrasian tatonnement process
changes the price system in such a way that prices of commodities for which there is a
negative total excess demand are lowered and prices of commodities for which there is a
positive total excess demand are raised with respect to the starting price system. Any
price system on the path generated by the price adjustment process of this chapter has
the natural property that the price of a commodity with a negative total excess demand
is lower than its starting price, while the price of a commodity with a positive total
excess demand is higher than the corresponding starting price.
It is also possible to define the price adjustment process considered in this chapter
for the case with non-trivial production possibilities. In van den Elzen (1993) and in van
den Elzen, van der Laan, and Talman (1994) the case where the production possibility
set corresponds to the linear activity model has been considered, and in van der Laan
and Kremers (1993) the case with constant returns to scale has been analyzed. However,
no proof of the global and universal stability of the price adjustment process is given in
the literature.
The approach taken above is related to the one of Smale (1976, 1981) and Kamiya
(1990). In Smale (1976) commodity N is considered to be a numeraire commodity and
a price adjustment process is defined for a total excess demand function z : IRN+ → IRN
and a starting price system v ∈ IRN+ with vN = 1, following price systems in the set
{
p ∈ IRN+
∣∣∣ pN = 1 and ∃λ ∈ IR+, ∀j ∈ IN−1, zj(p) = λzj(v)
}
.
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It is easily verified that taking λ = 1 yields that p = v is an element of this set, and
taking λ = 0 yields that p∗ is an element of the set if p∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price
system with p∗N = 1.
Let the set TN−1 be defined by TN−1 = {p ∈ IRN+ |
∑
j∈IN (pj)
2 = 1}, being a
normalized price space. In Kamiya (1990) a price adjustment process is defined for a
total excess demand function z : IRN+ → IRN , generating price systems in the set
{
p ∈ TN−1
∣∣∣ ∃λ ∈ [0, 1], ∀j ∈ IN−1, (1− λ)zj(p) = λ(pj − vj)
}
,
with v ∈ TN−1 again the starting price system. It is easily verified that λ = 1 yields
p = v as the unique solution. By considering λ = 0 it follows that if p∗ ∈ TN−1 is a
Walrasian equilibrium price system, then p∗ is an element of the set given above.
By making suitable differentiability, regularity, and boundary conditions, it can be
shown for the price adjustment processes of Smale (1976) and Kamiya (1990) that the
component of v in the sets defined above is an arc. It should be remarked that any arc
described as the solution to a system of continuously differentiable functions satisfying
certain regularity properties can be described by a system of differential equations, see
for example Garcia and Zangwill (1981). This system of differential equations is given in
Smale (1976) and Kamiya (1990) for their processes and can also be given for the price
adjustment process of this chapter, where for every s ∈ S a different system is needed.
10.3 Scarf’s Example
The price adjustment process can be illustrated using Scarf’s example concerning an
exchange economy with three commodities. It can be shown that for this example the
Walrasian tatonnement process does not converge for any starting price system except
for the unique Walrasian equilibrium price system, see Section 3.12. In this example
the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I3) is such that N = 3, X1 = X2 = X3 = IR3+, 1,
2, and 3 can be represented by utility functions u1 : X1 → IR, u2 : X2 → IR,
and u3 : X3 → IR, respectively, defined by u1(x1) = min({x11, x12}), ∀x1 ∈ IR3+, u2(x2)
= min({x22, x23}), ∀x2 ∈ IR3+, u3(x3) = min({x31, x33}), ∀x3 ∈ IR3+, and ω1 = (1, 0, 0)⊤,
ω2 = (0, 1, 0)⊤, and ω3 = (0, 0, 1)⊤. The total excess demand function z : IR3++ → IR3 of





















, ∀p ∈ IR3++,






Section 3.12. Let some p ∈ IR3++ be given. It is easily verified that z1(p) = 0 if and only














































































































































































































































































Figure 10.3.1. The sets A(s), for s ∈ S, in Scarf’s example, v = ( 1118 , 218 , 518)⊤.
if p2 = p3, z2(p) = 0 if and only if p1 = p3, and z3(p) = 0 if and only if p1 = p2. Consider





⊤. In Figure 10.3.1 the sets A(s) and in Figure
10.3.2 the sets B(s) are drawn for all s ∈ S. In Figure 10.3.3 the set C is depicted.
In Scarf’s example there is positive total excess demand on the markets of both





⊤. The process therefore starts by following an arc
in C((+1,+1,−1)⊤), having v as a boundary point. So, the prices of both commodities





⊤ the market of commodity 1 attains
an equilibrium situation. Now this market is kept in equilibrium, the relative price of
commodity 2 is kept maximal, and the relative price of commodity 3 is kept minimal,
so a path in C((0,+1,−1)⊤) is followed. At p = ( 1121 , 521 , 521)⊤ the price of commodity
1 becomes relatively minimal and equal to the relative price of commodity 3. Hence,
the process continues by following a path in C((−1,+1,−1)⊤), where the prices of both
commodities 1 and 3 are relatively decreased and the price of commodity 2 is relatively






market of commodity 3 attains an equilibrium situation and so a path in C((−1,+1, 0)⊤)





⊤ the process reaches a Walrasian equilibrium price system






It can be shown that the price adjustment process is globally stable in Scarf’s example.
Consider an arbitrary v in the relative interior of B((+1,+1,−1)⊤). Then v1 > v3 >
v2. It is easily verified that subsequently the paths C((+1,+1,−1)⊤), C((0,+1,−1)⊤),























respectively. If v is in the relative interior of B((+1,−1,+1)⊤) or B((−1,+1,+1)⊤), then












































































































































































































































Figure 10.3.2. The sets B(s), for s ∈ S, in Scarf’s example.
a completely symmetric case results. Now consider an arbitrary v in the relative interior
of B((+1,−1,−1)⊤). Then v3 > v1 > v2. It is easily verified that subsequently the paths
C((+1,−1,−1)⊤), C((+1, 0,−1)⊤), C((+1,+1,−1)⊤), and C((0,+1,−1)⊤) are followed,























respectively. If v is in the relative interior of B((−1,+1,−1)⊤) or B((−1,−1,+1)⊤),
then again a completely symmetric case results. Consider an arbitrary v in the relative
interior of B((0,+1,−1)⊤). Then v1 > v2 = v3. It is easily verified that subsequently the











The case where v is in the relative interior of B((+1,−1, 0)⊤) or B((−1, 0,+1)⊤) is
completely symmetric. Consider some v in the relative interior of B((+1, 0,−1)⊤). Then
v1 = v3 > v2. It is easily verified that subsequently the paths C((+1,+1,−1)⊤) and













The case where v is in the relative interior of B((0,−1,+1)⊤) or B((−1,+1, 0)⊤) is again





⊤, then the Walrasian equilibrium price
system is immediately obtained.































































































































































































































































































Figure 10.3.3. The sets C(s), for s ∈ S, in Scarf’s example, v = ( 1118 , 218 , 518)⊤.
10.4 Global and Universal Stability of the Walrasian
Equilibrium
For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i and the preference relation i
are assumed to be given in this section. In order to show that, generically, the price
adjustment process is globally and universally stable, the following standard assumptions
on consumption sets and preference relations are made.
A1. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i is equal to IRN++.
A2. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the preference relation i is complete, transitive, con-
tinuous, strongly monotonic, strongly convex, of the class C3, satisfies the boundary
condition, and has non-zero Gaussian curvature.
If the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) satisfies the Assumptions A1-A2, and for every
consumer i ∈ IM it holds that ωi ∈ X i, then it follows easily from Theorem 9.2.1 that the
total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IRN of the economy E belongs to C2(IRN++, IRN).
Clearly, the price adjustment process is well-defined in this case.
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting




++. In Definition 10.4.1, the initial
endowment ω of Ω is called regular if the set C for the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM )
with starting price system v has a certain nice structure.
Definition 10.4.1 (Regular initial endowments)
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
312 A Globally and Universally Stable Price Adjustment Process
system. The set of regular initial endowments, denoted by Ω∗, is the set of initial endow-
ments ωof Ω for which the components of the set C for the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM )
with starting price system v are given by
1. an arc containing v and precisely one Walrasian equilibrium price system as bound-
ary points,
2. a finite number of arcs containing precisely two Walrasian equilibrium price systems
both being boundary points,
3. a finite number of loops containing neither v nor any Walrasian equilibrium price
system.
Theorem 10.4.2 states that the set of non-regular initial endowments is small, both in a
topological and in a measure theoretic sense.
Theorem 10.4.2
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
system. Then the set of non-regular initial endowments Ω \ Ω∗ has a closure in Ω with
Lebesgue measure zero.
Theorem 10.4.2 will be proved in Section 10.5. In fact, the proof of Theorem 10.4.2 yields
that the path of price systems followed by the price adjustment process for ω ∈ Ω∗ is
a 1-dimensional piecewise C2 manifold, i.e., a 1-dimensional continuous manifold being
a finite union of C2 manifolds, some possibly of lower dimension. Moreover, the other
components of the set C are either loops or arcs, both being 1-dimensional piecewise C2
manifolds. Since ω ∈ Ω∗ implies that the price adjustment process converges, Theorem
10.4.2 immediately leads to the next result, where Ω can be taken equal to Ω∗.
Corollary 10.4.3
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
system. Then there exists a subset Ω of Ω such that the closure of Ω \ Ω in Ω has
Lebesgue measure zero and for every ω ∈ Ω the price adjustment process for the economy
E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) with starting price system v converges to a Walrasian equilibrium
price system of E .
Since every Walrasian equilibrium price system of ∆̇N−1 is an element of C, Theorem
10.4.2 confirms the well-known result of Dierker (1972) that, generically, an economy has
an odd number of Walrasian equilibria.
Corollary 10.4.4
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2. Then there exists a subset Ω of Ω
such that the closure of Ω \ Ω in Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and for every ω ∈ Ω the
number of Walrasian equilibria of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) with the Walrasian
equilibrium price system belonging to ∆̇N−1 is finite and odd.
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Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
system. For every ω ∈ Ω, define the set P (ω) as the component of v in C, for every s ∈ S,
define the set P̂s(ω) as the set C(s), and define the set P̂ (ω) as the set C for the economy
E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) with starting price system v. In this way one obtains the price
adjustment process correspondence P : Ω→ ∆̇N−1 and a correspondence P̂ : Ω→ ∆̇N−1.
Notice that the price adjustment correspondence P and the correspondence P̂ are non-
empty valued since, for every ω ∈ Ω, the starting price system v belongs to P (ω) and
P (ω) ⊂ P̂ (ω). To make clear the dependence of the total excess demand function on the
initial endowments, ω is included in the notation, and the domain of z is assumed to
be IRN++ × Ω for the remainder of this section and in Section 10.5. Therefore, for every
p ∈ IRN++, for every ω ∈ Ω, z(p, ω) denotes the total excess demand at p of the economy
E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ).
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2. Similarly as in Section 3.6, d̃i(p, wi)
denotes the demand of a consumer i ∈ IM at the price system p ∈ IRN++ and wealth
wi ∈ IR++, i.e., the best element of {xi ∈ X i | p ·xi ≤ wi} for i . From Theorem 9.2.1 it




i(p, p · ωi)−∑i∈IM ωi, ∀(p, ω) ∈ IRN++ × Ω.
Let a non-empty, compact subset S of IRm be given. Define the function dS : IR
m → IR
by
dS(s) = min ({‖s− s‖∞ | s ∈ S}) , ∀s ∈ IRm.
Lemma 5.3.2 states that dS is a continuous function.
Let S1 and S2 be two non-empty, compact subsets of IRm. Define e(S1, S2) ∈ IR+ by
e(S1, S2) = min
({
‖s1 − s2‖∞
∣∣∣s1 ∈ S1, s2 ∈ S2
})
.
If S1 and S2 are disjoint, then obviously e(S1, S2) > 0.
Theorem 10.4.5
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
system. Then P and P̂ are compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences from
Ω into ∆̇N−1.
Proof
First P̂ will be shown to be a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Let ((ω)n)n∈IN be a sequence in Ω converging to some ω ∈ Ω and let (pn)n∈IN be a
sequence in ∆̇N−1 such that pn ∈ P̂ ((ω)n), ∀n ∈ IN. It will be shown that (pn)n∈IN has a
subsequence converging to some p ∈ P̂ (ω). Then P̂ is compact-valued, and, by Theorem
2.5.6, an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Since ∆N−1 is compact, (pn)n∈IN has a
subsequence (pn
m
)m∈IN converging to some p ∈ ∆N−1. Moreover, since S is a finite set,
without loss of generality, there exists s ∈ S such that, for everym ∈ IN, pnm ∈ P̂s((ω)nm).




) ≥ 0 and pnmj ≥ vj if j ∈ I+(s). Therefore, for every m′ ∈ IN it holds



























‖∞ | m ∈ IN})
min({vj | j ∈ I+(s)})
. (10.1)
Notice that the right-hand side of (10.1) is finite.
Let some i ∈ IM be given. Using (10.1) it follows easily that (d̃i(pnm , pnm ·ωin
m
))m∈IN is a
bounded sequence, and, without loss of generality, it can be assumed to converge to some
xi ∈ IRN+ . Moreover, using that i satisfies the boundary condition and ωi
nm → ωi ∈
IRN++, it follows that x
i ∈ IRN++ = X i. Let some x̂i ∈ X i with p · x̂i ≤ p · ωi be given. If
p · x̂i < p ·ωi, then there exists m′ ∈ IN such that, for every m ≥ m′, pnm · x̂i < pnm ·ωin
m
,
so x̂i i d̃i(pnm, pnm · ωin
m
) and, by the continuity of i, x̂i i xi. If p · x̂i = p · ωi, then,
for every m ∈ IN, there exists xin
m
∈ X i such that p · xin
m
< p · ωi and the sequence
(xi
nm
)m∈IN converges to x̂
i. Now it follows as before that xi
nm i xi, ∀m ∈ IN, so the
continuity of i implies that x̂i i xi.
Suppose p ∈ ∆N−1 \ ∆̇N−1. Then there exists j′ ∈ IN such that pj′ = 0. Hence, xi +
eN(j′) ∈ X i, p · (xi + eN (j′)) ≤ p · xi, so xi + eN (j′) i xi, contradicting the strong
monotonicity of i . Consequently, p ∈ ∆̇N−1.





) → (p, ω) ∈ ∆̇N−1 × Ω, it follows immediately that p ∈ P̂s(ω). So, P̂ is a
compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence.
Now let ((ω)n)n∈IN be a sequence in Ω converging to some ω ∈ Ω and let (pn)n∈IN
be a sequence in ∆̇N−1 such that pn ∈ P ((ω)n). It will be shown that (pn)n∈IN has a
subsequence converging to some p ∈ P (ω). Then P is compact-valued, and, by Theorem
2.5.6, an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Using the previous paragraph, without
loss of generality, it can be assumed that (pn)n∈IN converges to some p ∈ P̂ (ω). Since
P (ω) is the component of v in P̂ (ω), the closure of P (ω) in P̂ (ω) is connected by Theorem
2.3.11, and since P̂ (ω) is compact, it follows that P (ω) is compact.
Suppose p /∈ P (ω). By Lemma 5.3.4 the component of v in P̂ (ω) equals the quasi-
component of v in P̂ (ω). Therefore, there exist disjoint compact sets S1 and S2 such
that v ∈ S1, p ∈ S2, and S1 ∪ S2 = P̂ (ω). Hence, there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that
e(S1, S2) > ε. By the upper hemi-continuity of the correspondence P̂ there exists n1 ∈ IN
such that, for every n ≥ n1, for every p ∈ P ((ω)n), d
P̂ (ω)
(p) < 12ε. Moreover, there exists
n2 ∈ IN such that n2 ≥ n1 and ‖pn2 − p‖∞ < 12ε. Let the sets S1 and S2 be defined by
S1 = {p ∈ P ((ω)n2) | dS1(p) < 12ε} and S2 = {p ∈ P ((ω)n
2
) | dS2(p) < 12ε}. By the
continuity of dS1 and dS2, the sets S
1 and S2 are open in P ((ω)n
2
). Clearly, S1 and S2
are disjoint, S1 ∪ S2 = P ((ω)n2), and both S1 and S2 are non-empty since v ∈ S1 and
pn
2 ∈ S2. So, P ((ω)n2) is not connected, a contradiction. Consequently, p ∈ P (ω).
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So, P is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Q.E.D.
Since P and P̂ are compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondences, it follows
from Theorem 2.5.16 that P and P̂ are continuous correspondences on a residual subset
of Ω, i.e., a countable intersection of sets being open and dense in Ω. Moreover, Ω
is a locally compact Hausdorff space and therefore a Baire space by Theorem 2.3.15.
Hence, a residual subset of Ω is dense in Ω. Therefore, from an economic point of view,
Theorem 10.4.5 is interesting since it means that the price adjustment process itself is
in some sense stable against perturbations in the initial endowments. The fact that P̂
is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous correspondence will be used in the proof of
Theorem 10.4.2 given in the next section.
10.5 The Walrasian Equilibrium Stability Proof
In this section consumption sets and preference relations (X i,i)i∈IM satisfying the
Assumptions A1-A2 and the starting price system v ∈ ∆̇N−1 are assumed to be given.
Then, for every ω ∈ Ω, for every s ∈ S, the sets B(s), C(s), and C for the economy
E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ) with starting price system v can be derived. To make clear the
dependence on the initial endowments, notation is changed in this section to Bω(s),
Cω(s), and Cω, respectively. Moreover, the domain of the total excess demand function
z is assumed to be IRN++ × Ω.
Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S, some j− ∈ I−(s) and some j+ ∈ I+(s) be given.
Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that I0(s) = Ii0(s), I
−(s) = Ii0(s)+i−(s)\Ii0(s),
and I+(s) = IN \ Ii0(s)+i−(s). Let some ω ∈ Ω be given. Then p ∈ Cω(s) if and only if
p ∈ IRN++ and
zj(p, ω) = 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s), (10.2)
pjvj+1 − pj+1vj = 0, ∀j ∈ Ii0(s)+i−(s)−1 \ Ii0(s), (10.3)
pjvj+1 − pj+1vj = 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ Ii0(s)+i−(s), (10.4)
∑
j∈INpj − 1 = 0, (10.5)
−zj(p, ω) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), (10.6)
zj(p, ω) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s), if i0(s) ≤ N − 3, (10.7)
pjvj− − pj−vj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s), (10.8)
pj+vj − pjvj+ ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s), (10.9)
pj+vj− − pj−vj+ ≥ 0. (10.10)
Notice that if i−(s) = 1, then (10.3) is not specified. The same holds for (10.4) if
i+(s) = 1. Since i−(s) and i+(s) are both greater than or equal to one, there are all
together N − 1 equations in (10.2)-(10.5). If i0(s) > N − 3, so i0(s) = N − 2, then
i−(s) = i+(s) = 1. In this case the inequality in (10.7) follows by Walras’ law from
equality (10.2) and inequality (10.6), so inequality (10.7) is redundant.
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Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S be given. It will be shown in the following that for
almost every ω ∈ Ω the set of price systems satisfying (10.2)-(10.10) is a 1-dimensional
C2 manifold with boundary. This is achieved by showing that, for almost every ω ∈ Ω,
(10.2)-(10.10) yields a regular constraint system, see Definition 2.10.10.
In order to show Theorem 10.4.2 it is useful to define, for every s ∈ S, for every








, ∀j′, j′′ ∈ I−(s),





, ∀j′, j′′ ∈ I+(s)
}
.
Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S be given. Clearly, for every ω ∈ Ω, Cω(s) ⊂ Dω(s),
the difference between these two sets being that no inequality constraints are taken into
account in the specification of Dω(s). In Lemma 10.5.1 it is shown that there exists a
subset Ω of Ω such that Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and for every ω ∈ Ω the set
Dω(s) is a 1-dimensional C
2 manifold. Hence, it can be shown to consist of a number of
disjoint sets being diffeomorphic to either the unit circle B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 1) or the open unit
interval (0, 1).
For every s ∈ S, the function ψs : IRN++ × Ω→ IRN−1 is defined such that, for every
(p, ω) ∈ IRN++×Ω, ψs(p, ω) is the left-hand side of (10.2)-(10.5). For every s ∈ S, for every
ω ∈ Ω, the function ψs,ω : IRN++ → IRN−1 is defined by ψs,ω(p) = ψs(p, ω), ∀p ∈ IRN++.
Notice that, for every s ∈ S, for every ω ∈ Ω, Dω(s) = ψs,ω−1({0N−1}).
Lemma 10.5.1
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
system. Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S be given. Then there exists a subset Ω of
Ω such that Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and, for every ω ∈ Ω, ψs,ω ⊤   {0N−1} and
Dω(s) is a 1-dimensional C
2 manifold.
Proof
The matrix of partial derivatives of ψs evaluated at (p, ω) ∈ IRN++×Ω satisfying ψs(p, ω) =
0N−1 is denoted by M and is given in Table 10.5.1. Moreover, in Table 10.5.1 two
submatrices M1 and M 2 of M are defined.
It will be shown that the matrix M has rank N − 1. First it is proved that, for every
i ∈ IM , ∂ωiz(p, ω) has rank N −1. Notice that, for every i ∈ IM , p⊤∂ωiz(p, ω) = 0N
⊤
and
∂ωiz(p, ω) = ∂wi d̃







N(j′′)− pj′′eN (j′), ∀j′, j′′ ∈ IN ,
so the rank of ∂ωiz(p, ω) is equal to N − 1.
Let some i ∈ IM be given. Consider the first i0(s) rows of ∂ωiz(p, ω). These rows have to
be independent. Suppose not, then i0(s) ≤ N −2 implies the existence of y ∈ IRN \{0N}
such that yN−1 = yN = 0 and y
⊤∂ωiz(p, ω) = 0
N⊤. Since p⊤∂ωiz(p, ω) = 0
N⊤, this implies
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M =
∂pz1(p, ω) ∂ωz1(p, ω)
...
... i0(s)

















0 vi0(s)+3 −vi0(s)+2 0i
−(s)−3⊤
. . .
. . . i−(s)− 1
0i







0 vi0(s)+i−(s)+3 −vi0(s)+i−(s)+2 0i
+(s)−3⊤
. . .
. . . i+(s)− 1
0i




Table 10.5.1. The matrix M.
that the rank of ∂ωiz(p, ω) is less than or equal to N − 2, a contradiction.
Now let y ∈ IRN−1 be such that y⊤M = 0MN+N⊤. From the previous paragraph it follows
that y⊤∂ω1ψ
s(p, ω) = 0N
⊤
implies yj = 0, ∀j ∈ Ii0(s).
Suppose yN−1 6= 0. Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that yN−1 < 0. If
i0(s) ≥ 1 or i−(s) = 1, then a contradiction is obtained with y⊤∂p1ψs(p, ω) = 0. If
i0(s) = 0 and i−(s) ≥ 2, then yN−1 < 0 and y⊤∂p1ψs(p, ω) = 0 implies y1 > 0. It
is easily seen that yj > 0 and y
⊤∂pj+1ψ
s(p, ω) = 0 implies yj+1 > 0, ∀j ∈ Ii−(s)−2.
Hence, yi−(s)−1 > 0, implying that y
⊤∂pi−(s)ψ
s(p, ω) < 0, a contradiction. Consequently,
yN−1 = 0.
The independence of the rows of M 1 and of the rows of M 2 yields yi0(s)+1 = · · · = yN−2 =
0. So, y = 0N−1 and M has rank N − 1.
Since M has rank N−1, it follows that ψs intersects {0N−1} transversally, ψs ⊤   {0N−1}.
Using Theorem 9.2.1, it follows that ψs ∈ C2(IRN++ × Ω, IRN−1). Moreover, IRN++ is an
N -dimensional C∞ manifold, Ω is anMN -dimensional C∞ manifold, IRN−1 is an (N−1)-
dimensional C∞ manifold, and {0N−1} is a 0-dimensional C∞ manifold. Let the set Ω
be defined by Ω = {ω ∈ Ω | ψs,ω ⊤   {0N−1}}. It follows from the transversality theorem,
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Theorem 2.10.18, that the set Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero in Ω. Since Ω is an
MN -dimensional C∞ manifold being a subset of IRMN , it follows that the set Ω \ Ω
has Lebesgue measure zero, see the remark below Theorem 2.10.17. For every ω ∈ Ω,
ψs,ω is a function from an N -dimensional C∞ manifold into an (N − 1)-dimensional
C∞ manifold, ψs,ω ∈ C2(IRN++, IRN−1), and ψs,ω ⊤   {0N−1}, so ψs,ω
−1
({0N−1}) and hence
Dω(s) is a 1-dimensional C
2 manifold by Theorem 2.10.16. Q.E.D.
Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S and some ω ∈ Ω be given. Let p ∈ Dω(s) be such
that there exists j1 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s) with zj1(p, ω) = 0. Hence, one of the inequalities
in (10.6) or (10.7) is satisfied with equality. Let the sign vector s ∈ SN be defined by
sj1 = 0 and sj = sj , ∀j ∈ IN \ {j1}. If it holds that s ∈ S, then the price system p
is an element of the intersection of the sets Dω(s) and Dω(s). Considering the system
of equations defining Cω(s) it follows that one of the inequalities in (10.8) or (10.9) is
satisfied with equality.










, ∀j′, j′′ ∈ I−(s),





, ∀j′, j′′ ∈ I+(s)
}
.
Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S and some j1 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s) be given. In Lemma
10.5.2 it is shown that there exists a subset Ω of Ω such that Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue
measure zero and for every ω ∈ Ω the set Dω(s, j1) is a 0-dimensional manifold and
hence a discrete set of points. Obviously, the commodities can be relabelled such that
I0(s) = Ii0(s), I
−(s) = Ii0(s)+i−(s) \ Ii0(s), and I+(s) = IN \ Ii0(s)+i−(s). Let some ω ∈ Ω
be given. It is easily verified that p ∈ Dω(s, j1) if and only if p ∈ IRN++, p satisfies the
equations (10.2)-(10.5), and
zj1(p, ω) = 0. (10.11)
For every s ∈ S, for every j1 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s), the function ψsj1 : IRN++ × Ω → IRN is
defined such that, for every (p, ω) ∈ IRN++ × Ω, ψsj1(p, ω) is the left-hand side of (10.2)-
(10.5) and (10.11). For every s ∈ S, for every j1 ∈ I−(s)∪ I+(s), for every ω ∈ Ω, define
the function ψs,ωj1 : IR
N
++ → IRN by ψs,ωj1 (p) = ψsj1(p, ω), ∀p ∈ IRN++.
Lemma 10.5.2
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
system. Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S and some j1 ∈ I−(s)∪ I+(s) be given. Then
there exists a subset Ω of Ω such that Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and, for every
ω ∈ Ω, ψs,ωj1 ⊤   {0N} and Dω(s, j1) is a 0-dimensional manifold.
Proof
The matrix of partial derivatives of ψsj1 evaluated at (p, ω) ∈ IRN++ × Ω satisfying
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ψsj1(p, ω) = 0
N is denoted by M̂. It will be shown that M̂ has rank N. Let y ∈ IRN
be such that y⊤M̂ = 0MN+N
⊤
. As in the proof of Lemma 10.5.1 it can be shown that for
every i ∈ IM the rows 1, . . . , i0(s) and j1 of ∂ωiz(p, ω) are independent since i0(s) ≤ N−2
and j1 6∈ I0(s). So, y⊤∂ω1ψsj1(p, ω) = 0N
⊤
implies y1 = · · · = yi0(s) = yN = 0. The proof
that yi0(s)+1 = · · · = yN−1 = 0 is now identical to the corresponding part of the proof
of Lemma 10.5.1. Hence, M̂ has rank N and ψsj1 ⊤   {0N}. Let the set Ω be defined
by Ω = {ω ∈ Ω | ψs,ωj1 ⊤   {0N}}. From the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.10.18,
it follows that the set Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero. For every ω ∈ Ω, ψs,ωj1 is
a function from an N -dimensional C∞ manifold into an N -dimensional C∞ manifold,
ψs,ωj1 ∈ C2(IRN++, IRN), and ψ
s,ω
j1 ⊤   {0N}, so ψ
s,ω−1
j1 ({0N}) and hence Dω(s, j1) is a 0-
dimensional manifold by Theorem 2.10.16. Q.E.D.
For every s ∈ S with i0(s) ≤ N − 3, for every ω ∈ Ω, for every j1, j2 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s)









, ∀j′, j′′ ∈ I−(s),





, ∀j′, j′′ ∈ I+(s)
}
.
Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S with i0(s) ≤ N − 3 and some j1, j2 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s)
with j1 6= j2 be given. The next lemma shows that there exists a subset Ω of Ω such
that Ω\Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and for every ω ∈ Ω the set Dω(s, j1, j2) is empty.
Notice that the condition i0(s) ≤ N − 3 is crucial since for an admissible sign vector
s with i0(s) = N − 2 a corresponding set Dω(s, j1, j2) is equal to the set of Walrasian
equilibrium price systems in A(s) of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ). Clearly, it
cannot be shown that this set is empty for almost every ω ∈ Ω.
Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S with i0(s) ≤ N−3 and some j1, j2 ∈ I−(s)∪I+(s)
with j1 6= j2 be given. Let some ω ∈ Ω be given. It is easily verified that p ∈ Dω(s, j1, j2)
if and only if p ∈ IRN++, p satisfies the equations (10.2)-(10.5), and
zj1(p, ω) = 0, (10.12)
zj2(p, ω) = 0. (10.13)
For every s ∈ S with i0(s) ≤ N − 3, for every j1, j2 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s) with j1 6= j2, the
function ψsj1,j2 : IR
N
++ × Ω → IRN+1 is defined such that, for every (p, ω) ∈ IRN++ × Ω,
ψsj1,j2(p, ω) is the left-hand side of (10.2)-(10.5), (10.12), and (10.13). For every s ∈ S
with i0(s) ≤ N − 3, for every j1, j2 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s) with j1 6= j2, for every ω ∈ Ω, the
function ψs,ωj1,j2 : IR
N
++ → IRN+1 is defined by ψs,ωj1,j2(p) = ψsj1,j2(p, ω), ∀p ∈ IRN++.
Lemma 10.5.3
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
system. Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S satisfying i0(s) ≤ N − 3 and some j1, j2 ∈
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I−(s) ∪ I+(s) with j1 6= j2 be given. Then there exists a subset Ω of Ω such that Ω \ Ω
has Lebesgue measure zero and, for every ω ∈ Ω, ψs,ωj1,j2 ⊤   {0N+1} and Dω(s, j1, j2) is an
empty set.
Proof
Let (p, ω) ∈ IRN++ × Ω be such that ψsj1,j2(p, ω) = 0N+1. Since i0(s) ≤ N − 3 and
j1, j2 6∈ I0(s), it holds that for every i ∈ IM the rows 1, . . . , i0(s), j1, and j2 of ∂ωiz(p, ω)
are independent. Similarly as in the proof of Lemma 10.5.1 and Lemma 10.5.2 it can be
shown that ψs,ωj1,j2 ⊤   {0N+1}. Let the set Ω be defined by Ω = {ω ∈ Ω | ψ
s,ω
j1,j2 ⊤   {0N+1}}.
From the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.10.18, it follows that the set Ω \ Ω has
Lebesgue measure zero. For every ω ∈ Ω, ψs,ωj1,j2 is a function from an N -dimensional
C∞ manifold into an (N + 1)-dimensional C∞ manifold, ψs,ωj1,j2 ∈ C2(IRN++, IRN+1), and
ψs,ωj1,j2 ⊤   {0N+1}, so ψ
s,ω−1
j1,j2 ({0N+1}) and hence Dω(s, j1, j2) is an empty set by Theorem
2.10.16. Q.E.D.
Let some ω ∈ Ω be given. If zj(v, ω) 6= 0, ∀j ∈ IN , then it holds that v ∈ Cω(s) for
a uniquely determined admissible sign vector s ∈ S. Therefore, it is shown in Lemma
10.5.4 that there exists a subset Ω of Ω such that the closure of Ω \Ω in Ω has Lebesgue
measure zero and, for every ω ∈ Ω, zj(v, ω) 6= 0, ∀j ∈ IN . For every j ∈ IN , define the
function ψj : {v} × Ω → IR by ψj(v, ω) = zj(v, ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω. For every j ∈ IN , for every
ω ∈ Ω, define the function ψωj : {v} → IR by ψωj (v) = ψj(v, ω).
Lemma 10.5.4
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price
system. Then there exists a subset Ω of Ω such that Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero
and, for every ω ∈ Ω, for every j ∈ IN , ψωj ⊤   {0} and zj(v, ω) 6= 0.
Proof
For every j ∈ IN it is easily seen that ψj ⊤   {0}. For every j ∈ IN , let the set Ωj be
defined by Ωj = {ω ∈ Ω | ψωj ⊤   {0}}. So, the set Ω \ Ωj has Lebesgue measure zero by
the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.10.18. Let the set Ω be defined by Ω = ∩j∈IN Ωj.
Clearly, the set Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero. For every ω ∈ Ω, for every j ∈ IN ,
ψωj is a function from a 0-dimensional manifold into a 1-dimensional C
∞ manifold, ψωj ∈
C∞({v}, IR), and ψωj ⊤   {0}, so ψω
−1
j ({0}) is an empty set by Theorem 2.10.16. Q.E.D.
Now all preliminary work has been done to give a proof of Theorem 10.4.2. The proof
consists of three parts. In the first part it is shown that, for almost every ω ∈ Ω, for
every s ∈ S, the set Cω(s) is a compact 1-dimensional C2 manifold with boundary. In
the second part the sets Cω(s), ∀s ∈ S, are linked together and it is shown that for
almost every ω ∈ Ω the set Cω consists of a finite number of arcs and loops. There
is a unique arc having the starting price system v and a unique Walrasian equilibrium
price system as boundary points. The other arcs have two Walrasian equilibrium price
systems as boundary points, whereas the loops contain no Walrasian equilibrium price
systems. Therefore, the set Ω \ Ω∗ has Lebesgue measure zero. In the third part of the
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proof it is shown that the closure in Ω of the set Ω \ Ω∗ has Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof of Theorem 10.4.2
Let the set Ω be given by the elements ω of Ω satisfying, for every j ∈ IN , ψωj ⊤   {0}, for
every s ∈ S, ψs,ω ⊤   {0N−1}, for every s ∈ S, for every j ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s), ψs,ωj ⊤   {0N},
and, for every s ∈ S with i0(s) ≤ N − 3, for every j1, j2 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s) with j1 6= j2,
ψs,ωj1,j2 ⊤   {0N+1}. By Lemma 10.5.1, Lemma 10.5.2, Lemma 10.5.3, and Lemma 10.5.4
the set Ω \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero. In Part 1 and Part 2 of the proof it will be
shown that Ω ⊂ Ω∗.
1. For every ω ∈ Ω, for every s ∈ S, Cω(s) is a compact 1-dimensional C2 manifold
with boundary.
Let some ω ∈ Ω and some s ∈ S be given. It is shown that when the left-hand sides of
equations (10.2)-(10.10) are considered as functions of p from the open set IRN++ into IR,
then they yield a C2 regular constraint system. Let some p ∈ Cω(s) be given.
If p = v, then, since for every j ∈ IN , ψωj ⊤   {0}, it holds that I0(s) = ∅ and the in-
equalities (10.6) and (10.7) are not binding. Hence, J0(p), the set of inequalities in
(10.6)-(10.10) holding with equality, see Section 2.10, consists of a unique element corre-
sponding to equation (10.10). It is easily verified that the partial derivatives with respect
to p of (10.3)-(10.5) and (10.10) at p constitute a set of independent vectors.
Consider the case with p 6= v. Then (10.10) holds with inequality.
Suppose that two (or more) equations in (10.6)-(10.9) hold with equality. Since p 6= v,
(10.8) and (10.9) cannot be binding for the same commodity in I0(s), so the two equa-
tions holding with equality correspond to j1, j2 ∈ IN with j1 6= j2. Let ŝ ∈ S be defined
by ŝj1 = −1 if j1 corresponds to an equation in (10.6) or (10.8), ŝj1 = +1 if j1 cor-
responds to an equation in (10.7) or (10.9), ŝj2 = −1 if j2 corresponds to an equation
in (10.6) or (10.8), ŝj2 = +1 if j
2 corresponds to an equation in (10.7) or (10.9), and
ŝj = sj, ∀j ∈ IN \ {j1, j2}. If j1 or j2 corresponds to (10.8) or (10.9), or if i0(s) ≤ N − 3,
then i0(ŝ) ≤ N − 3. Moreover, p ∈ Dω(ŝ, j1, j2), a contradiction since ψŝ,ωj1,j2 ⊤   {0N+1}.
So, i0(s) = N − 2 and j1, j2 correspond to two different equations in (10.6) and (10.7),
again leading to a contradiction as before since there is only one equation specified in
(10.6) and no equation (10.7) in this case. Consequently, at most one of the inequalities
in (10.6)-(10.10) is satisfied with equality.
If none of the inequalities in (10.6)-(10.10) is satisfied with equality, then it follows that
the partial derivatives with respect to p of the equations (10.2)-(10.5) at p constitute
a set of independent vectors since ψs,ω ⊤   {0N−1}. Moreover, #J0(p) = 0, the number
of inequalities in (10.6)-(10.10) holding with equality at p. If one of the inequalities in
(10.6)-(10.10) is satisfied with equality, then, since the case p 6= v is considered, one of
the inequalities in (10.6)-(10.9) is satisfied with equality, say the one corresponding to
commodity j′ ∈ IN . Let ŝ ∈ S be defined by ŝj′ = −1 if j′ corresponds to (10.6) or
(10.8), ŝj′ = +1 if j
′ corresponds to (10.7) or (10.9), and ŝj = sj, ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}. Then
ψŝ,ωj′ ⊤   {0N} implies that the partial derivatives with respect to p of the binding inequal-
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ity and (10.2)-(10.5) at p constitute a set of independent vectors. Moreover, #J0(p) = 1.
Therefore, it has been shown that (10.2)-(10.10) is a C2 regular constraint system.
Since (10.2)-(10.5) form N − 1 equations defined on IRN++ and, for every p ∈ Cω(s),
#J0(p) ≤ 1, it follows from Theorem 2.10.11 that Cω(s) is a 1-dimensional C2 mani-
fold with boundary, where the boundary is given by the set of points p ∈ Cω(s) with
#J0(p) = 1, a 0-dimensional manifold by Theorem 2.10.7.
The compactness of Cω(s) follows from Theorem 10.4.5. Therefore, Cω(s) is a compact
1-dimensional C2 manifold with boundary and hence a finite union of disjoint sets be-
ing diffeomorphic to either the unit circle B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 1) or the closed unit interval [0, 1]
by Theorem 2.10.9. Let these sets be denoted by Cω(s, 1), . . . , Cω(s, k(s)). Notice that,
for every k ∈ Ik(s), p ∈ Cω(s, k) is a point of the boundary of Cω(s, k) if and only if
#J0(p) = 1.
2. For every ω ∈ Ω, Cω is a finite union of arcs and loops.
Let some ω ∈ Ω be given.
Let p0 ∈ Cω be given. Then there exists s0 ∈ S and k0 ∈ Ik(s0) such that p0 ∈
Cω(s
0, k0). Either Cω(s
0, k0) is a component of Cω being diffeomorphic to the unit circle
B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 1) and has no boundary, or Cω(s
0, k0) is a subset of Cω being diffeomorphic
to the closed unit interval [0, 1] and having two boundary points, p1 and p−1. First p1 is
considered. Either p1 = v or exactly one of the inequalities in (10.6)-(10.9) is binding.
Four cases have to be considered.
2.1. p1 = v. Then, since for every j ∈ IN , ψωj ⊤   {0}, 6 ∃s ∈ S \ {s0} with p1 ∈ Cω(s).
2.2. i0(s0) = N − 2 and the inequality in (10.6) is binding. Then, by Walras’ law,
p1 is a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Suppose there exists s ∈ S \ {s0} such
that p1 ∈ Cω(s). Using p1 6= v it follows that I0(s0) 6= I0(s) and (I−(s0) ∪ I−(s)) ∩
(I+(s0) ∪ I+(s)) = ∅. Let ŝ ∈ S be defined by ŝj = −1, ∀j ∈ I−(s0) ∪ I−(s), ŝj = 0,
∀j ∈ I0(s0) ∩ I0(s), and ŝj = +1, ∀j ∈ I+(s0) ∪ I+(s). Let j1, j2 ∈ I−(ŝ) ∪ I+(ŝ) be
such that j1 6= j2. Then, since i0(ŝ) ≤ N − 3 and p1 ∈ Dω(ŝ, j1, j2), a contradiction with
ψŝj1,j2 ⊤   {0N+1} is obtained. Consequently, 6 ∃s ∈ S \ {s0} such that p1 ∈ Cω(s).
2.3. i0(s0) = N−2 and an inequality in (10.8) or (10.9) corresponding to some j′ ∈ I0(s)
is binding. Let s1 ∈ S be defined by s1j′ = −1 if an inequality in (10.8) is binding, s1j′ = +1
if an inequality in (10.9) is binding, and s1j = s
0
j , ∀j ∈ IN \{j′}. Clearly, p1 is a boundary
point of Cω(s
1, k1) for some k1 ∈ Ik(s1). Moreover, 6 ∃ s ∈ S \{s0, s1} such that p1 ∈ Cω(s)
since otherwise a contradiction is obtained as in Case 2.2.
2.4. i0(s0) ≤ N − 3. Then it can be shown in a similar way as in Case 2.3 that there
exists a unique s1 ∈ S such that p1 is a boundary point of Cω(s1, k1) for some k1 ∈ Ik(s1).
This concludes the four cases possible.
The set Cω(s
1, k1) obtained in Case 2.3 or Case 2.4 has two boundary points, p1 and, say,
p2. Using the same arguments as before either p2 = v, or p2 is a Walrasian equilibrium
price system, or p2 ∈ Cω(s2, k2) for uniquely determined s2 ∈ S\{s1} and k2 ∈ Ik(s2). Re-
peating these arguments, the sets C0 = Cω(s
0, k0), C1 = Cω(s
1, k1), C2 = Cω(s
2, k2), . . .
are obtained such that each set is a component of Cω(s) for some s ∈ S being diffeo-
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morphic to the closed unit interval [0, 1], Ck ∩ Ck+1 is a common boundary point, and
Ck 6= Ck+1. Therefore, after a finite number of, say, k2 ∈ Z+ steps either a set Ck2 is
obtained having v or a Walrasian equilibrium price system as a boundary point, or there
exists k1 ∈ Z+ with k1 < k2, Ck1 = Ck2, and C0, . . . , Ck2−1 being all different.
First, the second case is considered. It will be shown that k1 = 0. Then it is easily
verified that C0 ∪ · · · ∪Ck2−1 is the component of p0 in Cω and that it is homeomorphic
to the unit circle B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 1).
Suppose k1 ≥ 1. Then Ck1 ∩ Ck2−1 is a boundary point of Ck1−1 or Ck1+1. Clearly,
k1 + 1 ≤ k2 − 1.
Suppose k1 + 1 = k2 − 1. Then Ck1+1 has one boundary point in common with Ck1 and





, so it has both boundary
points in common with Ck
1




1+1 are different and share a
common boundary point, yielding a contradiction. Consequently, k1 + 1 < k2 − 1.









2−1 are different, while the three sets in one of these two collections of sets have a com-
mon boundary point, giving a contradiction. Consequently, k1 = 0, so C0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ck2−1
is the component of p0 in Cω and is homeomorphic to the unit circle B̃
1((0, 0)⊤, 1).
Next, the first case is considered, so v or a Walrasian equilibrium price system is a bound-
ary point of Ck
2
. Consider the boundary point p−1 of Ck
0
ω (s
0). Again, sets C0, C−1, . . .
are obtained such that after a finite number of, say, k1 ∈ Z+ steps either a set C−k1
is obtained having v or a Walrasian equilibrium price system as a boundary point, the
sets C−k
1
, . . . , Ck
2
all being different, and it is easily shown that the set ∪k∈{−k1,...,k2}Ck
is the component of p0 in Cω being homeomorphic to the closed unit interval [0, 1], or
there is k3 ∈ Z such that −k1 < k3 ≤ k2, C−k1 = Ck3, and the sets C−k1+1, . . . , Ck2 are
all different. It will be shown that the latter case leads to a contradiction.
Suppose k3 = k2. Then, since Ck
2
has v or a Walrasian equilibrium price system as a
boundary point, it holds that C−k
1+1 = Ck
2−1, giving a contradiction unless −k1 + 1 =
k2− 1. In this case Ck2−1 has one boundary point in common with Ck2−2 = C−k1 = Ck2
and the other boundary point in common with Ck
2
. This implies that Ck
2−1 and Ck
2
have v or the same Walrasian equilibrium price system as a boundary point, a contra-
diction. Consequently, k3 < k2.





3+1 have a common boundary point, yielding a contradiction. Con-
sequently, −k1 + 1 < k3 − 1.
Now it follows that C−k










3+1 are three different sets having a common boundary point,






It follows that Cω has a finite number of components, being either arcs or loops. The
boundary of Cω is given by the collection consisting of the starting price system v and
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the Walrasian equilibrium price systems. Therefore, the loops contain no Walrasian
equilibrium price systems, while the component of v in Cω is an arc having a Walrasian
equilibrium price system as the other boundary point. If there exists another Walrasian
equilibrium price system, say p∗, then the component of p∗ in Cω is an arc having p
∗ and
a third Walrasian equilibrium price system as boundary points. Therefore, ω ∈ Ω∗.
3. The closure of Ω \ Ω∗ in Ω has Lebesgue measure zero.
From Part 2 of the proof it follows that Ω ⊂ Ω∗, so Ω \ Ω∗ has Lebesgue measure zero.
If ω ∈ Ω \ Ω∗, then, by Part 1 and Part 2 of the proof, there exists p ∈ ∆̇N−1 such that
(p, ω) belongs to the set Σ defined below.
Σ = {(p, ω) ∈ ∆̇N−1 × Ω |
∃s∈S, p∈Cω(s) and rank ∂pψs,ω(p)≤N−2, or
∃s∈S, ∃j′∈I−(s)∪I+(s), p∈Cω(s), zj′(p, ω)=0, and rank ∂pψs,ωj′ (p)≤N−1, or
∃s∈S, i0(s)≤N−3, ∃j1, j2∈I−(s)∪I+(s), j1 6=j2, p∈Cω(s), andzj1(p, ω)=zj2(p, ω)=0,or
p=v and ∃j ∈ IN , zj(p, ω)=0}.
It is easily shown that Σ is closed in ∆̇N−1 × Ω since Σ can be obtained by finite
unions and intersections of sets being closed in ∆̇N−1 × Ω, due to the continuity of the
functions z, ∂pψ
s, ∀s ∈ S, ∂pψsj , ∀s ∈ S, ∀j ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s), and the continuity in p of
min({pj
vj
| j ∈ IN}) and of max({pjvj | j ∈ IN}). Let the function f : Σ → Ω be defined
by f(p, ω) = ω, ∀(p, ω) ∈ Σ. Then Ω \ Ω∗ ⊂ f(Σ) and f(Σ) is a subset of a set having
Lebesgue measure zero by Lemma 10.5.1, Lemma 10.5.2, Lemma 10.5.3, and Lemma
10.5.4. It will be shown that f(Σ) is closed in Ω, thereby finishing the proof. Since
the image by a continuous proper function of a closed set is closed, see Balasko (1988),
proof of Theorem 4.1.5, page 88, it is sufficient to show that f is proper. Let T be a
compact subset of Ω. It has to be shown that f−1(T ) is compact. From the continuity of
f it follows that f−1(T ) is closed in Σ and therefore it is closed in ∆̇N−1 ×Ω. Moreover,
it is a subset of the set {(p, ω) ∈ ∆̇N−1 × T | p ∈ P̂ (ω)}. This set is easily seen to be
compact using Theorem 2.5.7 and Theorem 10.4.5. Therefore, f−1(T ) is a closed subset
of a compact set and hence compact by Theorem 2.3.9. Q.E.D.
10.6 The Gross Substitutability Case
In this section a total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IRN and a starting price system
v ∈ ∆̇N−1 are assumed to be given. The main results are derived with the total excess
demand function z satisfying the following assumptions.
A3. The total excess demand function z : IRN++ → IRN is continuous.
A4. For every λ ∈ IR++, for every p ∈ IRN++, z(λp) = z(p).
A5. For every p ∈ IRN++, p · z(p) = 0.
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A6. The total excess demand function z is bounded from below, and if (pn)n∈IN is a
sequence of price systems in IRN++ converging to some p ∈ IRN+ \ ({0N}∪ IRN++), then




A7. If p, p̂ ∈ IRN++ are such that there exists j′ ∈ IN with pj′ < p̂j′, while pj = p̂j,
∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}, then zj(p) < zj(p̂), ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}.
Notice that the Assumptions A3-A6 can be derived from assumptions on the primitive
concepts, (X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , see Theorem 3.7.1, Theorem 3.7.2, and Theorem 3.11.1. As-
sumption A7, called gross substitutability in the finite increment form, cannot be derived
in this way. However, the Assumptions A3-A7 are the same as the assumptions under
which the Walrasian tatonnement process has been shown to be globally stable, see
Theorem 3.11.2.
Due to Assumption A4 it is possible to normalize the set of price systems to the set
∆̇N−1 on which the price adjustment process is defined. For p, p̂ ∈ ∆̇N−1 define the sets


















|  ∈ IN})
}
.
Clearly, for every p, p̂ ∈ ∆̇N−1, Jmin(p, p̂) 6= ∅ and Jmax(p, p̂) 6= ∅. Moreover, if p 6= p̂, then
j ∈ Jmin(p, p̂) implies p̂jpj < 1, and j ∈ Jmax(p, p̂) implies
p̂j
pj
> 1. The following lemma
will appear to be very useful.
Lemma 10.6.1
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A4 and A7. Let p, p̂ ∈
∆̇N−1 with p 6= p̂ be given. Then, zj(p) < zj(p̂), ∀j ∈ Jmin(p, p̂), and zj(p) > zj(p̂),
∀j ∈ Jmax(p, p̂).
Proof
Let some j′ ∈ Jmax(p, p̂) be given. Let p̃ ∈ IRN++ be defined by p̃ = p̂j′pj′ p. By Assumption
A4, z(p̃) = z(p). Clearly, p̃ > p̂ and p̃j′ = p̂j′. Given p̃, decrease the prices of commodities
j ∈ IN \{j′} until p̂ is reached. Using Assumption A7 repeatedly yields zj′(p̂) < zj′(p̃) =
zj′(p). The case with j
′ ∈ Jmin(p, p̂) can be treated similarly. Q.E.D.
Using Lemma 10.6.1 it is trivial to show that if the Assumptions A4 and A7 hold and a
Walrasian equilibrium price system in ∆̇N−1 exists, then it is unique. See also Theorem
3.11.2, where it is stated that the Assumptions A3-A7 imply that indeed a Walrasian
equilibrium exists. In this section another proof of the existence of a Walrasian equilib-
rium will be given if the Assumptions A3-A7 are satisfied, without using a fixed point
theorem.






| j ∈ IN}) = λ
}
.
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Clearly, ∆̇N−11 = {v}. If N = 3 and λ ∈ (0, 1), then the set ∆̇N−1λ consists of the sides of
a triangle. For arbitrary N ∈ IN\{1}, for every λ1, λ2 ∈ (0, 1] with λ1 6= λ2, it holds that
the sets ∆̇N−1λ1 and ∆̇
N−1
λ2 are disjoint, and that ∪λ∈(0,1]∆̇N−1λ = ∆̇N−1. The first step in
proving that under the Assumptions A3-A7 the price adjustment process converges to a
Walrasian equilibrium price system is to show that if the price adjustment process has
reached the set ∆̇N−1λ for some λ ∈ (0, 1] and did not find a Walrasian equilibrium price
system, then the price adjustment process will intersect the set ∆̇N−1λ−δ for every δ ∈ IR++
small enough. This will be used to show that the price adjustment process moves away
from the starting price system v.
Lemma 10.6.2
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A3-A5 and A7, and let
v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price system. Let p ∈ ∆̇N−1 with z(p) 6= 0N be given. If there
exists λ ∈ (0, 1] and s ∈ S such that p ∈ C(s) ∩ ∆̇N−1λ , then there exists s ∈ S and
ε ∈ IR++ such that, for every δ ∈ [0, ε], C(s) ∩ ∆̇N−1λ−δ 6= ∅. If zj(p) > 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s), and
zj(p) < 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), then s can be taken equal to s.
Proof
Let s be such that sj = −1 if zj(p) < 0, sj = 0 if zj(p) = 0, and sj = +1 if zj(p) > 0.
Notice that s = s if the requirements in the last part of the lemma are satisfied. Since
z(p) 6= 0N , it holds by Assumption A5 that s ∈ S. Clearly, p ∈ C(s)∩∆̇N−1λ . If zj(p) 6= 0,
∀j ∈ IN , then Lemma 10.6.2 holds by the continuity of z. So, consider the case where
I0(s) 6= ∅. For every δ ∈ [0, λ), let the set E(p, s, δ) be defined by



















|  ∈ IN}), ∀j ∈ I+(s)
}
.
It is easily verified that E(p, s, δ) is a compact subset of A(s) ∩ ∆̇N−1λ−δ . Since z is a
continuous function, there exists ε ∈ (0, λ) such that, for every δ ∈ [0, ε], for every
p ∈ E(p, s, δ), zj(p) > 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s), and zj(p) < 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s). Lemma 10.6.2 is
obviously true for the case δ = 0, so consider the case δ > 0.











, ∀p ∈ E(p, s, δ).
Notice that p̂ exists by Theorem 2.3.14.










∣∣∣zj(p̂) = max({|z(p̂)| |  ∈ I0(s)})
}
.
Suppose there exists j′ ∈ J0− such that p̂j′pj′ = 1 −
δ
λ
. By Lemma 10.6.1 and since p̂ ∈
E(p, s, δ), it follows that 0 = zj′(p) < zj′(p̂), a contradiction since j
′ ∈ J0−. Hence,





, ∀j ∈ J0−. Similarly, it can be shown that p̂jpj < max({
p̂
p
|  ∈ IN}), ∀j ∈ J0+.
Next, three possible cases will be considered, each leading to a contradiction with the
supposition that max({|zj(p̂)| | j ∈ I0(s)}) > 0.
1. J0− 6= ∅ and J0+ = ∅. Then, for every α ∈ IR++, let pα ∈ IRN be defined by
pαj = p̂j , ∀j ∈ I−(s) ∪ (I0(s) \ J0−),


















, ∀j ∈ J0−, α can be chosen small enough to guarantee that pα ∈ E(p, s, δ),
|zj(pα)| < max({|z(p̂)| |  ∈ I0(s)}), ∀j ∈ I0(s) \ J0−, and zj(pα) < 0, ∀j ∈ J0−. Now it
holds by Lemma 10.6.1 that max({|zj(pα)| | j ∈ I0(s)}) < max({|zj(p̂)| | j ∈ I0(s)}), a
contradiction with the definition of p̂.








|  ∈ IN})
}
.
Moreover, for every α ∈ IR++, let pα ∈ IRN be defined by
pαj = p̂j, ∀j ∈ I−(s) ∪ (I0(s) \ (J0+ ∪ J)),













p̂j , ∀j ∈ I+(s) ∪ J.
Since for every j ∈ J0+ it holds that p̂jpj < max({
p̂
p
|  ∈ IN}), α can be chosen small
enough to guarantee that pα ∈ E(p, s, δ), |zj(pα)| < max({|z(p̂)| |  ∈ I0(s)}), ∀j ∈
I0(s) \ J0+, and zj(pα) > 0, ∀j ∈ J0+. Using Lemma 10.6.1 and the construction of pα,
it follows that max({|zj(pα)| | j ∈ I0(s)}) < max({|zj(p̂)| | j ∈ I0(s)}), a contradiction
with the definition of p̂.
3. J0− 6= ∅ and J0+ 6= ∅. Then, for every α ∈ IR++, let pα ∈ IRN be defined by
pαj = p̂j, ∀j ∈ IN \ (J0− ∪ J0+),














p̂j, ∀j ∈ J0+.
Clearly, α can be chosen small enough to guarantee that pα ∈ E(p, s, δ), |zj(pα)| <
max({|z(p̂)| |  ∈ I0(s)}), ∀j ∈ I0(s) \ (J0− ∪ J0+), zj(pα) < 0, ∀j ∈ J0−, and zj(pα) > 0,
∀j ∈ J0+. By Lemma 10.6.1 a contradiction is obtained as before.
Consequently, max({|zj(p̂)| | j ∈ I0(s)}) = 0. This result together with the choice of ε
implies p̂ ∈ B(s). Moreover, p̂ ∈ E(p, s, δ) ⊂ A(s)∩∆̇N−1λ−δ and therefore p̂ ∈ C(s)∩∆̇N−1λ−δ .
Q.E.D.
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The next step is to show that if C(s) 6= ∅ for some s ∈ S, then, for every ŝ ∈ S with
i0(ŝ) = i0(s), C(ŝ) \ C(s) = ∅. This will be shown in Lemma 10.6.4. So, if during the
price adjustment process the region A(s) is reached and therefore i0(s) markets are in
equilibrium, then every price system p ∈ ∆̇N−1 ever generated by the price adjustment
process with i0(s) markets in equilibrium satisfies p ∈ A(s). Moreover, it will be shown in
Lemma 10.6.4 that if two price systems p, p̂ ∈ ∆̇N−1 are reached by the price adjustment
process with the same number of markets in equilibrium and with the minimal price ratio
with respect to the starting price system v of p greater than that of p̂, then p, p̂ ∈ C(s)
for a uniquely determined admissible sign vector s ∈ S. Moreover, I−(s) = Jmin(p, p̂)
and I+(s) = Jmax(p, p̂). So, the prices of commodities with a negative (positive) total
excess demand have been decreased (increased) maximally. In order to show Lemma
10.6.4, the purely technical Lemma 10.6.3 has to be shown first.
Lemma 10.6.3
Let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price system. Moreover, let s, ŝ ∈ S with i0(s) = i0(ŝ) and




















Suppose, on the contrary, that
Jmin(p, p̂) ⊂ I−(s) ∪ I+(ŝ), (10.14)
Jmax(p, p̂) ⊂ I+(s) ∪ I−(ŝ). (10.15)
It will be shown that if (10.14) and (10.15) hold, then
Jmin(p, p̂) ∩ I−(s) = ∅ or Jmax(p, p̂) ∩ I−(ŝ) = ∅, (10.16)
Jmin(p, p̂) ∩ I+(ŝ) = ∅ or Jmax(p, p̂) ∩ I−(ŝ) = ∅, (10.17)
Jmin(p, p̂) ∩ I−(s) = ∅ or Jmax(p, p̂) ∩ I+(s) = ∅, (10.18)
Jmin(p, p̂) ∩ I+(ŝ) = ∅ or Jmax(p, p̂) ∩ I+(s) = ∅. (10.19)
From (10.14), (10.18), and (10.19) it follows that Jmax(p, p̂)∩I+(s) = ∅, and from (10.14),
(10.16), and (10.17) it follows that Jmax(p, p̂) ∩ I−(ŝ) = ∅. Together with (10.15) this
yields Jmax(p, p̂) = ∅, a contradiction, and this proves the lemma. It remains to be
shown that (10.14) and (10.15) imply (10.16)-(10.19). Let some j1 ∈ Jmin(p, p̂) and some
j2 ∈ Jmax(p, p̂) be given.
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, so j ∈ Jmin(p, p̂), and by (10.14) j ∈ I+(ŝ). Therefore, I−(s) ⊂ I−(ŝ) and
I+(s) ⊂ I+(ŝ). Since s 6= ŝ and i0(s) = i0(ŝ), a contradiction is obtained. So, (10.17) is
true.












so j ∈ Jmax(p, p̂), and by (10.15) j ∈ I+(s). Therefore, I−(ŝ) ⊂ I−(s) and I+(ŝ) ⊂ I+(s).
Since s 6= ŝ and i0(s) = i0(ŝ), a contradiction is obtained. Hence, (10.18) is true. If






> 1, a contradiction. Hence, (10.19) is true. Q.E.D.
Lemma 10.6.4
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A4 and A7, and let
v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price system. Moreover, let two admissible sign vectors s, ŝ ∈ S
with i0(s) = i0(ŝ) be given. If C(s) 6= ∅, then C(ŝ) \ C(s) = ∅. Moreover, if there are
price systems p ∈ C(s) and p̂ ∈ C(ŝ) with min({pj
vj
| j ∈ IN}) > min({ p̂jvj | j ∈ IN}), then
s = ŝ, Jmin(p, p̂) = I
−(s), and Jmax(p, p̂) = I
+(s).
Proof
Suppose there exists p ∈ C(s) and p̂ ∈ C(ŝ)\C(s). Clearly, s 6= ŝ.Moreover, p ∈ A(s) and
p̂ ∈ A(ŝ), so by Lemma 10.6.3 there exists j′ ∈ Jmin(p, p̂)∩(I0(s)∪I+(s))∩(I−(ŝ)∪I0(ŝ))
or there exists j′ ∈ Jmax(p, p̂)∩(I−(s)∪I0(s))∩(I0(ŝ)∪I+(ŝ)). In the first case, zj′(p) ≥ 0
and zj′(p̂) ≤ 0, whereas by Lemma 10.6.1 zj′(p) < zj′(p̂), a contradiction. In the second
case, zj′(p) ≤ 0 and zj′(p̂) ≥ 0, whereas by Lemma 10.6.1 zj′(p) > zj′(p̂), a contradiction.
This proves the first part of the lemma.
Let p ∈ C(s) and p̂ ∈ C(ŝ) be given. By the first part of the lemma it holds that










= 1, so Jmax(p, p̂) ⊂
I0(ŝ) ∪ I+(ŝ). Suppose there exists j′ ∈ Jmax(p, p̂) ∩ I0(ŝ). Then, since p, p̂ ∈ C(ŝ) and
by Lemma 10.6.1, 0 = zj′(p) > zj′(p̂) = 0, a contradiction. Consequently, Jmax(p, p̂) ⊂








. Hence, Jmax(p, p̂) = I
+(ŝ) and
Jmin(p, p̂) ⊂ I−(ŝ) ∪ I0(ŝ). Suppose j′ ∈ Jmin(p, p̂) ∩ I0(ŝ). Then 0 = zj′(p) < zj′(p̂) = 0,
a contradiction. It follows that Jmin(p, p̂) = I
−(ŝ). In a similar way it can be shown
that Jmin(p, p̂) = I
−(s) and Jmax(p, p̂) = I
+(s), hence I−(s) = I−(ŝ), I+(s) = I+(ŝ), and
therefore s = ŝ. Q.E.D.
The next step in proving the convergence of the price adjustment process is showing that
for every λ ∈ (0, 1] the intersection of the price adjustment process and the set ∆̇N−1λ
contains at most one element. First it is shown, for every λ ∈ (0, 1], for every s ∈ S,
that the intersection of C(s) and ∆̇N−1λ contains at most one element.
Lemma 10.6.5
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A4 and A7, and let
v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price system. Then, for every λ ∈ (0, 1], for every s ∈ S, the
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set C(s) ∩ ∆̇N−1λ contains at most one element.
Proof
Let some λ ∈ (0, 1] and some s ∈ S be given. Suppose p, p̂ ∈ C(s) ∩ ∆̇N−1λ with




= 1. So, p 6= p̂ implies that there exists
j1 ∈ Jmax(p, p̂) ∩ (I0(s) ∪ I+(s)) and j2 ∈ Jmin(p, p̂) ∩ (I0(s)∪ I+(s)). By Lemma 10.6.1,
zj1(p) > zj1(p̂) and zj2(p) < zj2(p̂), so j











< 1, a contradiction. Consequently, C(s) ∩ ∆̇N−1λ contains at most one
element. Q.E.D.
After these preliminary lemmas it is possible to show the convergence of the price adjust-
ment process. Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A3-A7
and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1 be the starting price system. Define the relation Π : (0, 1]→ C by
Π(λ) = C ∩ ∆̇N−1λ , ∀λ ∈ (0, 1].
In Lemma 10.6.6 it is shown that there exists λ ∈ (0, 1] such that Π|[λ,1] : [λ, 1]→ C is a
function, while Π(λ) = ∅, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ).
Lemma 10.6.6
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A3-A7 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1
be the starting price system. Then there exists λ ∈ (0, 1] such that Π(λ) = ∅, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ),
Π(λ) = {p∗}, where p∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price system, and Π|[λ,1] : [λ, 1] → C
is a function.
Proof
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 10.4.5 it can be shown that the set C(s), ∀s ∈ S,
and the set C is compact. Let λ ∈ (0, 1] be defined by λ = min({min({pj
vj
| j ∈ IN}) |
p ∈ C}). Notice that λ is well-defined by Theorem 2.3.14. Obviously, it holds that
Π(λ) = ∅ if λ < λ. Moreover, by Lemma 10.6.2, Π(λ) consists of a Walrasian equilibrium
price system p∗ ∈ ∆̇N−1. Notice that Lemma 10.6.1 immediately implies that p∗ is
the unique Walrasian equilibrium price system of ∆̇N−1. Using the uniqueness of the
Walrasian equilibrium price system, Lemma 10.6.2, the compactness of C, and the fact
that v ∈ Π(1), it follows that Π(λ) 6= ∅, ∀λ ∈ [λ, 1].
Let some λ ∈ [λ, 1] be given.
Suppose there exists p ∈ C(s) ∩ ∆̇N−1λ and p̂ ∈ C(ŝ) ∩ ∆̇N−1λ such that p 6= p̂. From
Lemma 10.6.4 and Lemma 10.6.5 it follows that i0(s) 6= i0(ŝ). Without loss of generality,
it can be assumed that i0(s) < i0(ŝ). Since C(s) is compact, it follows from Theorem
2.3.14 that there exists p1 ∈ C(s) such that min({p1j
vj
| j ∈ IN}) ≤ min({pjvj | j ∈ IN}),
∀p ∈ C(s). From Lemma 10.6.2 it follows that there exists j′ ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s) such
that zj′(p
1) = 0. Hence, p1 ∈ C(s1), where s1 ∈ SN is defined by s1j′ = 0 and s1j = sj,
∀j ∈ IN \{j′}. Since i0(s) < i0(ŝ) ≤ N −2, j′ can be chosen such that s1 ∈ S. Repeating
this argument a finite number of times, a price system p̃ ∈ C(s̃) is found such that





| j ∈ IN}) or







| j ∈ IN}). Moreover, I−(s̃) ⊂ I−(s), I0(s) ⊂ I0(s̃), and I+(s̃) ⊂ I+(s).
Suppose min({ p̃j
vj
| j ∈ IN}) ≥ min({ p̂jvj | j ∈ IN}). Since p, p̂ ∈ ∆̇
N−1
λ , it follows that
min({ p̃j
vj
| j ∈ IN}) = min({ p̂jvj | j ∈ IN}) = min({
pj
vj
| j ∈ IN}). Using Lemma 10.6.5
it follows that p̃ = p. By Lemma 10.6.5, p 6∈ C(ŝ), and since p ∈ C(s̃), a contradiction
with Lemma 10.6.4 is obtained. Consequently, min({ p̃j
vj
| j ∈ IN}) < min({ p̂jvj | j ∈ IN}).
By Lemma 10.6.4, ŝ = s̃, Jmin(p̂, p̃) = I
−(ŝ), and Jmax(p̂, p̃) = I


















. So, j1 ∈ Jmin(p̂, p̃), a contradiction
with Jmin(p̂, p̃) = I






| j ∈ IN}). Consequently, for every λ ∈ [λ, 1], Π(λ) contains exactly one
element. Q.E.D.
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A3-A7 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1
be the starting price system. In Lemma 10.6.6 it has been shown that there exists
λ ∈ (0, 1] such that Π(λ) = ∅, ∀λ ∈ (0, λ), Π(λ) = {p∗}, where p∗ is a Walrasian
equilibrium price system of ∆̇N−1, which is easily seen to be unique using Lemma 10.6.1,
and Π|[λ,1] : [λ, 1]→ C is a function. Therefore, the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium
in the gross substitutability case is shown in this section without using a fixed point





∣∣∣ j ∈ IN
})
and define the function π : [0, 1]→ C by
{π(t)} = C ∩ ∆̇N−11+(λ∗−1)t, ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
In Theorem 10.6.7 it will be shown that π is a homeomorphism between [0, 1] and C
if λ∗ < 1. Moreover, π(0) = v and π(1) = p∗. If λ∗ = 1, then the function π is still
well-defined and it is a constant function, associating with every t ∈ [0, 1] the Walrasian
equilibrium price system v.
Theorem 10.6.7
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A3-A7 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1
be the starting price system. Then, either z(v) = 0N , or z(v) 6= 0N and the function
π : [0, 1]→ C is a homeomorphism such that π(0) = v and π(1) = p∗, where z(p∗) = 0N .
Proof
Either λ∗ = 1, C = {v}, and z(v) = 0N , or λ∗ < 1 and z(v) 6= 0N . Consider the latter
case. Obviously, by Lemma 10.6.6, the function π is injective and surjective. It remains
to be shown that π is continuous. The continuity of π−1 follows then immediately from
Theorem 2.3.4.
Suppose π is not continuous. Then there exists a sequence (tn)n∈IN in [0, 1] converging to
some t ∈ [0, 1] such that the sequence (π(tn))n∈IN in ∆̇N−1 does not converge to π(t). By
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the compactness of C there is no loss of generality in assuming that (π(tn))n∈IN converges














∣∣∣ j ∈ IN
})
= 1 + (λ∗ − 1)t.
Hence, {p, π(t)} ⊂ C ∩ ∆̇N−1
1+(λ∗−1)t
= {π(t)}, a contradiction. Consequently, π is a
continuous function. Q.E.D.
In the gross substitutability case the price adjustment process has very interesting eco-
nomic properties as will be made clear in the three final theorems. In Theorem 10.6.8 it
is shown that during the price adjustment process the number of markets in equilibrium
is increasing. More precisely, if a market attains an equilibrium situation, then it remains
in equilibrium during the remainder of the price adjustment process. In Theorem 10.6.9
this result is even strengthened and it is shown that on every market the absolute value
of the total excess demand is monotonically decreasing. In Theorem 10.6.10 it is shown
that during the entire process the prices of commodities with a negative total excess
demand are strictly decreasing, while the prices of commodities with a positive total
excess demand are strictly increasing. Theorem 10.6.10 makes clear that the prices on
markets out of equilibrium are adjusted in a way being qualitatively the same as in the
Walrasian tatonnement process, while Theorem 10.6.8 states an important difference,
markets in equilibrium stay in equilibrium.
Theorem 10.6.8
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A3-A7 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1
be the starting price system. Let t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1] with t1 < t2 be given. If s1, s2 ∈ S
are such that π(t1) ∈ C(s1) and π(t2) ∈ C(s2), and if λ∗ < 1, then I−(s2) ⊂ I−(s1),
I0(s1) ⊂ I0(s2), and I+(s2) ⊂ I+(s1).
Proof
Let p1 ∈ C(s1) and p2 ∈ C(s2) be defined by p1 = π(t1) and p2 = π(t2). Notice that
min({p1j
vj




| j ∈ IN}) since λ∗ < 1.
Suppose there exists j′ ∈ (I−(s2) \ I−(s1)) ∪ (I0(s1) \ I0(s2)) ∪ (I+(s2) \ I+(s1)).
Suppose i0(s1) = i0(s2). Then, by Lemma 10.6.4, it holds that s1 = s2, yielding a
contradiction with the choice of j′.
Suppose i0(s1) > i0(s2). Then, by the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 10.6.6,
starting with C(s2), there exists s̃ ∈ S and p̃ ∈ C(s̃) such that i0(s̃) = i0(s1) and
min({ p̃j
vj















| j ∈ IN}). Clearly, min({ p̃jvj | j ∈ IN}) <
min({p1j
vj
| j ∈ IN}), so it holds by Lemma 10.6.4 that s1 = s̃, Jmin(p1, p̃) = I−(s1),
and Jmax(p







| j ∈ IN}). Since






j1 ∈ Jmin(p1, p̃), a contradiction with Jmin(p1, p̃) = I−(s̃) and j1 ∈ I0(s̃). Similarly, a
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| j ∈ IN}).
Suppose i0(s1) < i0(s2). Then again the construction of the proof of Lemma 10.6.6 can
be used, starting with C(s1). So, there exists s̃ ∈ S and p̃ ∈ C(s̃) such that i0(s̃) = i0(s2)
and min({ p̃j
vj















| j ∈ IN}). Moreover, I−(s̃) ⊂ I−(s1),
I0(s1) ⊂ I0(s̃), and I+(s̃) ⊂ I+(s1). If min({ p̃j
vj




| j ∈ IN}), then,
by Lemma 10.6.4, s̃ = s2, so I−(s2) ⊂ I−(s1), I0(s1) ⊂ I0(s2), and I+(s2) ⊂ I+(s1),
giving a contradiction with the supposed existence of j′. So, consider the case where
min({ p̃j
vj




| j ∈ IN}). Now p̃ = p2 since C ∩ ∆̇N−11+(λ∗−1)t2 contains a
unique element. For every j ∈ I−(s̃) it holds that p̃j
p1
j
< 1, so Jmax(p
1, p̃) ⊂ I0(s̃) ∪ I+(s̃).
For every j ∈ Jmax(p1, p̃) ∩ I0(s̃) it holds by Lemma 10.6.1 that zj(p1) > zj(p̃) = 0,













, ∀, j ∈ I+(s̃). Therefore, I+(s̃) ⊂ Jmax(p1, p̃) and Jmin(p1, p̃) ⊂ I−(s̃) ∪ I0(s̃). It
follows in a similar way that I−(s̃) ⊂ Jmin(p1, p̃).
Suppose j′ ∈ I−(s2) \ I−(s1). Then zj′(p̃) ≤ 0 since p̃ = p2. Using I−(s̃) ⊂ I−(s1),






, ∀j ∈ I−(s̃). Therefore, j′ ∈ Jmin(p1, p̃).
By Lemma 10.6.1 it holds that 0 ≤ zj′(p1) < zj′(p̃) ≤ 0, a contradiction. The case
where j′ ∈ I+(s2) \ I+(s1) yields a contradiction in a similar way. Consequently, j′ ∈
I0(s1) \ I0(s2).
Since j′ ∈ I0(s1) \ I0(s2), it follows that j′ ∈ I−(s2)∪ I+(s2). Moreover, it can be shown
that j′ ∈ Jmin(p1, p̃) ∪ Jmax(p1, p̃). Since j′ ∈ I0(s1) and I0(s1) ⊂ I0(s̃), it follows that
0 = zj′(p
1) = zj′(p̃). By Lemma 10.6.1 it holds that zj′(p
1) 6= zj′(p̃), a contradiction.
Consequently, (I−(s2) \ I−(s1)) ∪ (I0(s1) \ I0(s2)) ∪ (I+(s2) \ I+(s1)) = ∅. Q.E.D.
Notice that in Theorem 10.6.8 it is required that λ∗ < 1. If λ∗ = 1, then π(t) = v,
∀t ∈ [0, 1], while z(v) = 0N . In this case it holds that v ∈ C(s), ∀s ∈ S, and a statement
like in Theorem 10.6.8 cannot be made.
Theorem 10.6.9
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A3-A7 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1
be the starting price system. Let t1, t2 ∈ [0, 1] with t1 < t2 and j′ ∈ IN be given.
Then zj′(π(t
1)) < zj′(π(t
2)) ≤ 0 if zj′(π(t1)) < 0, zj′(π(t2)) = 0 if zj′(π(t1)) = 0, and
zj′(π(t
1)) > zj′(π(t
2)) ≥ 0 if zj′(π(t1)) > 0.
Proof
If λ∗ = 1, then the proof of Theorem 10.6.9 is trivial, so consider the case λ∗ < 1.
Let s1, s2 ∈ S be such that π(t1) ∈ C(s1) and π(t2) ∈ C(s2). Let j− ∈ I−(s2)








1+(λ∗−1)t1 < 1. It follows from Theorem 10.6.8 that j






(t1) is independent of the choice of j













(t1) . Moreover, j
0 6∈ Jmax(π(t1), π(t2)) since otherwise, by Lemma
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10.6.1, zj0(π(t
1)) > zj0(π(t
2)) = 0, a contradiction with j0 ∈ I−(s1). Similarly, j0 ∈














0 6∈ Jmin(π(t1), π(t2)). Therefore, I−(s2) ⊂ Jmin(π(t1), π(t2))








From Theorem 10.6.8 it follows that zj′(π(t
2)) ≤ 0 if zj′(π(t1)) < 0, zj′(π(t2)) = 0 if
zj′(π(t
1)) = 0, and zj′(π(t
2)) ≥ 0 if zj′(π(t1)) > 0. Q.E.D.
Theorem 10.6.10
Let the total excess demand function z satisfy the Assumptions A3-A7 and let v ∈ ∆̇N−1
be the starting price system. Let t ∈ [0, 1] be given. Then there exists ε ∈ IR++ such
that, for every j ∈ IN , for every t ∈ (t − ε, t) ∩ [0, 1], πj(t) < πj(t) if zj(π(t)) > 0
and πj(t) > πj(t) if zj(π(t)) < 0, and, for every t ∈ (t, t + ε) ∩ [0, 1], πj(t) > πj(t) if
zj(π(t)) > 0 and πj(t) < πj(t) if zj(π(t)) < 0.
Proof
If λ∗ = 1, then the proof of Theorem 10.6.10 is trivial, so consider the case λ∗ < 1. Since
z and π are continuous functions, there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that, for every j ∈ IN , for
every t ∈ (t−ε, t+ε)∩ [0, 1], zj(π(t)) > 0 if zj(π(t)) > 0, and zj(π(t)) < 0 if zj(π(t)) < 0.
Let j′ ∈ IN be such that zj′(π(t)) < 0 and let some t ∈ (t − ε, t + ε) ∩ [0, 1] be given.
Then πj′(t) = (1 + (λ
∗ − 1)t)vj′. Hence, if t 6= t, then
(t− t) (πj′(t)− πj′(t)) = (λ∗ − 1)(t− t)2vj′ < 0.
Let j′ ∈ IN be such that zj′(π(t)) > 0 and let some t ∈ (t, t+ε)∩ [0, 1] be given. Suppose
πj′(t) < πj′(t), so
πj′ (t)
πj′ (t)
> 1. Then, for every j ∈ IN with zj(π(t)) > 0, πj(t)πj(t) > 1. Also,
for every j ∈ IN with zj(π(t)) < 0, πj(t)πj(t) > 1. Hence, there exists j′′ ∈ IN such that
zj′′(π(t)) = 0 and j
′′ ∈ Jmin(π(t), π(t)). By Lemma 10.6.1 it holds that zj′′(π(t)) > 0,
contradicting the choice of ε. The case where j′ ∈ IN is such that zj′(π(t)) > 0 and some
t ∈ (t− ε, t) ∩ [0, 1] is given can be treated similarly. Q.E.D.
Theorem 10.6.10 shows that the price adjustment process in some sense can be considered
as a generalization of the Walrasian tatonnement process. For the easy cases, like gross
substitutability in the finite increment form, it behaves qualitatively the same for markets
out of equilibrium. For the more complicated cases it still guarantees convergence to a
Walrasian equilibrium.
Chapter 11
A Globally and Universally Stable
Quantity Adjustment Process
11.1 Introduction
The question whether the Walrasian equilibrium is stable, is difficult to answer. Al-
though for a number of special cases the Walrasian tatonnement process as formulated
in Samuelson (1941) has been shown to be globally stable, see Theorem 3.11.2, and,
generically, the price adjustment process of Chapter 10 is globally and universally sta-
ble, it is not clear whether these price adjustment processes are the right model of price
adjustment processes taking place in the real world. For example, even if the Walrasian
tatonnement process converges to a Walrasian equilibrium, convergence may take too
much time and does not take place, a point of view considered in Blad (1978). Obviously,
the same remark is true for the price adjustment process of Chapter 10. Therefore, it
is well possible that, at least in the short run, a Walrasian equilibrium price system
is not reached and therefore trade has to take place at a non-Walrasian equilibrium
price system. Clearly, there are several other reasons why trade may take place at a
non-Walrasian equilibrium price system. Even if the Walrasian equilibrium is stable
with respect to some price adjustment process, and even if convergence takes place fast
enough, then government intervention, for instance minimum wages or price indexation,
might result in a non-Walrasian equilibrium price system at which trade has to take
place. In the models of the political economic system as described in Part III such in-
terventions are the generic case. Similarly, as the results in Madden (1983), Silvestre
(1988), and Bénassy (1993) indicate, a non-Walrasian equilibrium price system may re-
sult as the outcome of a game played between consumers and firms or the outcome of a
game played between workers and shareholders.
When trade takes place at a non-Walrasian equilibrium price system, several non-
Walrasian equilibrium concepts are available, see for instance Bénassy (1975b), Drèze
(1975), Younès (1975), and van der Laan (1980a). Although existence of each such a
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non-Walrasian equilibrium has been shown, again the question of stability for these non-
Walrasian equilibria should be addressed. Only Bénassy accompanies his equilibrium
concept by a dynamic process, specifying the amounts the consumers can supply or de-
mand on the various markets at each point in time. However, the issue of convergence
of such a process is not considered. In Movshovich (1994) a dynamic process is intro-
duced that converges to a Drèze equilibrium, given some fixed price system. However,
convergence can only be guaranteed under conditions similar to gross substitutability.
Many authors consider models where at each moment in time a non-Walrasian equi-
librium results. A price adjustment process in continuous time in a world with three
commodities, while at each point in time a Drèze equilibrium results, is considered by
Veendorp (1975) (see also the comment of Laroque (1981)). In this model prices are
adjusted on the basis of the effective total excess demand corresponding to the Drèze
equilibrium resulting in each time period. Due to the assumptions made, this Drèze
equilibrium is unique and can be easily determined. Under more general assumptions it
is not clear how this Drèze equilibrium can be attained. Even if at each point in time
a Drèze equilibrium results, then it is not clear which equilibrium will realize in case of
multiple equilibria. Hence, an adjustment process is needed to select a Drèze equilibrium
in this case. Other authors, like Böhm (1993) and Weddepohl and Yildirim (1993), con-
sider overlapping generation models where a Drèze equilibrium results in each period.
Again, assumptions are made such that the Drèze equilibrium can be easily determined.
Under more general assumptions it is again less clear whether a Drèze equilibrium will
result, and in case of multiple equilibria which equilibrium prevails in the economy.
In this chapter a quantity adjustment process in continuous time is considered for
the model of an economy as described in Chapter 4, while the set of admissible price
systems is assumed to consist of a single price system, which is in general a non-Walrasian
equilibrium price system. During the quantity adjustment process no trade takes place.
Under standard assumptions on the economy it is shown that, generically, the quantity
adjustment process converges from any initial state to a Drèze equilibrium. Moreover,
from the main result it follows that, generically, the number of Drèze equilibria is odd.
This extends a result of Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978) where it is shown that,
generically, the number of Drèze equilibria is finite. The assumptions made in this
chapter do not exclude the case where rationing occurs according to some priority system,
a case excluded by the assumptions in Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978).
In Section 11.2 the model of an economy with a fixed price system according to
Chapter 4 is given, the equilibrium concept of Drèze (1975) is defined, and the reduced
total excess demand function is introduced. Since the price system is fixed, the reduced
total excess demand function does only depend on the rationing schemes. There is
no rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity. An adjustment process in
rationing schemes, as introduced in this chapter, is equivalent to an adjustment process
in quantities. More precisely, adjusting the rationing scheme of a consumer on a market
is equivalent to adjusting the maximal amount a consumer is allowed to supply or to
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demand on that market. In the description of the quantity adjustment process an initial
state of the economy, in this case a specification of rationing schemes on every market, is
assumed to be given. In general this initial state is incompatible with a Drèze equilibrium.
Then the quantity adjustment process is defined having global features that are related
to the price adjustment process as defined in Chapter 10.
In the quantity adjustment process, adjustments of rationing schemes are based on
the total excess demand on the markets of the non-numeraire commodities and on the
change in the rationing schemes compared to the initial state. If there is a negative
total excess demand on a market at some point in time, then the rationing schemes are
adjusted in such a way that, compared to the initial state, supply rationing is tightened
and demand rationing is weakened on this market. So, compared to the initial state,
consumers are allowed to supply less and to demand more of this commodity. Similarly,
if there is a positive total excess demand on a market at some point in time, rationing
schemes are adjusted in such a way that, compared to the initial state, supply rationing
is weakened and demand rationing is tightened on this market. Finally, the rationing
schemes satisfy all the requirements imposed on them in a Drèze equilibrium also during
the quantity adjustment process. These global features make the quantity adjustment
process economically attractive.
In principle it is possible to adjust the rationing schemes according to the processes
as formulated in Samuelson (1941), i.e., the well-known Walrasian tatonnement process,
Smale (1976), Kamiya (1990), or Chapter 10. However, the reduced total excess demand
function will in general not satisfy the requirements needed to guarantee the convergence
of these processes. Typically, the reduced total excess demand function does not satisfy
assumptions like gross substitutability, does not have the required boundary behaviour,
and is not everywhere differentiable.
The quantity adjustment process is illustrated in Section 11.3 for Scarf’s example as
described in Section 3.12. In Section 11.4 it is shown that for almost every economy the
quantity adjustment process as defined in Section 11.2 converges to a Drèze equilibrium
given any initial state of the economy. In the terminology of Saari and Simon (1978)
or Saari (1985), the quantity adjustment process is an effective or globally convergent
mechanism.
This chapter is based on Herings (1994b).
11.2 The Quantity Adjustment Process
The quantity adjustment process, for the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) as
described in Chapter 4, is defined in this section. There are M ∈ IN consumers, indexed
by i ∈ IM , and N ∈ IN \ {1} commodities, indexed by j ∈ IN . A consumer i ∈ IM is
characterized by a consumption setX i, a preference relationi, and an initial endowment
ωi. The element (ω1, . . . , ωM) is denoted by ω. The rationing function, specifying the
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admissible rationing schemes, is given by the pair (l̃, L̃) with l̃ : IRN+ → −IRMN+ the
rationing function on supply and L̃ : IRN+ → IRMN+ the rationing function on demand.
Notice that l̃ and L̃ are assumed to be defined on IRN+ instead of on Q
N , which will be
more convenient in this chapter. The set
∏
i∈IM X
i is denoted by X. For every i ∈ IM , for
every j ∈ IN , component (i− 1)N + j of l̃ is denoted by l̃ij . Moreover, l̃i = (l̃i1, . . . , l̃iN)⊤,
∀i ∈ IM , and l̃j = (l̃1j , . . . , l̃Mj )⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . The same notation is used for the function L̃,
for a rationing scheme on supply l ∈ −IR∗MN+ , and for a rationing scheme on demand
L ∈ IR∗MN+ .
The price system is assumed to be completely fixed, i.e., both the lower bound and
the upper bound for the set of admissible price systems P(p,p) are given by some fixed
p ∈ IRN , so p = p = p. Commodity N is considered to be a numeraire commodity,
hence the price of commodity N equals one. In general it will not hold that p induces
a Walrasian equilibrium, see Definition 3.8.1, i.e., at p the total excess demand of the
consumers is not equal to zero. Therefore, when a fixed price system p is given, other
equilibrium concepts than the Walrasian one have to be used in order to describe the
allocation resulting in the economy. In this chapter the approach of Drèze (1975) will
be followed, using the same motivation as in Section 4.7 and in Section 8.2.
The budget set of a consumer i ∈ IM at a rationing scheme (li, Li) ∈ −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+
is denoted by βi(li, Li), so
βi(li, Li) =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣p · xi ≤ p · ωi and li ≤ xi − ωi ≤ Li
}
,
see also Section 4.2, and the set δi(li, Li) is defined by
δi(li, Li) =
{
xi ∈ βi(li, Li)
∣∣∣xi i xi, ∀xi ∈ βi(li, Li)
}
,
see also Section 4.3. Notice that the price system p, being fixed, is suppressed in the
notation of the budget set and the demand set. A Drèze equilibrium, see also Definition
4.7.5 and Definition 8.2.4, is defined as follows.
Definition 11.2.1 (Drèze equilibrium)
A Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) is an element
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ P(p,p) × l̃(IRN+ )× L̃(IRN+ )×X
satisfying




∗i −∑i∈IM ωi = 0N ,




j for some consumer i
′ ∈ IM implies






j for some consumer i
′ ∈ IM implies
x∗ij − ωij > l∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM ,
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4. l∗iN < x
∗i
N − ωiN < L∗iN , ∀i ∈ IM .
This definition of a Drèze equilibrium corresponds to the definition of a Drèze equilibrium
with respect to the market of commodity N of Definition 4.7.5. Since the price system is
assumed to be fixed, the conditions that there is no supply rationing on the market of a
commodity j ∈ IN−1 if the price of commodity j is not equal to the lower bound on the
price of commodity j, and, similarly, demand rationing does not occur on the market of
commodity j if the price of commodity j is not equal to the upper bound on the price
of commodity j, need not to be specified.
For the remainder of this section the economy Ẽ is assumed to satisfy the following
assumptions.
A1. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i is closed, convex, X i ⊂ IRN+ ,
and X i + IRN+ ⊂ X i.
A2. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the preference relation i is complete, transitive,
continuous, monotonic with respect to commodity N, and strongly convex.
A3. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the initial endowment ωi belongs to int(X i).
A4. The price system p is an element of IRN++ with pN = 1.
A5. The rationing function on supply l̃ : IRN+ → −IRMN+ and the rationing function on
demand L̃ : IRN+ → IRMN+ are continuous and satisfy, for every i ∈ IM , for every
j ∈ IN , for every q1, q1, q2, q2 ∈ IRN+ ,
l̃ij(q
1) = l̃ij(q










1) = 0 if q1j = 0, L̃
i
j(q
2) = 0 if q2j = 0,
l̃ij(q
1)→ −∞ if q1j → +∞, L̃ij(q2)→ +∞ if q2j → +∞.
Notice that Assumption A5 corresponds to a flexible, market independent, and contin-
uous rationing function as defined in Section 4.5. Although this is not assumed, the
functions l̃ and L̃ are considered to be monotonic whenever an intuitive explanation or
interpretation of the model is given. Under the Assumptions A1-A5 on the economy Ẽ
the existence of a Drèze equilibrium follows from Corollary 4.7.6 or from Theorem 8.4.1,
the domain on which l̃ and L̃ are defined being the only difference with the assumptions
made there. Furthermore, it is not difficult to show that
∀j ∈ IN , ∃qj ∈ IR+, ∀i ∈ IM , l̃ij(q1) is not binding if q1j ≥ qj ,
∀j ∈ IN , ∃qj ∈ IR+, ∀i ∈ IM , L̃ij(q2) is not binding if q2j ≥ qj,
where binding is as defined in Section 4.3. For example, for any j ∈ IN it follows
immediately that if qj is chosen such that, for every q
1
j ≥ qj , l̃ij(q1) < −ωij , ∀i ∈ IM , then
the first condition is satisfied, and, similarly, if qj is chosen such that, for every q
2
j ≥ qj,





− ωij, ∀i ∈ IM , then the second condition is satisfied. Define the functions
l̂ : QN−1 → −IRMN+ and L̂ : QN−1 → IRMN+ by
l̂(q) = l̃(2q1q1, . . . , 2qN−1qN−1, qN), ∀q ∈ QN−1,
L̂(q) = L̃(2q1(1− q1), . . . , 2qN−1(1− qN−1), qN), ∀q ∈ QN−1.
The notational conventions used for l̃ and L̃ are also used for l̂ and L̂. It is easily verified
that there is no supply rationing on the market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1 if qj ≥ 12 and
there is no demand rationing on the market of commodity j if qj ≤ 12 . Moreover, there
is no rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity for any q ∈ QN−1.
Let a commodity j ∈ IN−1 be given. If qj increases from 0 to 12 , then on the market of
commodity j the rationing scheme on supply, l̂j(q), changes from being equal to zero, i.e.,
no supply is possible of commodity j for any consumer, to being non-binding for every
consumer. If qj ∈ [12 , 1], then the rationing scheme on supply, l̂j(q), remains non-binding
for every consumer. If qj ∈ [0, 12 ], then on the market of commodity j the rationing
scheme on demand, L̂j(q), is non-binding for every consumer, and if qj increases from
1
2 to 1 then the rationing scheme on demand, L̂j(q), changes from being non-binding to
being zero. Hence, if qj is increased, then the total excess demand of commodity j has a
tendency to fall. In this sense the effect on the economy of an increment of qj resembles
the effect of an increment of the price of commodity j. The properties of the functions l̂
and L̂ will guarantee that Condition 3 of the definition of a Drèze equilibrium, Definition
11.2.1, is satisfied on the adjustment path. Moreover, it is easily verified that there is
no loss of generality in considering only rationing schemes (l, L) ∈ −IR∗MN+ × IR∗MN+
such that there exists q ∈ QN−1 satisfying (l̂(q), L̂(q)) = (l, L) in the sense that all
relevant rationing schemes, i.e., those rationing schemes that affect the behaviour of the
consumers in the economy, are obtained.
Let a rationing scheme (li, Li) ∈ −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ of a consumer i ∈ IM be given.
From the Assumptions A1-A4 it follows easily that the set δi(li, Li) of consumer i ∈ IM
contains exactly one element. Therefore, for every i ∈ IM , define the reduced demand








, ∀q ∈ QN−1,








ωi, ∀q ∈ QN−1.
The proof of the following result is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.7.1.
Theorem 11.2.2
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. If,
for some q∗ ∈ QN−1, ẑ(q∗) = 0N , then (p, l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂1(q∗), . . . , d̂M(q∗)) is a Drèze
equilibrium of the economy Ẽ .
11.2 The Quantity Adjustment Process 341
If, for some q∗ ∈ QN−1, ẑ(q∗) = 0N , then (p, l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂1(q∗), . . . , d̂M(q∗)) is called the
Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ induced by q∗. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4.7.2 the
following result can be shown.
Theorem 11.2.3
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5. If
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is a Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ , then there exists q∗ ∈ QN−1
such that ẑ(q∗) = 0N , while (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p, l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂1(q∗), . . . , d̂M(q∗)), i.e.,
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is equivalent to (p, l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂1(q∗), . . . , d̂M(q∗)) in the sense of Defini-
tion 4.6.2.
Therefore, it follows immediately that there is no loss of generality in considering only
Drèze equilibria of the economy Ẽ being induced by elements of QN−1. The proof of the
following result is similar to the proof of Theorem 8.2.8.
Theorem 11.2.4
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5.
Then the reduced demand function d̂i : QN−1 → IRN of a consumer i ∈ IM and the
reduced total excess demand function ẑ : QN−1 → IRN of the economy Ẽ have the follow-
ing properties:
1. d̂i and ẑ are continuous on QN−1,
2. for every q ∈ QN−1, for every j ∈ IN−1, qj = 0 implies d̂ij(q)−ωij ≥ 0 and ẑj(q) ≥ 0,
and qj = 1 implies d̂
i
j(q)− ωij ≤ 0 and ẑj(q) ≤ 0,
3. for every q ∈ QN−1, p · (d̂i(q)− ωi) = 0 and p · ẑ(q) = 0.
Now the quantity adjustment process can be defined. Notice that the state of the markets
is completely determined by the prevailing rationing schemes (l, L) ∈ −IR∗MN+ × IR∗MN+ .
Therefore, it is possible to describe the state of the economy by an element q ∈ QN−1
inducing the rationing scheme (l̂(q), L̂(q)). The basic idea of the quantity adjustment
process will be to decrease (increase) qj in case of a negative (positive) total excess
demand on the market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1.
Let v ∈ QN−1 denote the initial state of the economy. The initial state v = 121N−1 is
interesting from an economic point of view since at this state no consumer is rationed on
any market. In this case, initially, each consumer expresses his notional demand for every
commodity, given the price system p. Subsequently, supply rationing will be tightened
on markets with a negative total excess demand and demand rationing will be tightened
on markets with a positive total excess demand. Other interesting initial states are
v = 0N−1 and v = 1N−1, corresponding to situations with full rationing on supply and
full rationing on demand, respectively. For example, in case of full rationing on supply
all consumers are restricted to demand any non-numeraire commodity. This will lead
to a non-negative total excess demand on all markets, except possibly on the market of
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the numeraire commodity. Consider the case with a positive total excess demand on all
markets, except on the market of the numeraire commodity. This positive total excess
demand is allocated to potential suppliers by allowing some supply on all markets. This
will change the total excess demand on a particular market for two reasons. First, there
is a direct effect since a consumer supplying a commodity causes a direct decrease in
the positive total excess demand of this commodity. Secondly, there is an indirect spill-
over effect since the opportunity of supply on other markets will change the demand
on a market. The sign of this spill-over effect is ambiguous. Other initial states are
interesting too. If a sequence of temporary Drèze equilibria is considered in for example
an overlapping generations model, then the rationing scheme of the previous period
determines the initial state for the current period. Since there are many possible initial
states of interest, v is allowed to be an arbitrary element of QN−1 in this chapter.
Given an initial state v ∈ QN−1 and a commodity j ∈ IN−1, vj is the maximal
decrease of qj possible on the market of commodity j and 1− vj is the maximal increase
of qj possible on the market of commodity j. Let q ∈ QN−1 be a point reached by the
quantity adjustment process. The quantity adjustment process is such that if there is
a negative total excess demand on the market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1, then qj has
been decreased relatively maximally over all commodities towards zero, and if there is
a positive total excess demand on the market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1, then qj has
been increased relatively maximally over all commodities towards one. More precisely, if
an element q ∈ QN−1 has been reached by the quantity adjustment process, then there
exists a number µ ∈ [0, 1] such that, for every j ∈ IN−1,
qj = µvj if ẑj(q) < 0,
µvj ≤ qj ≤ 1− µ(1− vj) if ẑj(q) = 0, (11.1)
qj = 1− µ(1− vj) if ẑj(q) > 0.
Clearly, the behaviour of the quantity adjustment process depends heavily on the state
of the various markets, i.e., whether there is a negative total excess demand on a market,
or a market is in equilibrium, or there is a positive total excess demand on a market.
The sign of the total excess demand on the markets will be described by a sign vector
s ∈ SN−1, so, for every j ∈ IN−1, sj ∈ {−1, 0,+1}. Recall from Section 2.2 that for every
sign vector s ∈ SN−1 the sets I−(s), I0(s), and I+(s) are defined by I−(s) = {j ∈ IN−1 |
sj = −1}, I0(s) = {j ∈ IN−1 | sj = 0}, and I+(s) = {j ∈ IN−1 | sj = +1}. These sets
will denote markets for which there is a non-positive total excess demand, equilibrium,
and a non-negative total excess demand, respectively. Moreover, i−(s), i0(s), and i+(s)
denote the number of elements in the sets I−(s), I0(s), and I+(s), respectively.




∣∣∣vj > 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), vj < 1, ∀j ∈ I+(s), and ∃j′ ∈ IN−1, sj′ 6= 0
}
.
Notice that S 6= ∅. For every admissible sign vector s ∈ S, the sets A(s), B(s), and C(s)
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∣∣∣∃µ ∈ [0, 1], qj = µvj, ∀j ∈ I−(s),
µvj ≤ qj ≤ 1− µ(1− vj), ∀j ∈ I0(s),






∣∣∣ẑj(q) ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s),
ẑj(q) = 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s),
ẑj(q) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s)
}
,
C(s) = A(s) ∩B(s).
The sets defined above are used to describe the quantity adjustment process. Every state
q ∈ QN−1 reached by the quantity adjustment process will shown to be an element of
the set C defined by
C = ∪s∈SC(s).
Let an admissible sign vector s ∈ S and a state q ∈ QN−1 be given. For every j ∈ IN−1,
if sj = −1 (sj = +1), then there is a non-positive (non-negative) total excess demand
on the market of commodity j, while the value of qj is minimal (maximal) relative to
vj , i.e., relative to the situation at the initial state demand rationing on the market
of commodity j has been weakened (tightened) and supply rationing on the market of
commodity j has been tightened (weakened). Notice that the set B(s), ∀s ∈ S, does not
depend on the initial state v. The regions in QN−1 determined by the sets A(s), ∀s ∈ S,
however, do depend on v. The number of different regions A(s) equals the number of
admissible sign vectors and thus also depends on v. This is illustrated for the case N = 3
in Figure 11.2.1.
In order to obtain all states q ∈ QN−1 with the properties given in (11.1), it is
sufficient to restrict attention to the points q ∈ C, so only points being elements of
the set C(s) for some s ∈ S. If, for instance, vj = 0 for some j ∈ IN−1, then the
quantity adjustment process cannot reach a state q ∈ QN−1 that induces a negative
total excess demand on the market of commodity j. According to (11.1) such a state
must satisfy qj = 0, implying a non-negative total excess demand for commodity j by
Theorem 11.2.4. Similarly, if vj = 1 for some j ∈ IN−1, then the quantity adjustment
process cannot reach a state q ∈ QN−1 that induces a positive total excess demand on
the market of commodity j since by (11.1) such a state must satisfy qj = 1, implying a
non-positive total excess demand for commodity j by Theorem 11.2.4.
Let an initial state v ∈ QN−1 be given. In the next theorem it is shown that v ∈ C
and that for every q∗ ∈ QN−1 satisfying ẑ(q∗) = 0N it holds that q∗ ∈ C.
Theorem 11.2.5
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5 and
let v ∈ QN−1 be the initial state. Then v ∈ C and q∗ ∈ C for every state q∗ ∈ QN−1





































































































































































































































































































Figure 11.2.1. The sets A(s), for s ∈ S, N = 3.
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inducing a Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ .
Proof
Consider the total excess demand ẑ(v) at the initial state v. If ẑ(v) = 0N , then v ∈ C(s),
∀s ∈ S, so v ∈ C. If ẑ(v) 6= 0N , then ẑj(v) 6= 0 for some j ∈ IN−1 by Theorem 11.2.4.
Now let s ∈ SN−1 be obtained by defining, for every j ∈ IN−1, sj = −1 if ẑj(v) < 0,
sj = 0 if ẑj(v) = 0, and sj = +1 if ẑj(v) > 0. Then it holds that s ∈ S by Theorem
11.2.4, while, clearly, v ∈ C(s) ⊂ C.
Let q∗ ∈ QN−1 induce a Drèze equilibrium. Let µ ∈ IR be defined as the maximal value of
µ ∈ IR such that, for every j ∈ IN−1, q∗j ≥ µvj and 1− q∗j ≥ µ(1− vj). It is easily verified
that µ ∈ [0, 1]. If there exists j′ ∈ IN−1 such that both q∗j′ = µvj′ and 1− q∗j′ = µ(1−vj′),
then it follows that µ = 1, so q∗ = v. It follows from the first paragraph that q∗ ∈ C in
this case. If, for every j ∈ IN−1, q∗j > µvj or 1 − q∗j > µ(1 − vj), then let s ∈ SN−1 be
obtained by defining, for every j ∈ IN−1, sj = −1 if q∗j = µvj and vj > 0, sj = +1 if
1− q∗j = µ(1− vj) and vj < 1, and sj = 0 otherwise. By the definition of µ it holds that
q∗j′ = µvj′ for some j
′ ∈ IN−1 with vj′ > 0, or 1− q∗j′ = µ(1− vj′) for some j′ ∈ IN−1 with
vj′ < 1, so s ∈ S. It follows immediately that q∗ ∈ C(s) ⊂ C. Q.E.D.
Now the quantity adjustment process can be defined. The approach chosen to describe
the quantity adjustment process is closely related to the approach chosen in Smale (1976,
1981), van der Laan and Talman (1987a), Kamiya (1990), and Chapter 10 to describe
price adjustment processes. The quantity adjustment process is defined as a set of
elements of QN−1 containing the initial state v. It will be shown, under suitable dif-
ferentiability conditions, that, generically, this set is homeomorphic to the closed unit
interval having the initial state v and a state q∗ ∈ QN−1 inducing a Drèze equilibrium
as boundary points. Moreover, generically, under these assumptions the quantity ad-
justment process will be shown to be a 1-dimensional piecewise C2 manifold and can
therefore be described by a system of differential equations, see for example Garcia and
Zangwill (1981).
Definition 11.2.6 (Quantity adjustment process)
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5 and
let v ∈ QN−1 be the initial state. Then the quantity adjustment process is the component
of the set C containing the initial state v.
Since in the definition of the quantity adjustment process under consideration no differ-
entiability assumptions are used, one should also give a definition of convergence without
using such assumptions.
Definition 11.2.7 (Convergence)
Let the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) satisfy the Assumptions A1-A5 and
let v ∈ QN−1 be the initial state. The quantity adjustment process is convergent if either
ẑ(v) = 0N , or ẑ(v) 6= 0N and the component of v in C is an arc having v and a state
q∗ ∈ QN−1 inducing a Drèze equilibrium of the economy Ẽ as its boundary points.
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Let an initial state v ∈ QN−1 be given. If the quantity adjustment process is convergent,
then there exists a continuous function π : [0, 1]→ C satisfying π(0) = v and π(1) = q∗,
where the state q∗ induces a Drèze equilibrium. The continuous function π describes the
explicit time path of the quantity adjustment process. In case the quantity adjustment
process is described by a system of differential equations, this path corresponds to its
trajectory.
Let an initial state v ∈ QN−1 be given. The quantity adjustment process can be
followed numerically arbitrarily close using the product-ray algorithm described in Doup
and Talman (1987) or the exponent-ray algorithm described in Doup, van den Elzen,
and Talman (1987). These are simplicial algorithms with vector labelling and are suited
for problems on the simplotope. These algorithms can be applied to a piecewise linear
approximation of the reduced total excess demand function with respect to a triangu-
lation of QN−1 being such that a proper collection of the faces of the simplices in the
triangulation yields a triangulation of the set A(s), ∀s ∈ S. Theorem 2.7.7 guarantees
that the V -triangulation of QN−1 with respect to v and with grid size 1
n
for some n ∈ IN
satisfies these properties. In fact, the set S of Theorem 2.7.7 contains the set S as defined
in this chapter. The algorithms generate a piecewise linear path of points corresponding
to the quantity adjustment process in a similar way as the piecewise linear path of points
generated by the simplicial algorithm with vector labelling of Chapter 6, see Theorem
6.2.11, corresponds to the set of constrained equilibria of the economy considered there.
The quantity adjustment process has an appealing economic interpretation and can
be described as follows. Let an initial state v ∈ QN−1 be given. First the sign of the
total excess demand on the markets of the non-numeraire commodities is evaluated at
the initial state v. Consider an initial state in the interior of QN−1. In Section 11.4 it
will be shown that then, generically, ẑj(v) 6= 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1. Let the admissible sign vector
s0 ∈ S be obtained by defining, for every j ∈ IN−1, s0j = −1 if ẑj(v) < 0, and s0j = +1
if ẑj(v) > 0. Now the quantity adjustment process starts by leaving v along the ray
A(s0). Thus, for those j ∈ IN−1 with ẑj(v) < 0, qj will be proportionally decreased,
and when ẑj(v) > 0, then qj will be proportionally increased. Hence, supply rationing
is tightened and demand rationing is weakened on the markets of those commodities
j ∈ IN−1 with ẑj(v) < 0, and the other way around for those j ∈ IN−1 with ẑj(v) > 0.
This will tend to decrease the absolute value of the total excess demand on every market.
Rationing schemes are adjusted in this way until one of the markets, say the market of
commodity j′, is equilibrated. In Section 11.4 it will be shown that, generically, either
this happens for the market of exactly one commodity j′ ∈ IN−1 at a state q with
0 < qj′ < 1, or the boundary of Q
N−1 is reached at a state q∗ ∈ QN−1 satisfying
ẑ(q∗) = 0N . Consider the first case. Then, either ẑ(q) = 0N , or the quantity adjustment
process continues by keeping the market of commodity j′ in equilibrium, while qj′ is
relatively increased (decreased) if there was a negative (positive) total excess demand on
the market of commodity j′ before attaining equilibrium. For the market of a commodity
j ∈ IN−1\{j′}, qj is kept relatively minimal if ẑj(q) < 0, and qj is kept relatively maximal
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if ẑj(q) > 0. So, a path in C(s
1) is followed, where s1 ∈ S is defined by s1j′ = 0 and
s1j = s
0
j , ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ {j′}.
The general case is as follows. Suppose, for some n ∈ IN, the quantity adjustment
process follows a path in C(sn). In Section 11.4 it will be shown that, generically, the
following cases may result. Either a state q∗ ∈ QN−1 is reached satisfying z(q∗) = 0N ,
i.e., a Drèze equilibrium is obtained, and the quantity adjustment process is terminated.
Or the market of some commodity j′ ∈ I−(sn)∪ I+(sn) attains an equilibrium, in which
case a path in C(sn+1) is followed, where sn+1 is an admissible sign vector defined by




j , ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ {j′}, so the quantity adjustment process continues
by keeping the market of commodity j′ in equilibrium, while qj′ is relatively increased
(decreased) if there was a negative (positive) total excess demand on the market of
commodity j′ before attaining equilibrium, markets of commodities j ∈ I0(sn) are kept
in equilibrium, for commodities j ∈ I−(sn) \ {j′}, qj is kept relatively minimal, hence
supply rationing is tightened and demand rationing is weakened on the market of these
commodities, and for commodities j ∈ I+(sn)\{j′}, qj is kept relatively maximal, hence
supply rationing is weakened and demand rationing is tightened on the market of these
commodities compared to the initial state. Or qj′ , for some j
′ ∈ I0(sn), (1 − qj′, for
some j′ ∈ I0(sn)) has become relatively minimal, in which case a path in C(sn+1) is
followed, where sn+1 is an admissible sign vector defined by sn+1j′ = −1 (sn+1j′ = +1)
and sn+1j = s
n
j , ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ {j′}. Now the market of commodity j′ is no longer kept
in equilibrium, the total excess demand on the market of commodity j′ is allowed to
become negative (positive), while qj′ is kept relatively minimal (maximal). It will be
shown in Section 11.4 that, generically, C(s), ∀s ∈ S, is a finite collection of arcs and
loops and that the quantity adjustment process will converge to a state inducing a Drèze
equilibrium.
When the initial state v lies in the boundary of QN−1, then it is not a degenerate case
that the market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1 for which vj = 0 or vj = 1 is in equilibrium.
For example consider the case v = 0N−1. If pj is sufficiently high for every j ∈ IN−1, then
every consumer wants to supply every commodity j ∈ IN−1 in exchange for the numeraire
commodity. Hence, the initial state v induces a Drèze equilibrium with full rationing on
supply. When v lies in the boundary ofQN−1 it may happen that the quantity adjustment
process starts with keeping some markets in equilibrium. The interpretation of the
quantity adjustment process remains the same. None of the adjustment processes studied
in the literature has such a feature, so starting with keeping some markets in equilibrium
is an interesting novelty of the quantity adjustment process under consideration.
11.3 Scarf’s Example
The quantity adjustment process will now be illustrated using Scarf’s example, see
Section 3.12. For this example the Walrasian tatonnement process as formulated by
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Samuelson (1941) does not converge to the Walrasian equilibrium price system, unless
the starting price system is taken equal to the Walrasian equilibrium price system. It
is shown in Scarf (1960) that this result does not change, when one of the commodi-
ties is taken as a numeraire commodity having a price equal to one, whereas only the
prices of the other two commodities are allowed to vary. Therefore, Scarf’s example
can be considered as a difficult case for obtaining convergence of an adjustment pro-
cess for an economy with a numeraire commodity. In Scarf’s example the economy
E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈I3) is such that N = 3, X1 = X2 = X3 = IR3+, 1, 2, and 3 can
be represented by utility functions u1 : X1 → IR, u2 : X2 → IR, and u3 : X3 → IR,
respectively, defined by u1(x1) = min({x11, x12}), ∀x1 ∈ IR3+, u2(x2) = min({x22, x23}),
∀x2 ∈ IR3+, u3(x3) = min({x31, x33}), ∀x3 ∈ IR3+, and ω1 = (1, 0, 0)⊤, ω2 = (0, 1, 0)⊤, and
ω3 = (0, 0, 1)⊤. In this chapter the example is extended by choosing a fixed price system
p = (3, 2, 1) and considering the uniform rationing system. To avoid working with total
excess demand correspondences instead of total excess demand functions, the following
modification with respect to the preferences of the consumers is made. This modifica-
tion makes no difference at all for the Walrasian tatonnement process. Let a consumer
i ∈ I3 and consumption bundles xi, x̂i ∈ IR3+ be given. Then it holds that xi i x̂i if and
only if min({xii, xii+1}) < min({x̂ii, x̂ii+1}), or both min({xii, xii+1}) = min({x̂ii, x̂ii+1}) and
max({xii, xii+1}) ≤ max({x̂ii, x̂ii+1}), where i+1 is defined as 1 if i = 3. It is easily verified
that a rationing scheme lij ∈ −IR∗+ on the supply of a consumer i ∈ I3 on the market of a
commodity j ∈ I3 cannot be binding if lij ≤ −1 and that a rationing scheme Lij ∈ IR∗+ on
the demand of consumer i on the market of commodity j cannot be binding if Lij ≥ 1.
Therefore, let the functions l̂ : Q2 → −IR3+ and L̂ : Q2 → IR3+ be obtained by defining,
for every i ∈ I3,
l̂i(q) = (−2q1,−2q2,−1)⊤, ∀q ∈ Q2,
L̂i(q) = (2− 2q1, 2− 2q2, 1)⊤, ∀q ∈ Q2.






( 14 − 2q1, 3q1 − 2q2,−34 + 4q2)⊤, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 15 , 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 16 ,
( 14 − 2q1,−13 + 3q1,− 112)⊤, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ 15 , 16 ≤ q2, 2−3q1−2q2 ≥ 0,
(−1 112 + 1 13q2, 1 23 − 2q2,− 112)⊤, q1 ≤ 78 , 710 ≤ q2 ≤ 1, 2−3q1−2q2 ≤ 0,
(− 320 , 35 − 2q2,−34 + 4q2)⊤, 15 ≤ q1 ≤ 78 , 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 16 ,
(− 320 , 415 ,− 112)⊤, 15 ≤ q1 ≤ 78 , 16 ≤ q2 ≤ 710 ,
(1 35 − 2q1, 35 − 2q2,−6 + 6q1 + 4q2)⊤, 78 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q2 ≤ 16 ,
(1 35 − 2q1, 415 ,−5 13 + 6q1)⊤, 78 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, 16 ≤ q2 ≤ 710 ,
( 23 − 2q1 + 1 13q2, 1 23 − 2q2,−5 13 + 6q1)⊤, 78 ≤ q1 ≤ 1, 710 ≤ q2 ≤ 1.
In Figure 11.3.1 the sets B(s), ∀s ∈ S, corresponding to the example above are shown.
The unique Drèze equilibrium is induced by the state q∗ = ( 89 ,
5
6)
⊤. In this Drèze equilib-
rium there is demand rationing on the markets of both commodities 1 and 2, L̂i(q∗) =




⊤, ∀i ∈ I3, d̂1(q∗) = ( 79 , 13 , 0)⊤, d̂2(q∗) = (0, 23 , 23)⊤, and d̂3(q∗) = ( 29 , 0, 13)⊤. Con-
sumer 1 faces rationing on his demand on the market of commodity 2, consumer 3 faces
rationing on his demand on the market of commodity 1, while consumer 2 is not ra-
tioned and obtains his most preferred unconstrained consumption bundle. Notice that
in the unique Drèze equilibrium there is demand rationing on both markets, whereas the
notional total excess demand at p = (3, 2, 1)⊤ is negative on the market of commodity
1 and positive on the market of commodity 2. In Figure 11.3.2 the quantity adjustment






















































































Figure 11.3.1. The sets B(s), for s ∈ S, in Scarf’s example.
In the initial state v all consumers express their notional demand. Since there is
a negative total excess demand on the market of commodity 1 and a positive total
excess demand on the market of commodity 2, q1 is decreased and q2 is increased. The
quantity adjustment process initially follows a path in the set C((−1,+1)⊤). Hence, both
supply rationing on the market of commodity 1 and demand rationing on the market of
commodity 2 become tighter. Notice that this initial adjustment of q1 and q2 does not
go in the direction of the unique Drèze equilibrium. When q2 equals 710 , then consumer
1 becomes rationed on his demand of commodity 2. This decreases both the demand for
commodity 2 and the supply for commodity 1 of consumer 1 since consumer 1 needs to
supply less of commodity 1 in order to buy the maximal amount possible of commodity
2. Hence, an increase in q2 brings both the market of commodity 1 and the market of
commodity 2 closer to equilibrium. When q2 reaches the value 1316 , then the market of
commodity 1 attains an equilibrium situation. Now the market of commodity 1 is kept
in equilibrium and q1 is no longer required to remain relatively minimal. The quantity
adjustment process follows a path in the set C((0,+1)⊤). When q1 reaches the value






































































































































Figure 11.3.2. The sets C(s), for s ∈ S, in Scarf’s example, v = ( 12 , 12)⊤.
13
16 , both q1 and q2 are kept relatively maximal and the market of commodity 1 is no
longer kept in equilibrium. The quantity adjustment process follows a path in the set
C((+1,+1)⊤). The increase in q2 results in more demand rationing on the market of
commodity 2, less demand of consumer 1 for commodity 2, and less supply of consumer
1 for commodity 1. The demands of the other consumers are not affected by the changes
in q1 and q2. At q = ( 56 ,
5
6)
⊤ the market of commodity 2 is in equilibrium. Market 2 is
kept in equilibrium by keeping q2 equal to 56 and the quantity adjustment process follows
a path in the set C((+1, 0)⊤). Finally, the state q∗ = ( 89 ,
5
6), inducing a Drèze equilibrium,
is reached.
11.4 Global and Universal Stability of the Drèze Equi-
librium
In this section consumption sets and preference relations (X i,i)i∈IM , a rationing func-
tion (l̃, L̃), a fixed price system p, and an initial state v ∈ QN−1 are assumed to be
given. Then the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̃, L̃)) is obtained for every speci-




++. Hence, the set
of economies is parametrized by the set of initial endowments Ω.
Let initial endowments ω ∈ Ω be given. To make clear the dependence on the initial
endowments ω ∈ Ω, for every s ∈ S, for every q ∈ QN−1, the notation of B(s), C(s),
C, l̃(q), L̃(q), d̂i(q), ∀i ∈ IM , and ẑ(q) is changed into Bω(s), Cω(s), Cω, l̃(q, ω), L̃(q, ω),
d̂i(q, ω), ∀i ∈ IM , and ẑ(q, ω), respectively. In this section it will be shown that, gener-
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ically, the quantity adjustment process is globally and universally convergent, i.e., it
converges to a Drèze equilibrium for a large class of economies (universal convergence)
given any initial state of the economy (global convergence). More precisely, it will be
shown that the quantity adjustment process converges, except possibly for economies
parametrized by a set of initial endowments with a closure in Ω having Lebesgue mea-
sure zero.
First some remarks are made with respect to the functions l̃ and L̃, and the derivation
of the functions l̂ and L̂. Consider the case where the functions l̃ : IRN+×Ω→ −IRMN+ and














functions l̃′(·, ω) : IRN+ → IRMN and L̃′(·, ω) : IRN+ → IRMN satisfy Assumption A5.
These are weak requirements. It is not difficult to (slightly) modify the examples of
the uniform rationing function, the market share rationing function, and the priority
rationing function given in Section 4.5 such that these requirements are satisfied. As
in Section 11.2 the functions l̂ : QN−1 × Ω → −IRMN+ and L̂ : QN−1 × Ω → IRMN+ will
be constructed in such a way that on the adjustment path all conditions of a Drèze
equilibrium are satisfied, except possibly the equality of demand and supply.
Let a countable partition {Ω(ν) | ν ∈ IN} of Ω be given, which is locally finite, i.e., for
every ω ∈ Ω, there exists an open subset of Ω containing ω and intersecting only finitely
many sets Ω(ν). Moreover, let {Ω(ν) | ν ∈ IN} be a bounded partition. The functions
l̂ and L̂ are constructed in such a way that, for every ν ∈ IN, for every (q, ω), (q, ω) ∈
QN−1×Ω(ν), it holds that l̂(q, ω) = l̂(q, ω) and L̂(q, ω) = L̂(q, ω). Functions l̂ and L̂ with
these properties will be called locally constant with respect to the locally finite partition
{Ω(ν) | ν ∈ IN} of Ω. Locally constant functions l̂ and L̂ can be obtained as follows.
Let some ν ∈ IN be given. For every j ∈ IN , qνj ∈ IR+ is chosen such that, for every
ω ∈ Ω(ν), for every q1j ≥ qνj , l̃ij(q1, ω) < −ωij , ∀i ∈ IM , and qνj ∈ IR+ is chosen such that,
for every q2j ≥ qνj , L̃ij(q2, ω) > p·ω
i
pj
− ωij , ∀i ∈ IM . Notice that the assumptions on Ω(ν)
and (l̃, L̃) guarantee that, for every j ∈ IN , qνj and qνj with the above properties exist.
The existence of the continuous extensions l̃′ and L̃′ of l̃ and L̃, respectively, is needed
to guarantee that, for every j ∈ IN , qνj and qνj can be chosen independently of ω ∈ Ω(ν).
Now, define
l̂(q, ω) = l̃
(







, ∀q ∈ QN−1, ∀ω ∈ Ω(ν),
L̂(q, ω) = L̃
(
(2qν1(1− q1), . . . , 2qνN−1(1− qN−1), qνN)⊤, ω
)
, ∀q ∈ QN−1, ∀ω ∈ Ω(ν).
Repeating this procedure for every ν ∈ IN, the functions l̂ : QN−1 × Ω → −IRMN+ and
L̂ : QN−1×Ω→ IRMN+ are obtained. Then, for every q ∈ QN−1, for every ω ∈ Ω, for every
i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN−1, l̂ij(q, ω) is not binding if qj ≥ 12 , and L̂ij(q, ω) is not binding if
qj ≤ 12 . Moreover, for every q ∈ QN−1, for every ω ∈ Ω, for every i ∈ IM , l̂iN (q, ω) is not
binding and L̂iN (q, ω) is not binding. Functions l̂ and L̂ satisfying these properties are
called frictionless. For every ν ∈ IN, let ων be an element of Ω(ν). It is useful to define
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for every ν ∈ IN the functions l̂ν : QN−1 → −IRMN+ and L̂ν : QN−1 → IRMN+ by
l̂ν(q) = l̂(q, ων), ∀q ∈ QN−1,
L̂ν(q) = L̂(q, ων), ∀q ∈ QN−1.
Notice that the functions l̂ν , ∀ν ∈ IN, and L̂ν , ∀ν ∈ IN, completely determine the functions
l̂ and L̂, respectively.
From now on the functions l̂ : QN−1 × Ω → −IRMN+ and L̂ : QN−1 × Ω → IRMN+
are assumed to be given and are considered as primitive concepts. In this section the
following assumptions will be made.
A6. For every i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i is equal to IRN++.
A7. For every i ∈ IM , the preference relation i is complete, transitive, continuous,
strongly monotonic, strongly convex, of the class C3, satisfies the boundary condi-
tion, and has non-zero Gaussian curvature.
A8. The price system p is an element of IRN++ with pN = 1.
A9. The functions l̂ : QN−1 × Ω → −IRMN+ and L̂ : QN−1 × Ω → IRMN+ are locally
constant with respect to the bounded, locally finite partition {Ω(ν) | ν ∈ IN} of
Ω and frictionless. Moreover, for every ν ∈ IN, l̂ν ∈ C2(QN−1,−IRMN+ ) and L̂ν ∈
C2(QN−1, IRMN+ ), and, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN−1, for every q, q̂ ∈ QN−1,
l̂ν,ij (q) = l̂
ν,i
j (q̂) if qj = q̂j, L̂
ν,i
j (q) = L̂
ν,i
j (q̂) if qj = q̂j ,
l̂ν,ij (q) = 0 if qj = 0, L̂
ν,i
j (q) = 0 if qj = 1.









j (q) < 0.
Although the Assumptions A1 and A2 are not implied by the Assumptions A6 and A7,
using Theorem 9.2.5 it is easily shown that for every ω ∈ Ω Theorem 11.2.2, Theorem
11.2.3, Theorem 11.2.4, and Theorem 11.2.5 remain valid under the Assumptions A6-A9
for the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂(·, ω), L̂(·, ω))).
Assumption A9 admits many possible rationing functions. In fact, any rationing
function (l̃, L̃) such that l̃ and L̃ can be extended to continuous functions l̃′ : IRN+ ×∏
i∈IM IR
N




+ → IRMN , respectively, being such that for
every ω ∈ ∏i∈IM IRN+ the functions l̃′(·, ω) : IRN+ → IRMN and L̃′(·, ω) : IRN+ → IRMN
satisfy Assumption A5, while for every ω ∈ Ω the functions l̃(·, ω) : IRN+ → −IRMN+ and
L̃(·, ω) : IRN+ → IRMN+ are twice continuously differentiable and satisfy, for every q ∈ IRN+ ,








j(q, ω) > 0, yields functions
l̂ and L̂ satisfying Assumption A9 by the construction given at the beginning of this
section. Notice that the requirement that the functions l̂ and L̂ are locally constant is
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very reasonable, in the sense that a more general dependence of these functions upon
ω ∈ Ω can be approximated arbitrarily close.
Next, two examples of functions l̂ and L̂ satisfying Assumption A9 are given. For
every ν ∈ IN, let ων = ν1MN , let the set Ω(1) be given by Ω(1) = {ω ∈ Ω | ω ≤ ω1}, and,
for every ν ∈ IN \ {1}, let the set Ω(ν) be given by Ω(ν) = {ω ∈ Ω | ω ≤ ων} \Ω(ν − 1).
Notice that {Ω(ν) | ν ∈ IN} is a bounded, locally finite partition of Ω. First, functions
l̂ and L̂ satisfying Assumption A9 and corresponding to the uniform rationing function
are given. Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. For every ν ∈ IN, for every i ∈ IM , for every
j ∈ IN−1, let the functions l̂ν,ij and L̂ν,ij be defined by




(1− qj), ∀q ∈ QN−1.
For every ν ∈ IN, for every i ∈ IM , let l̂ν,iN and L̂ν,iN be defined by
l̂ν,iN (q) = −(ν + ε), ∀q ∈ QN−1,
L̂ν,iN (q) = νp · 1N , ∀q ∈ QN−1.
Secondly, functions l̂ and L̂ satisfying Assumption A9 and corresponding to the priority
rationing system are given. Let the function f : IR → IR be defined by f(t) = 0,
∀t ∈ −IR+, and f(t) = exp(−1t ), ∀t ∈ IR++. Then it holds by Theorem 2.9.1 that f ∈
C∞(IR, IR). Let πj : IM → IM be a permutation specifying the order in which consumers
are rationed on their supply on the market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1, so, for every
k ∈ IM , if consumer πj(k) is rationed on his supply on the market of commodity j, then
the consumers πj(1), . . . , πj(k−1) are fully rationed on their supply. Let πj : IM → IM be
a permutation specifying the order in which consumers are rationed on their demand on
the market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1, so, for every k ∈ IM , if consumer πj(k) is rationed
on his demand on the market of commodity j, then the consumers πj(1), . . . , πj(k − 1)
are fully rationed on their demand. Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. For every ν ∈ IN, for
every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN−1, define
l̂ν,ij (q) = −2M(ν + ε)qj, ∀q ∈ QN−1, if π−1j (i) = M,








f(π−1j (i) +M − 2Mqj), ∀q ∈ QN−1, if π−1j (i) ≤M − 1.
Moreover, define, for every ν ∈ IN, for every i ∈ IM ,
l̂ν,iN (q) = −(ν + ε), ∀q ∈ QN−1,
L̂ν,iN (q) = νp · 1N , ∀q ∈ QN−1.
For every ν ∈ IN, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN−1, for every q ∈ QN−1, notice
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Moreover, for every ν ∈ IN, for every j ∈ IN−1, the reason for defining l̂ν,ij and L̂ν,ij slightly
different in case π−1j (i) = M or π
−1
j (i) = M for some i ∈ IM , is to make sure that, for
every q ∈ QN−1, ∑i∈IM ∂qj l̂
ν,i




j (q) < 0.
Other examples of rationing functions given in Section 4.5, like the proportional
rationing function and the market share rationing function can be treated in a similar
way to obtain functions l̂ and L̂ satisfying Assumption A9.
A sign vector r ∈ SM(N−1) determines the rationing state of every consumer i ∈ IM
on the market of every commodity j ∈ IN−1, i.e., rij = −1 indicates that consumer i
is rationed on his supply on the market of commodity j, rij = 0 implies that consumer
i is not rationed on the market of commodity j, and rij = +1 indicates that consumer
i is rationed on his demand on the market of commodity j. Notice that the notational
conventions used for the functions l̃ and L̃ are also used for sign vectors r ∈ SM(N−1).
Since it can not occur that on any market there are both consumers being rationed on
their supply and consumers being rationed on their demand, it is sufficient to consider
sign vectors r ∈ SM(N−1) such that for every j ∈ IN−1 either rij ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ IM , or rij ≥ 0,




∣∣∣∀j ∈ IN−1, rij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ IM , or rij ≤ 0, ∀i ∈ IM
}
.
For an admissible sign vector r ∈ R, define the sets
I−(r) =
{
















Let i−(r), i0(r), and i+(r) denote the number of elements in the sets I−(r), I0(r), and
I+(r), respectively. A pair of admissible sign vectors (r, s) ∈ IRM(N−1) × IRN−1 will be
used to describe both the rationing state on the markets and the sign of the total excess
demand. It will be shown in Theorem 11.4.1 that it is sufficient to restrict attention to
the set of admissible pairs of sign vectors T , defined by
T =
{
(r, s) ∈ R× S
∣∣∣∀j ∈ IN−1, sj = −1⇒ ∃i′ ∈ IM , ri
′
j 6= +1,
∀j ∈ IN−1, sj = 0 and vj < 1⇒ ∃i′ ∈ IM , ri
′
j 6= +1,
∀j ∈ IN−1, sj = 0 and vj > 0⇒ ∃i′ ∈ IM , ri
′
j 6= −1,









∣∣∣∀(i, j) ∈ I−(r), d̂ij(q, ω)− ωij = l̂ij(q, ω),
∀(i, j) ∈ I0(r), neither l̂ij(q, ω) nor L̂ij(q, ω) is binding,
∀(i, j) ∈ I+(r), d̂ij(q, ω)− ωij = L̂ij(q, ω)
}
.
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Notice that if l̂ij(q, ω) or L̂
i
j(q, ω) is non-binding for some i ∈ IM and some j ∈ IN−1, then
it is still possible that d̂ij(q, ω) − ωij = l̂ij(q, ω) or d̂ij(q, ω) − ωij = L̂ij(q, ω). In Theorem
11.4.1 it is shown that there is indeed no loss of generality in considering only admissible
pairs of sign vectors (r, s) ∈ T .
Theorem 11.4.1
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
initial state. Let some ω ∈ Ω be given. Then Cω = ∪(r,s)∈T Cω(r, s) ∪ {v | ẑ(v, ω) = 0N
and vj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ IN−1}.
Proof
Clearly, ∪(r,s)∈T Cω(r, s) ∪ {v | ẑ(v, ω) = 0N and vj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ IN−1} ⊂ Cω. To prove
the converse, let some q ∈ Cω be given. Then there exists s ∈ S such that q ∈ Cω(s).
For every (i, j) ∈ IM × IN−1, exactly one of the following three statements is true,
l̂ij(q, ω) = d̂
i
j(q, ω)−ωij, or l̂ij(q, ω) < d̂ij(q, ω)−ωij < L̂ij(q, ω), or d̂ij(q, ω)−ωij = L̂ij(q, ω).
Let r ∈ R be defined by rij = −1, rij = 0, or rij = +1 if (i, j) ∈ IM × IN−1 satisfies
the first, second, or third statement, respectively. If (r, s) ∈ T , then q ∈ Cω(r, s). If
(r, s) /∈ T , then at least one of the following four cases occurs.
1. J1 = {j ∈ IN−1 | sj = −1 and rij = +1, ∀i ∈ IM} 6= ∅. Consider some j ∈ J1. Since




j(q, ω) ≥ 0, while sj = −1 implies
ẑj(q, ω) ≤ 0. Therefore, ẑj(q, ω) = 0 and, by Assumption A9, qj = 1. Since sj = −1,
there exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that qj = µvj. Hence, µ = 1, vj = 1, and, since q ∈ Cω(s),
q = v.
2. J2 = {j ∈ IN−1 | sj = 0, vj < 1, and rij = +1, ∀i ∈ IM} 6= ∅. Consider some
j ∈ J2. As in Case 1 this implies qj = 1. Since sj = 0, there exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that
0 = 1− qj ≥ µ(1− vj), so, since vj < 1, µ = 0 and 1− qj = µ(1− vj).
3. J3 = {j ∈ IN−1 | sj = 0, vj > 0, and rij = −1, ∀i ∈ IM} 6= ∅. Consider some




j(q, ω). Since sj = 0
implies ẑj(q, ω) = 0, it follows from Assumption A9 that qj = 0. Since sj = 0, there
exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that 0 = qj ≥ µvj, so, since vj > 0, it follows also that µ = 0 and
qj = µvj.
4. J4 = {j ∈ IN−1 | sj = +1 and rij = −1, ∀i ∈ IM} 6= ∅. Consider some j ∈ J4.
As in Case 3 it follows that qj = 0. Since sj = +1, there exists µ ∈ [0, 1] such that
1 = 1− qj = µ(1− vj), so, µ = 1, vj = 0, and, since q ∈ Cω(s), q = v.
Let ŝ ∈ SN−1 be defined by ŝj = 0, ∀j ∈ J1, ŝj = +1, ∀j ∈ J2, ŝj = −1, ∀j ∈ J3, ŝj = 0,
∀j ∈ J4, and ŝj = sj, ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ (J1 ∪ J2 ∪ J3 ∪ J4). Then ŝ ∈ S, unless ŝ = 0N−1. If
ŝ 6= 0N−1, then it is easily verified that (r, ŝ) ∈ T and q ∈ Cω(r, ŝ).
Next, consider the case ŝ = 0N−1. This implies ẑ(q, ω) = 0N , J2∪J3 = ∅, and J1∪J4 6= ∅,
so q = v. If there exists j′ ∈ IN−1 \ (J1 ∪ J4) such that 0 < vj′ < 1, then sj′ = 0 and,
since j′ /∈ J2 ∪ J3, there exists i′ ∈ IM such that ri′j′ 6= −1 and there exists i′′ ∈ IM such
that ri
′′
j′ 6= +1. Now let s̃ ∈ S be defined by s̃j′ = −1 and s̃j = ŝj, ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ {j′}, then
(r, s̃) ∈ T and, using q = v, q ∈ Cω(r, s̃). If there exists no j′ ∈ IN−1 \ (J1 ∪ J4) such
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that 0 < vj′ < 1, then it holds that q = v, ẑ(v, ω) = 0
N , and vj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ IN−1.
Q.E.D.
For almost every ω ∈ Ω, for every (r, s) ∈ T , Cω(r, s) will be shown to be a 1-dimensional
C2 manifold with boundary. First the following preliminary lemma is shown.
Lemma 11.4.2
Let (X i,i)i∈IM satisfy the Assumptions A1-A2. Then, for every i ∈ IM , the preference
relation i can be represented by a utility function ui ∈ C2(X i, IR) having no critical
point and being pseudo-concave.
Proof
Let some consumer i ∈ IM be given. Let ui ∈ C2(X i, IR) have no critical point and let
ui represent i . Notice that such a function ui exists by Theorem 3.6.3.
Suppose ui is not pseudo-concave and let xi, x̂i ∈ X i be such that ∂xiui(xi)(x̂i − xi) ≤ 0
and ui(x̂i) > ui(xi). Since i is strongly monotonic and has no critical point, there
exists j′ ∈ IN such that ∂xi
j′
ui(xi) > 0. Using the continuity of ui, there exists ε ∈ IR++
such that x̂i − εeN(j′) ∈ X i and ui(x̂i − εeN(j′)) > ui(xi). Let x̃i ∈ X i be defined by
x̃i = x̂i−εeN (j′). Clearly, ∂xiui(xi)(x̃i−xi) < 0. Since, for every λ ∈ (0, 1], ui(λx̃i+(1−
λ)xi) > ui(xi), it follows that ∂xiu
i(xi)(x̃i − xi) ≥ 0, a contradiction. Consequently, ui
is pseudo-concave. Q.E.D.
Let some ν ∈ IN and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. A system of equalities and inequalities
describing Cω(r, s) for every ω ∈ Ω(ν) will be given. Using this system it will be shown
in Theorem 11.4.7 that Cω(r, s) is a 1-dimensional C
2 manifold with boundary for almost
every ω ∈ Ω(ν).









∣∣∣sj = +1 and rij = +1, ∀i ∈ IM
}
,
define j(r, s) as the lowest ranked element in the set J(r, s) if J(r, s) is non-empty,
and define j(r, s) = 0 if J(r, s) = ∅. For every (r, s) ∈ T , the set J(r, s) contains the
commodities on the markets of which either all consumers are rationed on their supply
or all consumers are rationed on their demand. For every (r, s) ∈ T , define the sets
J−(r, s) and J+(r, s) by
J−(r, s) = I−(s) ∩
({
j ∈ IN−1







J+(r, s) = I+(s) ∩
({
j ∈ IN−1







Moreover, for every (r, s) ∈ T , define the sets J̃−(r, s) and J̃+(r, s) by
J̃−(r, s) = I0(s) ∩
{
j ∈ IN−1





J̃+(r, s) = I0(s) ∩
{
j ∈ IN−1
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These sets are needed to formulate the system of equalities and inequalities mentioned
above in such a way that no equality or inequality is redundant. For every consumer
i ∈ IM , let a utility function ui ∈ C2(X i, IR) having no critical point and being pseudo-
concave be given such that the preference relation i is represented by ui. Such a utility
function exists by Lemma 11.4.2.
Let ν ∈ IN, ω ∈ Ω(ν), and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. In Theorem 11.4.3 it will be
shown that q ∈ Cω(r, s) if and only if q ∈ IRN−1 and there exists (x, λ, µ) ∈ IRMN++ ×
IRM × IR such that (x, λ, q, µ) satisfies
∂xiju
i(xi)− λipj = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ I0(r), (11.2)
∂xi
N
ui(xi)− λi = 0, ∀i ∈ IM , (11.3)
p · (xi − ωi) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM , (11.4)
xij − ωij − l̂ν,ij (q) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ I−(r), (11.5)




j − ωij) = 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s), (11.7)
qj − µvj = 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), (11.8)
(1− qj)− µ(1− vj) = 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s), (11.9)
−∂xi
j
ui(xi) + λipj ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ I−(r), (11.10)
∂xiju
i(xi)− λipj ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ I+(r), (11.11)
xij − ωij − l̂ν,ij (q) ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ I0(r), (11.12)
−xij + ωij + L̂ν,ij (q) ≥ 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ I0(r), (11.13)
∑
i∈IM (−xij + ωij) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J−(r, s), (11.14)∑
i∈IM (x
i
j − ωij) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J+(r, s), (11.15)
qj − µvj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J̃−(r, s), (11.16)
(1− qj)− µ(1− vj) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J̃+(r, s), (11.17)
1− µ ≥ 0. (11.18)
Notice that, for every ν ∈ IN, l̂ν and L̂ν are assumed to be defined also on IRN−1 \QN−1.
Any twice continuously differentiable extension of l̂ν and L̂ν defined on IRN−1 such that,
for every q ∈ IRN−1 \QN−1, l̂ν(q) ≤ L̂ν(q), ∑i∈IM ∂qj l̂
ν,i




j (q) < 0,
suffices. Clearly, such an extension exists if (l̂, L̂) satisfies Assumption A9.
In the following, let MN + M + N − 1 be denoted by N1, being the number of
variables in (x, λ, q, µ) minus one, and let 2MN + M + N be denoted by N2, being
the total number of variables in (x, λ, ω, q, µ). Define the function µ̂ : QN−1 → [0, 1] by





| j ∈ IN−1 with vj > 0}),min({ 1−qj1−vj | j ∈ IN−1 with vj < 1})
})
.
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, ∀q ∈ QN−1, ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Theorem 11.4.3
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
initial state. Let ν ∈ IN, ω ∈ Ω(ν), and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. Then q ∈ Cω(r, s) and
(x, λ, q, µ) = f̂(q, ω) if and only if (x, λ, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR and (x, λ, q, µ)
satisfies (11.2)-(11.18).
Proof
If q ∈ Cω(r, s) and (x, λ, q, µ) = f̂(q, ω), then, using Theorem 2.9.7, it is clear that
(x, λ, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR satisfies (11.2)-(11.18). To show the converse, let
some (x, λ, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR satisfying (11.2)-(11.18) be given. First, it
is shown that, for every j ∈ IN−1, 0 ≤ qj ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. By (11.18) it holds that
µ ≤ 1. From (11.8) and (11.9) it follows that
qj = µvj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ I−(s), (11.19)
qj = 1− µ(1− vj) ≥ 1− 1 + vj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s). (11.20)









j − ωij), ∀j ∈ IN−1. For every j ∈ I0(s) ∪ J−(r, s) it follows




j − ωij) ≤ 0. Therefore,
qj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s) ∪ J−(r, s). (11.21)
Similarly, using (11.5), (11.6), (11.7), (11.13), and (11.15), it follows that
qj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ I0(s) ∪ J+(r, s). (11.22)
Now three cases have to be considered.
1. j(r, s) = 0. Then J−(r, s) = I−(s) and J+(r, s) = I+(s). So, (11.19)-(11.22) yields
0 ≤ qj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ IN−1. For every j ∈ I+(s), vj < 1, so if I+(s) 6= ∅, then (11.9) implies
µ ≥ 0. If I+(s) = ∅, then I−(s) 6= ∅, and now (11.8) implies µ ≥ 0. This together with
(11.18) shows that 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1.
2. j(r, s) ∈ I−(s).Then (11.21) implies qj(r,s) ≥ 0. Since j(r, s) ∈ I−(s) implies vj(r,s) > 0,
(11.8) yields µ ≥ 0. Now it follows from (11.8) that qj ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), and from (11.9)
that qj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ I+(s). So, (11.19)-(11.22) yields 0 ≤ qj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ IN−1.
3. j(r, s) ∈ I+(s). This case is similar to Case 2.
For every i ∈ IM , since ui is pseudo-concave, it follows from Theorem 2.9.6, equations
(11.2)-(11.6), inequalities (11.10)-(11.13), and the absence of constraints with respect
to the market of commodity N, that xi = d̂i(q, ω), ∀i ∈ IM . Hence, (11.7) implies
ẑj(q, ω) = 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s). Consider some j′ ∈ I−(s). Either there exists i′ ∈ IM such
that ri
′
j′ 6= −1, and by (11.14), ẑj′(q, ω) ≤ 0, or rij′ = −1, ∀i ∈ IM , and therefore by
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j′ (q) ≤ 0. Similarly, it can be shown that
ẑj(q, ω) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s). Hence, q ∈ Bω(s).
For every j ∈ I0(s) with vj = 0 it holds that µvj ≤ qj , and for every j ∈ I0(s) with
vj = 1 it holds that qj ≤ 1 − µ + µvj . For every j ∈ I0(s) such that (i, j) ∈ I+(r),




j (q) = 0, and therefore qj = 1. Hence,





j (q) = 0, therefore qj = 0, and hence qj ≤ 1 − µ + µvj . Therefore,
(11.8), (11.9), (11.16), and (11.17), together with q ∈ Bω(s), implies q ∈ Cω(s). Now
(11.2), (11.5), and (11.6) implies, for every (i, j) ∈ I0(r), neither l̂ij(q, ω) nor L̂ij(q, ω) is
binding, for every (i, j) ∈ I−(r), d̂ij(q, ω) − ωij = l̂ij(q, ω), and, for every (i, j) ∈ I+(r),
d̂ij(q, ω)− ωij = L̂ij(q, ω). Hence, q ∈ Cω(r, s). Using the above and (11.3), it follows that
(x, λ, q, µ) = f̂(q, ω). Q.E.D.
For every ν ∈ IN, let Ω̃(ν) ⊂ Ω be an open set containing the closure of Ω(ν) in Ω.
For every ν ∈ IN, for every (r, s) ∈ T , define the function ψν,r,s : IRMN++ × IRM × Ω̃(ν) ×
IRN−1× IR→ IRN1 such that, for every (x, λ, ω, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × Ω̃(ν)× IRN−1× IR,
ψν,r,s(x, λ, ω, q, µ) is the left-hand side of (11.2)-(11.9). For every ν ∈ IN, for every
(r, s) ∈ T , for every ω ∈ Ω̃(ν), define the function ψν,r,s,ω : IRMN++ ×IRM×IRN−1×IR→ IRN
1
by ψν,r,s,ω(x, λ, q, µ) = ψν,r,s(x, λ, ω, q, µ), ∀(x, λ, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR.
Let ν ∈ IN and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. The N1×N2 matrix of partial derivatives of
ψν,r,s evaluated at a point ξ = (x, λ, ω, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × Ω̃(ν)× IRN−1× IR satisfying
ψν,r,s(ξ) = 0N
1
is denoted by M and is given in Table 11.4.1. For every k ∈ IN, 0k and














ui(xi) 0(M−i)N −eM (i) 0MN 0N−1 0 i ∈ IM
3 0(i−1)N p⊤ 0(M−i)N 0M 0(i−1)N − p⊤ 0(M−i)N 0N−1 0 i ∈ IM
4 eMN ((i− 1)N + j) 0M −eMN ((i − 1)N + j) −∂qj l̂
ν,i
j
(q)eN−1(j) 0 (i, j) ∈ I−(r)
5 −eMN ((i − 1)N + j) 0M eMN ((i− 1)N + j) ∂qj L̂
ν,i
j
(q)eN−1(j) 0 (i, j) ∈ I+(r)
6 eN (j), . . . , eN (j) 0M −eN (j), . . . ,−eN (j) 0N−1 0 j ∈ I0(s)
7 0MN 0M 0MN eN−1(j) −vj j ∈ I−(s)
8 0MN 0M 0MN −eN−1(j) −(1 − vj) j ∈ I
+(s)
MN M MN N − 1 1
Table 11.4.1. The matrix M.
Recall from Section 2.2 that the characteristic function of a set S is denoted by χS,
so χS(s) = 1 if s ∈ S, and χS(s) = 0 if s /∈ S.
Lemma 11.4.4
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
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initial state. Let ν ∈ IN and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. Then there exists a subset Ω of
Ω̃(ν) such that Ω̃(ν)\Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and, for every ω ∈ Ω, ψν,r,s,ω ⊤   {0N1}
and ψν,r,s,ω
−1
({0N1}) is a 1-dimensional C2 manifold.
Proof
First, it is shown that ψν,r,s ⊤   {0N1}. Let ξ ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × Ω̃(ν)× IRN−1 × IR be such
that ψν,r,s(ξ) = 0N
1
. The matrix of partial derivatives of ψν,r,s evaluated at ξ, M, is given
in Table 11.4.1. It has to be shown that the rows of M are independent. This is done
by proving that y⊤M = 0N
2⊤
implies y = 0N
1
. Hence, let y ∈ IRN1 satisfy y⊤M = 0N2
⊤
.
The matrix M is subdivided into eight parts in Table 11.4.1, and the components of y
will be denoted accordingly by y(1,i,j), ∀(i, j) ∈ I0(r), y(2,i), ∀i ∈ IM , and so on. For every
i ∈ IM it holds that 0 = y⊤∂ωi
N
ψν,r,s(ξ) = −y(3,i). Therefore,
y(3,i) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM . (11.23)
Using (11.23) it holds for every (i, j) ∈ IM × IN−1 that
0 = y⊤∂ωi
j
ψν,r,s(ξ) = −y(4,i,j)χI−(r)((i, j)) + y(5,i,j)χI+(r)((i, j))− y(6,j)χI0(s)(j). (11.24)
Consider some (i′, j′) ∈ I−(r). Obviously, (i′, j′) /∈ I+(r). There are three possibilities.
Either j′ /∈ I0(s), implying y(4,i′,j′) = 0. Or j′ ∈ I0(s) and there exists i′′ ∈ IM such that
(i′′, j′) /∈ I−(r), implying by (11.24) with (i, j) = (i′′, j′) that y(6,j′) = 0 and therefore,
using (11.24) with (i, j) = (i′, j′), that y(4,i′,j′) = 0. Finally, consider the case with (i, j
′) ∈
I−(r), ∀i ∈ IM , and j′ ∈ I0(s). From (11.24) it follows that y(6,j′) = −y(4,i,j′), ∀i ∈ IM .
Since j′ ∈ I0(s) and therefore j′ /∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s), it holds that 0 = y⊤∂qj′ψν,r,s(ξ) =
−∑i∈IM y(4,i,j′)∂qj′ l̂
ν,i








j′ (q) < 0, this implies
y(6,j′) = 0. Hence, y(4,i,j′) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM . Now it has been shown that
y(4,i,j) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ I−(r). (11.25)
Similarly, it can be shown that
y(5,i,j) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ I+(r). (11.26)
Then it follows from (11.24) that
y(6,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I0(s). (11.27)
By (11.25) and (11.26), it holds for every j ∈ IN−1 that
0 = y⊤∂qjψ
ν,r,s(ξ) = y(7,j)χI−(s)(j)− y(8,j)χI+(s)(j). (11.28)
Since I−(s) ∩ I+(s) = ∅, it follows that
y(7,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), (11.29)
y(8,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s). (11.30)
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Let some consumer i′ ∈ IM be given. Using the non-zero Gaussian curvature of i′ and
































)⊤] corresponding to the indices j ∈ IN−1









pj , ∀j ∈ IN−1 with (i′, j) ∈ I0(r) and for j = N, it follows that the first
i0(r) + M rows of M are independent. From (11.23), (11.25), (11.26), (11.27), (11.29),














Since M has rank N1, it follows that ψν,r,s intersects {0N1} transversally, ψν,r,s ⊤   {0N1}.
Clearly, ψν,r,s ∈ C2(IRMN++ ×IRM×Ω̃(ν)×IRN−1×IR, IRN
1
).Moreover, IRMN++ ×IRM×IRN−1×
IR is an (N1 + 1)-dimensional C∞ manifold, Ω̃(ν) is an MN -dimensional C∞ manifold,
IRN
1
is an N1-dimensional C∞ manifold, and {0N1} is a 0-dimensional C∞ manifold.
Let the set Ω be defined by Ω = {ω ∈ Ω̃(ν) | ψν,r,s,ω ⊤   {0N1}}. Now it follows from the
transversality theorem, Theorem 2.10.18, that the set Ω̃(ν) \ Ω has Lebesgue measure
zero in Ω̃(ν). Since Ω̃(ν) is an MN -dimensional C∞ manifold being a subset of IRMN , it
follows that the set Ω̃(ν) \Ω has Lebesgue measure zero, see the remark below Theorem
2.10.17. For every ω ∈ Ω, ψν,r,s,ω is a function from an (N1+1)-dimensional C∞ manifold
into an N1-dimensional C∞ manifold, ψν,r,s,ω ∈ C2(IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1× IR, IRN
1
), and
ψν,r,s,ω ⊤   {0N1}, so ψν,r,s,ω−1({0N1}) is a 1-dimensional C2 manifold by Theorem 2.10.16.
Q.E.D.
Let ν ∈ IN and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. Let K be the set of indices corresponding to
one of the inequalities in (11.10)-(11.18). More precisely, K is defined by









∣∣∣(i, j) ∈ I0(r) and 6 ∃i′ ∈ IM , (i′, j) ∈ I−(r)
}









∣∣∣j ∈ J̃+(r, s)
}
∪ {0} .
Consider some index k ∈ K. The index k = (i, j) ∈ I−(r) corresponds to inequality (i, j)
in (11.10), k = (i, j) ∈ I+(r) corresponds to inequality (i, j) in (11.11), k = (i, j,−)
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corresponds to inequality (i, j) in (11.12), k = (i, j,+) corresponds to inequality (i, j)
in (11.13), k ∈ J−(r, s) corresponds to inequality k in (11.14), k ∈ J+(r, s) corresponds
to inequality k in (11.15), k = (j,−) corresponds to inequality j in (11.16), k = (j,+)
corresponds to inequality j in (11.17), and k = 0 corresponds to inequality (11.18).
Notice that not every (i, j) ∈ I0(r) yields indices (i, j,−) and (i, j,+). It will be sufficient
to consider only the indices belonging to K.
For every ν ∈ IN, for every (r, s) ∈ T , for every k ∈ K, the function ψν,r,sk : IRMN++ ×
IRM × Ω̃(ν)× IRN−1× IR→ IRN1+1 is defined such that, for every (x, λ, ω, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ ×
IRM × Ω̃(ν)× IRN−1× IR, ψν,r,sk (x, λ, ω, q, µ) is the left-hand side of (11.2)-(11.9) and the
inequality corresponding to k. For every ν ∈ IN, for every (r, s) ∈ T , for every k ∈ K,
for every ω ∈ Ω̃(ν), define the function ψν,r,s,ωk by ψν,r,s,ωk (x, λ, q, µ) = ψν,r,sk (x, λ, ω, q, µ).
Lemma 11.4.5
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
initial state. Let ν ∈ IN, some (r, s) ∈ T , and some k ∈ K be given. Then there exists
a subset Ω of Ω̃(ν) such that Ω̃(ν) \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and, for every ω ∈ Ω,
ψν,r,s,ωk ⊤   {0N
1+1} and ψν,r,s,ω−1k ({0N
1+1}) is a 0-dimensional manifold.
Proof
First, it is shown that ψν,r,sk ⊤   {0N
1+1}. Let ξ = (x, λ, ω, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × Ω̃(ν) ×
IRN−1 × IR be such that ψν,r,sk (ξ) = 0N
1+1. It will be proved that the rows of the (N1 +
1)×N2 matrix of partial derivatives of ψν,r,sk at ξ, denoted by Mk, are independent. Let
y ∈ IRN1+1 satisfy y⊤Mk = 0N2
⊤
. It will be shown that y = 0N
1+1. Let yk denote the last
component of y. In the following it will be shown that yk = 0. Then it follows from the
proof of Lemma 11.4.4 that y = 0N
1+1. It follows as in the proof of Lemma 11.4.4 that
y(3,i) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM . Now five different cases are considered.
1. k ∈ I−(r)∪ I+(r). This case goes along the same lines as the proof of Lemma 11.4.4.





ψν,r,sk (ξ) = −yk − y(6,j′)χI0(s)(j′), (11.31)
0 = y⊤∂ωi
j′
ψν,r,sk (ξ) = −y(4,i,j′)χI−(r)((i, j′))− y(6,j′)χI0(s)(j′), ∀i ∈ IM\{i′}.(11.32)
There are three possibilities. Either j′ /∈ I0(s), implying yk = 0 by (11.31). Or j′ ∈ I0(s)
and there exists i′′ ∈ IM \ {i′} such that (i′′, j′) /∈ I−(r), implying y(6,j′) = 0 by (11.32),
and hence yk = 0 by (11.31). Or j
′ ∈ I0(s) and (i, j′) ∈ I−(r), ∀i ∈ IM \ {i′}. Then
0 = y⊤∂qj′ψ
ν,r,s





j′ (q)− yk∂qj′ l̂
ν,i′






where the last equality follows from (11.31) and (11.32), implying that yk = 0. The case
where k = (i′, j′,+) for some (i′, j′) ∈ I0(r) goes along the same lines.
3. k ∈ J−(r, s). It follows that k ∈ I−(s) and therefore vk > 0. Clearly,
0 = y⊤∂ωi
k
ψν,r,sk (ξ) = −y(4,i,k)χI−(r)((i, k)) + y(5,i,k)χI+(r)((i, k)) + yk, ∀i ∈ IM . (11.33)
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Now, rik ∈ {−1, 0}, ∀i ∈ IM , or rik ∈ {0,+1}, ∀i ∈ IM . In the first case, either there
exists i′ ∈ IM such that ri′k = 0 and it follows from (11.33) for i = i′ that yk = 0, or
rik = −1, ∀i ∈ IM , and (11.33) yields yk = y(4,i,k), ∀i ∈ IM . It follows as in the proof
of Lemma 11.4.4 that y(7,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s) \ {k}, and y(8,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s). Hence,
0 = y⊤∂µψ
ν,r,s
k (ξ) = −vky(7,k), implying that y(7,k) = 0. So,
0 = y⊤∂qkψ
ν,r,s











and it holds that yk = 0. Now consider the case with r
i
k ∈ {0,+1}, ∀i ∈ IM . Since
(r, s) ∈ T and sk = −1, there exists i′ ∈ IM such that ri′k 6= +1. From (11.33) for i = i′
it follows that yk = 0. The case where k ∈ J+(r, s) goes along the same lines.
4. ∃j′ ∈ J̃−(r, s), k = (j′,−). Either there exists i′ ∈ IM such that (i′, j′) /∈ I−(r),
implying as in the proof of Lemma 11.4.4 that y(4,i,j′) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM such that (i, j′) ∈
I−(r), and y(5,i,j′) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM such that (i, j′) ∈ I+(r). Then 0 = y⊤∂qj′ψ
ν,r,s
k (ξ) = yk.Or
(i, j′) ∈ I−(r), ∀i ∈ IM , implying vj′ = 0 since j′ ∈ I0(s) and (r, s) ∈ T , a contradiction
with j′ ∈ J̃−(r, s). The case where k = (j′,+) for some j′ ∈ J̃+(r, s) goes along the same
lines.
5. k = 0. In Lemma 11.4.4 it has been shown that y(7,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), and y(8,j) = 0,
∀j ∈ I+(s), without using the partial derivatives with respect to µ. Hence, this proof
can be used again and it follows that 0 = y⊤∂µψ
ν,r,s
k (ξ) = −yk.
Now it has been shown that ψν,r,sk ⊤   {0N
1+1}. Let the set Ω be defined by Ω = {ω ∈ Ω̃(ν) |
ψν,r,s,ωk ⊤   {0N
1+1}}. From the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.10.18, it follows that
the set Ω̃(ν)\Ω has Lebesgue measure zero. For every ω ∈ Ω, ψν,r,s,ωk is a function from an
(N1 +1)-dimensional C∞ manifold into an (N1 +1)-dimensional C∞ manifold, ψν,r,s,ωk ∈
C2(IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR, IRN
1+1), and ψν,r,s,ωk ⊤   {0N
1+1}, so ψν,r,s,ω−1k ({0N
1+1}) is a
0-dimensional manifold by Theorem 2.10.16. Q.E.D.
Let ν ∈ IN and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. Define the set K2 by
K2 =
{
(k1, k2) ∈ K ×K
∣∣∣k1 6= k2,
k1 = (i′, j′,−)⇒ k2 6= (i′′, j′,+),
k1 = (i′, j′,+)⇒ k2 6= (i′′, j′,−)
}
.
For every ν ∈ IN, for every (r, s) ∈ T , for every (k1, k2) ∈ K2, the function ψν,r,sk1,k2 :
IRMN++ × IRM × Ω̃(ν)× IRN−1× IR→ IRN
1+2 is defined such that, for every (x, λ, ω, q, µ) ∈
IRMN++ × IRM × Ω̃(ν)× IRN−1× IR, ψν,r,sk1,k2(x, λ, ω, q, µ) is the left-hand side of (11.2)-(11.9)
and the two inequalities corresponding to k1 and k2. For every ν ∈ IN, for every (r, s) ∈ T ,
for every (k1, k2) ∈ K2, for every ω ∈ Ω, the function ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 : IRMN++ ×IRM×IRN−1×IR→
IRN
1+2 is defined by ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 (x, λ, q, µ) = ψ
ν,r,s
k1,k2(x, λ, ω, q, µ), ∀(x, λ, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM ×
IRN−1 × IR.
Lemma 11.4.6
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
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initial state. Let ν ∈ IN, some (r, s) ∈ T , and some (k1, k2) ∈ K2 be given. Then there
exists a subset Ω of Ω̃(ν) such that Ω̃(ν) \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and, for every
ω ∈ Ω, ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 ⊤   {0N
1+2} and ψν,r,s,ω−1k1,k2 ({0N
1+2}) = ∅.
Proof
First, it is shown that ψν,r,sk1,k2 ⊤   {0N
1+2}. Let ξ = (x, λ, ω, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × Ω̃(ν) ×
IRN−1 × IR be such that ψν,r,sk1,k2(ξ) = 0N




1,k2 denotes the (N1 + 2) × N2 matrix of partial derivatives of ψν,r,sk1,k2
evaluated at ξ. It has to be shown that y = 0N
1+2. Let yk1 and yk2 denote the second last
and the last component of y corresponding to the inequalities k1 and k2, respectively. It
will be shown that yk1 = 0 or yk2 = 0. Then the proof can be completed as in Lemma
11.4.5. As before it follows that y(3,i) = 0, ∀i ∈ IM . Ten different cases have to be
considered.
1. k1 ∈ I−(r) ∪ I+(r) and k2 ∈ K. This case follows as the Cases 1-5 in the proof of
Lemma 11.4.5.
2. ∃(i1, j1) ∈ I0(r), k1 = (i1, j1,−), ∃(i2, j2) ∈ I0(r), k2 = (i2, j2,−), and (i1, j1) 6=
(i2, j2). The case where j1 6= j2 follows as in Case 2 of Lemma 11.4.5. So, let j1 = j2
and therefore i1 6= i2. By the definition of K, rij1 ∈ {−1, 0}, ∀i ∈ IM . It holds that
0= y⊤∂ωi
j1










ψν,r,sk1,k2(ξ)=−yk2 − y(6,j1)χI0(s)(j1). (11.36)
If j1 /∈ I0(s), then it follows from (11.36) that yk2 = 0. If j1 ∈ I0(s) and there exists
i3 ∈ IM \ {i1, i2} such that (i3, j1) /∈ I−(r), then y(6,j1) = 0 by (11.34). Hence, yk2 = 0
by (11.36). If j1 ∈ I0(s) and (i, j1) ∈ I−(r), ∀i ∈ IM \ {i1, i2}, then (11.34), (11.35), and








j1 (q)− yk1∂qj1 l̂
ν,i1









so yk2 = 0. The case k
1 = (i1, j1,+) and k2 = (i2, j2,+) is similar. If k1 = (i1, j1,−)
and k2 = (i2, j2,+), then it follows from the definition of K2 that j1 6= j2, and the proof
follows as in Case 2 of Lemma 11.4.5.
3. ∃(i1, j1) ∈ I0(r), k1 = (i1, j1,−), and k2 ∈ J−(r, s). The case where j1 6= k2 follows
as in Case 2 of Lemma 11.4.5. So, let j1 = k2. Since j1 ∈ I−(s), it holds that vj1 > 0.
By the definition of K, rij1 ∈ {−1, 0}, ∀i ∈ IM . Hence,
0 = y⊤∂ωi
j1





ψν,r,sk1,k2(ξ) = −yk1 + yk2. (11.38)
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The case where there exists i2 ∈ IM \ {i1} such that ri2j1 = 0 is trivial. Consider the
case where (i, j1) ∈ I−(r), ∀i ∈ IM \ {i1}. Then yk1 = yk2 = y(4,i,j1), ∀i ∈ IM \ {i1}.
As in Lemma 11.4.4 it can be shown that y(7,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s) \ {j1}, and y(8,j) = 0,








j1 (q)− yk1∂qj1 l̂
ν,i1
j1 (q),
implying that yk1 = 0. The cases k
1 = (i1, j1,−) and k2 ∈ J+(r, s), and k1 = (i1, j1,+)
and k2 ∈ J−(r, s) ∪ J+(r, s) are similar.
4. ∃(i1, j1) ∈ I0(r), k1 = (i1, j1,−), and ∃j2 ∈ J̃−(r, s), k2 = (j2,−). Then it holds that
j2 ∈ I0(s) and vj2 > 0. The case where j1 6= j2 follows as in Case 2 of Lemma 11.4.5.
So, let j1 = j2. Since k1 ∈ K, it holds that rij1 ∈ {−1, 0}, ∀i ∈ IM . Clearly,
0 = y⊤∂ωi
j1





ψν,r,sk1,k2(ξ) = −y(6,j1) − yk1.
The case where there exists i2 ∈ IM \ {i1} such that ri2j1 = 0 is trivial, so consider the
case rij1 = −1, ∀i ∈ IM \ {i1}. Then y(6,j1) = −yk1 = −y(4,i,j1), ∀i ∈ IM \ {i1}. As in
the proof of Lemma 11.4.4 it can be shown that y(7,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), and y(8,j) = 0,
∀j ∈ I+(s). Hence, 0 = y⊤∂µψν,r,sk1,k2(ξ) = −vj1yk2, implying that yk2 = 0. The proof of
the cases k1 = (i1, j1,−) and k2 = (j2,+), and k1 = (i1, j1,+) and k2 = (j2,−) or
k2 = (j2,+) is similar.
5. ∃(i1, j1) ∈ I0(r), k1 = (i1, j1,−) or k1 = (i1, j1,+), and k2 = 0. It can be shown as in
Case 2 of Lemma 11.4.5 that yk1 = 0.
6. k1 ∈ J−(r, s)∪ J+(r, s) and k2 ∈ J−(r, s)∪ J+(r, s). By definition of the sets J−(r, s)
and J+(r, s), and since k1 6= k2, there exists i1 ∈ IM such that ri1k1 = 0 or there exists
i2 ∈ IM such that ri2k2 = 0. In the first case it follows easily that yk1 = 0 and in the
second case that yk2 = 0.
7. k1 ∈ J−(r, s) ∪ J+(r, s) and ∃j2 ∈ J̃−(r, s), k2 = (j2,−). So, k1 ∈ I−(s) ∪ I+(s) and
j2 ∈ I0(s), and hence k1 6= j2. Therefore, it can be shown that yk2 = 0 as in Case 4 of
Lemma 11.4.5. The proof for the case where k1 ∈ J−(r, s) ∪ J+(r, s) and k2 = (j2,+)
for some j2 ∈ J̃+(r, s) is similar.
8. k1 ∈ J−(r, s) and k2 = 0. Since k1 ∈ I−(s), it holds that vk1 > 0. Since k2 = 0, it
holds that µ = 1. If there exists i1 ∈ IM such that ri1k1 = 0, then it can be shown as in
Case 3 of Lemma 11.4.5 that yk1 = 0. Otherwise, r
i










l̂ν,ik1 (q) < 0
since qk1 = µvk1 = vk1 > 0, a contradiction. The case k
1 ∈ J+(r, s) and k2 = 0 is similar.
9. ∃j1 ∈ J̃−(r, s), k1 = (j1,−), or ∃j1 ∈ J̃+(r, s), k1 = (j1,+), and ∃j2 ∈ J̃−(r, s),
k2 = (j2,−), or ∃j2 ∈ J̃+(r, s), k2 = (j2,+). If j1 6= j2, then the proof is as in Case 4
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of Lemma 11.4.5. Otherwise, without loss of generality, k1 = (j1,−) and k2 = (j1,+)
with j1 ∈ I0(s), 0 < vj1 < 1, and there exists i1, i2 ∈ IM such that (i1, j1) /∈ I+(r) and
(i2, j1) /∈ I−(r). It follows easily that y(4,i,j1) = 0, ∀(i, j1) ∈ I−(r), y(5,i,j1) = 0, ∀(i, j1) ∈
I+(r), y(7,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I−(s), and y(8,j) = 0, ∀j ∈ I+(s). So, 0 = y⊤∂qj1ψ
ν,r,s
k1,k2(ξ) =
yk1 − yk2. Moreover,
0 = y⊤∂µψ
ν,r,s
k1,k2(ξ) = −vj1yk1 − (1− vj1)yk2.
Hence, yk1 = yk2 = 0.
10. ∃j1 ∈ J̃−(r, s), k1 = (j1,−), or ∃j1 ∈ J̃+(r, s), k1 = (j1,+), and k2 = 0. It is easily
shown that yk1 = 0 as in Case 4 of Lemma 11.4.5.
Now it has been shown that ψν,r,sk1,k2 ⊤   {0N
1+2}. Let the set Ω be defined by Ω = {ω ∈
Ω̃(ν) | ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 ⊤   {0N
1+2}}. From the transversality theorem, Theorem 2.10.18, it fol-
lows that the set Ω̃(ν) \ Ω has Lebesgue measure zero. For every ω ∈ Ω, ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 is a
function from an (N1 + 1)-dimensional C∞ manifold into an (N1 + 2)-dimensional C∞
manifold, ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 ∈ C2(IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR, IRN





1+2}) is an empty set by Theorem 2.10.16. Q.E.D.
Denote an element (x, λ, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR by ξ. Let ω ∈ Ω and some
(r, s) ∈ T be given. The function gr,s,ω : IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1× IR→ IRN
1
is defined such
that, for every ξ ∈ IRMN++ ×IRM×IRN−1×IR, g̃r,s,ω(ξ) is the left-hand side of (11.2)-(11.9),
where ν is chosen such that ω ∈ Ω(ν). The function h̃r,s,ω : IRMN++ ×IRM×IRN−1×IR→ IRN
3
is defined such that, for every ξ ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1× IR, h̃r,s,ω(ξ) is the left-hand side
of (11.10)-(11.18), where N3 denotes the number of inequalities.
For every ω ∈ Ω, for every (r, s) ∈ T , for every ξ ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR, define




∣∣∣h̃r,s,ωj (ξ) = 0
}
and define the integer ℓr,s,ω(ξ) by
ℓr,s,ω(ξ) = #J0,r,s,ω(ξ).
For every ω ∈ Ω, for every (r, s) ∈ T , the set Dω(r, s) is defined by
Dω(r, s) =
{
ξ ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IRN−1 × IR
∣∣∣g̃r,s,ω(ξ) = 0N
1
and h̃r,s,ω(ξ) ≥ 0N3
}
.




∣∣∣∃(x, λ, µ) ∈ IRMN++ × IRM × IR, (x, λ, q, µ) ∈ Dω(r, s)
}
,
hence Cω(r, s) is the image of a projection of Dω(r, s). Moreover, it follows from Theorem
11.4.3 that the function f̃ r,s,ω : Cω(r, s)→ Dω(r, s), defined by
f̃ r,s,ω(q) = f̂(q, ω), ∀q ∈ Cω(r, s),
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where f̂ is the function defined above Theorem 11.4.3, is injective and surjective. It
follows immediately that f̃ r,s,ω
−1 ∈ C∞(Dω(r, s), Cω(r, s)). Now it will be shown that
f̃ r,s,ω ∈ C2(Cω(r, s), Dω(r, s)). Using Laroque (1978), proof of Proposition 5.1, page 1147,
and the twice continuous differentiability of l̂ν,i, ∀i ∈ IM , and of L̂ν,i, ∀i ∈ IM , where
ν is chosen such that ω ∈ Ω(ν), it follows that the first MN components of f̃ r,s,ω are
twice continuously differentiable. For every q ∈ Cω(r, s), the last component of f̃ r,s,ω(q)
equals qj
vj
if I−(s) 6= ∅ and j ∈ I−(s), while this component equals 1−qj1−vj if I+(s) 6= ∅ and
j ∈ I+(s). Therefore, the last component of f̃ r,s,ω is twice continuously differentiable.
Now it follows easily that f̃ r,s,ω ∈ C2(Cω(r, s), Dω(r, s)).
In the proof of Theorem 11.4.7 it will be shown that, for almost every ω ∈ Ω, for every
(r, s) ∈ T , Dω(r, s) is a 1-dimensional C2 manifold with boundary. Using Theorem 2.10.8
it follows then immediately that, for almost every ω ∈ Ω, for every (r, s) ∈ T , the set
Cω(r, s) = f̃
r,s,ω−1(Dω(r, s)) is a 1-dimensional C
2 manifold with boundary. Moreover,
Cω(r, s) is easily shown to be compact, and therefore, by Theorem 2.10.9, Cω(r, s) consists
of a finite number of components, each being C2 diffeomorphic to either the unit circle
B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 1) or the closed unit interval [0, 1].
Theorem 11.4.7
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
initial state. Let ω ∈ Ω and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. Let ν ∈ IN be such that ω ∈ Ω(ν).
If ψν,r,s,ω ⊤   {0N1}, for every k ∈ K, ψν,r,s,ωk ⊤   {0N
1+1}, and, for every (k1, k2) ∈ K2,
ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 ⊤   {0N
1+2}, then Cω(r, s) is a compact 1-dimensional C2 manifold with boundary.





By Theorem 2.10.11 it holds that Dω(r, s) is a 1-dimensional C
2 MGB if (g̃r,s,ω, h̃r,s,ω) is
















is a set of independent vectors.
Suppose there exists j1, j2 ∈ J0,r,s,ω(ξ) with j1 6= j2. Since (l̂, L̂) is frictionless, it holds
that (j1, j2) corresponds to some (k1, k2) ∈ K2. Hence, ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 (ξ) = 0N
1+2, leading to a
contradiction with ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 ⊤   {0N
1+2} by Theorem 2.10.16. Consequently, ℓr,s,ω(ξ) ≤ 1.
Either ℓr,s,ω(ξ) = 0, so J0,r,s,ω(ξ) = ∅ and ψν,r,s,ω ⊤   {0N1} yields that {∂ξg̃r,s,ωj (ξ)⊤ |
j ∈ IN1} is a set of independent vectors. Or ℓr,s,ω(ξ) = 1 and, since (l̂, L̂) is friction-
less, J0,r,s,ω(ξ) corresponds to an element k′ ∈ K. Then ψν,r,s,ωk′ ⊤   {0N
1+1} yields that
{∂ξg̃r,s,ωj (ξ)⊤ | j ∈ IN1} ∪ {∂ξh̃r,s,ωk′ (ξ)⊤} is a set of independent vectors. So, Dω(r, s)
is a 1-dimensional C2 manifold with boundary. Since Cω(r, s) = f̃
r,s,ω−1(Dω(r, s)), it
follows from Theorem 2.10.8 that Cω(r, s) is a 1-dimensional C
2 manifold with boundary




easily that Cω(r, s) is bounded and closed, hence compact. Q.E.D.
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For every ν ∈ IN, by Lemma 11.4.4, Lemma 11.4.5, Lemma 11.4.6, and by the fact that
Ω(ν) ⊂ Ω̃(ν), it follows that the finite number of requirements in Theorem 11.4.7 is
satisfied for almost every ω ∈ Ω(ν). Since there is a countable number of sets Ω(ν),
Theorem 11.4.7 holds for almost every ω ∈ Ω. In Definition 11.4.8 the initial endowment
ω of Ω is called regular if the set Cω has a nice structure.
Definition 11.4.8 (Regular initial endowments)
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
initial state. The set of regular initial endowments, denoted by Ω∗, is the set of initial
endowments ω of Ω for which the components of the set Cω are given by
1. the initial state v as an isolated point and inducing a Drèze equilibrium, or an
arc containing v and precisely one state inducing a Drèze equilibrium as boundary
points,
2. a finite number of arcs containing precisely two states both being boundary points
and inducing a Drèze equilibrium,
3. a finite number of loops containing neither v nor any state inducing a Drèze equi-
librium.
Let ω ∈ Ω∗ be given. Then the quantity adjustment process satisfies the convergence cri-
terion given in Definition 11.2.7. Moreover, using Theorem 11.2.5, it follows immediately
that the number of Drèze equilibria is odd. In Theorem 11.4.9 conditions will be given
under which ω ∈ Ω is regular. By Lemma 11.4.4, Lemma 11.4.5, and Lemma 11.4.6,
these conditions are satisfied for almost every ω ∈ Ω. In fact, under these conditions it
follows from the proof of Theorem 11.4.9 that every component being an arc or a loop
is a 1-dimensional piecewise C2 manifold.
The proof follows the interpretation of the quantity adjustment process given in
Section 11.2. Let ω ∈ Ω∗ and some (r, s) ∈ T be given. By Theorem 11.4.7 it holds
that Cω(r, s) is a compact 1-dimensional C
2 manifold with boundary. Therefore, Cω(r, s)
consists of a finite number of components, each being C2 diffeomorphic to either the unit
circle B̃1((0, 0)⊤, 1) or the closed unit interval [0, 1] by Theorem 2.10.9. Denote these
different sets by Cω(r, s, 1), . . . , Cω(r, s, k(r, s)). For some k ∈ Ik(r,s), let Cω(r, s, k) be
given. In the proof of Theorem 11.4.9 it will be shown that if q ∈ QN−1 is a boundary
point of Cω(r, s, k), then either there is a unique sign vector (r
′, s′) ∈ T and a unique
k′ ∈ Ik(r′,s′) such that q ∈ Cω(r′, s′, k′) and q is a boundary point of the latter set, or q
induces a Drèze equilibrium, or q equals the initial state v. In the first case, either r′ = r
and s′ differs from s in only one component, or s′ = s and r′ differs from r in only one
component, hence at most one market attains an equilibrium at the same time.
Theorem 11.4.9
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
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initial state. Let ν ∈ IN and ω ∈ Ω(ν) be given. If, for every (r, s) ∈ T , ψν,r,s,ω ⊤   {0N1},
for every k ∈ K, ψν,r,s,ωk ⊤   {0N
1+1}, and, for every (k1, k2) ∈ K2, ψν,r,s,ωk1,k2 ⊤   {0N
1+2},
then ω ∈ Ω∗.
Proof
Let some (r, s) ∈ T and some boundary point q ∈ Cω(r, s) be given. Let f̂(q, ω) be
equal to (x, λ, q, µ) = ξ. So, ℓr,s,ω(ξ) = 1, i.e., there is exactly one j ∈ IN3 such that
h̃r,s,ωj (ξ) = 0. Clearly, j corresponds to a unique element k
1 ∈ K. It will be shown that
either q = v, or q induces a Drèze equilibrium, or there exists a unique (r′, s′) ∈ T and a
unique k′ ∈ Ik(r′,s′) such that q belongs to Cω(r′, s′, k′) while (r, s) 6= (r′, s′). Five different
cases have to be distinguished.
1. k1 = (i1, j1) ∈ I−(r) ∪ I+(r). Let r ∈ SM(N−1) be defined by ri1j1 = 0 and rij = rij,
∀(i, j) ∈ (IM × IN−1) \ {(i1, j1)}. Clearly, (r, s) ∈ T and q ∈ Cω(r, s). Notice that
ℓr,s,ω(ξ) = 1, so q is a boundary point of Cω(r, s).
Let (r̂, ŝ) ∈ T be such that q ∈ Cω(r̂, ŝ). It will be shown that (r̂, ŝ) = (r, s) or
(r̂, ŝ) = (r, s).
Suppose there exists j2 ∈ I−(ŝ) ∩ I0(s). Then qj2 = µvj2 and ẑj2(q, ω) = 0. If vj2 >




1+2}) = ∅, a contradiction. So, vj2 = 0 or (i, j2) ∈ I+(r), ∀i ∈ IM . Since
j2 ∈ I−(ŝ), it holds that vj2 > 0, hence (i, j2) ∈ I+(r), ∀i ∈ IM . Since ẑj2(q, ω) = 0, this
implies 1 = qj2 = µvj2, hence µ = 1. So, ξ ∈ ψν,r,s,ω
−1
k1,0 ({0N
1+2}) = ∅, a contradiction.
Consequently, I−(ŝ) ∩ I0(s) = ∅.
Suppose there exists j2 ∈ I−(ŝ) ∩ I+(s). Then qj2 = µvj2 and (1 − qj2) = µ(1 − vj2).
This implies µ = 1, so ξ ∈ ψν,r,s,ω−1k1,0 ({0N
1+2}) = ∅, a contradiction. Consequently,
I−(ŝ) ∩ I+(s) = ∅.
Similarly, it can be shown that I+(ŝ) ∩ (I−(s) ∪ I0(s)) = ∅.
Suppose there exists j2 ∈ I0(ŝ) ∩ I−(s). Then vj2 > 0 and ẑj2(q, ω) = 0. It holds that
j2 /∈ J−(r, s) since ψν,r,s,ω−1k1,j ({0N
1+2}) = ∅, ∀j ∈ J−(r, s). So, rij2 = −1, ∀i ∈ IM . Since
ẑj2(q, ω) = 0, it follows that qj2 = 0. Since j
2 ∈ I−(s), it holds that qj2 = µvj2. Hence,




1+2}) = ∅, for any j3 ∈ J−(r̂, ŝ) ∪ J+(r̂, ŝ). Consequently,
I0(ŝ) ∩ I−(s) = ∅.
Similarly, it can be shown that I0(ŝ) ∩ I+(s) = ∅.
Now it has been shown that ŝ = s. If r̂ 6= r and r̂ 6= r, then at least two of the inequalities
in (11.10)-(11.13) are binding, giving a contradiction as before.
2. ∃(i1, j1) ∈ I0(r), k1 = (i1, j1,−) or k1 = (i1, j1,+). Let r ∈ R be defined by ri1j1 = −1 if
k1 = (i1, j1,−), ri1j1 = +1 if k1 = (i1, j1,+), and rij = rij, ∀(i, j) ∈ (IM ×IN−1)\{(i1, j1)}.
Consider the case where k1 = (i1, j1,−). Then (r, s) ∈ T and q ∈ Cω(r, s), unless
rij1 = −1, ∀i ∈ IM , and sj1 = +1, or rij1 = −1, ∀i ∈ IM , sj1 = 0, and vj1 > 0. In
the first case it follows that ẑj1(q, ω) = 0 and, since j




1+2}) = ∅, a contradiction. In the second case it follows that ẑj1(q, ω) = 0,
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hence qj1 = 0, and therefore µ = 0. So, ẑ(q, ω) = 0
N and, since J−(r, s) ∪ J+(r, s) 6= ∅,
a contradiction is obtained with ψν,r,s,ω
−1
k1,j2 ({0N+2}) = ∅, for any j2 ∈ J−(r, s) ∪ J+(r, s).
So, (r, s) ∈ T . Similarly, it can be shown that (r, s) ∈ T if k1 = (i1, j1,+). Notice that
ℓr,s,ω(ξ) = 1, so q is a boundary point of Cω(r, s).
Let (r̂, ŝ) ∈ T be such that q ∈ Cω(r̂, ŝ). As in Case 1 it can be shown that (r̂, ŝ) = (r, s)
or (r̂, ŝ) = (r, s).
3. k1 ∈ J−(r, s) ∪ J+(r, s). Let s ∈ SN−1 be defined by sk1 = 0 and sj = sj,
∀j ∈ IN−1 \ {k1}. Then (r, s) ∈ T , q ∈ Cω(r, s), and ℓr,s,ω(ξ) = 1, so q is a bound-
ary point of Cω(r, s), unless s = 0
N−1, or vk1 < 1 and r
i
k1 = +1, ∀i ∈ IM , or vk1 > 0
and rik1 = −1, ∀i ∈ IM . In the first case it is clear that q induces a Drèze equilibrium.
In the second case it follows that ẑk1(q, ω) = 0, hence qk1 = 1, and therefore µ = 0.
So, ẑ(q, ω) = 0N and q induces a Drèze equilibrium. In the third case it follows that
ẑk1(q, ω) = 0, hence qk1 = 0, and therefore µ = 0. So, ẑ(q, ω) = 0
N and q induces a Drèze
equilibrium.












Consider the case that there exists j2 ∈ I0(ŝ) ∩ I−(s). Then it holds that vj2 > 0 and
ẑj2(q, ω) = 0. Now j
2 /∈ J−(r, s) \ {k1} since otherwise ψν,r,s,ω−1k1,j2 ({0N
1+2}) = ∅ yields
a contradiction. So, j2 = k1 or rij2 = −1, ∀i ∈ IM . The latter case is excluded since
(r, ŝ) ∈ T , vj2 > 0, and ŝj2 = 0 implies ri′j2 6= −1 for some i′ ∈ IM . Therefore, j2 = k1.
In the previous paragraph s ∈ SN−1 has been defined. If (r, s) /∈ T , then it follows from
the previous paragraph that s = 0N−1 since the cases vk1 < 1 and r
i
k1 = +1, ∀i ∈ IM , or
vk1 > 0 and r
i
k1 = −1, ∀i ∈ IM , are excluded. However, s = 0N−1, I0(ŝ) ∩ I−(s) = {k1},
(11.39), and (11.40) implies ŝ = 0N−1, a contradiction. Therefore, (r, s) /∈ T implies
I0(ŝ) ∩ I−(s) = ∅. Similarly, it can be shown in this case that I0(ŝ) ∩ I+(s) = ∅. Notice
that I0(ŝ) ∩ I−(s) = ∅ or I0(ŝ) ∩ I+(s) = {k1} in case (r, s) ∈ T . Therefore, (r, s) /∈ T
implies ŝ = s, and (r, s) ∈ T implies ŝ ∈ {s, s}.
4. ∃j1 ∈ J̃−(r, s), k1 = (j1,−), or ∃j1 ∈ J̃+(r, s), k1 = (j1,+). Let s ∈ S be defined by
sk1 = −1 if k1 = (j1,−), sk1 = +1 if k1 = (j1,+), and sj = sj, ∀j ∈ IN−1 \ {k1}. Then
(r, s) ∈ T and q ∈ Cω(r, s). Notice that ℓr,s,ω(ξ) = 1, so q is a boundary point of Cω(r, s).
Let (r̂, ŝ) ∈ T be such that q ∈ Cω(r̂, ŝ). It is easily shown that r̂ = r. Suppose there
exists j2 ∈ I−(ŝ) ∩ I0(s). Then j2 ∈ J̃−(r, s) and ξ ∈ ψν,r,s,ω−1k1,(j2,−)({0N
1+2}) = ∅, yielding
a contradiction, unless vj2 = 0, or (i, j
2) ∈ I+(r), ∀i ∈ IM , or j2 = j1. Since j2 ∈
I−(ŝ) implies vj2 > 0 and there exists i
2 ∈ IM such that ri2j2 6= +1, it holds that
j2 = j1. Moreover, k1 = (j1,−) since otherwise µ = 1 and ξ ∈ ψν,r,s,ω−1(j1,+),0 ({0N
1+2}) = ∅, a
contradiction. Similarly, it can be shown that j2 ∈ I+(ŝ)∩I0(s) implies j1 = j2 and k1 =
(j1,+). Finally, it can be shown as in Case 1 that I−(ŝ)∩ I+(s) = ∅, I+(ŝ) ∩ I−(s) = ∅,
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and I0(ŝ) ∩ (I−(s) ∪ I+(s)) = ∅. So, ŝ = s or ŝ = s.
5. k1 = 0. So, µ = 1 and q = v.
Let (r̂, ŝ) ∈ T be such that q ∈ Cω(r̂, ŝ). It will be proved that (r̂, ŝ) = (r, s). It is easily
shown that r̂ = r.
Suppose there exists j2 ∈ I−(ŝ)∩I0(s). Then qj2 = µvj2 and ẑj2(q, ω) = 0. If j2 ∈ J̃−(r, s),
then ξ ∈ ψν,r,s,ω−1(j2,−),0 ({0N
1+2}) = ∅, a contradiction. So, j2 /∈ J̃−(r, s) and hence vj2 = 0
or (i, j2) ∈ I+(r), ∀i ∈ IM . Since j2 ∈ I−(ŝ) implies vj2 > 0 and there exists i2 ∈ IM
such that ri
2
j2 6= +1, it holds that I−(ŝ) ∩ I0(s) = ∅, a contradiction. Consequently,
I−(ŝ) ∩ I0(s) = ∅.
Suppose there exists j2 ∈ I−(ŝ) ∩ I+(s). Then ẑj2(q, ω) = 0. Since j2 ∈ I−(ŝ) implies




1+2}) = ∅. Consequently, I−(ŝ) ∩ I+(s) = ∅.
Similarly, it can be shown that I+(ŝ) ∩ (I−(s) ∪ I0(s)) = ∅.
Suppose there exists j2 ∈ I0(ŝ) ∩ I−(s). As in Case 1 it can be shown that µ = 0,
contradicting µ = 1. Consequently, I0(ŝ) ∩ I−(s) = ∅.
Similarly, it can be shown that I0(ŝ) ∩ I+(s) = ∅. Therefore, ŝ = s.
It is easily shown that ẑ(q, ω) 6= 0N since otherwise ξ ∈ ψν,r,s,ω−1j3,0 ({0N
1+2}) = ∅, for any
j3 ∈ J−(r, s) ∪ J+(r, s), a contradiction.
Next, let (r1, s1) ∈ T and k1 ∈ Ik(r1,s1), and (r′, s′) ∈ T and k′ ∈ Ik(r′,s′) be given such
that (r1, s1, k1) 6= (r′, s′, k′). Using the Cases 1-5 it follows easily that the intersection of
Cω(r
1, s1, k1) and Cω(r
′, s′, k′) is either empty or a common boundary point. Moreover,
it follows that if q1 is a boundary point of Cω(r
1, s1, k1), then either q1 = v, or q1 induces
a Drèze equilibrium, or q1 is a boundary point of a uniquely determined set Cω(r
2, s2, k2)
for some (r2, s2) ∈ T \{(r1, s1)}. In the last case it follows that Cω(r2, s2, k2) is an arc and
therefore has another boundary point. For the other boundary point of Cω(r
2, s2, k2), say
q2, it holds that either q2 = v, or q2 induces a Drèze equilibrium, or q2 is a boundary point
of a uniquely determined set Cω(r
3, s3, k3). The remainder of this proof is closely related
to the proof of Theorem 10.4.2. Using the finiteness of the number of sets Cω(r, s, k),
(r, s) ∈ T , k ∈ Ik(r,s), it follows that after a finite number of, say k, steps a boundary
point qk is reached satisfying either qk = v, or qk induces a Drèze equilibrium, or qk = q1.
Using the fact that the intersection of three different sets is empty, it is easily seen that
the components of ∪(r,s)∈T Cω(r, s) are given by a finite number of loops and a finite
number of arcs, where the boundary points of any arc are either v and a state inducing
a Drèze equilibrium or two different states both inducing Drèze equilibria.
Let v be such that ẑ(v, ω) = 0N , and, for every j ∈ IN−1, vj = 0 or vj = 1. Let f̂(v, ω)
be equal to (x, λ, v, µ) = ξ. For every j ∈ IN−1 it will be shown that vj = 0 implies
−∂xi
j
ui(xi) + λipj > 0, ∀i ∈ IM , and vj = 1 implies ∂xi
j
ui(xi)− λipj > 0, ∀i ∈ IM .









Clearly, this inequality is binding since vj1 = 0 implies that demand rationing cannot be
binding on the market of commodity j1. Let s ∈ S be defined by sj1 = −1 and sj = 0,
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∀j ∈ IN−1\{j1}. Let r ∈ R be obtained by defining, for every (i, j) ∈ IM×IN−1, rij = +1
if ∂xiju
i(xi)−λipj > 0, rij = 0 if ∂xiju
i(xi)−λipj = 0, and rij = −1 if −∂xiju
i(xi)+λipj > 0.
It is easily verified that (r, s) ∈ T and j1 ∈ J−(r, s). Since ξ ∈ ψν,r,s,ω−1(i1,j1,−),j1({0N
1+2}) = ∅, a
contradiction is obtained. Consequently, for every j ∈ IN−1, vj = 0 implies −∂xiju
i(xi)+
λipj > 0, ∀i ∈ IM .
Similarly, it can be shown that, for every j ∈ IN−1, vj = 1 implies ∂xi
j
ui(xi)− λipj > 0,
∀i ∈ IM .
Suppose there exists (r, s) ∈ T such that v ∈ Cω(r, s). Using the previous paragraph it
follows that, for every j ∈ IN−1, vj = 0 implies rij = −1, ∀i ∈ IM , and vj = 1 implies
rij = +1, ∀i ∈ IM . If j′ ∈ IN−1 satisfies vj′ = 0, then (r, s) ∈ T implies sj′ ≥ 0. Now,
since rij′ = −1, ∀i ∈ IM , it holds that sj′ = 0. Similarly, it can be shown that if j ∈ IN−1
satisfies vj = 1, then sj = 0. Therefore, s = 0
N−1, a contradiction. Consequently,
6 ∃(r, s) ∈ T such that v ∈ Cω(r, s).
By Theorem 11.4.7, Cω(r, s), ∀(r, s) ∈ T , is compact. So, using Theorem 11.4.1 it follows
that v is an isolated point of the set Cω. Q.E.D.
Finally, it will be shown that the closure of the set of non-regular initial endowments has
Lebesgue measure zero. A preliminary lemma is needed first. For every ν ∈ IN, for every





∣∣∣∃(x, λ, µ)∈IRMN++ ×IRM×IR, (x, λ, ω, q, µ) satisfies (11.2)-(11.18)
}
.
For every ν ∈ IN, define the correspondence Q̃ν : Ω̃(ν)→ QN−1 by
Q̃ν(ω) = ∪(r,s)∈T Q̃ν,r,s(ω) ∪ {v}, ∀ω ∈ Ω̃(ν).
For every ν ∈ IN, for every ω ∈ Ω(ν), for every (r, s) ∈ T , Theorem 11.4.3 implies that
Q̃ν,r,s(ω) = Cω(r, s). For every ν ∈ IN, for every ω ∈ Ω(ν), by Theorem 11.2.5, Theorem
11.4.1, and Theorem 11.4.3 it follows that Q̃ν(ω) = Cω.
Lemma 11.4.10
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
initial state. Let ν ∈ IN be given. Then Q̃ν is a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence.
Proof
Let ((ω)n)n∈IN be a sequence in Ω̃(ν) converging to some ω ∈ Ω̃(ν) and let (qn)n∈IN be
a sequence in QN−1 such that qn ∈ Q̃ν((ω)n), ∀n ∈ IN. It will be shown that (qn)n∈IN
has a subsequence converging to some q ∈ Q̃ν(ω). Then Q̃ν is compact-valued, and, by
Theorem 2.5.6, an upper hemi-continuous correspondence. The case where qn = v for an
infinite number of elements n ∈ IN is trivial, so consider the opposite case. Since the set
of sign vectors T is finite, it can be assumed, without loss of generality, that there exists
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(r, s) ∈ T such that qn ∈ Q̃ν,r,s((ω)n), ∀n ∈ IN. Let the sequence ((x)n, (λ)n, µn)n∈IN in
IRMN++ × IRM × IR be such that, for every n ∈ IN, ((x)n, (λ)n, (ω)n, qn, µn) satisfies (11.2)-
(11.18). It follows easily that the sequence ((x)n, (λ)n, (ω)n, qn, µn)n∈IN is bounded and,
using that i, ∀i ∈ IM , satisfies the boundary condition, there is no loss of generality
in assuming that ((x)n, (λ)n, (ω)n, qn, µn)n∈IN converges to some (x, λ, ω, q, µ) ∈ IRMN++ ×
IRM × Ω̃(ν) × QN−1 × IR. Since the left-hand side of (11.2)-(11.18) is continuous as a
function of (x, λ, ω, q, µ), it follows that q ∈ Q̃ν,r,s(ω) ⊂ Q̃ν(ω). Q.E.D.
Theorem 11.4.11
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
initial state. Then the set of non-regular initial endowments Ω \ Ω∗ has a closure in Ω
with Lebesgue measure zero.
Proof
Let some ν ∈ IN be given. First, it is shown that the closure of the set Ω(ν) \ Ω∗ in the
closure of Ω(ν) in Ω, denoted by Π(ν), has Lebesgue measure zero. If ω ∈ Ω(ν) \ Ω∗,
then, by Theorem 11.4.3 and Theorem 11.4.9, there exists q ∈ QN−1 such that (q, ω)
belongs to the set Σ̃(ν) given by
Σ̃(ν) =
{
(q, ω) ∈ QN−1 × Ω̃(ν)
∣∣∣q ∈ Q̃ν(ω) and
∃(r, s)∈T , ψν,r,s,ω(f̂(q, ω)) = 0N1 and rank ∂ξψν,r,s,ω(f̂(q, ω)) ≤ N1 − 1, or
∃(r, s)∈T , ∃k∈K, ψν,r,s,ωk (f̂(q, ω)) = 0N
1+1 and rank ∂ξψ
ν,r,s,ω
k (f̂(q, ω)) ≤ N1, or




It is easily shown that Σ̃(ν) is closed in QN−1 × Ω̃(ν) since Σ̃(ν) can be obtained by a
finite union of sets being closed in QN−1 × Ω̃(ν), due to the continuity of the functions
f̂ , ψν,r,s, ∀(r, s) ∈ T , ψν,r,sk , ∀(r, s) ∈ T , ∀k ∈ K, and ψν,r,sk1,k2, ∀(r, s) ∈ T , ∀(k1, k2) ∈ K2,
intersected with the set {(q, ω) ∈ QN−1× Ω̃(ν) | q ∈ Q̃ν(ω)} being closed in QN−1× Ω̃(ν)
by Theorem 2.5.7 since Q̃ν is shown to be a compact-valued, upper hemi-continuous
correspondence in Lemma 11.4.10. Let the function f : Σ̃(ν) → Ω̃(ν) be defined by
f(q, ω) = ω, ∀(q, ω) ∈ Σ̃(ν). Then Ω(ν) \ Ω∗ ⊂ f(Σ̃(ν)) and f(Σ̃(ν)) is a subset of a set
with Lebesgue measure zero by Lemma 11.4.4, Lemma 11.4.5, and Lemma 11.4.6.
It will be shown that f(Σ̃(ν)) is closed in Ω̃(ν). Since the image by a continuous proper
mapping of a closed set is closed, see Balasko (1988), proof of Theorem 4.1.5, page 88,
it is sufficient to show that f is proper. Let T be a compact subset of Ω̃(ν). It has to be
shown that f−1(T ) is compact. By the continuity of f it holds that f−1(T ) is closed in
Σ̃(ν). Since Σ̃(ν) is closed in QN−1×Ω̃(ν), it follows that f−1(T ) is closed in QN−1×Ω̃(ν).
Obviously, f−1(T ) is a subset of the set {(q, ω) ∈ QN−1×T | q ∈ Q̃ν(T )}, which is easily
seen to be compact using Theorem 2.5.7 and Lemma 11.4.10. Consequently, f−1(T ) is
a closed subset of a compact set and is therefore compact by Theorem 2.3.9. So, the
function f is proper and hence f(Σ̃(ν)) is closed in Ω̃(ν). Since Ω̃(ν) contains the closure
of Ω(ν) in Ω and Ω(ν) \ Ω∗ ⊂ f(Σ̃(ν)), it follows that Π(ν) is contained in f(Σ̃(ν)).
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Let ((ω)n)n∈IN be a sequence in ∪ν∈INΠ(ν) converging to some ω ∈ Ω. Since {Ω(ν) |
ν ∈ IN} is a locally finite, bounded partition of Ω, there exists ν ∈ IN such that an
infinite number of elements of (ωn)n∈IN belongs to Ω(ν). Since Π(ν) is closed in Ω, it
follows that ω ∈ Π(ν) ⊂ ∪ν∈INΠ(ν). So, ∪ν∈INΠ(ν) is closed in Ω. Moreover, ∪ν∈INΠ(ν) ⊂
∪ν∈INf(Σ̃(ν)), a countable union of sets having Lebesgue measure zero, so ∪ν∈INΠ(ν) has
Lebesgue measure zero. Finally, Ω\Ω∗ ⊂ ∪ν∈IN(Ω(ν)\Ω∗) ⊂ ∪ν∈INΠ(ν), thereby showing
the theorem. Q.E.D.
The following corollaries follow immediately.
Corollary 11.4.12
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9 and let v ∈ QN−1 be the
initial state. Then there exists a subset Ω of Ω such that the closure of Ω \ Ω in Ω
has Lebesgue measure zero and for every ω ∈ Ω the quantity adjustment process for
the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂)) with initial state v converges to a state
inducing a Drèze equilibrium of Ẽ .
Corollary 11.4.12 stipulates that, given any initial state v ∈ QN−1, generically, the
quantity adjustment process converges to a state inducing a Drèze equilibrium.
Corollary 11.4.13
Let (X i,i)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂) satisfy the Assumptions A6-A9. Then there exists a subset
Ω of Ω such that the closure of Ω \ Ω in Ω has Lebesgue measure zero and for every
ω ∈ Ω the number of Drèze equilibria of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p,p), (l̂, L̂))
is finite and odd.
Corollary 11.4.13 guarantees that, generically, the number of Drèze equilibria is odd.
This extends the result of Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978), Theorem 1.6b, page 58,
where it is shown that there exists a finite number of Drèze equilibria. Moreover, their





In this chapter a price and quantity adjustment process is described to obtain a Wal-
rasian equilibrium in the economy. At a Walrasian equilibrium price system the supply
is equal to the demand for every commodity. For an arbitrary price system it holds that
the total excess demand for some commodities is negative, while for other commodities
it is positive. A Drèze equilibrium can then be obtained by rationing on the markets of
the non-numeraire commodities.
As has been noticed in Veendorp (1975), the relevant market signals for an adjust-
ment process in the economy are based on the effective total excess demand associated
with a Drèze equilibrium instead of the notional total excess demand as used usually,
see Chapter 10 for example. Therefore, Veendorp considers a price adjustment process
which follows a path of Drèze equilibria and where prices are adjusted as in the Walrasian
tatonnement process, with the notional total excess demand replaced by the effective to-
tal excess demand related to a uniquely determined Drèze equilibrium. In Veendorp
(1975), see also the correction in Laroque (1981), a proof of the convergence of this pro-
cess is given in the case with three commodities and two consumers, and the total excess
demand function satisfying a gross substitutability condition. In general, however, such
a process does not necessarily converge to a Walrasian equilibrium price system and
even chaotic behaviour may be expected. The possibility of chaotic behaviour has been
confirmed in Böhm (1993) in a more complicated model with overlapping generations,
producers, and a government. Therefore, an alternative adjustment process, also follow-
ing a path of Drèze equilibria but having better stability properties, is considered in this
chapter.
One of the commodities is assumed to be a numeraire commodity having a price
equal to one. The other commodities, called real commodities, have a flexible price level
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with respect to the numeraire commodity and have mutually fixed relative prices in the
short run. When the price level is so low that no consumer wants to sell any amount
of the real commodities, an equilibrium is sustained by full rationing on demand on the
markets of all the real commodities. The price and quantity adjustment process con-
sidered in this chapter starts with such a trivial real demand constrained equilibrium.
Subsequently the price system and the rationing scheme are adjusted in such a way that
at any moment during the adjustment process all markets are kept in equilibrium. This
is achieved by using demand rationing on the markets of the real commodities, while
there is no supply rationing on any market. In the beginning of the process only the
price level of the real commodities and the rationing schemes are adjusted. As soon
as there is no demand rationing on the market of at least one of the real commodi-
ties, then its price is allowed to decrease relatively with respect to the price level of the
other real commodities, while the price level is further adjusted in order to bring also
the markets of the other commodities in equilibrium. This procedure of adjustment of
the price level, allowing the price of a commodity to decrease relatively if there is no
demand rationing, and allowing for demand rationing if the price is maximal relative to
its initial value, is continued until there is no rationing on any market and a Walrasian
equilibrium has been obtained. It will be constructively proved that there exists a path
of price systems and rationing schemes inducing approximate demand constrained equi-
libria without rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity and connecting the
trivial real demand constrained equilibrium and an approximate Walrasian equilibrium.
The inaccuracy of the approximation can be made arbitrarily small.
Many authors have introduced models with only supply rationing, e.g., van der Laan
(1980a), Kurz (1982), Dehez and Drèze (1984), Weddepohl (1987), and Wu (1988). How-
ever, recent experiences in Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Republics
give reason to look at demand rationing as well. The price and quantity adjustment
process described in the previous paragraph captures some stylized facts of phenomena
occurring in these countries. In general, markets are cleared by means of demand ra-
tioning, while there is no supply rationing on any market. Moreover, there is an upward
pressure on the prices of commodities on the markets of which demand rationing pre-
vails. As soon as there is no demand rationing on a market, then the upwards pressure
on its price disappears. For general equilibrium type models with demand rationing of
the situation in the former Soviet Republics and the Eastern European countries the
reader is referred to Polterovich (1993). The existence of demand constrained equilibria
has been shown in Chapter 4.
Trade is possible at any point on the path generated by the price and quantity ad-
justment process of this chapter. This is contrary to other adjustment processes such as
the Walrasian tatonnement process as formulated in Samuelson (1941), or the processes
of Smale (1976), Kamiya (1990), van der Laan and Talman (1987a, 1987b), Chapter 10,
or Chapter 11. In these processes trade must be postponed until the Walrasian equi-
librium price system has been reached. As argued by Blad (1978), if convergence takes
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too long, then trade should take place at a non-Walrasian equilibrium price system. So,
although the price and quantity adjustment process considered in this chapter converges
to a state of the economy corresponding to a Walrasian equilibrium, it might happen
that convergence is not fast enough. However, the adjustment process may terminate
at any point in time, because it is always possible to trade according to the prevailing
demand constrained equilibrium.
In Section 12.2 a model of the economic system endowed with short run rigidities
is presented. The short run rigidities imply that the price level is flexible, but that
the relative prices of the real commodities are fixed in the short run. The concept of
a real demand constrained equilibrium for a given price level is introduced. In such an
equilibrium there is no rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity, there may
be demand rationing on the markets of the real commodities, and the price level equals
a given value. The existence of such an equilibrium with full rationing on demand on the
markets of all real commodities is shown for price levels low enough. Then the concept of
a proper demand constrained equilibrium is introduced, being a real demand constrained
equilibrium without rationing on the market of at least one real commodity. In Section
12.3 the reduced total excess demand function is introduced and some of its properties
are derived. The reduced total excess demand function restricts attention to a subset of
all possible price systems and rationing schemes, this subset being such that all relevant
price systems and rationing schemes are contained in it. In Section 12.4 it is proved by
means of a simplicial algorithm with integer labelling that there exists a path of price
systems and rationing schemes inducing approximate real demand constrained equilibria.
Moreover, it is shown that this path joins the trivial real demand constrained equilibrium
with full rationing on demand on the markets of all real commodities with an approximate
proper demand constrained equilibrium. In Section 12.5 some price flexibility for the
real commodities is introduced. A generalized real demand constrained equilibrium for
a given price level is defined, being a constrained equilibrium such that there is no
rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity, there is no supply rationing on the
markets of the real commodities, and the price of a commodity is allowed to be decreased
relative to the given price level if there is no rationing on the market of this commodity.
The existence of a path of approximate generalized real demand constrained equilibria
joining the trivial real demand constrained equilibrium and an approximate Walrasian
equilibrium is shown. So far, only approximate real demand constrained equilibria are
considered with the inaccuracy of the approximation arbitrarily small. In Section 12.6
the set of real demand constrained equilibria itself is considered. Then the existence of
a connected set of generalized real demand constrained equilibria containing both the
trivial real demand constrained equilibrium and a Walrasian equilibrium is shown. In
Section 12.7 the behaviour of the price and quantity adjustment process is discussed and
illustrated.
This chapter is based on Herings, van der Laan, Talman, and Venniker (1994).
378 Equilibrium Adjustment of Disequilibrium Prices
12.2 The Model and the Equilibrium Concepts
In this section the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ is
considered. There are M ∈ IN consumers, indexed by i ∈ IM , and N ∈ IN \ {1}
commodities, indexed by j ∈ IN . A consumer i ∈ IM is characterized by a consumption
set X i, a preference relation i, and an initial endowment ωi. The rationing function,
specifying the admissible rationing schemes, is given by the pair (l̃, L̃) with l̃ : QN →




i is denoted by X and if x = (x1, . . . , xM) is an element of X,
then xj = (x
1
j , . . . , x
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . The element (ω1, . . . , ωM) is denoted by ω. The total
initial endowment is denoted by ω̃, so ω̃ =
∑
i∈IM ω
i. For every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN ,
component (i− 1)N + j of l̃ is denoted by l̃ij. Moreover, l̃i = (l̃i1, . . . , l̃iN)⊤, ∀i ∈ IM , and
l̃j = (l̃
1
j , . . . , l̃
M
j )
⊤, ∀j ∈ IN . The same notation is used for the function L̃, for a rationing
scheme on supply l ∈ −IR∗MN+ , and for a rationing scheme on demand L ∈ IR∗MN+ .
Commodity N is considered to be a numeraire commodity, hence the price of com-
modity N is equal to one. In this chapter it is assumed that the economy E is initially
faced with completely fixed relative prices for the non-numeraire or real commodities,
determined by the vector r̃ ∈ IRN−1, while these prices are flexible relative to the nu-
meraire commodity. For a given price level λ ∈ IR, the price system p̃(λ) ∈ IRN is defined
by p̃j(λ) = λr̃j, ∀j ∈ IN−1, and p̃N(λ) = 1. By varying the price level λ ∈ IR, the prices
of the real commodities can be adjusted upwards or downwards with respect to the price
of the numeraire commodity. The economy E with short run rigidities r̃ is assumed to
satisfy the following assumptions for the remainder of this chapter.
A1. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the consumption set X i is closed, convex, X i ⊂ IRN+ ,
and X i + IRN+ ⊂ X i.
A2. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the preference relation i is complete, transitive,
continuous, strongly monotonic, and strongly convex.
A3. For every consumer i ∈ IM , the initial endowment ωi belongs to int(X i).
A4. The vector of short run rigidities r̃ belongs to IRN−1++ .
A5. The rationing function (l̃, L̃) is flexible, market independent, and continuous.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 these assumptions are discussed. Although this is not
assumed, the rationing function is often considered to be monotonic whenever an intuitive
interpretation of the results obtained is given.
In general the fixed relative prices will not be equal to the relative prices in any
Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E , see Definition 3.8.1, and hence there may not
exist a price level λ∗ ∈ IR such that p∗ = p̃(λ∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium price system.
Therefore, attention will be focused on constrained equilibria, see Definition 4.6.1. As
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in Section 4.2 the budget set of a consumer i ∈ IM at a price system p ∈ IRN and a
rationing scheme (li, Li) ∈ −IR∗N+ × IR∗N+ is denoted by βi(p, li, Li), so
βi(p, li, Li) =
{
xi ∈ X i
∣∣∣p · xi ≤ p · ωi and li ≤ xi − ωi ≤ Li
}
,
and as in Section 4.3 the set δi(p, li, Li) is defined by
δi(p, li, Li) =
{
xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li)
∣∣∣xi i xi, ∀xi ∈ βi(p, li, Li)
}
.
A constrained equilibrium with a given price level is defined as follows.
Definition 12.2.1 (Constrained equilibrium with a given price level)
Let some price level λ ∈ IR be given. A constrained equilibrium with price level λ of the
economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ is an element
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ {p̃(λ)} × l̃(QN)× L̃(QN )×X
satisfying




∗i −∑i∈IM ωi = 0N ,




j for some consumer i
′ ∈ IM implies






j for some consumer i
′ ∈ IM implies
x∗ij − ωij > l∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM .
A constrained equilibrium with price level λ coincides with the definition of a constrained
equilibrium of the economy Ẽ = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , P(p̃(λ),p̃(λ)), (l̃, L̃)) as given in Definition
4.6.1.
Let some price level λ ∈ IR++ be given. Then there exist two trivial constrained
equilibria with price level λ. One is given by p∗ = p̃(λ) and, for every consumer i ∈ IM ,
l∗i = 0N , L∗i = L̃i(1N), and x∗i = ωi. The other one is given by p∗ = p̃(λ) and, for every
consumer i ∈ IM , l∗i = l̃(1N), L∗i = 0N , and x∗i = ωi. At the trivial constrained equilibria
with price level λ all trading possibilities are excluded by the rationing schemes. This
exclusion of all trading possibilities is not allowed at the so-called supply constrained
and demand constrained equilibria with some given price level, see also Definition 4.8.1
and Definition 4.8.5, respectively.
Definition 12.2.2 (Supply constrained (demand constrained) equilibrium
with a given price level)
Let some price level λ ∈ IR be given. A supply constrained (demand constrained) equi-
librium with price level λ of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run
rigidities r̃ is a constrained equilibrium with price level λ, (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗), of the economy
E with short run rigidities r̃ satisfying, for every commodity j ∈ IN ,
x∗ij − ωij < L∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM , (x∗ij − ωij > l∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM),
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while for at least one commodity j′ ∈ IN it holds that
x∗ij′ − ωij′ > l∗ij′ , ∀i ∈ IM , (x∗ij′ − ωij′ < L∗ij′ , ∀i ∈ IM).
Theorem 4.3.3 guarantees that in a supply constrained (demand constrained) equilibrium
with price level λ there is no demand rationing (supply rationing) on the market of any
commodity, while there is no rationing on the market of at least one commodity. In
van der Laan (1982) it has been shown that for every λ ∈ IR++ a supply constrained
equilibrium with price level λ exists, see also van der Laan (1980a), Kurz (1982), and
Corollary 4.8.3. For a similar model with production it has been proved in Dehez and
Drèze (1984) that under a flexible price level, i.e., under endogenous determination of
the price level λ ∈ IR, there exists a supply constrained equilibrium with some price
level λ ∈ IR++ without rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity and non-
full rationing on at least one real commodity. In van der Laan (1984) this result is
strengthened by proving that there exists a price level λ ∈ IR++ and a supply constrained
equilibrium with price level λ without rationing on the market of both the numeraire and
at least one real commodity. Some supply constrained equilibrium existence results for
economies with a different modelling of price rigidities have been provided by Weddepohl
(1987) and Wu (1988).
In van der Laan (1980a) some motivation is given for considering constrained equi-
libria without demand rationing in Western or capitalist economies. Recent experiences
in Eastern Europe give enough reason to look at constrained equilibria without supply
rationing as well. In Polterovich (1993) some general equilibrium type models of the
situation in the Soviet Republics and the Eastern European countries are considered
with the possibility of demand rationing on every market. It follows from Corollary
4.8.7 that a demand constrained equilibrium with price level λ exists for every λ ∈ IR++.
In the sequel of this chapter attention will be focused on demand constrained equilibria
with price level λ for some λ ∈ IR without rationing on the market of the numeraire
commodity. Such an equilibrium is called a real demand constrained equilibrium with
price level λ.
Definition 12.2.3 (Real demand constrained equilibrium with a given price
level)
Let some price level λ ∈ IR be given. A real demand constrained equilibrium with price
level λ (RDEλ) of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃
is a demand constrained equilibrium with price level λ, (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗), of the economy E
with short run rigidities r̃ satisfying
x∗iN − ωiN < L∗iN , ∀i ∈ IM .
This definition states that at an RDEλ for some given price level λ ∈ IR there is no
supply rationing on any market, while there is no demand rationing on the market of
the numeraire commodity. In order to show the existence of an RDEλ given some price
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level λ ∈ IR++, the following lemma gives a result concerning the demand of a consumer
if the price of some commodity is relatively very low.
Let some commodity j1 ∈ IN be given. Lemma 12.2.4 states that if p ∈ IRN+ with
pN = 1, l
i = l̃i(1N), and Li = L̃i(q) for some q ∈ QN with qj1 = 1, and the price ratio pj1p
j2
for any commodity j2 ∈ IN is sufficiently small, then the demand of a consumer i ∈ IM
of commodity j1 at (p, li, Li) exceeds the total initial endowment of this commodity. For
every j ∈ IN , for every α ∈ IR++, define the set Pαj by
Pαj =
{
(p, l, L) ∈ IRN+ × {l̃(1N)} × IRMN+
∣∣∣ pN = 1,
∃j′ ∈ IN , pj ≤ αpj′,




Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then, for every i ∈ IM , there exists αi ∈ IR++ such that, for every
j ∈ IN , for every (p, l, L) ∈ Pαij , for every xi ∈ δi(p, li, Li), xij > ω̃j.
Proof
Suppose the lemma does not hold for consumer i ∈ IM . Then there exists j′ ∈ IN and
a sequence
(




in IRN+ × {l̃(1N)} × L̃(QN) × X i such that, for every
n ∈ IN,


































in ∆N−1×{l̃i(1N)}× L̃i(QN)×X i has a subsequence converging to some (p, li, Li, xi) ∈
∆N−1 × {l̃i(1N)} × L̃i(QN)×X i. Moreover, pj′ = 0, Lij′ = L̃ij′(q) for some q ∈ QN with
qj′ = 1, so L
i
j′ > ω̃j′ − ωij′, and xij′ ≤ ω̃j′. Clearly, pn · li
n
< 0, ∀n ∈ IN, and p · li < 0,
so using Theorem 2.5.6 and Theorem 8.2.1 it follows that xi ∈ δi(p, li, Li). Since pj′ = 0







j′ + ω̃j′ − ωij′ = ω̃j′,
contradicting xij′ ≤ ω̃j′. Consequently, the lemma holds for every consumer i ∈ IM .
Q.E.D.
For the remainder of this chapter, numbers αi ∈ IR++ are assumed to be given for every
i ∈ IM such that Lemma 12.2.4 holds for the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with
short run rigidities r̃. Define λ ∈ IR++ by
λ =
min({αi | i ∈ IM})
max({r̃j | j ∈ IN−1})
.
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Then λ corresponds to a price level in the economy being so low that, under some
conditions with respect to the rationing scheme, the demand of a real commodity of
any consumer exceeds the total initial endowment of this commodity. This yields the
following result.
Theorem 12.2.5
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then, for every λ ∈ (0, λ], there exists an RDEλ. Moreover, for every
λ ∈ (0, λ], for every RDEλ (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗), it holds that x∗i = ωi, ∀i ∈ IM , and L∗j = 0M ,
∀j ∈ IN−1.
Proof
Let some λ ∈ (0, λ] and a demand constrained equilibrium with price level λ, (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗),
be given. By Corollary 4.8.7 a demand constrained equilibrium with price level λ indeed
exists.




j′ . From Theorem
4.6.4 it follows that x∗i
′ ∈ δi′(p∗, l∗i′ , Li′), where Li′ ∈ L̃i′(QN ) is defined by Li′j′ = L̃i
′
j′(q)
for some q ∈ QN with qj′ = 1 and Li′j = L∗i
′





= λr̃j′ ≤ λr̃j′ ≤ αi′,
it follows from Lemma 12.2.4 that x∗i
′
j′ > ω̃j′, contradicting Condition 2 of the definition
of a demand constrained equilibrium with price level λ, Definition 12.2.2. Consequently,
for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN−1, x∗ij − ωij = L∗ij .











so L∗ij = 0, ∀i ∈ IM , and x∗i = ωi, ∀i ∈ IM . Since (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is a demand constrained
equilibrium with price level λ, there is at least one market without rationing and this
should therefore be the market of commodity N. So, (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is an RDEλ. Q.E.D.
For every λ ∈ (0, λ], Theorem 12.2.5 shows the existence of a trivial RDEλ in the sense
that the price ratio between any real commodity and the numeraire commodity becomes
so low that nobody supplies a real commodity. Therefore, such an equilibrium is sus-
tained by full rationing on demand on the markets of the real commodities. In Section
12.6 it will be shown that there exists a price level λ∗ ∈ IR++ and an RDEλ∗ at which
there is no rationing on the market of both the numeraire commodity and at least one real
commodity. The latter equilibrium is called a proper demand constrained equilibrium.
Definition 12.2.6 (Proper demand constrained equilibrium)
A proper demand constrained equilibrium (PDE) of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM ,
(l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ is an RDEλ∗ (p
∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) for some λ∗ ∈ IR of the
economy E with short run rigidities r̃ such that there exists a real commodity j ∈ IN−1
satisfying
x∗ij − ωij < L∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM .
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To prove the existence of a proper demand constrained equilibrium, the reduced total
excess demand function is derived in the next section and some of its properties are
discussed.
12.3 The Reduced Total Excess Demand Function
To show the existence of a PDE, a price level, a price system, and a rationing scheme is






∣∣∣ qN < 1
}
.
Define the functions λ̂ : QN → IR++, p̂ : QN → IRN++, l̂ : QN → −IRMN+ , and L̂ : QN →
IRMN+ by





, ∀q ∈ QN , (12.2)
l̂(q) = l̃(1N), ∀q ∈ QN , (12.3)
L̂(q) = L̃(q1, . . . , qN−1, 1), ∀q ∈ QN . (12.4)
Notice that, for every j ∈ IN−1, for every q ∈ QN with qN = 0, p̂j(q) = λr̃j. Moreover,
for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN−1, q ∈ QN and qj = 1 implies l̂ij(q) < −ωij and
L̂ij(q) > ω̃j − ωij . Furthermore, for every i ∈ IM , for every q ∈ QN , l̂iN(q) < −ωiN and
L̂iN (q) > ω̃N − ωiN .
Let some (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN+ ×{l̃i(1N)}× L̃i(QN ) be given. From the Assumption A1-A5
it follows easily that the set δi(p, li, Li) of consumer i ∈ IM contains exactly one element.
Therefore, for every i ∈ IM , define the reduced demand function d̂i : QN → IRN of







, ∀q ∈ QN .
For every q ∈ QN , (d̂1(q), . . . , d̂M(q)) will be denoted by d̂(q). Moreover, define the








ωi, ∀q ∈ QN .
The proof of the following two results is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.7.1.
Theorem 12.3.1
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. If q∗ ∈ QN is such that ẑ(q∗) = 0N , then (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)) is
an RDEλ̂(q∗).
If q∗ ∈ QN is such that ẑ(q∗) = 0N , then (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)) is called the RDEλ̂(q∗)
induced by q∗.
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Theorem 12.3.2
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. If q∗ ∈ QN is such that ẑ(q∗) = 0N and there exists j ∈ IN−1 such
that q∗j = 1, then (p̂(q
∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)) is a PDE.
If q∗ ∈ QN is such that ẑ(q∗) = 0N and j ∈ IN−1 is such that q∗j = 1, then there is
no rationing on the market of commodity j at the PDE (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)), being
called the PDE induced by q∗.
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 4.7.2 the following result can be shown.
Theorem 12.3.3
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the
Assumptions A1-A5. Let some price level λ ∈ [λ,→) be given. If (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is
an RDEλ, then there exists q
∗ ∈ QN such that λ̂(q∗) = λ and z(q∗) = 0N , while
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)), so it holds that (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is equivalent
to (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)) in the sense of Definition 4.6.2.
From Theorem 12.3.3 it follows that there is no loss of generality in considering only
RDEλ’s for λ ∈ [λ,→) and PDE’s being induced by elements of QN . The RDEλ’s for
λ ∈ (0, λ] are characterized in Theorem 12.2.5. Notice that if q∗ = 0N , then λ̂(q∗) = λ




An element q ∈ QN is often called a state of the economy.
The following lemma describes some properties of the reduced total excess demand
function ẑ. The proof of the following result is similar to the proof of Theorem 8.2.8.
Theorem 12.3.4
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then the reduced total excess demand function ẑ : QN → IRN has the
following properties:
1. ẑ is continuous,
2. for every q ∈ QN , for every j ∈ IN−1, qj = 0 implies ẑj(q) ≤ 0,
3. for every q ∈ QN , p̂(q) · ẑ(q) = 0.
To prove that there exists q∗ ∈ QN inducing a PDE, the behaviour of ẑ on the boundary
of the set QN is considered first. Observe that at p̂(0N) every consumer wants to supply
the numeraire commodity and is willing to exchange the numeraire commodity against
each of the real commodities. However, as long as qj = 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1, none of the real
commodities can be bought. So, the consumers must keep their initial endowment of
the numeraire commodity and the trivial RDEλ is obtained. Consider some q ∈ QN
satisfying that for exactly one j′ ∈ IN−1 it holds that L̂j′(q) > 0M . Then there is no
longer full rationing on demand on the market of commodity j′ and the consumers
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demand commodity j′ and supply the numeraire commodity. Therefore, ẑN(q) < 0 and
ẑj′(q) > 0, so the economy is out of equilibrium. In the following theorem this reasoning
is generalized.
Theorem 12.3.5
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Let some q ∈ QN with qN = 0 be given. Then, for every j ∈ IN−1,
ẑj(q) ≥ 0, and if, moreover, L̂j(q) > 0M , then ẑj(q) > 0.
Proof
Suppose there exists j′ ∈ IN−1 such that L̂j′(q) > 0M and ẑj′(q) ≤ 0. Then there




j′(q). It follows from Theorem 4.6.4 that
{d̂i′(q)} = δi′(p̂(q), l̂i′(q), Li′), where Li′ ∈ L̃i′(QN) is defined by Li′j′ = L̃i
′
j′(q) for some




j (q), ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}. From Lemma 12.2.4 it follows
that d̂i
′
j′(q) > ω̃j′, a contradiction with ẑj′(q) ≤ 0. Consequently, for every j ∈ IN−1, if
L̂j(q) > 0
M , then ẑj(q) > 0.
Next, consider the remaining case where there exists j′ ∈ IN−1 such that L̂j′(q) = 0M .
From the result of the previous paragraph and from the continuity of ẑ stated in Theorem
12.3.4, it follows that ẑj′(q) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Now the behaviour of ẑ near the frontier of QN where qN = 1 is considered. In this
case the numeraire commodity is very cheap compared to the other commodities. Define








Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Let some q ∈ QN with qN ≥ 1 − δ̃ be given. Then it holds that
ẑN (q) > 0.
Proof








≤ λmin ({r̃j |j ∈ IN−1}) ≤ min({αi | i ∈ IM}).
Hence, by Lemma 12.2.4, d̂iN(q) > ω̃N , ∀i ∈ IM , so ẑN(q) > Mω̃N − ω̃N ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Now it is possible to give a constructive proof of the existence of an approximate PDE by
showing that there exists a piecewise linear path of approximate zero points of ẑ inducing
approximate RDEλ’s joining q = 0
N , inducing the trivial RDEλ, with an approximate
zero point q∗ of ẑ on the boundary of QN satisfying that q∗j = 1 for at least one j ∈ IN−1.
Such a point q∗ induces an approximate PDE. In Section 12.6 the existence of a PDE is
shown by considering the limit of a sequence of approximate PDE’s.
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12.4 The Short Run Price and Quantity Adjustment
Process
In this section attention is focused on approximate real demand constrained equilibria.
In the following definition an approximate RDEλ for some λ ∈ IR and an approximate
PDE are defined.
Definition 12.4.1 (ε-RDEλ and ε-PDE)
Let some price level λ ∈ IR++ and some ε ∈ IR+ be given. An ε-RDEλ (ε-PDE) of the
economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ is an element
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ {p̃(λ)} × l̃(QN)× L̃(QN )×X
such that all conditions of an RDEλ (PDE) are satisfied, except possibly the condition of




In order to show the existence of a path of ε-RDEλ’s joining the trivial RDEλ and an
ε-PDE for arbitrary ε ∈ IR++, some techniques of simplicial approximation of functions
are used. This approach is also used in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
In this section a simplicial algorithm with integer labelling is presented. The algo-








∣∣∣qN ≤ 1− δ̃
}
,
needs to be triangulated. An example of a triangulation of QN
δ̃
with arbitrarily small
mesh size is obtained by a slight modification of theK-triangulation as given in Definition
2.7.3.
Let some n ∈ IN be given. Then the K-triangulation of QN
δ̃
with grid size 1
n
is the collection of all N -simplices σ(q1,π) with vertices q






eN (j) + a
N
n
(1 − δ̃)eN (N) for some a1, . . . , aN ∈ I0n−1, π : IN → IN is
a permutation, and, for every k ∈ IN , qk+1 = qk + 1neN(π(k)) if π(k) ∈ IN−1, and
qk+1 = qk + 1
n
(1− δ̃)eN (π(k)) if π(k) = N. The mesh size of the K-triangulation of QN
δ̃
with grid size 1
n
is equal to 1
n
.
For every q ∈ QN
δ̃
, define the set J(q) by
J(q) = {j′ ∈ IN |ẑj′(q) = min({ẑj(q) | j ∈ IN})} .
Notice that Theorem 12.3.4 guarantees that min({ẑj(q) | j ∈ IN}) ≤ 0. Define the
labelling function f̂ : QN
δ̃
→ IN by
f̂(q) = max(J(q)), ∀q ∈ QN
δ̃
.
So, with every q ∈ QN
δ̃
the last component for which the total excess demand at q is
minimal is associated. Notice that this labelling function is different from the one used
in Chapter 5.
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Let some triangulation Σ ofQN
δ̃
be given. A simplicial algorithm with integer labelling
on QN
δ̃
will be described that starts at q = 0N and that generates a sequence of simplices
of varying dimension being faces of simplices in Σ. For a t-simplex σ(q1, . . . , qt+1) in this
sequence it holds for every j ∈ IN that qj = 0, ∀q ∈ σ, or j ∈ f̂({q1, . . . , qt+1}). In
the first case it holds that ẑj(q) ≤ 0, ∀q ∈ σ, by Theorem 12.3.4 and Theorem 12.3.5,
and in the second case there exists k ∈ It+1 such that ẑj(qk) ≤ 0 for a vertex qk of σ
with f̂(qk) = j, using the definition of the labelling function f̂ . These properties will be
shown to guarantee that for every q ∈ QN
δ̃
belonging to a simplex of Σ containing a face
generated by the algorithm it holds that ẑ(q) is approximately equal to zero.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN
δ̃
be given. For every non-empty subset J of IN , define





∣∣∣ qj = 0, ∀j ∈ IN \ J
}
.
Clearly, A(J) is a convex (#J)-dimensional subset of IRN for every non-empty subset J
of IN . For every non-empty subset J of IN , define the collection Σ(J) by
Σ (J) = {τ ⊂ A (J) |∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is a (#J)-face of σ} .
These definitions are closely related to the ones given in Chapter 5, the only difference
being that in Chapter 5 the set QN is considered instead of QN
δ̃
. If J, Ĵ ⊂ IN with
∅ 6= J ⊂ Ĵ , then A(J) = A(Ĵ) ∩ aff(A(J)). By repeated application of Theorem 2.7.8 it
follows that Σ (J) is a triangulation of A (J) , for every non-empty subset J of IN . Let
Q̃N
δ̃
denote the part of the boundary of QN
δ̃







∣∣∣∃j ∈ IN−1, qj = 1, or qN = 1− δ̃
}
.
Definition 12.4.2 (J-complete simplices)
Consider the labelling function f̂ : QN
δ̃
→ IN . Let J be a non-empty subset of IN
with #J = t. A (t − 1)-simplex τ(q1, . . . , qt) being a subset of QN
δ̃
is J-complete if
f̂({q1, . . . , qt}) = J.
In general, a (t − 1)-simplex is called complete if it is J-complete for some non-empty
subset J of IN with #J = t.
Let a triangulation Σ of QN
δ̃
be given. The algorithm will generate a finite sequence
of complete simplices of varying dimension in QN
δ̃
starting with the {f̂(0N)}-complete
simplex {0N} and terminating with a complete simplex being a subset of Q̃N
δ̃
. For every
(t − 1)-simplex τ in the finite sequence, there exists a non-empty subset J of IN with
#J = t such that τ is a J-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(J). Moreover, any two
successive simplices in the finite sequence either both are a facet of the same simplex or
one is a facet of the other. In Lemma 12.4.3 and Lemma 12.4.4 all possible situations
are described that can occur when some (t − 1)-simplex τ being a J-complete facet of
a t-simplex of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t is given. The
proofs of these lemmas are exactly the same as the proofs of Lemma 5.2.3 and Lemma
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5.2.4, respectively. Lemma 12.4.3 and Lemma 12.4.4 will be used in Theorem 12.4.7 to
determine in a unique way the finite sequence of complete simplices described above.
The detailed steps of the algorithm yielding this finite sequence are given in Algorithm
12.4.8.
Lemma 12.4.3
Consider the labelling function f̂ : QN
δ̃
→ IN and let a triangulation Σ of QNδ̃ be given.
Let σ be a t-simplex of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t. Moreover,
let a J-complete facet τ of σ be given. Then exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. the t-simplex σ is a J-complete facet of a (t+ 1)-simplex of Σ(J) for precisely one
subset J of IN ,
2. the t-simplex σ has exactly one other J-complete facet τ .
Notice that the set J in Case 1 of Lemma 12.4.3 contains J, while #J = t+ 1.
Lemma 12.4.4
Consider the labelling function f̂ : QN
δ̃
→ IN and let a triangulation Σ of QNδ̃ be given.
Let τ be a J-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN
with #J = t. Moreover, let τ be a member of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN .
Then precisely one facet of the (t− 1)-simplex τ is J-complete.
Notice that the set J of Lemma 12.4.4 has t− 1 elements.
Definition 12.4.5 (Adjacent complete simplices)
Consider the labelling function f̂ : QN
δ̃
→ IN and let a triangulation Σ of QNδ̃ be given.
Then the (t − 1)-simplices τ and τ̂ are adjacent complete simplices if τ and τ̂ are both
J-complete facets of the same t-simplex σ of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN
with #J = t, or if τ is a J-complete facet of the complete t-simplex τ̂ of Σ(J) for some
non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t, or if τ̂ is a J-complete facet of the complete
t-simplex τ of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t.
The algorithm will generate a finite sequence of adjacent complete simplices. Theorem
12.4.6 makes a statement concerning the number of adjacent complete simplices when
some complete simplex is given.
Theorem 12.4.6
Consider the labelling function f̂ : QN
δ̃
→ IN and let a triangulation Σ of QNδ̃ be given.
Let τ be a J-complete facet of a t-simplex of Σ(J) for some non-empty subset J of IN
with #J = t. If τ = {0N} or if τ is a subset of Q̃N
δ̃
, then τ has exactly one adjacent
complete simplex. Otherwise, there exist exactly two adjacent complete simplices to τ.
Proof
Let τ = {0N}. Then τ is J-complete with J = {f̂(0N)}. Since Σ({f̂(0N)}) is a triangu-
lation of A({f̂(0N)}) and {0N} is a facet in rb(A({f̂(0N)})), it holds by Definition 2.7.1
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of a triangulation that there is a unique 1-simplex σ of Σ({f̂(0N)}) such that {0N} is a
facet of σ. By Lemma 12.4.3, either σ is a J-complete facet of a 2-simplex of Σ(J) for
precisely one non-empty subset J of IN , or σ has exactly one other {f̂(0N)}-complete
facet τ̂ . This yields exactly one adjacent complete simplex to {0N}. Since {0N} has no
facets, there can be no other adjacent complete simplex to {0N}.
Let τ be a subset of Q̃N
δ̃
, so τ lies in the relative boundary of A(J). By the properties
of a triangulation, there is a unique t-simplex σ of Σ(J) containing τ as a facet. By
Lemma 12.4.3, either σ is a J-complete facet of a (t + 1)-simplex of Σ(J) for precisely
one non-empty subset J of IN , or σ has exactly one other J-complete facet τ̂ . This yields
one adjacent complete simplex to τ. Obviously, τ is not a subset of A(J) for any proper
subset J of J, so there can be no other adjacent complete simplex to τ.
Now consider the case τ 6= {0N} and τ is not a subset of Q̃N
δ̃
. There are two possibilities,
either τ ⊂ rb(A(J)) or τ ⊂ ri(A(J)).
Let τ be a subset of rb(A(J)). Then, by the properties of a triangulation, there is a
unique t-simplex σ in A(J) having τ as a facet. By Lemma 12.4.3, either σ is a J-
complete facet of a (t+ 1)-simplex of Σ(J) for precisely one non-empty subset J of IN ,
or σ has exactly one other J-complete facet τ̂ . This yields one adjacent complete simplex
to τ. Since τ ⊂ rb(A(J)), it holds that q ∈ Q̃N
δ̃
, ∀q ∈ τ, or there exists j′ ∈ IN such that
qj′ = 0, ∀q ∈ τ. Since τ is not a subset of Q̃Nδ̃ , it follows that qj′ = 0, ∀q ∈ τ. Notice that
j′ is uniquely determined since τ is a (t − 1)-simplex. Since τ 6= {0N} it follows that
J \{j′} 6= ∅, so τ ∈ Σ(J \{j′}). By Lemma 12.4.4 it holds that precisely one facet of τ is
(J \ {j′})-complete and the second adjacent complete simplex to τ is obtained. Clearly,
there can be no other adjacent complete simplex to τ.
Let τ be a subset of ri(A(J)). Then, by the definition of a triangulation, Definition 2.7.1,
it holds that τ is a facet of exactly two simplices of Σ(J). Applying Lemma 12.4.3 twice
shows that τ has exactly two adjacent complete simplices. It is easily verified that there
cannot be any other adjacent complete simplex to τ. Q.E.D.
The following theorem states that there exists a unique finite sequence of adjacent com-
plete simplices such that the first simplex in the sequence is equal to {0N} and the last




Consider the labelling function f̂ : QN
δ̃
→ IN and let a triangulation Σ of QNδ̃ be given.
Then there exists a unique finite sequence of complete simplices τ 1, . . . , τk
′
such that
τ 1 = {0N}, τk′ ⊂ Q̃N
δ̃
, and any two successive simplices in the finite sequence are adjacent
complete simplices.
Proof
Clearly, τ 1 is {f̂(0N)}-complete. Let τ 2 be the unique adjacent complete simplex to τ 1
that exists according to Theorem 12.4.6. If τk, for some k ∈ IN \ {1}, is not a subset
of Q̃N
δ̃
, then there exists by Theorem 12.4.6 a unique adjacent complete simplex τk+1
not being equal to τk−1. If τk, for some k ∈ IN \ {1}, is a subset of Q̃N
δ̃
, then there
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exists by Theorem 12.4.6 no adjacent complete simplex different from τk−1. So, after




or, due to the finiteness of the number of facets of simplices in Σ(J) for
every non-empty subset J of IN , τ
k′ has been generated before. However, applying the
well-known door-in-door-out principle of Lemke and Howson (1964), see also the proof
of Theorem 5.2.7, it follows from Theorem 12.4.6 that each J-complete facet of a simplex




Now the steps of the algorithm generating the simplices τ 1, . . . , τk
′
of Theorem 12.4.7
are described in detail.
Algorithm 12.4.8 (Simplicial algorithm with integer labelling)
Consider the labelling function f̂ : QN
δ̃
→ IN and let a triangulation Σ of QNδ̃ be given.
The simplicial algorithm on QN
δ̃
with integer labelling has the following steps.
Step 0. Let k = 1, t = 1, τk = τ(0N), J = {f̂(0N)}, and let qt+1 be the unique vertex
of the simplex of Σ(J) containing τk as the facet opposite to it.
Step 1. Let σ be equal to the convex hull of τk∪{qt+1}. If f̂(qt+1) /∈ J, then go to Step 3.
Otherwise, there is a unique vertex q of σ such that q 6= qt+1 and f̂(q) = f̂(qt+1).
Step 2. Increase the value of k by 1 and let τk be the facet of σ opposite q. If there
exists j′ ∈ J such that τk ∈ Σ(J \ {j′}), then let J be equal to J \ {j′} and go to
Step 4. If τk ⊂ Q̃N
δ̃
, then the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, there is exactly one
t-simplex σ of Σ(J) such that σ 6= σ and τk is a facet of σ. Go to Step 1 with qt+1
as the unique vertex of σ opposite τk.
Step 3. Let J be equal to J ∪ {f̂(qt+1)}. There is a unique (t + 1)-simplex σ of Σ(J)
having σ as a facet. Increase the value of both k and t by 1 and go to Step 1 with
qt+1 as the unique vertex of σ opposite σ, J = J, and τk = σ.
Step 4. Let σ be equal to τk. Let q̂ be the unique vertex of σ such that f̂(q̂) = j′. Decrease
the value of t by 1 and go to Step 2 with q = q̂ and J = J.
The only difference with Algorithm 5.2.8 concerns the criterion for termination of the
algorithm. Algorithm 5.2.8 terminates with a simplex carrying all the labels of the set
IN+1. Algorithm 12.4.8 terminates when reaching the set Q̃
N
δ̃
. The algorithm is illustrated
in Figure 12.4.1.
In Figure 12.4.1 the algorithm starts with the {2}-complete simplex τ 1 = {0N} being
a facet of a uniquely determined 1-simplex τ 2 of Σ({2}). The algorithm terminates with
the {2}-complete simplex τ 16 = {(0, 1 − δ̃)⊤} of Σ({2}). After the starting simplex
τ 1 the algorithm generates three {1, 2}-complete simplices τ 2, τ 3, and τ 4 being facets
of simplices of Σ({1, 2}). Then the {1}-complete simplex τ 5 and nine {1, 2}-complete
simplices τ 6 up to τ 14 are generated. Finally, two {2}-complete simplices τ 15 and τ 16
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Figure 12.4.1. Illustration of the algorithm, N = 2.
are obtained. The barycentres of any two adjacent complete simplices generated by the
algorithm have been joined by a straight line.
Given any triangulation Σ ofQN
δ̃
, the algorithm generates a finite sequence of adjacent





. Observe that τ 1 = {0N} induces the
trivial RDEλ with full rationing on demand on the markets of all real commodities. In
the following theorem it is shown that the maximal absolute value of the total excess
demand, ‖ẑ(q)‖∞, at any point q of a simplex of Σ containing any of the adjacent
complete simplices generated by the algorithm, can be made arbitrarily small by taking
the mesh size of Σ small enough.
Theorem 12.4.9
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Let Σ be a triangulation of QN
δ̃
. Then, for every J-complete simplex
generated by Algorithm 12.4.8, it holds that N ∈ J. Moreover, for every ε ∈ IR++, there
exists δ ∈ IR++ such that if mesh(Σ) < δ and σ ∈ Σ contains one of the adjacent com-
plete simplices generated by Algorithm 12.4.8, then ‖ẑ(q)‖∞ < ε, ∀q ∈ σ.
Proof
Let some J-complete facet τ(q1, . . . , qt) of a simplex of Σ(J) generated by the algorithm
be given.
Suppose N /∈ J. Then qN = 0, ∀q ∈ τ. For every k ∈ It, it holds by Theorem 12.3.5 that
ẑj(q
k) ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ IN−1. For every k ∈ It, it holds by Theorem 12.3.4 that p̂(qk) · ẑ(qk) = 0,
so ẑN (q
k) ≤ 0. Hence, for every k ∈ It, f̂(qk) = N, a contradiction with N 6∈ J. Conse-
quently, N ∈ J.
Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. Let δ ∈ IR++ be such that q1, q2 ∈ QNδ̃ and ‖q1 − q2‖∞ < δ
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implies
‖ẑ(q1)− ẑ(q2)‖∞ <




Since ẑ is a continuous function by Theorem 12.3.4 and QN
δ̃
is compact, such a δ exists by
Theorem 2.7.10. Let σ ∈ Σ be any N -simplex containing one of the adjacent complete
simplices generated by the algorithm. Then there exists a non-empty subset J of IN
with #J = t and a J-complete simplex τ(q1, . . . , qt) ⊂ A(J) being contained by σ. For
every j ∈ J, there exists a vertex qk of τ for some k ∈ It such that ẑj(qk) ≤ 0. For every
j ∈ IN \J, for every q ∈ τ, j 6= N and qj = 0, so by Theorem 12.3.4, ẑj(q) ≤ 0. Therefore,
for every j ∈ IN , there exists q ∈ τ such that ẑj(q) ≤ 0.
Let some q ∈ σ be given. Since mesh(Σ) < δ, it follows from the previous paragraph and
from (12.5) that
ẑj(q) <
min({p̃(λ) |  ∈ IN})
∑
∈IN p̃(λ/δ̃)
ε < ε, ∀j ∈ IN . (12.6)











>−ε, ∀j ∈ IN .
Q.E.D.
The next corollary follows immediately from Theorem 12.4.9 but also from the fact that
ẑ(0N) = 0N . The corollary implies that initially only the price level is increased.
Corollary 12.4.10
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then f̂(0N) = N.
If ‖ẑ(q)‖∞ < ε for some q ∈ QNδ̃ , then it is easily verified that (p̂(q), l̂(q), L̂(q), d̂(q))
satisfies all the properties of an ε-RDEλ̂(q), except possibly the requirement that there
is no demand rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity. Notice that, for
every q ∈ QN
δ̃
, for every i ∈ IM , L̂iN (q) = L̃iN (q1, . . . , qN−1, 1) > ω̃N − ωiN and L̂iN (q) is
independent of the choice of q. Let q be some element of QN
δ̃
. So, if ε < min({L̂iN(q) −
ω̃N + ω
i
N | i ∈ IM}) and ‖ẑ(q)‖∞ < ε for some q ∈ QNδ̃ , then, for every i ∈ IM ,
d̂iN(q)− ωiN ≤ ẑN (q) + ω̃N − ωiN < ε+ ω̃N − ωiN < L̂iN (q) = L̂iN (q)










∣∣∣∃j ∈ IN−1, qj = 1
}
.






∣∣∣ i ∈ IM
})
. (12.7)
Using the previous paragraph and Theorem 12.3.2 it follows that, for every q ∈ QN
δ̃
, for
every ε < ε̂, if ‖ẑ(q)‖∞ < ε and q ∈ Q̂Nδ̃ , then q induces the ε-PDE (p̂(q), l̂(q), L̂(q), d̂(q)).
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Theorem 12.4.11
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then, for every ε ∈ IR++, there exists a piecewise linear, continu-
ous function π : [0, 1] → QN
δ̃
such that (p̂(π(0)), l̂(π(0)), L̂(π(0)), d̂(π(0))) is the triv-
ial RDEλ, for every t ∈ [0, 1], (p̂(π(t)), l̂(π(t)), L̂(π(t)), d̂(π(t))) is an ε-RDEλ̂(π(t)), and
(p̂(π(1)), l̂(π(1)), L̂(π(1)), d̂(π(1))) is an ε-PDE.
Proof
Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. There is no loss of generality in assuming that ε < ε̂.
Choose δ as in Theorem 12.4.9, let Σ be a triangulation of QN
δ̃
with mesh(Σ) < δ, and
consider the sequence τ 1, . . . , τk
′
of adjacent complete simplices generated by Algorithm
12.4.8 given the triangulation Σ. Every simplex in this sequence is a J-complete facet of
a simplex of Σ(J) for some J ⊂ IN . For every k ∈ Ik′ , let bk denote the barycentre of
τk. Clearly, b1 = 0N . By the definition of adjacent complete simplices it holds that for
every k ∈ Ik′−1 there exists σ ∈ Σ containing both bk and bk+1. Recall from Section 2.2
that, for t ∈ IR, ⌊t⌋ denotes the greatest integer which is less than or equal to t. Let the
function π : [0, 1]→ QN
δ̃
be defined by
π(t) = (1− (k′ − 1)t+ ⌊(k′ − 1)t⌋)b⌊1+(k′−1)t⌋




From the convexity of simplices and from Theorem 12.4.9 it follows that π is a continu-
ous, piecewise linear function, π(0) yields the trivial RDEλ, and, for every t ∈ [0, 1], π(t)
induces an ε-RDEλ̂(π(t)). It remains to be verified that π(1) induces an ε-PDE, or, equiv-
alently, π(1) ∈ Q̂N
δ̃
. Clearly, π(1) ∈ Q̃N
δ̃
, so it is sufficient to show that πN(1) < 1− δ̃.
Suppose πN (1) = 1− δ̃. Let q1, . . . , qt be the vertices of τk′. Then, since π(1) = bk′ , being
the barycentre of τk
′
, it holds for every k ∈ It that qkN = 1 − δ̃ and by Lemma 12.3.6
that ẑN(q
k) > 0, so f̂(qk) 6= N. Hence, τk′ is J-complete for a non-empty subset J of IN
not containing N, a contradiction with Theorem 12.4.9. Q.E.D.
To conclude this section the path π : [0, 1] → QN
δ̃
of Theorem 12.4.11 joining π(0)
and π(1), inducing the trivial RDEλ and an ε-PDE, respectively, is considered for some
ε ∈ IR++. This path can be considered as a price and quantity adjustment process in
which, given fixed relative prices r̃ of the real commodities, the price level λ ∈ IR++ and
the rationing scheme L ∈ L̃(QN) are adjusted from the trivial equilibrium values λ = λ
and L = 0MN to values λ = λ̂(π(1)) and L = L̂(π(1)) inducing an ε-PDE. Starting at
the state q = 0N , it follows from Theorem 12.3.5 that raising the value of qj for some
j ∈ IN−1, without raising the value of qN , leads to a disequilibrium situation. This is
caused by the low price level λ. According to Corollary 12.4.10 the value of qN is increased
first, in order to increase the price level. Therefore, the price and quantity adjustment
process starts along the boundary of QN
δ̃
at which only the value of qN rises, i.e., only
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the price level increases. Because of this increasing price level the notional total excess
demand for the real commodities will decrease. Clearly, qN is prevented from increasing
to 1− δ̃ since Lemma 12.3.6 guarantees that there exists a positive total excess demand
of the numeraire commodity for values of qN greater than or equal to 1 − δ̃. So, there
must be a value of qN at which at least one consumer would like to sell at least one of
the real commodities. At this point the price and quantity adjustment process proceeds
by increasing the value of qj for some j ∈ IN−1. So, demand rationing on the market of
such a commodity is weakened and trade becomes possible in such a commodity. When
there are commodities with very low fixed prices with respect to other commodities, the
value of qj corresponding to these commodities will not change at first and there will
be full rationing on demand on the market of these commodities. Continuing along the
path, full rationing on demand on commodity j disappears as soon as at least one of
the consumers starts supplying this commodity. By adjusting the price level and the
rationing scheme, the economy remains approximately in equilibrium. Proceeding along
the path, finally the end point in Q̂N
δ̃
is reached. By Theorem 12.4.11 the value of qj is
equal to one at this end point for some j ∈ IN−1. So, by adjusting the price level and
the rationing scheme an ε-PDE has been reached.
12.5 The Long Run Price and Quantity Adjustment
Process
The adjustment process described in the previous section can be seen as short term
adjustment given fixed relative prices of the real commodities determined by r̃. In the
short run the relative prices are fixed and the markets must be equilibrated by means
of rationing. With a free price level, it follows from Section 12.4 that in order to obtain
a constrained equilibrium it is sufficient to impose demand rationing on at most N − 2
markets of the N − 1 real commodities. The real commodity on the market of which
there is no rationing can not be chosen a priori, but follows ex post from the adjustment
process. Following the arguments of van der Laan (1984) it is also possible to choose
this real commodity ex ante, by imposing supply rationing or demand rationing on the
markets of the other real commodities. In general, for fixed relative prices but a flexible
price level, equilibrium is obtained by rationing on the markets ofN−2 real commodities.
To reduce the number of markets with rationing, more price flexibility is needed, which
may be assumed to occur in the longer run. In the longer run not only the price level may
adjust, but also the relative prices of the commodities. This adjustment of the relative
prices will continue until the economy reaches an approximate Walrasian equilibrium
in which the notional total excess demand equals the total initial endowment. A well-
known price adjustment process is the Walrasian tatonnement process as formulated by
Samuelson (1941). That price adjustment process adjusts at any point in time the price
system proportional to the prevailing notional total excess demand. So, the tatonnement
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process is a local price adjustment process in the sense that at any price system reached
only the local information of the notional total excess demand at this price system is
used. The Walrasian tatonnement process has two drawbacks.
First, the local adjustment of the price system does not guarantee the convergence
of the process to a Walrasian equilibrium price system, see Section 3.12. In Chapter
10 it is shown that, generically, the price adjustment process introduced in van der
Laan and Talman (1987a) converges to a Walrasian equilibrium price system given any
initial starting price system and under standard assumptions on the consumption sets,
preference relations, and initial endowments. Therefore, the price adjustment process
of van der Laan and Talman (1987a) does not suffer from this drawback. Secondly, in
the Walrasian tatonnement process the total excess demand is not equal to zero as long
as the process has not reached the Walrasian equilibrium price system. So, trade must
be excluded until the Walrasian equilibrium price system has been reached. Also the
price adjustment process proposed in van der Laan and Talman (1987a) suffers from
this drawback. Moreover, as has been noticed in Veendorp (1975), the relevant market
signals for an adjustment process in the economic system are based on the effective
total excess demand associated with a Drèze equilibrium instead of the notional total
excess demand used in the price adjustment processes mentioned above. Veendorp (1975)
gives a price adjustment process which follows a path of constrained equilibria. In this
process the price system is adjusted as in the Walrasian tatonnement process, with the
notional total excess demand replaced by the effective total excess demand. Although a
convergence proof has been given for a model with three commodities if the total excess
demand function satisfies a gross substitutability condition, see also Laroque (1981) for a
correction of the original proof, in general the process might not converge to a Walrasian
equilibrium price system and even chaotic behaviour may be expected. The possibility
of chaotic behaviour has been confirmed in Böhm (1993) in a more complicated model
with overlapping generations, producers, and a government. In Movshovich (1994) a
stochastic price adjustment process in discrete time is introduced. It is assumed that at
each point in time a Drèze equilibrium results. It is shown that the process converges to
a Walrasian equilibrium (a.s.) if some conditions similar to gross substitutability of the
total excess demand function are satisfied.
In this chapter an alternative price and quantity adjustment process is considered in
which an approximate Walrasian equilibrium is reached along a path of approximate real
demand constrained equilibria. At any point along the path of this price and quantity
adjustment process the total excess demand is equal to zero and hence trade is possible.
This property allows one to give two interesting interpretations of the price and quantity
adjustment process. In the first interpretation agents enter the market every day with
their constant stock of daily initial endowments and with unchanging preference relations.
Based on the previous price system and rationing scheme, adjustment of the price system
and the rationing scheme takes place daily in such a way that the economy stays in
equilibrium, i.e., at the prevailing price system and rationing scheme the total excess
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demand is equal to zero on every market. After trade the consumers leave the market
and consume their commodity bundles. At the next day they enter the market again in
possession of their constant initial endowments.
The second interpretation stays closer to the usual interpretation of a tatonnement
process. Based on the total excess demand the price system and the rationing scheme is
changed until a Walrasian equilibrium price system is reached. This Walrasian equilib-
rium price system specifies a price for every commodity, both for present and for future
commodities. During the adjustment of the price system no trade takes place. As argued
by Blad (1978) it is not sufficient that a tatonnement process is convergent, convergence
should also be considerably fast. If convergence is guaranteed, but takes too long, then at
some point in time trade should take place at a non-Walrasian equilibrium price system.
In the price adjustment processes usually considered, it is not clear at all which alloca-
tion will result in such a case. In the price and quantity adjustment process proposed
in this chapter, at every point in time a uniquely specified allocation, compatible with a
real demand constrained equilibrium is obtained.
Given the short run rigidities, the price and quantity adjustment process adjusts
the price system along a path of approximate real demand constrained equilibria by
keeping the price of a commodity, on the market of which demand rationing prevails,
relatively equal to the price level λ, while the price of a commodity corresponding to
a market without demand rationing is allowed to decrease from the price level λ. This
reflects the natural property, known as the law of demand, that the ratio of prices of
a commodity with demand rationing and a commodity without rationing should be
increased. Therefore, for a given price level λ ∈ IR, define the set of admissible price




∣∣∣ pj ≤ λr̃j, ∀j ∈ IN−1, and pN = 1
}
.
Although λ now only reflects the maximal price ratio pj
r̃j
, this variable will still be called
the price level. Given some λ ∈ IR, the concept of an RDEλ is generalized in the following
definition.
Definition 12.5.1 (Generalized real demand constrained equilibrium with a
given price level)
Let some price level λ ∈ IR be given. A generalized real demand constrained equilibrium
with price level λ (GRDEλ) of the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run
rigidities r̃ is an element
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ P (λ)× l̃(QN)× L̃(QN )×X
satisfying




∗i −∑i∈IM ωi = 0N ,
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3. for every commodity j ∈ IN−1, x∗ij − ωij > l∗ij , ∀i ∈ IM ,
4. for every commodity j ∈ IN−1, p∗j < λr̃j implies L∗j > x∗ij − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM ,
5. for every consumer i ∈ IM , l∗iN < x∗iN − ωiN < L∗iN .
This definition reflects the standard condition in the theory of constrained equilibria that
in equilibrium rationing on a market may only occur if the price constraint is binding.
Let some price level λ ∈ IR++ be given. Clearly, there is no demand rationing on the
market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1 if the price pj is below λr̃j. On the other hand, demand
rationing on the market of a commodity j ∈ IN−1 may occur if the price of commodity
j is relatively equal to the price level λ, i.e., pj = λr̃j. Clearly, it holds that any RDEλ
is a GRDEλ. Notice that at an RDEλ a situation corresponding to Condition 4 of the
definition of a GRDEλ does not occur.
Any Walrasian equilibrium (WE) (p∗, x∗) of the economy E corresponds to a GRDEλ
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) with l∗ = l̃(1N) and L∗ = L̃(1N), for any price level λ satisfying λ ≥
max({p∗j
r̃j
| j ∈ IN−1}). Conversely, for every λ ∈ IR++, for every GRDEλ (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗)
with L∗ij > x
∗i
j −ωij , ∀i ∈ IM , ∀j ∈ IN−1, it holds that (p∗, x∗) is a Walrasian equilibrium
of E . Therefore, such a GRDEλ is also referred to as a Walrasian equilibrium.
In the remainder of this section attention is focused on approximate equilibria. Anal-
ogously to Definition 12.4.1 an approximate GRDEλ for a price level λ ∈ IR and an
approximate Walrasian equilibrium are defined as follows.
Definition 12.5.2 (ε-GRDEλ and ε-WE)
Let some price level λ ∈ IR and some ε ∈ IR+ be given. An ε-GRDEλ (ε-WE) of the
economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ is an element
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∈ P (λ)× l̃(QN)× L̃(QN )×X
such that all conditions of a GRDEλ (WE) are satisfied, except possibly the condition of




Obviously, for every λ ∈ IR it holds that a 0-GRDEλ is a GRDEλ. Moreover, for every
λ ∈ IR, for every ε ∈ IR+, it holds that an ε-RDEλ is an ε-GRDEλ. Furthermore, for
every ε-WE, there exists λ ∈ IR++ such that it is an ε-GRDEλ.
Now a price and quantity adjustment process is developed to obtain an ε-WE by
following a path of ε-GRDEλ’s. The set Q
N
δ̃








∣∣∣0 ≤ qN ≤ 1− δ̃, 0 ≤ qj ≤ 2, ∀j ∈ IN−1, and ∃j′ ∈ IN−1, qj′ ≤ 1
}
.




















∣∣∣ qj ≥ 1, ∀j ∈ IN−1
}
.





















































































































































. In Figure 12.5.1 these sets are depicted for the case N = 3.
The set R̂3
δ̃




to the striped area.
Define the functions λ̂ : RN
δ̃
→ IR++, p̂ : RNδ̃ → IR
N
++, l̂ : R
N
δ̃




λ̂(q) = λ1−qN , ∀q ∈ RNδ̃ , (12.8)
p̂j(q) = min({1, 2− qj})λ̂(q)r̃j, ∀j ∈ IN−1, ∀q ∈ RNδ̃ , (12.9)
p̂N (q) = 1, ∀q ∈ RNδ̃ , (12.10)





inf({(q1, . . . , qN−1, 1)⊤, 1N})
)
, ∀q ∈ RN
δ̃
. (12.12)
Notice that these functions are extensions of the functions λ̂, l̂, L̂, and p̂ defined in Section
12.3. Moreover, for every i ∈ IM , for every j ∈ IN−1, for every q ∈ RNδ̃ , p̂j(q) < λ̂(q)r̃j
implies L̂ij(q) > ω̃j − ωij.
Let some (p, li, Li) ∈ IRN+ × {l̃i(1N)} × L̃i(QN ) be given. From the Assumptions
A1-A5 it follows easily that the set δi(p, li, Li) of consumer i ∈ IM contains exactly one
element. Therefore, for every i ∈ IM , define the reduced demand function d̂i : RNδ̃ → IR
N







, ∀q ∈ RN
δ̃
.
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Define the reduced total excess demand function ẑ : RN
δ̃
→ IRN of the economy E with







ωi, ∀q ∈ RN
δ̃
.
The following results are the analogues of Theorem 12.3.1, Theorem 12.3.3, and Theorem
12.3.4, respectively, and can be shown in a similar way as Theorem 4.7.1, Theorem 4.7.2,
and Theorem 8.2.8, respectively.
Theorem 12.5.3
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Let some ε ∈ [0, ε̂) be given with ε̂ as defined in (12.7). If the element
q∗ of RN
δ̃
is such that ‖ẑ(q∗)‖∞ ≤ ε, then (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)) is an ε-GRDEλ̂(q∗).
Let some ε ∈ [0, ε̂) be given. Then (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)) is called the ε-GRDEλ̂(q∗)
induced by q∗ if q∗ ∈ RN
δ̃
is such that ‖ẑ(q∗)‖∞ ≤ ε.
Theorem 12.5.4
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the
Assumptions A1-A5. Let some price level λ ∈ [λ,→) and some ε ∈ [0, ε̂) be given.
If (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is an ε-GRDEλ, then there exists q
∗ ∈ RN
δ̃
such that ‖ẑ(q∗)‖∞ ≤
ε, while (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) ∼ (p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)), i.e., (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is equivalent to
(p̂(q∗), l̂(q∗), L̂(q∗), d̂(q∗)) in the sense of Definition 4.6.2.
From Theorem 12.5.4 it follows immediately that there is no loss of generality in con-
sidering only ε-GRDEλ’s for ε ∈ [0, ε̂), for λ ∈ [λ,→), being induced by elements of
RN
δ̃
. Therefore, q ∈ RN
δ̃
is called the state of the economy. In Theorem 12.5.4 it can
not be guaranteed that q∗ can be chosen such that λ̂(q∗) = λ if p̃(λ) ≫ p∗. However,
in this case (p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is also an ε-GRDEλ with λ = max({
p∗j
r̃j
| j ∈ IN−1}). In fact,
(p∗, l∗, L∗, x∗) is an ε-WE and the element q∗ given in Theorem 12.5.4 can be chosen such




| j ∈ IN−1}). The following lemma describes some properties of
the reduced total excess demand function ẑ.
Theorem 12.5.5
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then the reduced total excess demand function ẑ : RN
δ̃
→ IRN has the
following properties:
1. ẑ is continuous,
2. for every q ∈ RN
δ̃
, for every j ∈ IN−1, qj = 0 implies ẑj(q) ≤ 0,
3. for every q ∈ RN
δ̃
, p̂(q) · ẑ(q) = 0.
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The following result follows immediately from the definition of ẑ.
Theorem 12.5.6
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Let some q ∈ R̂N
δ̃
and ε ∈ [0, ε̂) be given. If (p̂(q), l̂(q), L̂(q), d̂(q)) is
an ε-GRDEλ̂(q), then it is an ε-WE.




Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Let some q ∈ RN
δ̃
with qN = 0 be given. Then, for every j ∈ IN−1,
ẑj(q) ≥ 0.
Proof







j′(q). It follows from Theorem 4.6.4 that {d̂i
′
(q)} = δi′(p̂(q), l̂i′(q), Li′),
where Li
′ ∈ L̃i′(QN) is defined by Li′j′ = L̃i
′





j (q), ∀j ∈ IN \ {j′}. Then
p̂j′ (q)
p̂N (q)
≤ λr̃j′ ≤ αi
′
,
so, from Lemma 12.2.4 it follows that d̂i
′
j′(q) > ω̃j′, a contradiction to ẑj′(q) < 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12.5.8
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Let some q ∈ RN
δ̃
with qN = 1 − δ̃ be given. Then it holds that
ẑN (q) > 0.
Proof
By definition of RN
δ̃






≤ (λmin({r̃j | j ∈ IN−1}))
2
λr̃j′
≤λmin({r̃j | j ∈ IN−1})≤min({αi | i ∈ IM}).
Hence, by Lemma 12.2.4 ẑN (q) > (M − 1)ω̃N ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 12.5.9
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then, for every q ∈ RN
δ̃
, for every j ∈ IN−1, qj = 2 implies ẑj(q) > 0.
Proof
Let some q ∈ RN
δ̃
and j ∈ IN−1 such that qj = 2 be given. Then p̂j(q) = 0 and
L̂ij(q) > ω̃j − ωij, ∀i ∈ IM . Since i, ∀i ∈ IM , is strongly monotonic, it follows that
ẑj(q) > 0. Q.E.D.
Now, for every ε ∈ IR++, the existence of a path of ε-GRDEλ’s leading from the trivial
RDEλ to an ε-WE can be shown.
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Theorem 12.5.10
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then, for every ε ∈ IR++, there exists a piecewise linear, continu-
ous function π : [0, 1] → RN
δ̃
such that (p̂(π(0)), l̂(π(0)), L̂(π(0)), d̂(π(0))) is the trivial
RDEλ, for every t ∈ [0, 1], (p̂(π(t)), l̂(π(t)), L̂(π(t)), d̂(π(t))) is an ε-GRDEλ̂(π(t)), and
(p̂(π(1)), l̂(π(1)), L̂(π(1)), d̂(π(1))) is an ε-WE.
Proof
Let some ε ∈ IR++ be given. Without loss of generality, assume that ε < ε̂. Moreover, let
some triangulation Σ of RN
δ̃
be given, for example an extension of the slight modification
of the K-triangulation discussed before. Although in the definition of a triangulation,
Definition 2.7.1, only convex sets are considered, this definition can be applied to RN
δ̃
as
well. For every q ∈ RN
δ̃
, let the set J(q) be defined by
J(q) = {j′ ∈ IN |ẑj′(q) = min({ẑj(q) | j ∈ IN})} .
Let the labelling function f̂ : RN
δ̃
→ IN be defined by
f̂(q) = max(J(q)), ∀q ∈ RN
δ̃
.
Now it is possible to extend the algorithm given in Section 12.4 to the set RN
δ̃
. For every





∣∣∣ qj = 0, ∀j ∈ IN \ J
}
.
Clearly, A(J) is a convex (#J)-dimensional subset of IRN for every subset J of IN . For
every non-empty subset J of IN , define the set Σ(J) by
Σ (J) = {τ ⊂ A (J) |∃σ ∈ Σ, τ is a (#J)-face of σ} .
The only modification of Algorithm 12.4.8 is in Step 2, where now termination takes
place if τk ⊂ R̃N
δ̃
. Again, each step in the algorithm is feasible by the properties of a
triangulation, and using the proof of Theorem 12.4.7 it can be shown that the algorithm
terminates, after generating a finite number of adjacent complete simplices, in Step 2
with a J-complete simplex being a subset of A(J)∩ R̃N
δ̃
for some non-empty subset J of
IN .
Let τ(q1, . . . , qt) be a J-complete facet of a simplex of Σ(J), for some non-empty subset
J of IN with #J = t, generated by the algorithm. As in the proof of Theorem 12.4.9 it
can be shown that for every j ∈ J there exists k ∈ It such that ẑj(qk) ≤ 0. Moreover,
for every q ∈ τ, for every j ∈ IN \ J, it holds that j 6= N and ẑj(q) ≤ 0. Let δ ∈ IR++ be
such that q1, q2 ∈ RN
δ̃
and ‖q1 − q2‖∞ < δ implies
‖ẑ(q1)− ẑ(q2)‖∞ <
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Since ẑ is a continuous function by Theorem 12.5.5 and RN
δ̃
is compact, such a δ exists by
Theorem 2.7.10. Let q be an arbitrary element of a simplex of Σ containing τ(q1, . . . , qt).
Let the triangulation Σ be such that mesh(Σ) ≤ δ. Then, for every j ∈ IN ,
ẑj(q) <




Consider some j′ ∈ IN . If p̂j′(q) < λr̃j′, then qj′ > 1, so L̂j′(q) = L̃j′(q̂) for some q̂ ∈ QN
with q̂j′ = 1. Now it follows from Lemma 12.2.4 that ẑj′(q) > 0. If p̂j′(q) ≥ λr̃j′, then,
as in the proof of Theorem 12.4.9, ẑj′(q) > −ε. Therefore, (p̂(q), l̂(q), L̂(q), d̂(q)) is an
ε-GRDEλ̂(q).
Consider the sequence τ 1, . . . , τk
′
of simplices generated by the algorithm and, for every
k ∈ Ik′, let bk denote the barycentre of τk. Let the function π : [0, 1] → RNδ̃ be defined
as in the proof of Theorem 12.4.11, so
π(t) = (1− (k′ − 1)t+ ⌊(k′ − 1)t⌋)b⌊1+(k′−1)t⌋




Then, for every t ∈ [0, 1], π(t) induces an ε-GRDEλ̂(π(t)). It will be shown that π(1)
induces an ε-WE, or according to Theorem 12.5.6, π(1) ∈ R̂N
δ̃
. Since the algorithm
terminates with a simplex having a J-complete facet τk
′
(q1, . . . , qt) being a subset of
A(J) ∩ R̃N
δ̃
for some non-empty subset J of IN with #J = t, it holds that π(1) ∈ R̃Nδ̃ .
Suppose bk
′
N = 1− δ̃. Then N ∈ J and qkN = 1− δ̃, ∀k ∈ It. For every k ∈ It, by Lemma
12.5.8 ẑN (q
k) > 0, so f̂(qk) 6= N, a contradiction with N ∈ J and τk′ being J-complete.
Consequently, bk
′
N < 1− δ̃.
Suppose there exists j′ ∈ IN−1 such that bk′j′ = 2. Then j′ ∈ J and qkj′ = 2, ∀k ∈ It.
For every k ∈ It, by Lemma 12.5.9 ẑj′(qk) > 0 and so f̂(qk) 6= j′, yielding again a
contradiction. Consequently, bk
′
j < 2, ∀j ∈ IN−1.
Now it follows immediately that π(1) ∈ R̂N
δ̃
. Q.E.D.
12.6 The Existence of Generalized Real Demand Con-
strained Equilibria
So far the existence of a continuous piecewise linear path of ε-GRDEλ’s has been shown
for every ε ∈ IR++. In this section the case ε = 0 will be considered. It is conjectured
that under suitable differentiability conditions on consumption sets and preference rela-
tions the path of points q∗ ∈ RN
δ̃
satisfying ẑ(q∗) = 0N is, generically, a 1-dimensional
piecewise differentiable manifold with boundary. Moreover, one of the components of
this 1-dimensional manifold with boundary is homeomorphic to the unit interval and




12.6 The Existence of Generalized Real Demand Constrained Equilibria 403
Walrasian equilibrium. In this section another approach will be taken. No differentiabil-
ity assumptions will be made, instead only the Assumptions A1-A5 are used. The result,
being that the set of points q∗ ∈ RN
δ̃
satisfying ẑ(q∗) = 0N has a component containing
both the point 0N and a point in R̂N
δ̃
, holds for every economy satisfying the previously
mentioned assumptions. The proof of the result follows the approach of Chapter 5 and








Let a non-empty, compact subset S of IRm be given and define the function dS : IR
m → IR
by
dS(s) = min({‖s− s‖∞ | s ∈ S}), ∀s ∈ IRm.
In Lemma 5.3.2 it is shown that the function dS is continuous. Let S
1 and S2 be non-
empty, compact subsets of IRm. Define e(S1, S2) ∈ IR+ by
e(S1, S2) = min
({
‖s1 − s2‖∞
∣∣∣ s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2
})
.
Obviously, if S1 and S2 are disjoint, then e(S1, S2) > 0.
Theorem 12.6.1
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then the set Q̃ has a component containing 0N and an element of
R̂N
δ̃
, i.e., there exists a connected set of elements of RN
δ̃
inducing a set of GRDEλ’s con-
taining both the trivial RDEλ and a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof
For every n ∈ IN, let πn denote a function π obtained in Theorem 12.5.10 satisfying
‖ẑ(πn(t))‖∞ < 1n , ∀t ∈ [0, 1]. Consider an accumulation point of the sequence (πn(1))n∈IN
in R̂N
δ̃
, say q∗. Clearly, q∗ ∈ R̂N
δ̃
, ẑ(q∗) = 0N , and q∗ induces a Walrasian equilibrium.
Moreover, 0N ∈ Q̃ and q∗ ∈ Q̃.
Suppose q∗ is not an element of the component of 0N . Since it follows easily that Q̃ is
compact, it holds by Lemma 5.3.4 that there exist disjoint, compact sets Q̃1 and Q̃2
such that 0N ∈ Q̃1, q∗ ∈ Q̃2, and Q̃1 ∪ Q̃2 = Q̃. Hence, there exists ε ∈ IR++ such that
e(Q̃1, Q̃2) > ε. Consider a subsequence (πn
m
)m∈IN with ‖πnm(1) − q∗‖∞ < ε2 , ∀m ∈ IN.













, ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
From the continuity of the functions dQ̃1, dQ̃2, and π
nm , ∀m ∈ IN, it follows that the
function fm, ∀m ∈ IN, is continuous. Moreover, for every m ∈ IN, fm(0) < −ε




nm(tm)) > ε2 , ∀m ∈ IN. Consider the sequence
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(πn
m
(tm))m∈IN in the compact set R
N
δ̃
. Without loss of generality, (πn
m
(tm))m∈IN con-
verges to some q ∈ RN
δ̃




































a contradiction is obtained. Q.E.D.
Corollary 12.6.2
Let the economy E = ((X i,i, ωi)i∈IM , (l̃, L̃)) with short run rigidities r̃ satisfy the As-
sumptions A1-A5. Then there exists a connected set of GRDEλ’s containing the trivial
RDEλ and a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof
Consider the set of GRDEλ̂(q)’s
{




with Q̃0 the component of 0N in Q̃. By Theorem 12.6.1 the set above contains the
trivial RDEλ and a Walrasian equilibrium, and since the image of a connected set by a
continuous function is connected by Theorem 2.3.13, the corollary follows. Q.E.D.
12.7 The Adjustment Process to a Walrasian Equi-
librium
In this section the path followed by the price and quantity adjustment process is consid-
ered for some given ε ∈ IR++. As has been shown in Section 12.4, the path first proceeds
from the trivial RDEλ to an ε-PDE. At the state q inducing the ε-PDE it holds that
qj = 1 for at least one j ∈ IN−1, implying that there is no rationing on the market of at
least one real commodity. Then the price and quantity adjustment process continues by
keeping the relative prices of the commodities corresponding to markets with demand
rationing maximal and by allowing a decrement of the relative price of commodities cor-
responding to markets without rationing by increasing the value of the corresponding
variable qj. In order to keep the total excess demand equal to zero, the process adjusts
simultaneously the prices of the real commodities corresponding to markets without ra-
tioning, the price level, and the rationing schemes of the real commodities with prices
still on their relative upper bound. The commodities corresponding to markets without
rationing correspond to the indices j ∈ IN−1 with qj > 1. As soon as for some j ∈ IN−1
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Figure 12.7.1. Illustration of the path in the (q1, q2)-space.
the value of qj becomes equal to one from below, the regime on the market of commod-
ity j switches from rationing adjustment under a fixed relative price to price adjustment
without rationing, while the reverse happens if the value of qj becomes equal to one from
above. Finally, the process reaches a point at which qj , ∀j ∈ IN−1, is equal to or greater
than one and hence an ε-WE is obtained. A typical example of the process is illustrated
in Figure 12.7.1 for N = 3 by drawing the projection of the path in the (q1, q2)-space.
Initially only the value of q3 increases. This means that the projection in the (q1, q2)-
space does not change and remains equal to the point (0, 0)⊤. Suppose next that a
consumer starts to supply commodity 1. Then also the value of q1 starts to increase. So,
the projection goes from (0, 0)⊤ in the direction of the point q1, generating ε-RDEλ̂(q)’s
by weakening demand rationing on the market of commodity 1 according to the value
of q1 and changing the price level according to the value of q3. At the point q
1 also the
value of q2 becomes positive, meaning that there is no longer full rationing on demand
on the market of commodity 2. At the point q2 the path reaches an ε-PDE without
rationing on the market of commodity 1. Then the path continues with values of q1 above
one. This part of the path induces ε-GRDEλ̂(q)’s in which for commodity 1 a situation
corresponding to Condition 4 of Definition 12.5.1 occurs, i.e., no demand rationing on the
market of commodity 1, while the price of this commodity is below the maximum value
at the current price level. This level is still determined by the value of q3. At the point
q3 a second ε-PDE is reached. From this point on the path induces again ε-RDEλ̂(q)’s
with demand rationing on the market of both commodities, until point q4 is reached with
q2 = 1. From this point the path induces ε-GRDEλ̂(q)’s without rationing on the market
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Figure 12.7.2. The partition of the (p1, p2)-space in disequilibrium regimes.
of commodity 2 until at point q∗ the price and quantity adjustment process reaches a
state inducing an ε-WE. Notice that along the path initially the value of q3 increases.
However, in general it is not guaranteed that the value of q3 increases monotonically.
Along some parts of the path it is possible that the value of q3, determining the price
level, will decrease in order to keep the total excess demand equal to zero.
Using the definition of p̂(q) it is possible to translate the picture of Figure 12.7.1 in
the (q1, q2)-space to the picture of Figure 12.7.3 in the (p1, p2)-space. Notice that p3 = 1
is fixed. Figure 12.7.2 is to be considered first.
Assuming that there is no rationing on the market of the numeraire commodity, the
several rationing regimes related to the values of p1 and p2 are drawn in Figure 12.7.2.
The point p∗ denotes the Walrasian equilibrium values of the prices of commodities 1
and 2. The curves going through this point separate the different rationing regimes.
At a point in Region IV the values of p1 and p2 are rather high and supply rationing
on the markets of both commodities is needed in order to equilibrate the markets. In
Region II (III) the value of p2 (p1) is rather low and therefore demand rationing on the
market of commodity 2 (commodity 1) and supply rationing on the market of commodity
1 (commodity 2) is needed. At a point in Region I demand rationing on both markets
occurs. At the intersection of two regions rationing occurs on only one of the markets, for
instance demand rationing on the market of commodity 2 at the intersection of Region I
and Region II. At this point the market of commodity 1 switches from demand rationing
in Region I to supply rationing in Region II. Of course, at the point p∗ the markets are
equilibrated without rationing and the Walrasian equilibrium price system is obtained.
The regions are drawn again in Figure 12.7.3. In this figure the ray from (0, 0)⊤
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Figure 12.7.3. Illustration of the path in the (p1, p2)-space.
through p0 represents the initially fixed relative prices of the real commodities. At any
point on this line it holds that pj = λr̃j, ∀j ∈ I2, for some price level λ ∈ IR+. Point
p0 corresponds to the price level λ. At this point the trivial RDEλ is obtained with full
rationing on demand on the market of both commodities. Translating Figure 12.7.1 to
Figure 12.7.3 the path starts at this point p0. Increasing the value of q3 corresponds to an
increase of the price level and hence in Figure 12.7.3 the path goes upwards along the ray
of fixed relative prices, until at the point p0
′
some consumer starts to supply commodity
1. This point still corresponds to the point (0, 0)⊤ in Figure 12.7.1, because (0, 0)⊤ is the
projection of the part of the path along which only q3 increases. At the point p
0′ the full
rationing on demand is relaxed by allowing that q1 becomes positive. Going from (0, 0)
⊤
to q1 in Figure 12.7.1 corresponds to going from p0
′
to p1 in Figure 12.7.3. The path from
(0, 0)⊤ to q1 shows that demand rationing on the market of commodity 1 is weakened,
while the path from p0
′
to p1 shows that the price level increases simultaneously. At the
point q1 also q2 becomes positive. Continuing along the path in Figure 12.7.1 from q
1 to
q2, Figure 12.7.3 shows that simultaneously the price level, i.e., λ̂(q), increases until at
the point p2, corresponding to the point q2 in Figure 12.7.1, the border between Region
I and Region II is reached, at which the market regime for commodity 1 switches from
demand rationing into supply rationing. At this point the path in Figure 12.7.1 continues
with values of q1 above 1 and hence with price p1 below the maximum according to the
price level, while the markets are kept in equilibrium without rationing on the market
of commodity 1. In Figure 12.7.3 this is illustrated by the fact that the path leaves




, by following the
curve between Region I and Region II. At the point p3, corresponding to the point q3 in
408 Equilibrium Adjustment of Disequilibrium Prices
Figure 12.7.1, this curve again meets the ray of fixed relative prices. Observe that going
along this curve from p2 to p3, the absolute value of p2 first is increasing and afterwards
decreasing, showing that the price level and hence q3 does not increase monotonically.
Continuing at the point q3 the path in Figure 12.7.1 again induces an equilibrium with
fixed relative prices and demand rationing on both markets, and hence the corresponding
path in Figure 12.7.3 continues along the ray through p0 going further upwards in Region
I. At this part of the path the price level increases again. At the point p4, corresponding
to the point q4 in Figure 12.7.1, the border between Region I and Region III is reached.
Now the path continues along the curve between these regions, keeping the markets in
equilibrium by allowing the price of commodity 2 to vary below the allowed maximum
value, so q2 > 1, and by imposing a demand constraint on the market of commodity 1, so
q1 < 1, until at the point p
∗ corresponding to the point q∗ in Figure 12.7.1 the Walrasian
equilibrium values of the prices of commodities 1 and 2 are reached.
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Drèze equilibrium with respect to a given market,
146, 180, 201, 240
Dynamic general equilibrium model, 3





Economic system, 1, 235













Equilibrium, 1, 4, 5, 87
approximate generalized real demand constrained
with a given price level, 397
approximate proper demand constrained, 386
approximate real demand constrained, 386
classical unemployment, 147
constrained, 7, 133, 164, 201, 230, 240
constrained with a given price level, 379
demand constrained, 11, 151, 180, 207
demand constrained with a given price level,
379
directional political economic, 284
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induced Drèze, 243, 269, 341
induced generalized real demand constrained
with a given price level, 399
induced proper demand constrained, 384
induced real demand constrained with a given
price level, 383
Keynesian unemployment, 147
locally unique Walrasian, 277
Nash, 13, 249, 250, 270, 284
Nash in mixed strategies, 250
Nash in pure strategies, 250
political economic, 8, 250, 270
proper demand constrained, 382




supply constrained, 11, 148, 180, 207
supply constrained with a given price level,
379
trivial constrained, 142, 379
trivial demand constrained, 11, 142, 164
trivial real demand constrained with a given
price level, 382
trivial supply constrained, 11, 142, 164
Walrasian, 5, 87, 138, 241, 276, 303, 338, 378
Equilibrium price system, 5
Equilibrium relation, 11, 154
Equilibrium stability question, 3
Equilibrium state, 1, 5
Equivalence relation, 34
Equivalent constrained equilibria, 135
Equivalent economies, 135
Equivalent rationing schemes, 123
Equivalent rationing schemes on demand, 123
Equivalent rationing schemes on supply, 123
Equivalent rationing systems, 123
Equivalent rationing systems on demand, 123





Expected plurality, 8, 249, 270
Extended integer, 50
Extended natural number, 50
Extended non-negative integer, 50
Extended real number, 50
Extension of a function, 23









First fundamental welfare theorem, 10, 90
First order partial derivative, 55
Fixed point, 38
Flexible rationing function, 126
Flexible rationing function on demand, 126
Flexible rationing function on supply, 126
Flexible rationing system, 121
Index 427
Flexible rationing system on demand, 121





Frontier of a set, 25
Full rationing, 11
Full rationing on demand, 121








critical point of, 64


















r-th order partial derivative, 55








regular point of, 64
regular value of, 64
representation of, 33
restriction of, 23






r times continuously differentiable, 55, 57
twice continuously differentiable, 55
Game, 13, 249, 270, 284
Gauss map, 64
Gaussian curvature, 64
General equilibrium model, 1
dynamic, 3
General equilibrium theory, 1
Generalized real demand constrained equilibrium
with a given price level, 396
Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem, 39






of K-triangulation of Qm, 41
of V -triangulation of ∆m−1, 44
of V -triangulation of Qm, 47
Gross substitutability in the finite increment form,
6, 97, 325
Hausdorff space, 24
Homeomorphic topological spaces, 26
Homeomorphism, 26
Homogeneity of degree zero, 85
Homotopy method, 9
Ichiishi Lemma, 12, 227, 228
Image
of a set by a function, 23
of a set by a relation, 33
of an element by a function, 23
of an element by a relation, 33
Incomplete markets, 9
Increasing function, 34







Indirect utility function, 245, 269
Indivisible commodity, 9
Induced constrained equilibrium, 141, 164
Induced Drèze equilibrium, 243, 269, 341
Induced generalized real demand constrained equi-
librium with a given price level, 399
Induced proper demand constrained equilibrium,
384
Induced real demand constrained equilibrium with
a given price level, 383
Induced topology, 24
Infimum of a set, 34
Initial endowment, 4, 83, 108, 163, 235, 268, 303,
337, 378
regular, 311, 312, 368




of a consumer, 70















of a function, 23
of a matrix, 32
Inverse function theorem, 56
Inverse image
of a set by a function, 23
of a set by a relation, 34
Invertible matrix, 32
Invisible hand, 5
Irreversibility of production, 73
Joined by a path, 26
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, 38, 39
Keynesian unemployment equilibrium, 147
KKM Lemma, 12, 226
KKMS Lemma, 12, 228, 229
Label, 164
Labelling function, 164, 386
proper, 164
Law of demand, 96, 396
Lebesgue covering, 52
Lebesgue measure, 53
Lebesgue measure zero in a manifold, 65
Lebesgue outer measure, 52
Lexicographic pivot step, 193, 195
Lexicographic preference relation, 78
Lexicographically positive row vector, 190
Lexicopositive matrix, 190
Limit, 26, 50, 94
Limit point, 25
Linear activity model, 73, 307
Linear function, 32
Linear topological space, 39
Local Cr coordinates, 59
Local option, 13, 283
Locally compact topological space, 30
Locally constant function, 351
Locally finite partition, 29
Locally non-satiated preference relation, 78
Locally stable dynamic process, 94




of a set, 34
on a price, 117
on a price system, 117, 235, 338




k-dimensional piecewise Cr, 59
k-dimensional topological, 59
Lebesgue measure zero in, 65
tangent space of, 59
Manifold with boundary, 61
Manifold with generalized boundary
dimension of, 61
k-dimensional Cr, 60
relative boundary of, 61
relative interior of, 61
tangent cone of, 63





Market independent rationing function, 126
Market independent rationing function on demand,
126
Market independent rationing function on supply,
126
Market independent rationing system, 121
Market independent rationing system on demand,
121
Market independent rationing system on supply,
121
Market mechanism, 4, 71
Market share rationing function, 125
Market share rationing system, 120
Matrix, 32
column of, 32
column space of, 33










Matrix of partial derivatives, 55
Maximal element of a set, 35
























Minimal element of a set, 35






Minimum of a set, 35
Mixed extension of a game, 249
Mixed strategy, 13, 250
Monotonic preference relation, 79
Monotonic rationing function, 126
Monotonic rationing function on demand, 126
Monotonic rationing function on supply, 126
Monotonic rationing system, 122
Monotonic rationing system on demand, 122
Monotonic rationing system on supply, 122
Multiplication, 22, 31, 51
Nash equilibrium, 13, 249, 250, 270, 284
in mixed strategies, 250
in pure strategies, 250
Natural number, 21
extended, 50
Negative real number, 22
Negligible set, 52
No rationing on demand, 121
No rationing on supply, 121
Non-decreasing function, 34
Non-increasing function, 34
Non-increasing returns to scale, 72
Non-negative integer, 21
Non-negative orthant, 22
Non-negative real number, 22
Non-numeraire commodity, 378
Non-positive real number, 22
Non-satiated preference relation, 78





















Open m-dimensional ball, 22




of a consumer, 83, 84, 115
of a producer, 76
Optimal consumption bundle, 83, 84, 115
Optimal production plan, 76






of a consumer, 70
of a producer, 70
Pairwise disjoint sets, 29
Pareto dominated allocation, 89










beginning point of, 26
end point of, 26
Path-component in a topological space, 27
Path-connected set, 27
Path-connected topological space, 27





Piecewise linear approximation, 49
Piecewise linear function, 32
Place of availability, 69
Point, 21
Political candidate, 8, 244, 268
Political economic equilibrium, 8, 250, 270
Political economic system, 8, 247, 270, 284
Political system, 1, 244
Polytope, 40
Positive orthant, 22
Positive real number, 22
Power set, 23
Pre-ordering, 34










monotonic with respect to a commodity, 79
non-satiated, 78
non-zero Gaussian curvature, 82








lower bound on, 117
upper bound on, 117
Price adjustment process, 5, 96, 304
convergent, 305
Price adjustment process correspondence, 313
Price following commodities, 117
Price index, 117
Price index function, 117
Price level, 14, 378, 396
Price regulation, 8, 244, 269
admissible, 8, 244, 269
Price rigidities, 7
Price system, 4, 71, 108, 163, 235, 268, 303, 338,
378
Index 431
admissible, 7, 117, 118, 163, 236, 269, 338, 396
constrained equilibrium, 133
equilibrium, 5
lower bound on, 117
starting, 5, 303





Priority rationing function, 125
Priority rationing system, 120
Probabilistic voting model, 247
Probability measure, 52




of a real number and a set, 22
of an extended real number and a set, 51
of matrices, 32







Production possibility set, 4, 72
bounded, 72
closed, 72
constant returns to scale, 73
convex, 72
free disposal, 73
increasing returns to scale, 73
linear activity model, 73




Profit share, 4, 83
Proper demand constrained equilibrium, 382
Proper function, 31
Proper labelling function, 164
Properties of a binary relation, 34
Property, 21
Proportional rationing function, 125
Proportional rationing system, 120
Proposal, 8, 235, 269
Pseudo-concave function, 57
Pseudo-convex function, 57
Pure strategy, 13, 250
Quantity, 70
Quantity adjustment process, 14, 345
convergent, 345




of a closed ball, 23
of a sphere, 23
of an open ball, 22
Range
of a function, 23
of a relation, 34
Rank of a matrix, 32
Rational number, 21









































Rationing scheme, 7, 108, 163, 235, 268, 338, 378
admissible, 7, 119, 163, 235, 268, 338, 378
constrained equilibrium, 133






































Real demand constrained equilibrium with a given
price level, 380
Real number, 21
Reduced demand function, 340, 383, 398
Reduced demand relation, 140, 243, 269
Reduced total excess demand function, 163, 340,
383, 399
Reduced total excess demand relation, 140, 163,
186, 211
Reflexive binary relation, 34
Regular approximating sequence, 53
Regular constraint set, 62
Cr Regular constraint set, 62
Regular constraint system, 62
Regular initial endowment, 311, 312, 368
Regular point, 64
Regular value, 64












of a manifold with generalized boundary, 61
of a set, 40
of an arc, 26
Relative frontier of a set, 40
Relative interior
of a manifold with generalized boundary, 61
of a set, 40
of an arc, 26
Relative projection, 42
Representation
of a function, 33
of a preference relation, 80
of a rationing system, 124
of a rationing system on demand, 124
of a rationing system on supply, 124




of a function, 23
of a relation, 34




Second fundamental welfare theorem, 10, 91
Second order partial derivative, 55
Semi-compact set, 245
Semi-lexicopositive matrix, 190










bounded from above, 29















lower bound of, 34










relative boundary of, 40
relative frontier of, 40




upper bound of, 35
Set of admissible actions, 3, 244, 269, 283
Set of admissible pairs of sign vectors, 354
Set of admissible price regulations, 8, 244, 269
Set of admissible price systems, 7, 117, 118, 163,
236, 269, 338, 396
Set of admissible sign vectors, 41, 44, 303, 342, 354
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Het doel van de wiskundige economie is de beschrijving en de verklaring van de economi-
sche realiteit waarbij gebruik gemaakt wordt van wiskundig gereedschap. De algemeen
evenwichtstheorie vormt het hart van de wiskundige economie. In deze monografie wor-
den verscheidene algemeen evenwichtsmodellen beschreven en geanalyseerd met behulp
van de axiomatische methode. In de axiomatische methode onderscheidt men allereerst
de elementaire bouwstenen, ook wel primitieve begrippen genoemd, van het economisch
systeem. Voorbeelden van primitieve begrippen zijn consumenten, producenten, de over-
heid, goederen, voorkeuren van consumenten voor goederen, aanwezige produktiesyste-
men, en initiële bezittingen van consumenten, waaronder ook begrepen de mogelijkheid
van een consument om bepaalde soorten arbeid aan te bieden. De initiële bezittingen
van de consumenten duidt men ook wel aan met de beginvoorraden van de consumenten.
Vervolgens maakt men veronderstellingen met betrekking tot deze primitieve begrippen,
ook wel axioma’s genoemd. Voorbeelden van axioma’s zijn de veronderstellingen dat
de consument streeft naar een pakket goederen dat zijn behoeften het best bevredigt
en dat een producent tracht zijn totale winst te maximaliseren. Gebruik maken van de
axiomatische methode leidt tot een dieper begrip van de economische problematiek, tot
het vermijden van onjuiste redeneringen en tot een verbeterde communicatie binnen de
economische wetenschap.
In de algemeen evenwichtstheorie wordt de economische werkelijkheid als geheel ge-
modelleerd, zodat men alle voorkomende onderlinge afhankelijkheden in de analyse mee-
neemt. Hiertegenover staat de partiële analyse, waarin men de markt voor een enkel
goed bestudeert en waarin de invloed van andere markten verwaarloosd wordt. Gezien
bijvoorbeeld de vergaande gevolgen van de prijsstijging van olie in 1973 op welhaast alle
sectoren van de economie moge het duidelijk zijn dat een partiële analyse lang niet altijd
toereikend is.
In de economische theorie gaat men er vaak van uit dat het mogelijk is het economisch
systeem te isoleren en andere systemen zoals het politiek, het cultureel, het technolo-
gisch en het ecologisch systeem buiten beschouwing te laten. De waarde en de verdeling
van goederen in het economisch systeem dient beschouwd te worden als de belangrijk-
ste vraag van de economische wetenschap. In het algemeen zal er echter een interactie
tussen deze systemen bestaan. In één van de delen van deze monografie is de interactie




Een algemeen evenwichtsmodel van het economisch systeem zal hierna worden aange-
duid met een economie. Een specificatie van de waarden van alle primitieve begrippen
levert een beschrijving van de economie op. Deze waarden worden als gegeven beschouwd
en worden daarom aangeduid als exogene variabelen. Dit in tegenstelling tot de endo-
gene variabelen, die men met behulp van het model verklaart. Typische voorbeelden van
endogene variabelen zijn de prijzen van de goederen, de winsten van de producenten,
het inkomen van de consumenten en de hoeveelheden geproduceerde en geconsumeerde
goederen. Een specificatie van de waarden van alle endogene variabelen levert een be-
schrijving op van de toestand waarin de economie verkeert. Het is van belang om aan te
geven wanneer een toestand van de economie kan worden aangeduid als een evenwichts-
toestand. In de regel zijn dit toestanden die, indien bereikt door een economie, niet
leiden tot veranderingen van de endogene variabelen.
Een belangrijke vraag die men in een algemeen evenwichtsmodel van het economisch
systeem wil beantwoorden, is of een evenwichtstoestand bestaat. Indien deze vraag
bevestigend beantwoord kan worden, is het van belang om te weten of er een unieke
evenwichtstoestand bestaat. Het is in de economische theorie bekend dat dit niet altijd
het geval hoeft te zijn. Het begrip evenwichtstoestand is een statisch concept. Zelfs
indien er een unieke evenwichtstoestand bestaat, is het niet duidelijk of de economie een
dergelijke toestand bereikt. Om op deze vraag een antwoord te kunnen geven, dient men
aan te geven hoe de waarden van de endogene variabelen veranderen indien de economie
nog geen evenwichtstoestand bereikt heeft. Dit betekent dat men een dynamisch model
van de economie moet specificeren.
Binnen één van de basismodellen van de algemeen evenwichtstheorie, het Arrow-
Debreu model, onderscheidt men consumenten en producenten als economische agenten.
Verder zijn er allerlei goederen aanwezig in de economie, die men onderscheidt op basis
van fysieke karakteristieken en tijd en plaats van beschikbaarheid. Handel vindt plaats
volgens het marktmechanisme. Voor ieder goed is er een markt waarop consumenten en
producenten, gegeven de prijzen van de goederen, hun vraag en aanbod tot uitdrukking
brengen. Een consument streeft ernaar om een betaalbaar pakket goederen te krijgen
dat zijn behoeften zo goed mogelijk bevredigt, terwijl een producent tracht zijn winst te
maximaliseren, hierbij rekening houdend met de technologische mogelijkheden die hij tot
zijn beschikking heeft. De endogene variabelen binnen dit model zijn de prijzen van alle
goederen. Hieruit kan men de waarden van alle andere van belang zijnde variabelen, zoals
de vraag en het aanbod van iedere economische agent, afleiden. Een evenwichtstoestand
is een stelsel van prijzen waarbij de vraag en het aanbod van ieder goed gelijk aan elkaar
zijn. Een dergelijk evenwicht heet een Walrasiaans evenwicht.
De eerste opzet van het Arrow-Debreu model, alsmede het bovenstaande concept
van evenwicht en een eerste analyse van de vraag hoe een economie een dergelijk even-
wicht bereikt, werd gegeven door Walras in 1874. Arrow en Debreu gaven in 1954 een
wiskundig bewijs dat er inderdaad een Walrasiaans evenwicht bestaat in de economie.
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De vraag hoe dit evenwicht bereikt wordt, kon men echter alleen voor speciale gevallen
beantwoorden. Deze vraag is hierdoor één van de belangrijkste openstaande problemen
binnen de algemeen evenwichtstheorie. Vandaar dat het een voor de hand liggende vraag
is hoe de verdeling van de goederen in het economisch systeem bepaald wordt indien han-
del plaatsvindt tegen prijzen waarbij niet alle markten in evenwicht zijn. De onderlinge
afhankelijkheid tussen markten veroorzaakt nu veel problemen. Immers, ongelijkheid
van vraag en aanbod op sommige markten heeft tot gevolg dat niet alle economische
agenten het gewenste pakket goederen kunnen krijgen. Een eenvoudig voorbeeld be-
treft een aanbodoverschot van arbeid op de arbeidsmarkt. Dit leidt tot werkloze con-
sumenten, die vervolgens hun vraag naar consumptiegoederen zullen aanpassen, hetgeen
weer leidt tot tekorten en overschotten op andere markten. Veel voorbeelden van oneven-
wichtigheden op markten, zoals de aanwezigheid van werkloosheid op de arbeidsmarkt,
spanningen op de woningmarkt, problemen op de valutamarkten en het bestaan van
boterbergen, wijnplassen, melkmeren en mesthopen, kunnen niet los worden gezien van
overheidsinterventies, zoals minimumlonen, koppelingen tussen lonen van verschillende
groepen consumenten, bovengrenzen voor de huur van woningen, het streven naar vaste
wisselkoersen en minimumprijzen voor agrarische produkten. Dit levert nog meer re-
denen op waarom de economie geen Walrasiaans evenwicht bereikt met gelijkheid van
vraag en aanbod op alle markten. Verder wordt vaak het argument gebruikt dat lonen
zich op de korte termijn niet of nauwelijks aanpassen aan de situatie op de arbeidsmarkt,
met name in benedenwaartse richting, waardoor de economie geen Walrasiaans evenwicht
bereiken kan.
Het doel van deel II van deze monografie betreft de analyse van een algemeen even-
wichtsmodel waarmee de waarde en de verdeling van goederen bepaald kan worden indien
prijzen niet volkomen flexibel zijn, maar onderhevig zijn aan allerlei beperkingen. Deze
modellen duidt men aan met onevenwichtigheidsmodellen omdat het mogelijk is dat
ieder Walrasiaans evenwicht door de aanwezige prijsstarheden uitgesloten wordt. Het
is nu niet langer mogelijk om de toestand van de economie te beschrijven met behulp
van de prijzen van alle goederen. Ook de maximale hoeveelheden die een agent van
de verscheidene goederen kan vragen en aanbieden, een rantsoeneringsschema genaamd,
maken deel uit van de beschrijving van de toestand van de economie. Het is nu mo-
gelijk om een andere definitie van het begrip evenwichtstoestand te geven, waarbij het
toegestaan is dat op sommige markten de economische agenten meer willen vragen dan
er aanwezig is of dat de economische agenten meer willen aanbieden dan er gevraagd
wordt. Werkloosheid is dus mogelijk in een dergelijk evenwicht. Rekening houdend met
het rantsoeneringsschema geldt dat in een evenwichtstoestand de vraag en het aanbod
op alle markten gelijk zijn. Een dergelijk evenwicht heet een rantsoeneringsevenwicht.
Men zegt dat een economische agent gerantsoeneerd is met betrekking tot een bepaald
goed indien de restricties op de maximaal te vragen of de maximaal aan te bieden hoe-
veelheden van dat goed het keuzegedrag van de economische agent bëınvloeden. Indien
minstens één economische agent gerantsoeneerd is met betrekking tot een bepaald goed
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zegt men dat er rantsoenering is op de markt van dat goed. Werkloosheid is dus een
voorbeeld van rantsoenering van het aanbod op de arbeidsmarkt. Een belangrijke voor-
waarde in de definitie van een rantsoeneringsevenwicht is dat markten doorzichtig zijn.
Dit betekent dat er niet tegelijkertijd rantsoenering van de vraag en van het aanbod van
een bepaald goed plaatsvindt. Aangezien arbeid moet worden onderverdeeld in velerlei
typen, sluit deze veronderstelling niet uit dat er openstaande vacatures zijn, terwijl er
toch werkloosheid is. De modellen beschouwd in deel II van deze monografie zijn nauw
verwant aan het model dat in 1975 door Drèze gëıntroduceerd is.
Het is reeds opgemerkt dat overheidsingrijpen een bijzondere bron van restricties
op de prijzen vormt. In deel II van deze monografie zijn dergelijke restricties exogeen
gegeven. Het doel van deel III van de monografie is om overheidsgedrag, en daarmee ook
restricties met betrekking tot de prijzen, endogeen te verklaren. In deel III wordt er niet
langer van uitgegaan dat het economisch en politiek systeem afzonderlijk geanalyseerd
kunnen worden, maar worden beide systemen tezamen bekeken. Politieke kandidaten
die ernaar streven om bij de verkiezingen met een zo groot mogelijke kans verkozen te
worden, worden gëıntroduceerd als nieuwe primitieve begrippen. Politieke kandidaten
hebben de mogelijkheid om bepaalde restricties op de prijzen in te voeren. Hierbij kan
men bijvoorbeeld denken aan een minimumloon of aan een koppeling van de lonen van
ambtenaren en de lonen van werknemers in het bedrijfsleven. De voorstellen die hierom-
trent door politieke kandidaten gedaan worden, maken nu deel uit van de definitie van
een evenwichtstoestand. Een dergelijk evenwicht heet een politiek economisch evenwicht.
De delen II en III van deze monografie zijn statisch van karakter omdat evenwichten
geanalyseerd worden zonder te bestuderen hoe een dergelijk evenwicht bereikt wordt.
Doel van deel IV van deze monografie is het geven van dynamische specificaties van het
economisch systeem, ook wel aanpassingsprocessen genoemd, waarmee de evenwichtscon-
cepten die in deze monografie bestudeerd zijn, ondersteund kunnen worden. Idealiter
heeft een aanpassingsproces een zinvolle economische interpretatie en convergeert het
naar een evenwicht onder redelijke veronderstellingen met betrekking tot de primitieve
begrippen en gegeven een willekeurige initiële toestand van de economie. Bovendien le-
vert een aanpassingsproces de mogelijkheid op om een evenwicht te selecteren indien er
meer dan één evenwichtstoestand is. De analyse van de convergentie-eigenschappen van
de in 1987 door Van der Laan en Talman gëıntroduceerde dynamische specificatie van het
Arrow-Debreu model vormt het uitgangspunt voor het in deel IV uitgevoerde onderzoek.
In de literatuur bestaan resultaten omtrent de onmogelijkheid van de existentie van een
aanpassingsproces met de gewenste convergentie-eigenschappen. Het proces van Van
der Laan en Talman behoort echter niet tot de klasse van processen waarvoor dergelijke
convergentie-eigenschappen uitgesloten zijn, omdat het aanpassingsproces mede afhanke-
lijk is van de hoogte van de prijzen die in het verleden gegenereerd zijn, en wel in het
bijzonder van de initiële hoogte van de prijzen.
De opzet van deze monografie is als volgt. Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een inleiding in de te
bestuderen problematiek. Deel I bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 2 en 3. In hoofdstuk 2
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wordt een vrijwel volledig en op zichzelf staand overzicht gegeven van de mathematische
technieken die in de delen II tot en met IV gebruikt worden. Hoofdstuk 3 bevat een
overzicht van het Arrow-Debreu model, terwijl in dat hoofdstuk bovendien de veron-
derstellingen behandeld worden die op de verschillende plaatsen in deze monografie met
betrekking tot de primitieve begrippen gemaakt worden.
Deel II bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 7. Hoofdstuk 4 bevat een algemeen
evenwichtsmodel van het economisch systeem voor het geval prijsstarheden aanwezig
kunnen zijn. De beschrijving van de toestand van de economie bevat nu de maxi-
male hoeveelheden die de economische agenten van de verschillende goederen kunnen
vragen en aanbieden, het rantsoeneringsschema. Een rantsoeneringssysteem geeft alle
mogelijke toegestane rantsoeneringsschema’s weer. Voorbeelden van rantsoeneringssys-
temen zijn het uniforme rantsoeneringssysteem, waarbij het rantsoeneringsschema voor
iedere economische agent hetzelfde is, het marktaandeel-rantsoeneringssysteem, waarbij
de rantsoenering van economische agenten per markt in vaste verhoudingen plaatsvindt,
en het prioriteit-rantsoeneringssysteem, waarbij rantsoenering van economische agenten
plaatsvindt in een bepaalde volgorde. In de literatuur wordt het rantsoeneringssys-
teem meestal weergegeven met behulp van een rantsoeneringsfunctie. Hoofdstuk 4 geeft
noodzakelijke en voldoende voorwaarden voor een dergelijke weergave. Voorts wordt in
hoofdstuk 4 de definitie van een rantsoeneringsevenwicht gegeven en wordt het bestaan
van een dergelijk evenwicht bewezen. Er bestaat een tweetal triviale rantsoeneringseven-
wichten, te weten het rantsoeneringsevenwicht met volledige rantsoenering op het aanbod
van ieder goed en het rantsoeneringsevenwicht met volledige rantsoenering op de vraag
van ieder goed. Meerdere volledige classificaties van alle rantsoeneringsevenwichten wor-
den gepresenteerd. Uit deze classificaties volgt het bestaan van een aantal bijzondere
typen rantsoeneringsevenwicht, zoals het rantsoeneringsevenwicht zonder rantsoenering
op de aanbodzijde, het rantsoeneringsevenwicht zonder rantsoenering op een van te voren
bepaalde markt, ook wel het Drèze-evenwicht genoemd, en het rantsoeneringsevenwicht
zonder rantsoenering op de vraagzijde. Bovendien wordt nagegaan hoe de verzameling
van rantsoeneringsevenwichten verandert indien de prijsstarheden of de beginvoorraden
van de consumenten veranderen. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt aangetoond dat er een continuüm
van rantsoeneringsevenwichten bestaat dat beide triviale rantsoeneringsevenwichten be-
vat en bovendien ieder type evenwicht waarvan het bestaan is aangetoond in hoofdstuk
4. Alle resultaten van hoofdstuk 4 volgen dan ook als eenvoudige gevolgtrekkingen van
de belangrijkste stelling van hoofdstuk 5. Ofschoon het bewijs in hoofdstuk 5 sterk
gebaseerd is op een simpliciaal algoritme dat het mogelijk maakt om een benadering
van een rantsoeneringsevenwicht te bepalen, kan dit algoritme toch niet in alle gevallen
voor een daadwerkelijke berekening gebruikt worden. Vandaar dat in hoofdstuk 6 een
simpliciaal algoritme gëıntroduceerd wordt dat een benadering voor een continuüm van
rantsoeneringsevenwichten kan berekenen onder dezelfde voorwaarden waaronder het
bestaan ervan bewezen wordt in hoofdstuk 5. In het algemeen leveren intersectiestellin-
gen condities op waaronder er een element bestaat in de doorsnede van bepaalde verza-
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melingen die een gegeven andere verzameling overdekken. Vaak bestaat er een nauw
verband tussen een intersectiestelling en het bewijs van het bestaan van een evenwicht
in een bepaald algemeen evenwichtsmodel van de economie. In hoofdstuk 7 worden een
aantal nieuwe intersectiestellingen beschreven, die bovendien een aantal zeer bekende
reeds bestaande intersectiestellingen generaliseren. De intersectiestellingen van hoofd-
stuk 7 behoren tot een nieuwe klasse omdat ze, in tegenstelling tot alle bestaande inter-
sectiestellingen, niet het bestaan van minstens één element in een bepaalde doorsnede
garanderen, doch het bestaan van een continuüm van elementen. De intersectiestellingen
van hoofdstuk 7 hangen zeer nauw samen met de in hoofdstuk 5 behaalde resultaten met
betrekking tot het bestaan van een continuüm van rantsoeneringsevenwichten.
Deel III bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 8 en 9. In deel III wordt de endogene totstand-
koming van prijsstarheden geanalyseerd. Indien er prijsstarheden aanwezig zijn in de
economie wordt er in hoofdstuk 8 van uitgegaan dat er een Drèze-evenwicht resulteert.
In hoofdstuk 8 wordt de interactie tussen het economisch en het politiek systeem behan-
deld. Politieke kandidaten kunnen kiezen voor regulering van de prijzen. Het is mogelijk
te modelleren dat niet alle reguleringen van de prijzen mogelijk zijn, bijvoorbeeld van-
wege historische, partijpolitieke of institutionele redenen. Indien een politieke kandidaat
kiest voor regulering van de prijzen, heeft dit rantsoenering van bepaalde economische
agenten tot gevolg. Indien politieke kandidaten bijvoorbeeld kiezen voor het invoeren
van een minimumloon leidt dit tot werkloosheid. Hoofdstuk 8 bevat de definitie van
een politiek economisch evenwicht en enige resultaten met betrekking tot de existentie
van een dergelijk evenwicht. Met behulp van een standaardvoorbeeld wordt aangetoond
dat het zeer wel mogelijk is dat alle politieke kandidaten besluiten tot regulering van
de prijzen waarmee ze ieder Walrasiaans evenwicht uitsluiten. In hoofdstuk 9 wordt het
vraagstuk geanalyseerd of politieke kandidaten in het algemeen over zullen gaan tot re-
gulering van de prijzen. Bovendien wordt in hoofdstuk 9 een alternatief model bekeken,
waarbij politieke kandidaten alleen kijken naar lokale opties gegeven een bepaalde status-
quo. Politieke kandidaten hebben de mogelijkheid zich van de status-quo weg te bewegen
of in de status-quo te blijven. Een voorbeeld met minimumloon levert in dit model drie
mogelijkheden op voor de politieke kandidaten, te weten het minimumloon verlagen,
ofwel het huidige minimumloon handhaven, ofwel het minimumloon verhogen. De resul-
taten van hoofdstuk 9 tonen aan dat politieke kandidaten inderdaad vrijwel altijd zullen
besluiten tot regulering van de prijzen in het model van hoofdstuk 8. In het in hoofd-
stuk 9 behandelde model met als status-quo een Walrasiaans evenwicht zullen politieke
kandidaten vrijwel nooit voor handhaving hiervan kiezen.
Deel IV bestaat uit de hoofdstukken 10 tot en met 12. In hoofdstuk 10 wordt be-
wezen dat het aanpassingsproces van de prijzen van Van der Laan en Talman vrijwel
altijd naar een Walrasiaans evenwicht convergeert ongeacht de initiële toestand van de
economie. Dit vindt plaats onder zeer zwakke veronderstellingen met betrekking tot de
primitieve begrippen. Uit de belangrijkste stelling van hoofdstuk 10 volgt bovendien
dat het aantal Walrasiaanse evenwichten van een economie in principe oneven is. In het
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aanpassingsproces van hoofdstuk 10 worden prijzen zodanig aangepast dat de prijzen van
goederen met vraagoverschotten relatief maximaal blijven, dat wil zeggen dat de ratio
van een dergelijke prijs en de initiële prijs maximaal blijft, de prijzen van goederen met
aanbodoverschotten relatief minimaal blijven, terwijl voor de goederen waarvan de markt
in evenwicht is de prijs mag variëren tussen het relatieve minimum en het relatieve maxi-
mum. In het geval de totale vraag in de economie aan de eigenschap van bruto-substitutie
voldoet, kunnen nog een aantal extra eigenschappen van het proces aangetoond worden.
Convergentie naar een Walrasiaans evenwicht vindt dan altijd plaats. Bovendien stijgen
de prijzen van goederen met vraagoverschotten monotoon, terwijl de prijzen van goederen
met aanbodoverschotten monotoon dalen. Verder nemen de overschotten en tekorten zelf
monotoon af, hetgeen impliceert dat een markt die eenmaal een evenwicht bereikt heeft
ook in evenwicht blijft. In hoofdstuk 11 wordt een aanpassingsproces gëıntroduceerd
waarbij de prijzen niet veranderen, maar waarbij de maximale hoeveelheden die economi-
sche agenten kunnen vragen of aanbieden op de verschillende markten aangepast worden,
een aanpassingsproces in hoeveelheden genaamd. Het aanpassingsproces in hoeveelhe-
den van hoofdstuk 11 convergeert vrijwel altijd naar een Drèze-evenwicht ongeacht de
initiële toestand van de economie. Dit vindt plaats onder zeer zwakke veronderstellingen
met betrekking tot de primitieve begrippen. Uit de belangrijkste stelling van hoofdstuk
11 volgt bovendien dat het aantal Drèze-evenwichten van een economie in principe on-
even is. In het aanpassingsproces in hoeveelheden vindt er nooit rantsoenering plaats
op de markt van het goed waarin alle prijzen worden uitgedrukt, het numeraire goed.
Indien er een vraagoverschot is op een markt, wordt de rantsoenering op de vraag ver-
sterkt en de rantsoenering op het aanbod verzwakt ten opzichte van de initiële toestand.
Het omgekeerde gebeurt in het geval van een aanbodoverschot. Ook in hoofdstuk 12
wordt een economie met prijsstarheden beschouwd. Op de korte termijn hebben de niet-
numeraire goederen een flexibel prijsniveau ten opzichte van het numeraire goed, terwijl
hun relatieve prijzen vast liggen. Op de lange termijn zijn alle prijzen volledig flexi-
bel. In hoofdstuk 12 wordt een aanpassingsproces in prijzen en hoeveelheden beschreven
dat langs een pad van rantsoeneringsevenwichten naar een Walrasiaans evenwicht con-
vergeert. Alle markten worden voortdurend in evenwicht gehouden door middel van
rantsoenering, waarbij er op geen enkele markt rantsoenering op het aanbod plaatsvindt
en helemaal geen rantsoenering op de markt van het numeraire goed. Initieel worden
alle relatieve prijzen vastgehouden en wordt het prijsniveau verhoogd, waarbij de rant-
soeneringsschema’s worden aangepast om de markten in evenwicht te houden. Zodra
er geen rantsoenering op een markt plaatsvindt, staat het aanpassingsproces toe dat de
relatieve prijs van een goed verlaagd wordt. In tegenstelling tot de hoofdstukken 10 en
11 worden in hoofdstuk 12 voornamelijk benaderde evenwichten beschouwd.
